Apr 272022
 
The Radical Right Research Bot just learned to tag radical right parties 1
Four years ago, the Radical Right Research Bot started its life as a fun (?) little side project. To make Twitter slightly less dumb, the bot tweets about the many, many titles in the Eclectic, Erratic Bibliography on the Extreme Right in Western Europe.

Some say that you cannot teach an old bot new tricks, but that is not true: the bot just learned to recognise the names of several radical right parties and began hashtagging them every now and then. It’s a very small step for mankind, but a giant leap for a silly old bot.

 

Mar 312022
 
Two years ago, we freaked out because of the pandemic. A year ago, we were still worried about the pandemic. And this spring, the pandemic is not over, but we also have Russia’s brutal attack on Ukraine, a major shift in the global (dis)order, the prospect of food and energy crises and many other things to worry about. Climate change, anyone?

But I digress. Crises or not, many of us are busy researching the radical right, and so we have another bumper spring update of the Eclectic, Erratic Bibliography on the Extreme Right (in (Western) Europe)™ on our hands. You can download the latest version here in a format that most reference software can import.

The Radical Right Bibliography: Spring 2022 update

Watch this video on YouTube.

Before I show you the goods, here is my standard reminder: If you know of works that should be in the bibliography, send me the reference. If you think that your publications should be in the bibliography, send me the reference and a PDF (no guarantees, obviously). And now, without further ado …

What is new in research on the radical right?

Since April 2021, I have added 80 new titles to the bibliography. This brings the total number of entries to 1101. Going through my files, this number should probably be 1102, but who cares?

More than half of the new titles came out in 2021, and almost 25 per cent were published in the first three months of 2022, which is probably a record. The equivalent number for last year was 18 per cent.

Publication yearn
202146
202218
20195
20205
20184
20151
20161

Journals keep messing with publication years. “Online first” is now the default, but editors keep assigning article to issues, which in my view are an increasingly meaningless concept. When was the last time that you went to the library to have a look at a bound piece of dead tree (full of stuff that has been available as PDF for years)? Exactly. Still, I occasionally update publication years.

If we ignore the details, 2018 (110 titles) is still the high watermark for publications on the radical right. 2013 remains as the median publication year, and a staggering 34 per cent of all titles in the bibliography have been published in the 2017-2022 period.

Journaln
West European Politics8
Electoral Studies5
Comparative Political Studies4
Swiss Political Science Review4
European Journal of Political Research3
European Societies3
Government and Opposition3
American Journal of Political Science2
Contemporary Italian Politics2
European Political Science Review2
European Union Politics2
International Journal of Public Opinion Research2
Party Politics2
Political Behavior2
Politics2
Research & Politics2
Acta Politica1
American Political Science Review1
British Journal of Political Science1
European Journal of Political Economy1
European Politics and Society1
European Sociological Review1
Frontiers in Political Science1
German Politics1
German Politics and Society1
Information, Communication & Society1
Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica1
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies1

78 of the 80 new entries are journal articles, which must be another all-time high. West European Politics returns to the top spot, and it’s another strong showing from Electoral Studies, Elsevier boycott or not. Taking a longer view, West European Politics remains the most important journal with 61 titles in the bibliography, but the importance of the European Journal of Political Research (2nd place with 57 titles) has waned a bit in recent years.

What are the new topics in radical right research?

Last year, I began looking not just at the titles but also at the abstracts to get an idea what the texts are about. This year, I did the same, but also gave full lemmatisation of texts (via the excellent udpipe package) a shot.

The result is still not perfect. Udpipe recognises Europe as a (proper) noun and European as an adjective but does not assign them to the same lemma. So I ran lemmatize_words (from the textstem package) on the results, which at least merges singular and plural forms. As per the usual procedure, I removed topic-specific common words (“right”, “radical”, “extreme” etc.). I should probably also remove “political”. But you don’t care about the technology. You want a wordcloud, and you get a wordcloud.

The Spring 2022 update of the far-right bibliography 2

“Party” once more stands out, and “vote”, voter, and “electoral” are also quite prominent. “Movement” as an alternative object of study is much rarer, which neatly illustrates the slant of the bibliography. “Support” is more general and even more popular. Then there is the usual verbiage with which we pad out our articles: “analysis”, “research”, “article”, “study”, “evidence”, and my old favourite, “suggest”. “Immigrant” and “immigration” should be grouped together, but even so they are less prominent than “Europe” and “European”. “Welfare” and “social” are also important, just as they were last year.

If you look closely, you will also spot the words “alternative”, “Germany”, and “AfD”. Unsurprisingly that’s because there is a lot of stuff (some 15 or 16 titles by my count) that at least peripherally touches on the AfD.

Just for the fun of it, I subjected the texts to a wordfish analysis. Wordfish is quite good at finding an underlying single dimension that is responsible for the frequency of words in a given set of texts.

The Spring 2022 update of the far-right bibliography 3

As it turns out, there seems to be such a dimension. The y-axis shows how likely the appearance of a word is in general. That’s why the prominent words from the cloud make another appearance at the top of the plot.

The more interesting dimension is the x-axis, which shows the strength of the association of a given word with the underlying dimension. On the left-hand side of the plot, there are words such as leaders/leadership and organisational (both with a British and a heathen spelling) that seem to be associated with parties and other groups, and also (slightly further to the right) with their environment. Here, we are clearly in meso/macro land. Conversely, on the very right, you will find words associated with individuals, or with the effect of the environment on individuals (survey, immigration, economic, salience). This fits rather neatly with the two kinds of research that tend to go into the bibliography.

The Spring 2022 update of the far-right bibliography 4

The second plot orders the texts by their position on the underlying dimension. Almost all the articles in the upper half of the graph make massive use of micro data. Articles in the lower half are more concerned with party organisations and party systems, content analysis, aggregate data and conceptual work. Have a look for yourself – the pattern is surprisingly clear.

Because that was still not enough fun, I ran the LexRank algorithm on the abstracts to create one-sentence summaries, which I then turned into a video so that you can lie back and stare aimlessly at other people’s research drifting past you really quick. That is surprisingly relaxing.

Radical Right Research 2022: the TL;DR edition

Watch this video on YouTube.

Gender of radical right researchers

For the 80 titles, there are 140 unique author names and 129 unique given names. Inferring gender from first names is always tricky, especially if one is trying to do it algorithmically. After dealing with some well-known false positives (looking at you, Andrea, Daniele, and Mattia) and some staring at people’s websites, I ended up with 37 (almost unique) female names, as opposed to 94 non-unique male names, which amounts to a female share of 28 per cent, almost the same as two years ago and slightly less than in 2021.

It’s worth mentioning that this methodology is far from perfect, because it does not account for the number of publications a person is involved in. But anyway, here is the ever popular cloud of authors’ first names. Not a pretty picture.

The Spring 2022 update of the far-right bibliography 5

So, if you are female, please send me your work on right-wing radicalism. The men do it. All. The. Time.

Show us the latest titles in radical right research

Here is a full list of all that is new in the bibliography. Click here to download/import these new titles into your reference management software.

  • Abou-Chadi, Tarik and Simon Hix. “Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right? Education, class, multiparty competition, and redistribution in Western Europe.” The British Journal of Sociology 72.1 (2021): 79–92. doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12834
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    In this article, we revisit the main claims of Part Four of Thomas Piketty{“}s Capital and Ideology and especially the changing support coalitions for parties of the left. Piketty{“}s core argument in this part of the book is that the left now represents the highly educated and that, as a result, the redistributive preferences of the working class do not find representation in today{“}s party systems. We address these claims building on existing political science research that has investigated the transformation of politics in advanced capitalist societies. We argue, first, that the educational divide cannot be adequately analyzed by looking at a left and a right bloc, but crucially needs to pay attention to the rise of green/left-libertarian and radical right parties. Second, we contend that the new middle classes that support parties of the left are largely in favor of economic redistribution. Analyzing data from the European Social Survey in 11 West European countries from 2002 to 2018, we show that the effect of education on voting left or right is indeed largely driven by green/left-libertarian and radical right parties, while there is little empirical evidence that social democratic parties represent the educational elite. We also find that redistributive preferences remain at the heart of voting behavior and that, especially for educated voters, these preferences determine whether someone votes for a party of the left rather than the right.

    @Article{abou-chadi-hix-2021,
    author = {Tarik Abou-Chadi and Simon Hix},
    title = {Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right? Education, class, multiparty competition, and redistribution in Western Europe},
    journal = {The British Journal of Sociology},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {72},
    number = {1},
    pages = {79--92},
    abstract = {In this article, we revisit the main claims of Part Four of Thomas Piketty{"}s Capital and Ideology and especially the changing support coalitions for parties of the left. Piketty{"}s core argument in this part of the book is that the left now represents the highly educated and that,
    as a result, the redistributive preferences of the working class do not find representation in today{"}s party systems. We address these claims building on existing political science research that has investigated the transformation of politics in advanced capitalist societies. We
    argue, first, that the educational divide cannot be adequately analyzed by looking at a left and a right bloc, but crucially needs to pay attention to the rise of green/left-libertarian and radical right parties. Second, we contend that the new middle classes that support parties
    of the left are largely in favor of economic redistribution. Analyzing data from the European Social Survey in 11 West European countries from 2002 to 2018, we show that the effect of education on voting left or right is indeed largely driven by green/left-libertarian and radical
    right parties, while there is little empirical evidence that social democratic parties represent the educational elite. We also find that redistributive preferences remain at the heart of voting behavior and that, especially for educated voters, these preferences determine whether
    someone votes for a party of the left rather than the right.},
    doi = {10.1111/1468-4446.12834},
    }

  • Afonso, Alexandre. “Correlates of Aggregate Support for the Radical Right in Portugal.” Research & Politics 8.3 (2021): 205316802110294. doi:10.1177/20531680211029416
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article explains variation in local aggregate support for the populist radical right in Portugal, a country long considered immune to the rise of this political force. Using local electoral results of the 2021 presidential election, I find positive statistical associations between the radical right vote share and the share of social assistance benefit recipients, as well as with the size of the local Roma minority. I also show that the effect of the percentage of social assistance recipients is conditioned on a higher size of the local Roma minority. In contrast, factors such as unemployment, average income levels or the share of immigrants and their change over time do not explain variation in radical right vote shares. The research points to the presence of outgroups that can be construed as {“}outsiders{“} as a relevant factor explaining aggregate support for the radical right in contexts where the salience of immigration is low.

    @Article{afonso-2021,
    author = {Alexandre Afonso},
    title = {Correlates of Aggregate Support for the Radical Right in Portugal},
    journal = {Research \& Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {8},
    number = {3},
    pages = {205316802110294},
    abstract = {This article explains variation in local aggregate support for the populist radical right in Portugal, a country long considered immune to the rise of this political force. Using local electoral results of the 2021 presidential election, I find positive statistical associations
    between the radical right vote share and the share of social assistance benefit recipients, as well as with the size of the local Roma minority. I also show that the effect of the percentage of social assistance recipients is conditioned on a higher size of the local Roma minority.
    In contrast, factors such as unemployment, average income levels or the share of immigrants and their change over time do not explain variation in radical right vote shares. The research points to the presence of outgroups that can be construed as {"}outsiders{"} as a relevant factor
    explaining aggregate support for the radical right in contexts where the salience of immigration is low.},
    doi = {10.1177/20531680211029416},
    }

  • Albertazzi, Daniele, Donatella Bonansinga, and Mattia Zulianello. “The Right-Wing Alliance at the Time of the Covid-19 Pandemic: All Change?.” Contemporary Italian Politics online first (2021): 1–15. doi:10.1080/23248823.2021.1916857
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The growth of populist radical right parties at the expense of Berlusconi{“}s Forza Italia (FI) has recently reconfigured the right in Italy. Changes in power relations created for the Lega (League), Fratelli d{“}Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) and FI, different competitive pressures, resulting in distinctive – and often conflicting – responses to the pandemic. Based on the analysis of these parties{“} Twitter accounts and on survey data, this article examines how right-wing actors positioned themselves vis à vis the government, and each other, throughout 2020. Eventually, the League became the government{“}s most vocal critic, forcing FdI to follow suit; meanwhile, FI reinvented itself as a moderate, pro-EU party. Despite these changes, our analysis also stresses continuity, insofar as the alliance continued to craft its message around taxation, the EU, immigration and law/order, as it had done in the past. It also continued to enjoy electoral support similar to that of recent decades.

    @Article{albertazzi-bonansinga-zulianello-2021,
    author = {Daniele Albertazzi and Donatella Bonansinga and Mattia Zulianello},
    title = {The Right-Wing Alliance at the Time of the Covid-19 Pandemic: All Change?},
    journal = {Contemporary Italian Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--15},
    abstract = {The growth of populist radical right parties at the expense of Berlusconi{"}s Forza Italia (FI) has recently reconfigured the right in Italy. Changes in power relations created for the Lega (League), Fratelli d{"}Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) and FI, different competitive pressures,
    resulting in distinctive - and often conflicting - responses to the pandemic. Based on the analysis of these parties{"} Twitter accounts and on survey data, this article examines how right-wing actors positioned themselves vis à vis the government, and each other, throughout 2020.
    Eventually, the League became the government{"}s most vocal critic, forcing FdI to follow suit; meanwhile, FI reinvented itself as a moderate, pro-EU party. Despite these changes, our analysis also stresses continuity, insofar as the alliance continued to craft its message around
    taxation, the EU, immigration and law/order, as it had done in the past. It also continued to enjoy electoral support similar to that of recent decades.},
    doi = {10.1080/23248823.2021.1916857},
    }

  • Albertazzi, Daniele and Mattia Zulianello. “Populist Electoral Competition in Italy: The Impact of Sub-National Contextual Factors.” Contemporary Italian Politics 13.1 (2021): 4–30. doi:10.1080/23248823.2020.1871186
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article investigates the impact of sub-national contextual variations on the performance of populist actors in a country in which several electorally relevant populist parties exist: Italy. By employing a multi-model Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of the 2018 Italian general election, it explores the extent to which factors such as the distribution of {“}economic losers{“} and the impact of migration, political discontent and societal malaise have influenced the performance of the Lega (League) and the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star Movement, M5s). The study shows that, while the League has thrived especially in areas characterized by {“}cultural backlash{“}, but also in contexts characterized by Euroscepticism and societal malaise, the success of the M5s cannot be explained without reference to poor economic and institutional performances. Moreover, by stressing the advantages of assessing sub-national variations, the study encourages us to move away from one-size-fits-all grand narratives that see some factors (or combination of factors) as necessarily impacting populist performance throughout national territories in a consistent manner.

    @Article{albertazzi-zulianello-2021,
    author = {Daniele Albertazzi and Mattia Zulianello},
    title = {Populist Electoral Competition in Italy: The Impact of Sub-National Contextual Factors},
    journal = {Contemporary Italian Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {13},
    number = {1},
    pages = {4--30},
    abstract = {This article investigates the impact of sub-national contextual variations on the performance of populist actors in a country in which several electorally relevant populist parties exist: Italy. By employing a multi-model Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of the 2018 Italian
    general election, it explores the extent to which factors such as the distribution of {"}economic losers{"} and the impact of migration, political discontent and societal malaise have influenced the performance of the Lega (League) and the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star Movement,
    M5s). The study shows that, while the League has thrived especially in areas characterized by {"}cultural backlash{"}, but also in contexts characterized by Euroscepticism and societal malaise, the success of the M5s cannot be explained without reference to poor economic and
    institutional performances. Moreover, by stressing the advantages of assessing sub-national variations, the study encourages us to move away from one-size-fits-all grand narratives that see some factors (or combination of factors) as necessarily impacting populist performance
    throughout national territories in a consistent manner.},
    doi = {10.1080/23248823.2020.1871186},
    }

  • Ortiz Barquero, Pablo, Antonia Marïa Ruiz Jimënez, and Manuel Tomäs Gonzälez-Fernändez. “Ideological Voting for Radical Right Parties in Europe.” Acta Politica online first (2021). doi:10.1057/s41269-021-00213-8
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The aim of this research is to examine to what extent the electoral support for radical right parties (RRPs) is driven by {“}policy voting{“} and to compare this support with that of centre-right parties. Using the European Election Study 2019, we focus on six party systems: Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom. Our analyses reveal that party preferences for RRPs are better explained by policy considerations than by other alternative explanations (e.g. by {“}globalization losers{“} or {“}protest voting{“}). Additionally, the results show that although preferences for both party families are mainly rooted in {“}policy voting{“}, notable differences emerge when looking at the role of specific policy dimensions. Overall, these findings suggest that the support for RRPs cannot be understood fundamentally as a mere reaction against economic pauperization or political dissatisfaction but instead as an ideological decision based on rational choice models.

    @Article{barquero-jimenez-gonzalez-fernandez-2021,
    author = {Pablo {Ortiz Barquero} and Antonia Mar\"ia {Ruiz Jim{\"e}nez} and Manuel Tom{\"a}s Gonz{\"a}lez-Fern{\"a}ndez},
    title = {Ideological Voting for Radical Right Parties in Europe},
    journal = {Acta Politica},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The aim of this research is to examine to what extent the electoral support for radical right parties (RRPs) is driven by {"}policy voting{"} and to compare this support with that of centre-right parties. Using the European Election Study 2019, we focus on six party systems: Spain,
    Italy, France, Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom. Our analyses reveal that party preferences for RRPs are better explained by policy considerations than by other alternative explanations (e.g. by {"}globalization losers{"} or {"}protest voting{"}). Additionally, the results show
    that although preferences for both party families are mainly rooted in {"}policy voting{"}, notable differences emerge when looking at the role of specific policy dimensions. Overall, these findings suggest that the support for RRPs cannot be understood fundamentally as a mere reaction
    against economic pauperization or political dissatisfaction but instead as an ideological decision based on rational choice models.},
    doi = {10.1057/s41269-021-00213-8},
    }

  • Ben-Shitrit, Lihi, Julia Elad-Strenger, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. “”Pinkwashing” the radical-right: Gender and the mainstreaming of radical-right policies and actions.” European Journal of Political Research 61.1 (2022): 86–110. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12442
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Across the globe, women are increasingly more visible as leaders and activists in radical-right parties and movements. Does women{“}s visibility in radical-right politics, both institutionalized and non-institutionalized, affect public acceptance of radical-right agendas? The present paper proposes a {“}radical-right gender mainstreaming model{“}, arguing that women in radical-right politics are perceived by the general public through a prism of feminine gender stereotypes, which counteract radical-right parties{“} and movements{“} masculine stereotypes, thus {“}softening{“} their image and making them more acceptable to the general public. Across four experimental studies conducted in the Israeli context, we find strong evidence that women{“}s visibility as radical-right parliamentary representatives (Studies 1a and 1b) and as radical-right political activists (Studies 2a and 2b) increases acceptance of and support for these parties{“} and movements{“} agenda, particularly among women. We further demonstrate that these effects are mediated by the attribution of feminine stereotypes (warmth) to women versus men political actors. Implications of these findings are discussed.

    @Article{ben-shitrit-elad-strenger-hirsch-hoefler-2022,
    author = {Lihi Ben-Shitrit and Julia Elad-Strenger and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler},
    title = {{"}Pinkwashing{"} the radical-right: Gender and the mainstreaming of radical-right policies and actions},
    journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {61},
    number = {1},
    pages = {86--110},
    abstract = {Across the globe, women are increasingly more visible as leaders and activists in radical-right parties and movements. Does women{"}s visibility in radical-right politics, both institutionalized and non-institutionalized, affect public acceptance of radical-right agendas? The
    present paper proposes a {"}radical-right gender mainstreaming model{"}, arguing that women in radical-right politics are perceived by the general public through a prism of feminine gender stereotypes, which counteract radical-right parties{"} and movements{"} masculine stereotypes, thus
    {"}softening{"} their image and making them more acceptable to the general public. Across four experimental studies conducted in the Israeli context, we find strong evidence that women{"}s visibility as radical-right parliamentary representatives (Studies 1a and 1b) and as radical-right
    political activists (Studies 2a and 2b) increases acceptance of and support for these parties{"} and movements{"} agenda, particularly among women. We further demonstrate that these effects are mediated by the attribution of feminine stereotypes (warmth) to women versus men political
    actors. Implications of these findings are discussed.},
    doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12442},
    }

  • Bolet, Diane. “Drinking Alone: Local Socio-Cultural Degradation and Radical Right Support-The Case of British Pub Closures.” Comparative Political Studies 54.9 (2021): 1653–1692. doi:10.1177/0010414021997158
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Little is known about how local context influences radical right voting. This paper advances the theory that the degradation of local socio-cultural hubs is linked to radical right support by contributing to loss of community and cultural identity. I examine this thesis by exploiting an original dataset on British community pub closures. I argue that the disappearance of community pubs triggers social isolation and signals the decline of the British working class condition, which is associated with UKIP support. Combining district-level data with UK panel data (2013-2016), I show that individuals living in districts that experience one additional community pub closure (relative to the total number of pubs per district) are more likely to support UKIP than any other party by 4.3 percentage points. The effect is magnified under conditions of material deprivation. This paper highlights the significance of local socio-cultural degradation as a mechanism to explain radical right support.

    @Article{bolet-2021,
    author = {Diane Bolet},
    title = {Drinking Alone: Local Socio-Cultural Degradation and Radical Right Support-The Case of British Pub Closures},
    journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {54},
    number = {9},
    pages = {1653--1692},
    abstract = {Little is known about how local context influences radical right voting. This paper advances the theory that the degradation of local socio-cultural hubs is linked to radical right support by contributing to loss of community and cultural identity. I examine this thesis by
    exploiting an original dataset on British community pub closures. I argue that the disappearance of community pubs triggers social isolation and signals the decline of the British working class condition, which is associated with UKIP support. Combining district-level data with UK
    panel data (2013-2016), I show that individuals living in districts that experience one additional community pub closure (relative to the total number of pubs per district) are more likely to support UKIP than any other party by 4.3 percentage points. The effect is magnified under
    conditions of material deprivation. This paper highlights the significance of local socio-cultural degradation as a mechanism to explain radical right support.},
    doi = {10.1177/0010414021997158},
    }

  • Bolin, Niklas, Stefan Dahlberg, and Sofie Blombäck. “The Stigmatisation Effect of the Radical Right on Voters” Assessment of Political Proposals.” West European Politics online first (2022): 1–22. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.2019977
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Despite the continued electoral progress of the radical right, there are reasons to believe that its full electoral potential has yet to be revealed. Previous research suggests that it suffers from a stigmatisation effect and that many voters will find its proposals less compelling compared to if they were presented by a mainstream party even for policy issues they agree upon. This study employs a unique survey design, with two experiments conducted seven years apart, on a panel of Swedish voters. The aim is to evaluate whether proposals are assessed differently dependent on who the sender is and whether the effect diminishes as the cordon sanitaire of the party weakens. The results show that proposals are less liked if the sender is the radical right. This effect persists even after a weakening of the ostracisation of the radical right as well as for different types of political issues.

    @Article{bolin-dahlberg-blombaeck-2022,
    author = {Niklas Bolin and Stefan Dahlberg and Sofie Blomb{\"a}ck},
    title = {The Stigmatisation Effect of the Radical Right on Voters{"} Assessment of Political Proposals},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--22},
    abstract = {Despite the continued electoral progress of the radical right, there are reasons to believe that its full electoral potential has yet to be revealed. Previous research suggests that it suffers from a stigmatisation effect and that many voters will find its proposals less
    compelling compared to if they were presented by a mainstream party even for policy issues they agree upon. This study employs a unique survey design, with two experiments conducted seven years apart, on a panel of Swedish voters. The aim is to evaluate whether proposals are
    assessed differently dependent on who the sender is and whether the effect diminishes as the cordon sanitaire of the party weakens. The results show that proposals are less liked if the sender is the radical right. This effect persists even after a weakening of the ostracisation of
    the radical right as well as for different types of political issues.},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.2019977},
    }

  • Busemeyer, Marius R., Philip Rathgeb, and Alexander H. J. Sahm. “Authoritarian Values and the Welfare State: the Social Policy Preferences of Radical Right Voters.” West European Politics 45.1 (2021): 77–101. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.1886497
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    What kind of welfare state do voters of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) want and how do their preferences differ from voters of mainstream left- and right-wing parties? In this paper, we draw on an original, representative survey of public opinion on education and related social policies in eight Western European countries to measure (1) support for social transfers, (2) support for workfare and (3) support for social investment. Challenging the view that PRRPs turned into pro-welfare parties, our results indicate that their voters want a particularistic-authoritarian welfare state, displaying moderate support only for {“}deserving{“} benefit recipients (e.g. the elderly), while revealing strong support for a workfare approach and little support for social investment. These findings have important implications for contemporary debates about the future of capitalism and the welfare state.

    @Article{busemeyer-rathgeb-sahm-2021,
    author = {Marius R. Busemeyer and Philip Rathgeb and Alexander H. J. Sahm},
    title = {Authoritarian Values and the Welfare State: the Social Policy Preferences of Radical Right Voters},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {45},
    number = {1},
    pages = {77--101},
    abstract = {What kind of welfare state do voters of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) want and how do their preferences differ from voters of mainstream left- and right-wing parties? In this paper, we draw on an original, representative survey of public opinion on education and related
    social policies in eight Western European countries to measure (1) support for social transfers, (2) support for workfare and (3) support for social investment. Challenging the view that PRRPs turned into pro-welfare parties, our results indicate that their voters want a
    particularistic-authoritarian welfare state, displaying moderate support only for {"}deserving{"} benefit recipients (e.g. the elderly), while revealing strong support for a workfare approach and little support for social investment. These findings have important implications for
    contemporary debates about the future of capitalism and the welfare state.},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.1886497},
    }

  • Capaul, Raphael and Christian Ewert. “Moderation of Radical Right-wing Populist Parties in Western European Governments – A Comparative Analysis.” Swiss Political Science Review 27.4 (2021): 778–798. doi:10.1111/spsr.12491
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    {More and more Western European radical right-wing populist parties participate in the governments of their respective countries. At least some of these parties moderate-that is, become less radical-once they join the government; others, however, do not. Although the literature has addressed such moderation, the conditions that lead to it have not been analyzed comprehensively. In this paper, we use a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA

    @Article{capaul-ewert-2021,
    author = {Raphael Capaul and Christian Ewert},
    title = {Moderation of Radical Right-wing Populist Parties in Western European Governments - A Comparative Analysis},
    journal = {Swiss Political Science Review},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {27},
    number = {4},
    pages = {778--798},
    abstract = {More and more Western European radical right-wing populist parties participate in the governments of their respective countries. At least some of these parties moderate-that is, become less radical-once they join the government; others, however, do not. Although the literature has
    addressed such moderation, the conditions that lead to it have not been analyzed comprehensively. In this paper, we use a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA, N = 14) to determine what conditions are consistently associated with moderation across cases. We find that
    the degree of governmental responsibility a party takes over is as important as its internal dynamic. In a ruling coalition, compromises must be found, which can create high internal tensions within the radical right-wing populist party. Joining government can thus have its price:
    a crisis of party identity and a strong compulsion to moderate.},
    doi = {10.1111/spsr.12491},
    }

  • Carvalho, João. “Understanding the Emergence of Extreme Right Parties in Portugal in the Late 2010s.” Parliamentary Affairs online first (2022). doi:10.1093/pa/gsac001
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    After more than four decades of immunity to the extreme-right party family, this Portuguese exceptionalism came to an end after the electoral breakthrough of the Chega party in the 2019 general elections. Drawing on a case study approach, this article discusses different explanations for the timing of Chega{“}s emergence in Portuguese mainstream politics in the late 2010s. Considering this late success, Portugal can be seen as a crucial case study to assess the available theories. This investigation employs a popular schema that implies the distinction between explanations focused on {“}demand-side{“} factors (the protest voting thesis and the public salience of immigration) from those concerned with {“}supply-side{“} factors (the spatial competition theory and internal supply factors). Through the employment of the congruence method, this article highlights the interaction between party-centric factors as a more appropriate explanation for understanding the timing of Chega{“}s electoral breakthrough than demand-side approaches.

    @Article{carvalho-2022,
    author = {Jo{\~a}o Carvalho},
    title = {Understanding the Emergence of Extreme Right Parties in Portugal in the Late 2010s},
    journal = {Parliamentary Affairs},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {After more than four decades of immunity to the extreme-right party family, this Portuguese exceptionalism came to an end after the electoral breakthrough of the Chega party in the 2019 general elections. Drawing on a case study approach, this article discusses different
    explanations for the timing of Chega{"}s emergence in Portuguese mainstream politics in the late 2010s. Considering this late success, Portugal can be seen as a crucial case study to assess the available theories. This investigation employs a popular schema that implies the
    distinction between explanations focused on {"}demand-side{"} factors (the protest voting thesis and the public salience of immigration) from those concerned with {"}supply-side{"} factors (the spatial competition theory and internal supply factors). Through the employment of the
    congruence method, this article highlights the interaction between party-centric factors as a more appropriate explanation for understanding the timing of Chega{"}s electoral breakthrough than demand-side approaches.},
    doi = {10.1093/pa/gsac001},
    }

  • Castelli Gattinara, Pietro, Caterina Froio, and Andrea L. P. Pirro. “Far-right Protest Mobilisation in Europe: Grievances, Opportunities and Resources.” European Journal of Political Research online first.nil (2021): nil. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12484
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    What explains far-right mobilisation in the protest arena? After decades of growing electoral support and policy influence, the far right is experiencing an increase in grassroots mobilisation. Scholars of social movements and political parties have devoted little attention to the determinants of far-right protest mobilisation in Europe. In this article, we bridge previous research on the far right and social movements to advance hypotheses on the drivers of far-right protest mobilisation based on grievances, opportunities and resource mobilisation models. We use an original dataset combining novel data on 4,845 far-right protest events in 11 East and West European countries (2008-2018), with existing measures accounting for the (political, economic and cultural) context of mobilisation. We find that classical approaches to collective action can be fruitfully applied to the study of the far right. Cultural grievances, notably concerns about immigration, as well as the availability of institutional access points in contexts characterised by divided government increase far-right protest mobilisation. But far-right protest mobilisation also rests on the organisational resources available to nativist collective actors, that is, the network in which they are embedded, their visibility in the media and elected officials. These findings have important implications to understand far-right success in advanced democracies. They show that far-right mobilisation in the protest arena not only rests on favourable circumstances, but also on whether far-right actors can profit from them. More broadly, the study links party politics and social movement research to grasp the far right{“}s modes of political contestation, locating research on this phenomenon at the intersection of political sociology and comparative politics.

    @Article{castelli-froio-pirro-2021,
    author = {Pietro {Castelli Gattinara} and Caterina Froio and Andrea L. P. Pirro},
    title = {Far-right Protest Mobilisation in Europe: Grievances, Opportunities and Resources},
    journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    number = {nil},
    pages = {nil},
    abstract = {What explains far-right mobilisation in the protest arena? After decades of growing electoral support and policy influence, the far right is experiencing an increase in grassroots mobilisation. Scholars of social movements and political parties have devoted little attention to the
    determinants of far-right protest mobilisation in Europe. In this article, we bridge previous research on the far right and social movements to advance hypotheses on the drivers of far-right protest mobilisation based on grievances, opportunities and resource mobilisation models.
    We use an original dataset combining novel data on 4,845 far-right protest events in 11 East and West European countries (2008-2018), with existing measures accounting for the (political, economic and cultural) context of mobilisation. We find that classical approaches to
    collective action can be fruitfully applied to the study of the far right. Cultural grievances, notably concerns about immigration, as well as the availability of institutional access points in contexts characterised by divided government increase far-right protest mobilisation.
    But far-right protest mobilisation also rests on the organisational resources available to nativist collective actors, that is, the network in which they are embedded, their visibility in the media and elected officials. These findings have important implications to understand
    far-right success in advanced democracies. They show that far-right mobilisation in the protest arena not only rests on favourable circumstances, but also on whether far-right actors can profit from them. More broadly, the study links party politics and social movement research to
    grasp the far right{"}s modes of political contestation, locating research on this phenomenon at the intersection of political sociology and comparative politics.},
    doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12484},
    }

  • Chan, Ka Ming. “The Making of Radical-Right Voters: Persuasion and Contrast Effects in a Dynamic Political Context.” Political Psychology online first (2022). doi:10.1111/pops.12801
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Under what circumstances do first-time radical-right party (RRP) voters become more identified with the right-wing label? Also, when do they perceive the center-right party as more left wing and evaluate it more negatively? To answer these two intertwined questions, this article leverages the dynamic political context of Germany during the 2013-17 election cycle. In this election cycle, the political arena became abruptly polarized, as the refugee crisis took place and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) broke into 13 subnational parliaments. Using a unique longitudinal dataset, I find that first-time AfD voters experienced a persuasion effect in such a polarized environment, as they became slightly more right wing. In addition, I find a contrast effect among these voters, as they came to perceive the Christian Democratic Union as more left wing and judged it more negatively. These findings have important implications for understanding the psychological processes of first-time RRP voters in a multiparty system, as they show how a polarized environment can shape RRP voters{“} ideological identity and motivate them to see the mainstream center-right party as an outgroup.

    @Article{chan-2022,
    author = {Ka Ming Chan},
    title = {The Making of Radical-Right Voters: Persuasion and Contrast Effects in a Dynamic Political Context},
    journal = {Political Psychology},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Under what circumstances do first-time radical-right party (RRP) voters become more identified with the right-wing label? Also, when do they perceive the center-right party as more left wing and evaluate it more negatively? To answer these two intertwined questions, this article
    leverages the dynamic political context of Germany during the 2013-17 election cycle. In this election cycle, the political arena became abruptly polarized, as the refugee crisis took place and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) broke into 13 subnational parliaments. Using a unique
    longitudinal dataset, I find that first-time AfD voters experienced a persuasion effect in such a polarized environment, as they became slightly more right wing. In addition, I find a contrast effect among these voters, as they came to perceive the Christian Democratic Union as
    more left wing and judged it more negatively. These findings have important implications for understanding the psychological processes of first-time RRP voters in a multiparty system, as they show how a polarized environment can shape RRP voters{"} ideological identity and motivate
    them to see the mainstream center-right party as an outgroup.},
    doi = {10.1111/pops.12801},
    }

  • Chou, Mark, Benjamin Moffitt, and Rachel Busbridge. “The Localist Turn in Populism Studies.” Swiss Political Science Review nil.online first (2021): nil. doi:10.1111/spsr.12490
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    While the study of populism has typically focused on the national level, recent years have seen a growing body of research on populism{“}s local dimensions. Despite making important scholarly advances, this {“}localist turn{“} has yet to develop a systematic account of how populism intersects with localism. In this research note, we broach this gap. By exploring how right- and left-wing populisms conceptualize the {“}local{“}, as well as how localist sentiments can heighten or diminish the appeal of right and left populist politics, we establish a general framework to guide future inquiry into local manifestations of populist politics.

    @Article{chou-moffitt-busbridge-2021,
    author = {Mark Chou and Benjamin Moffitt and Rachel Busbridge},
    title = {The Localist Turn in Populism Studies},
    journal = {Swiss Political Science Review},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {nil},
    number = {online first},
    pages = {nil},
    abstract = {While the study of populism has typically focused on the national level, recent years have seen a growing body of research on populism{"}s local dimensions. Despite making important scholarly advances, this {"}localist turn{"} has yet to develop a systematic account of how populism
    intersects with localism. In this research note, we broach this gap. By exploring how right- and left-wing populisms conceptualize the {"}local{"}, as well as how localist sentiments can heighten or diminish the appeal of right and left populist politics, we establish a general
    framework to guide future inquiry into local manifestations of populist politics.},
    doi = {10.1111/spsr.12490},
    }

  • Cools, Sara, Henning Finseraas, and Ole Rogeberg. “Local Immigration and Support for Anti-Immigration Parties: A Meta-Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science online first (2021). doi:10.1111/ajps.12613
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Does the share of immigrants in a community influence whether people vote for anti-immigration parties? We conduct a systematic review of the causal inference literature studying this question. We collect estimates from 20 studies and develop a new Bayesian meta-analysis framework to account for both between-study heterogeneity in effect sizes and the possibility of reporting bias. Although meta-analysis methods that do not adjust for reporting bias suggest a moderate effect of local immigration, our Bayesian model finds that the effect of local immigration on far-right voting is on average negligible once we account for reporting bias. However, the analysis also reveals a large heterogeneity in effects across contexts, suggesting that local immigration may be important for anti-immigration vote shares in certain settings.

    @Article{cools-finseraas-rogeberg-2021,
    author = {Sara Cools and Henning Finseraas and Ole Rogeberg},
    title = {Local Immigration and Support for Anti-Immigration Parties: A Meta-Analysis},
    journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Does the share of immigrants in a community influence whether people vote for anti-immigration parties? We conduct a systematic review of the causal inference literature studying this question. We collect estimates from 20 studies and develop a new Bayesian meta-analysis framework
    to account for both between-study heterogeneity in effect sizes and the possibility of reporting bias. Although meta-analysis methods that do not adjust for reporting bias suggest a moderate effect of local immigration, our Bayesian model finds that the effect of local immigration
    on far-right voting is on average negligible once we account for reporting bias. However, the analysis also reveals a large heterogeneity in effects across contexts, suggesting that local immigration may be important for anti-immigration vote shares in certain settings.},
    doi = {10.1111/ajps.12613},
    }

  • Cordero, Guillermo, Piotr Zagörski, and Josë Rama. “Give Me Your Least Educated: Immigration, Education and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.” Political Studies Review online first (2021). doi:10.1177/14789299211029110
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article deepens the analysis of the effects of immigration on the vote for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, focusing on education levels of both natives and immigrants. By analysing the immigrant population in 101 regions from 11 European countries, we show that in contexts with a large immigrant presence, the low-educated voters tend to support Populist Radical Right Parties to a greater degree than those who are more educated. However, when the ratio of skilled immigrants is high, also the more educated population tends to support these parties. Hence, our analysis adds insight into the relationship between immigration, education and Populist Radical Right Parties voting, highlighting the need of focusing at lower levels of aggregation and combining the characteristics of both foreign-born and host populations.

    @Article{cordero-zagorski-rama-2021,
    author = {Guillermo Cordero and Piotr Zag{\"o}rski and Jos{\"e} Rama},
    title = {Give Me Your Least Educated: Immigration, Education and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe},
    journal = {Political Studies Review},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {This article deepens the analysis of the effects of immigration on the vote for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, focusing on education levels of both natives and immigrants. By analysing the immigrant population in 101 regions from 11 European countries, we show that in
    contexts with a large immigrant presence, the low-educated voters tend to support Populist Radical Right Parties to a greater degree than those who are more educated. However, when the ratio of skilled immigrants is high, also the more educated population tends to support these
    parties. Hence, our analysis adds insight into the relationship between immigration, education and Populist Radical Right Parties voting, highlighting the need of focusing at lower levels of aggregation and combining the characteristics of both foreign-born and host populations.},
    doi = {10.1177/14789299211029110},
    }

  • Cremer, Tobias. “A Religious Vaccination? How Christian Communities React To Right-Wing Populism in Germany, France and the Us.” Government and Opposition online first (2021): 1–21. doi:10.1017/gov.2021.18
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Right-wing populists across Western democracies have markedly increased references to Christianity in recent years. While there is much debate about how and why they have done so, less attention has been paid to how Christian communities react to this development. The present study addresses this gap through a comparative analysis of Christian responses to right-wing populist politics in Germany, France and the US. It relies on quantitative studies, survey data and the qualitative analysis of 39 in-depth interviews with right-wing populist leaders, mainstream party politicians and church officials. The findings of this analysis suggest a potential {“}religious vaccination effect{“} among Christian voters against right-wing populism but underline its connection to elite actor behaviour. Specifically, the availability of a {“}Christian alternative{“} in the party system, as well as religious leaders{“} willingness and ability to create a social taboo around the populist right seem critically to impact religious immunity to populism.

    @Article{cremer-2021,
    author = {Tobias Cremer},
    title = {A Religious Vaccination? How Christian Communities React To Right-Wing Populism in Germany, France and the Us},
    journal = {Government and Opposition},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--21},
    abstract = {Right-wing populists across Western democracies have markedly increased references to Christianity in recent years. While there is much debate about how and why they have done so, less attention has been paid to how Christian communities react to this development. The present
    study addresses this gap through a comparative analysis of Christian responses to right-wing populist politics in Germany, France and the US. It relies on quantitative studies, survey data and the qualitative analysis of 39 in-depth interviews with right-wing populist leaders,
    mainstream party politicians and church officials. The findings of this analysis suggest a potential {"}religious vaccination effect{"} among Christian voters against right-wing populism but underline its connection to elite actor behaviour. Specifically, the availability of a
    {"}Christian alternative{"} in the party system, as well as religious leaders{"} willingness and ability to create a social taboo around the populist right seem critically to impact religious immunity to populism.},
    doi = {10.1017/gov.2021.18},
    }

  • de Jonge, L{a’e}onie. The Success and Failure of Right-Wing Populist Parties in the Benelux Countries. Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy. London, New York: Routledge, 2021.
    [BibTeX]
    @Book{de-jonge-2021,
    author = {L{\a'e}onie {de Jonge}},
    title = {The Success and Failure of Right-Wing Populist Parties in the Benelux Countries},
    publisher = {Routledge},
    year = {2021},
    series = {Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy},
    address = {London, New York},
    }

  • Dehdari, Sirus H.. “Economic Distress and Support for Radical Right Parties-Evidence From Sweden.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2021). doi:10.1177/00104140211024301
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This paper studies the effects of economic distress on support for radical right parties. Using Swedish election data, I show that one layoff notice among low-skilled native-born workers increases, on average, support for the Swedish radical right party the Sweden Democrats by 0.17-0.45 votes. The relationship between layoff notices and support for the Sweden Democrats is stronger in areas with a high share of low-skilled immigrants and in areas with a low share of high-skilled immigrants. These findings are in line with theories suggesting that economically distressed voters oppose immigration as they fear increased labor market competition. In addition, I use individual-level survey data to show that self-reported unemployment risk is positively associated with voting for the Sweden Democrats among low-skilled respondents while the opposite is true for high-skilled respondents, echoing the aggregate-level findings.

    @Article{dehdari-2021,
    author = {Sirus H. Dehdari},
    title = {Economic Distress and Support for Radical Right Parties-Evidence From Sweden},
    journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {This paper studies the effects of economic distress on support for radical right parties. Using Swedish election data, I show that one layoff notice among low-skilled native-born workers increases, on average, support for the Swedish radical right party the Sweden Democrats by
    0.17-0.45 votes. The relationship between layoff notices and support for the Sweden Democrats is stronger in areas with a high share of low-skilled immigrants and in areas with a low share of high-skilled immigrants. These findings are in line with theories suggesting that
    economically distressed voters oppose immigration as they fear increased labor market competition. In addition, I use individual-level survey data to show that self-reported unemployment risk is positively associated with voting for the Sweden Democrats among low-skilled
    respondents while the opposite is true for high-skilled respondents, echoing the aggregate-level findings.},
    doi = {10.1177/00104140211024301},
    }

  • Deppisch, Larissa, Torsten Osigus, and Andreas Klärner. “How Rural Is Rural Populism? on the Spatial Understanding of Rurality for Analyses of Right‐wing Populist Election Success in Germany*.” Rural Sociology online first.nil (2021): ruso.12397. doi:10.1111/ruso.12397
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    In this article, the authors take up the thesis of the narrative that the support for right-wing populist election successes is located in rural areas. For the case of the German right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) the authors propose a complex definition of rurality, and perform a quantitative small-scale analysis of the national election results in Germany in 2017. They examine the potential connection between a high share of votes for the AfD and the rurality of a municipality. The results show that in eastern Germany, the fairly rural municipalities have comparatively high AfD vote shares, whereas in western Germany, the fairly rural and the non-rural municipalities have similar AfD vote shares. Therefore, it appears that the thesis that rural areas are the source of the support of right-wing populism applies to some, but not to all rural areas of Germany.

    @Article{deppisch-osigus-klaerner-2021,
    author = {Larissa Deppisch and Torsten Osigus and Andreas Kl{\"a}rner},
    title = {How Rural Is Rural Populism? on the Spatial Understanding of Rurality for Analyses of Right‐wing Populist Election Success in Germany*},
    journal = {Rural Sociology},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    number = {nil},
    pages = {ruso.12397},
    abstract = {In this article, the authors take up the thesis of the narrative that the support for right-wing populist election successes is located in rural areas. For the case of the German right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) the authors propose a complex definition
    of rurality, and perform a quantitative small-scale analysis of the national election results in Germany in 2017. They examine the potential connection between a high share of votes for the AfD and the rurality of a municipality. The results show that in eastern Germany, the fairly
    rural municipalities have comparatively high AfD vote shares, whereas in western Germany, the fairly rural and the non-rural municipalities have similar AfD vote shares. Therefore, it appears that the thesis that rural areas are the source of the support of right-wing populism
    applies to some, but not to all rural areas of Germany.},
    doi = {10.1111/ruso.12397},
    }

  • van Elsas, Erika J., Armen Hakhverdian, and Wouter van der Brug. “United Against a Common Foe? The Nature and Origins of Euroscepticism Among Left-Wing and Right-Wing Citizens.” West European Politics 39.6 (2016): 1181–1204. doi:10.1080/01402382.2016.1175244
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    In Western European democracies opposition to the European Union is commonly found at the ideological extremes. Yet, the Euroscepticism of radical left-wing and radical right-wing parties has been shown to have distinct roots and manifestations. The article investigates whether these differences are mirrored at the citizen level. Using data from the European Election Study (2009/2014) and the European Social Survey (2008/2012) in 15 West European countries, it is found that left-wing and right-wing citizens not only differ in the object of their Euroscepticism, but also in their motivations for being sceptical of the EU. Left-wing Eurosceptics are dissatisfied with the current functioning of the EU, but do not oppose further European integration per se, while right-wing Eurosceptics categorically reject European integration. Euroscepticism among left-wing citizens is motivated by economic and cultural concerns, whereas for right-wing citizens Euroscepticism is solely anchored in cultural attitudes. These results refine the common {“}horseshoe{“} understanding of ideology and Euroscepticism.

    @Article{elsas-hakhverdian-brug-2016,
    author = {Erika J. {van Elsas} and Armen Hakhverdian and Wouter {van der Brug}},
    title = {United Against a Common Foe? The Nature and Origins of Euroscepticism Among Left-Wing and Right-Wing Citizens},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2016},
    volume = {39},
    number = {6},
    pages = {1181--1204},
    abstract = {In Western European democracies opposition to the European Union is commonly found at the ideological extremes. Yet, the Euroscepticism of radical left-wing and radical right-wing parties has been shown to have distinct roots and manifestations. The article investigates whether
    these differences are mirrored at the citizen level. Using data from the European Election Study (2009/2014) and the European Social Survey (2008/2012) in 15 West European countries, it is found that left-wing and right-wing citizens not only differ in the object of their
    Euroscepticism, but also in their motivations for being sceptical of the EU. Left-wing Eurosceptics are dissatisfied with the current functioning of the EU, but do not oppose further European integration per se, while right-wing Eurosceptics categorically reject European
    integration. Euroscepticism among left-wing citizens is motivated by economic and cultural concerns, whereas for right-wing citizens Euroscepticism is solely anchored in cultural attitudes. These results refine the common {"}horseshoe{"} understanding of ideology and Euroscepticism.},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2016.1175244},
    }

  • Enggist, Matthias and Michael Pinggera. “Radical Right Parties and Their Welfare State Stances – Not So Blurry After All?.” West European Politics online first (2021): 1–22. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.1902115
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Recent literature shows that radical right parties (RRPs) present moderate or blurry economic stances. However, this paper argues that this blurriness is restricted to only one of the two main conflicts of contemporary welfare politics, namely questions centring on welfare generosity. In contrast, when it comes to the goals and principles the welfare state should meet, RRPs take a clear stance favouring consumption policies such as old age pensions over social investment, in accordance with their voters{“} preferences. The empirical analysis based on new, fine-grained coding of welfare stances in party manifestos and original data on voters{“} perceptions of party stances in seven European countries supports this argument. RRPs de-emphasise how much welfare state they want while consistently and clearly defending the traditional welfare state{“}s consumptive focus against recalibration proposals. These findings have important implications for party competition and welfare politics.

    @Article{enggist-pinggera-2021,
    author = {Matthias Enggist and Michael Pinggera},
    title = {Radical Right Parties and Their Welfare State Stances - Not So Blurry After All?},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    number = {0},
    pages = {1--22},
    abstract = {Recent literature shows that radical right parties (RRPs) present moderate or blurry economic stances. However, this paper argues that this blurriness is restricted to only one of the two main conflicts of contemporary welfare politics, namely questions centring on welfare
    generosity. In contrast, when it comes to the goals and principles the welfare state should meet, RRPs take a clear stance favouring consumption policies such as old age pensions over social investment, in accordance with their voters{"} preferences. The empirical analysis based on
    new, fine-grained coding of welfare stances in party manifestos and original data on voters{"} perceptions of party stances in seven European countries supports this argument. RRPs de-emphasise how much welfare state they want while consistently and clearly defending the traditional
    welfare state{"}s consumptive focus against recalibration proposals. These findings have important implications for party competition and welfare politics.},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.1902115},
    }

  • Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz. “The Impact of Radical Right Parties on Family Benefits.” West European Politics 45.1 (2021): 154–176. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.1936944
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Radical right parties have gained access to government across Europe, yet scholarly work on how they shape welfare states remains scarce. Therefore, this article examines how radical right parties affect family benefits. Combining pro-natalist views with a commitment to traditional gender roles, these parties seek to support family incomes without altering the traditional intra-family division of labour. Radical right governance should therefore correlate positively with spending on family allowances, but negatively with childcare expenditures. However, generous family allowances may become less attractive and childcare spending more attractive to the radical right as immigrant populations increase. An analysis of 26 European countries between 1980 and 2015 shows a negative, yet noisy, effect of the radical right on childcare expenditures. By contrast, effects on family allowances are negligible. Further analysis also uncovers that radical right governance is associated with larger gaps between spending on family allowances and spending on childcare.

    @Article{ennser-jedenastik-2021,
    author = {Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik},
    title = {The Impact of Radical Right Parties on Family Benefits},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {45},
    number = {1},
    pages = {154--176},
    abstract = {Radical right parties have gained access to government across Europe, yet scholarly work on how they shape welfare states remains scarce. Therefore, this article examines how radical right parties affect family benefits. Combining pro-natalist views with a commitment to
    traditional gender roles, these parties seek to support family incomes without altering the traditional intra-family division of labour. Radical right governance should therefore correlate positively with spending on family allowances, but negatively with childcare expenditures.
    However, generous family allowances may become less attractive and childcare spending more attractive to the radical right as immigrant populations increase. An analysis of 26 European countries between 1980 and 2015 shows a negative, yet noisy, effect of the radical right on
    childcare expenditures. By contrast, effects on family allowances are negligible. Further analysis also uncovers that radical right governance is associated with larger gaps between spending on family allowances and spending on childcare.},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.1936944},
    }

  • o, S. and Kristian Kongsh o. “The implosion of radical right populism and the path forward for social democracy: Evidence from the 2019 Danish national election.” Scandinavian Political Studies online first (2022). doi:10.1111/1467-9477.12225
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The collapse of the Danish People’s Party (DPP) was pivotal for the Danish 2019 election since a substantial bloc of their previous voters moved to the Social Democratic Party (SDP). This provides an interesting countermovement to the trend of mainstream left parties losing voters to populist or radical right-wing parties across European countries. This paper seeks to explain the driving issues in this voter movement, thereby shedding light on how mainstream left parties can turn the tables vis-à-vis their new right-wing challengers. Specifically, we focus on the traditional or first-dimension issues of welfare and redistribution versus the second-dimension issue of immigration. The simultaneous left-wing turn on welfare and redistribution and right-wing turn on immigration of the Danish SDP has provided room for varying interpretations of the election result. This paper utilizes new survey data to analyze the voter movements from and to the SDP with a special focus on defectors from the DPP. We find that attitudes toward welfare and redistribution were pivotal in moving voters from the DPP to the SDP. Meanwhile, the SDP has not completely “neutralized” the issue of immigration, which still tends to induce these voters to remain loyal to the DPP. We do not find support for the claim that immigration attitudes condition the extent to which redistributive preferences increase the likelihood of switching to the SDP. The SDP’s right turn on immigration, moreover, seems to push voters to the immigration-friendly (center-left wing) support parties.

    @Article{etzerodt-kongshoj-2022,
    author = {S{\o}ren Frank Etzerodt and Kristian Kongsh{\o}j},
    title = {The implosion of radical right populism and the path forward for social democracy: Evidence from the 2019 Danish national election},
    journal = {Scandinavian Political Studies},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The collapse of the Danish People's Party (DPP) was pivotal for the Danish 2019 election since a substantial bloc of their previous voters moved to the Social Democratic Party (SDP). This provides an interesting countermovement to the trend of mainstream left parties losing voters
    to populist or radical right-wing parties across European countries. This paper seeks to explain the driving issues in this voter movement, thereby shedding light on how mainstream left parties can turn the tables vis-à-vis their new right-wing challengers. Specifically, we focus
    on the traditional or first-dimension issues of welfare and redistribution versus the second-dimension issue of immigration. The simultaneous left-wing turn on welfare and redistribution and right-wing turn on immigration of the Danish SDP has provided room for varying
    interpretations of the election result. This paper utilizes new survey data to analyze the voter movements from and to the SDP with a special focus on defectors from the DPP. We find that attitudes toward welfare and redistribution were pivotal in moving voters from the DPP to the
    SDP. Meanwhile, the SDP has not completely “neutralized” the issue of immigration, which still tends to induce these voters to remain loyal to the DPP. We do not find support for the claim that immigration attitudes condition the extent to which redistributive preferences
    increase the likelihood of switching to the SDP. The SDP's right turn on immigration, moreover, seems to push voters to the immigration-friendly (center-left wing) support parties.},
    doi = {10.1111/1467-9477.12225},
    }

  • Favero, Adrian. “Charisma in Right-Wing Populism: Comparing the View of the Leader and Followers within the Swiss People’s Party.” Swiss Political Science Review online first (2022). doi:10.1111/spsr.12510
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The ‘charismatic leader’ is a recurring topic within the literature on populist radical right parties (PRRPs), arguing that charisma is important for the success of these parties. However, most studies assess charismatic leadership only through the perception of the leaders’ followers and make no statement on the leaders’ perspectives and their role for party institutionalisation. This article compares the supply and the demand sides of charisma by drawing on interviews with the so-called charismatic leader of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) – Christoph Blocher – and local, regional and national party representatives. The article shows that assessing both perspectives contributes to a better understanding of charisma and its importance for internal leadership in institutionalised PRRPs. The case of the SVP further demonstrates that successful party institutionalisation and a strong internal organisational structure make the party’s durability less dependent on the charismatic leader and could lead to efforts of depersonalisation.

    @Article{favero-2022,
    author = {Adrian Favero},
    title = {Charisma in Right-Wing Populism: Comparing the View of the Leader and Followers within the Swiss People’s Party},
    journal = {Swiss Political Science Review},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The ‘charismatic leader’ is a recurring topic within the literature on populist radical right parties (PRRPs), arguing that charisma is important for the success of these parties. However, most studies assess charismatic leadership only through the perception of the leaders'
    followers and make no statement on the leaders' perspectives and their role for party institutionalisation. This article compares the supply and the demand sides of charisma by drawing on interviews with the so-called charismatic leader of the Swiss People's Party (SVP) –
    Christoph Blocher – and local, regional and national party representatives. The article shows that assessing both perspectives contributes to a better understanding of charisma and its importance for internal leadership in institutionalised PRRPs. The case of the SVP further
    demonstrates that successful party institutionalisation and a strong internal organisational structure make the party's durability less dependent on the charismatic leader and could lead to efforts of depersonalisation.},
    doi = {10.1111/spsr.12510},
    }

  • Froio, Caterina and Bharath Ganesh. “The Transnationalisation of Far Right Discourse on Twitter.” European Societies 21.4 (2018): 513–539. doi:10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    How transnational are the audiences of far right parties and movements on Twitter? While an increasing number of contributions addresses the topic of transnationalism in far right politics, few systematic investigations exist on the actors and discourses favored in transnational exchanges on social media. Building on the literature on the far right, social movements, transnationalism and the Internet, the paper addresses this gap by studying the initiators and the issues that are favored in online exchanges between audiences of far right organizations, e.g. political parties and movements across France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. We use a new dataset on the activities of far right Twitter users that is analyzed through a mixed methods approach. Using social network analysis, we detect transnational links between far right organizations across countries based on retweets from audiences of far right Twitter users. Retweets are qualitatively coded for content and compared to the content retweeted within national communities. Finally, using a logistic regression, we quantify the level to which specific issues and organizations enjoy high levels of attention across borders. Subsequently, we use discourse analysis to qualitatively reconstruct the interpretative frames accompanying these patterns. We find that although social media are often ascribed much power in favoring transnational exchanges between far right organizations, there is little evidence of this. Only a few issues (anti-immigration and nativist interpretations of the economy) garner transnational far right audiences on Twitter. In addition, we find that more than movements, political parties play a prominent role in the construction of a transnational far right discourse.

    @Article{froio-ganesh-2018,
    author = {Caterina Froio and Bharath Ganesh},
    title = {The Transnationalisation of Far Right Discourse on Twitter},
    journal = {European Societies},
    year = {2018},
    volume = {21},
    number = {4},
    pages = {513--539},
    abstract = {How transnational are the audiences of far right parties and movements on Twitter? While an increasing number of contributions addresses the topic of transnationalism in far right politics, few systematic investigations exist on the actors and discourses favored in transnational
    exchanges on social media. Building on the literature on the far right, social movements, transnationalism and the Internet, the paper addresses this gap by studying the initiators and the issues that are favored in online exchanges between audiences of far right organizations,
    e.g. political parties and movements across France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. We use a new dataset on the activities of far right Twitter users that is analyzed through a mixed methods approach. Using social network analysis, we detect transnational links between far
    right organizations across countries based on retweets from audiences of far right Twitter users. Retweets are qualitatively coded for content and compared to the content retweeted within national communities. Finally, using a logistic regression, we quantify the level to which
    specific issues and organizations enjoy high levels of attention across borders. Subsequently, we use discourse analysis to qualitatively reconstruct the interpretative frames accompanying these patterns. We find that although social media are often ascribed much power in favoring
    transnational exchanges between far right organizations, there is little evidence of this. Only a few issues (anti-immigration and nativist interpretations of the economy) garner transnational far right audiences on Twitter. In addition, we find that more than movements, political
    parties play a prominent role in the construction of a transnational far right discourse.},
    doi = {10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295},
    }

  • Gattinara, Pietro Castelli and Andrea L. P. Pirro. “The Far Right as Social Movement.” European Societies 21.4 (2019): 447–462. doi:10.1080/14616696.2018.1494301
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The literature on the far right is trying to connect with social movement studies. Scholars from different social scientific backgrounds are increasingly acknowledging that extra-parliamentary grassroots activism is part of the alliance and conflict structure of nativist collective actors. The recent rise in far-right street politics – or, precisely, its re-emergence with seemingly different clothes – should encourage the study of the inter-relations between party and non-party collective actors. As a case in point, the far right not only includes political parties geared towards elections and public office but also social movements or {“}networks of networks{“} that aim to mobilise public support, and a conglomeration of subcultural groups and groupuscules. By putting forward a three-part metric to analyse mobilisation factors at the macro, meso, and micro levels, this piece and the Special Issue it introduces bring the (inter-)relations between far-right parties, movements, and subcultures frontstage, and elaborate on nativist collective action across different arenas of contention.

    @Article{gattinara-pirro-2019,
    author = {Pietro Castelli Gattinara and Andrea L. P. Pirro},
    title = {The Far Right as Social Movement},
    journal = {European Societies},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {21},
    number = {4},
    pages = {447--462},
    abstract = {The literature on the far right is trying to connect with social movement studies. Scholars from different social scientific backgrounds are increasingly acknowledging that extra-parliamentary grassroots activism is part of the alliance and conflict structure of nativist
    collective actors. The recent rise in far-right street politics - or, precisely, its re-emergence with seemingly different clothes - should encourage the study of the inter-relations between party and non-party collective actors. As a case in point, the far right not only includes
    political parties geared towards elections and public office but also social movements or {"}networks of networks{"} that aim to mobilise public support, and a conglomeration of subcultural groups and groupuscules. By putting forward a three-part metric to analyse mobilisation factors
    at the macro, meso, and micro levels, this piece and the Special Issue it introduces bring the (inter-)relations between far-right parties, movements, and subcultures frontstage, and elaborate on nativist collective action across different arenas of contention.},
    doi = {10.1080/14616696.2018.1494301},
    }

  • de Geus, Roosmarijn and Elizabeth Ralph-Morrow. “An Every Man, Not for Every Woman: Nigel Farage and the Radical Right Gender Gap.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties online first (2021): 1–18. doi:10.1080/17457289.2021.1968410
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Support for the populist radical right (PRR) has surged across Europe. Existing studies on female support for the PRR are mostly cross-national in nature and have found that neither social-demographic nor attitudinal differences satisfactorily explain the gender gap in PRR support. Here we focus on the gender gap in support for UKIP and the Brexit Party, two parties that have significantly shaped British politics. Using data covering two European Parliamentary and three General Elections, we show that a gender gap exists in PRR support, but that it varies over time. In line with comparative studies, we find little evidence to suggest that social-demographic or attitudinal differences explain the gender gap in PRR support. Instead, we show that party leadership is crucial. Women in the British electorate hold negative opinions on Nigel Farage and this explains the gender gap in PRR support in Britain.

    @Article{geus-ralph-morrow-2021,
    author = {Roosmarijn {de Geus} and Elizabeth Ralph-Morrow},
    title = {An Every Man, Not for Every Woman: Nigel Farage and the Radical Right Gender Gap},
    journal = {Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--18},
    abstract = {Support for the populist radical right (PRR) has surged across Europe. Existing studies on female support for the PRR are mostly cross-national in nature and have found that neither social-demographic nor attitudinal differences satisfactorily explain the gender gap in PRR
    support. Here we focus on the gender gap in support for UKIP and the Brexit Party, two parties that have significantly shaped British politics. Using data covering two European Parliamentary and three General Elections, we show that a gender gap exists in PRR support, but that it
    varies over time. In line with comparative studies, we find little evidence to suggest that social-demographic or attitudinal differences explain the gender gap in PRR support. Instead, we show that party leadership is crucial. Women in the British electorate hold negative opinions
    on Nigel Farage and this explains the gender gap in PRR support in Britain.},
    doi = {10.1080/17457289.2021.1968410},
    }

  • Gherghina, Sergiu and Jean-Benoit Pilet. “Do Populist Parties Support Referendums? A Comparative Analysis of Election Manifestos in Europe.” Electoral Studies 74 (2021): online first. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102419
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Earlier research refers to populist parties as being advocates of a greater use of referendum. Yet, there has been no large-scale systematic test of this claim. This article addresses this gap in the literature and tests the relationship between populism and greater use for referendums in party manifestos. It analyzes 824 manifestos of 187 populist and non-populist parties in 27 Member States of the European Union between 1994 and 2018. We test if populist parties are virtually all in favor of a greater use of referendums and whether they would talk about referendums much more than non-populist parties.

    @Article{gherghina-pilet-2021,
    author = {Sergiu Gherghina and Jean-Benoit Pilet},
    title = {Do Populist Parties Support Referendums? A Comparative Analysis of Election Manifestos in Europe},
    journal = {Electoral Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {74},
    pages = {online first},
    abstract = {Earlier research refers to populist parties as being advocates of a greater use of referendum. Yet, there has been no large-scale systematic test of this claim. This article addresses this gap in the literature and tests the relationship between populism and greater use for
    referendums in party manifestos. It analyzes 824 manifestos of 187 populist and non-populist parties in 27 Member States of the European Union between 1994 and 2018. We test if populist parties are virtually all in favor of a greater use of referendums and whether they would talk
    about referendums much more than non-populist parties.},
    doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102419},
    }

  • Green, Jane, Timothy Hellwig, and Edward Fieldhouse. “Who Gets What: The Economy, Relative Gains and Brexit.” British Journal of Political Science 52.1 (2022): 320–338. doi:10.1017/S0007123420000551
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    There has been a lively debate about the economic and cultural-based drivers of support for populism. This article argues that economic concerns matter, but that they are realized through the relative gains and losses of social groups. Using new survey items in a large representative survey administered in Britain, it shows that citizens{“} economic assessments of the ethnic minority out-group – in relation to the group{“}s situation 12 months ago and to assessments of the economic conditions of the white British in-group – are a predictor of support for Brexit. The results, which are robust to prior referendum vote, immigration attitudes and cultural sentiment, extend across income groups and national identity strength. Extending the analysis to a comparison of geographic in- and out-groups between local communities and London lends additional support to the argument. The implications of relative group-based economics are important for understanding Brexit and the economic sources of support for populism more broadly.

    @Article{green-hellwig-fieldhouse-2022,
    author = {Jane Green and Timothy Hellwig and Edward Fieldhouse},
    title = {Who Gets What: The Economy, Relative Gains and Brexit},
    journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {52},
    number = {1},
    pages = {320--338},
    abstract = {There has been a lively debate about the economic and cultural-based drivers of support for populism. This article argues that economic concerns matter, but that they are realized through the relative gains and losses of social groups. Using new survey items in a large
    representative survey administered in Britain, it shows that citizens{"} economic assessments of the ethnic minority out-group - in relation to the group{"}s situation 12 months ago and to assessments of the economic conditions of the white British in-group - are a predictor of support
    for Brexit. The results, which are robust to prior referendum vote, immigration attitudes and cultural sentiment, extend across income groups and national identity strength. Extending the analysis to a comparison of geographic in- and out-groups between local communities and London
    lends additional support to the argument. The implications of relative group-based economics are important for understanding Brexit and the economic sources of support for populism more broadly.},
    doi = {10.1017/S0007123420000551},
    publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
    }

  • Hackenesch, Christine, Maximilian Högl, Hannes Öhler, and Aline Burni. “Populist Radical Right Parties” Impact on European Foreign Aid Spending.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies online first (2022). doi:10.1111/jcms.13308
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Since the early 2000s, populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have more than doubled their electoral support in Europe. Previous research found that PRRPs impact migration policy. However, little is known about whether they also impact other fields of domestic and foreign policy. Using a cross-country panel analysis, we test to what extent the rise of PRRPs has influenced European foreign aid spending. We find that while the rise of PRRPs has not been associated with an overall reduction in foreign aid, it has led to changes in how aid moneys are spent. PRRP strength is linked to a higher share of aid for migration-containment objectives, and less aid for addressing climate change and for multilateral organizations. Our analysis thereby provides evidence that the {“}electoral threat{“} of PRRPs puts mainstream parties under pressure not only with regard to migration but also in relation to the climate-development nexus and aid for multilateralism.

    @Article{hackenesch-hoegl-oehler-burni-2022,
    author = {Christine Hackenesch and Maximilian H{\"o}gl and Hannes {\"O}hler and Aline Burni},
    title = {Populist Radical Right Parties{"} Impact on European Foreign Aid Spending},
    journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Since the early 2000s, populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have more than doubled their electoral support in Europe. Previous research found that PRRPs impact migration policy. However, little is known about whether they also impact other fields of domestic and foreign policy.
    Using a cross-country panel analysis, we test to what extent the rise of PRRPs has influenced European foreign aid spending. We find that while the rise of PRRPs has not been associated with an overall reduction in foreign aid, it has led to changes in how aid moneys are spent.
    PRRP strength is linked to a higher share of aid for migration-containment objectives, and less aid for addressing climate change and for multilateral organizations. Our analysis thereby provides evidence that the {"}electoral threat{"} of PRRPs puts mainstream parties under pressure
    not only with regard to migration but also in relation to the climate-development nexus and aid for multilateralism.},
    doi = {10.1111/jcms.13308},
    }

  • Haffert, Lukas. “The Long-Term Effects of Oppression: Prussia, Political Catholicism, and the Alternative für Deutschland.” American Political Science Review online first (2021): 1–20. doi:10.1017/s0003055421001040
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Contemporary political behavior is often affected by historical legacies, but the specific mechanisms through which these legacies are transmitted are difficult to pin down. This paper argues that historical political conflicts can affect political behavior over several generations when they trigger an enduring organizational mobilization. It studies how the oppression of German Catholics in the nineteenth century led to a regionally differentiated mobilization of political Catholicism that still affects political support for the radical right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) today. Using newly collected data on historical oppression events, it shows that Catholic regions where oppression was intense saw greater mobilization of Catholic lay organizations than Catholic regions where oppression was milder and show lower support for the AfD today. The paper thus contributes to the literature on the historical determinants of political behavior as well as to the question of which regional context effects strengthen or weaken the radical right.

    @Article{haffert-2021,
    author = {Lukas Haffert},
    title = {The Long-Term Effects of Oppression: Prussia, Political Catholicism, and the Alternative f{\"u}r Deutschland},
    journal = {American Political Science Review},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--20},
    abstract = {Contemporary political behavior is often affected by historical legacies, but the specific mechanisms through which these legacies are transmitted are difficult to pin down. This paper argues that historical political conflicts can affect political behavior over several
    generations when they trigger an enduring organizational mobilization. It studies how the oppression of German Catholics in the nineteenth century led to a regionally differentiated mobilization of political Catholicism that still affects political support for the radical right
    Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) today. Using newly collected data on historical oppression events, it shows that Catholic regions where oppression was intense saw greater mobilization of Catholic lay organizations than Catholic regions where oppression was milder and show lower
    support for the AfD today. The paper thus contributes to the literature on the historical determinants of political behavior as well as to the question of which regional context effects strengthen or weaken the radical right.},
    doi = {10.1017/s0003055421001040},
    }

  • Hagemeister, Felix. “Populism and Propagation of Far-Right Extremism.” European Journal of Political Economy online first (2021). doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102116
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Under which conditions does populist success propagate far-right extremism? This paper examines how an information shock about the acceptance of xenophobic positions spurs an increase in far-right protests in more liberal areas in Germany. Using staggered state elections between 2014 and 2017 as a quasi-natural experiment and leveraging novel data, I show that far-right protests are unleashed in more liberal areas which were {“}shocked{“} by the surprising state-level results of the newly emerging right-wing populist AfD party ({“}Alternative für Deutschland{“}). The effect is sizeable, but depends on surprise. When success of the populist party is severely underestimated, a municipality with a populist vote share 10 percentage points below state average faces a roughly 30 percent increase of the mean likelihood of an additional far- right protest. The effect materializes only after the rightward shift of the AfD and vanishes when polling institutions correctly estimate the populist party{“}s success.

    @Article{hagemeister-2021,
    author = {Felix Hagemeister},
    title = {Populism and Propagation of Far-Right Extremism},
    journal = {European Journal of Political Economy},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Under which conditions does populist success propagate far-right extremism? This paper examines how an information shock about the acceptance of xenophobic positions spurs an increase in far-right protests in more liberal areas in Germany. Using staggered state elections between
    2014 and 2017 as a quasi-natural experiment and leveraging novel data, I show that far-right protests are unleashed in more liberal areas which were {"}shocked{"} by the surprising state-level results of the newly emerging right-wing populist AfD party ({"}Alternative für Deutschland{"}).
    The effect is sizeable, but depends on surprise. When success of the populist party is severely underestimated, a municipality with a populist vote share 10 percentage points below state average faces a roughly 30 percent increase of the mean likelihood of an additional far- right
    protest. The effect materializes only after the rightward shift of the AfD and vanishes when polling institutions correctly estimate the populist party{"}s success.},
    doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102116},
    }

  • Han, Kyung Joon and Eric Graig Castater. “It”s Not Just Where You Stand, It”s How You Got There: Social Pacts and Manual Worker Support for Radical Right-wing Parties.” European Politics and Society online first (2021): 1–25. doi:10.1080/23745118.2021.1973214
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    We utilize the literature on social pacts to argue that governments can reduce manual worker support for the radical right by engaging in an inclusive process of decision-making with unions. Our analysis examines 11 Western European countries between 1999 and 2017 and employs a Heckman selection model. We find that when left or mainstream right governments complete social pact agreements, manual workers become less likely to support radical right-wing parties (RRPs); but when such governments fail to convert social pact proposals into social pact agreements, manual workers become more likely to support RRPs. We also find that social pact agreements have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under mainstream right governments, but that failed social pact proposals have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under left governments; and that the social pact formation process matters more for the RRP support of manual workers who belong to a union than those who do not. Our results suggest that manual worker support for the radical right is not only a function of issue voting or socioeconomic and policy outcomes, but also features of the policymaking process.

    @Article{han-castater-2021,
    author = {Kyung Joon Han and Eric Graig Castater},
    title = {It{"}s Not Just Where You Stand, It{"}s How You Got There: Social Pacts and Manual Worker Support for Radical Right-wing Parties},
    journal = {European Politics and Society},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--25},
    abstract = {We utilize the literature on social pacts to argue that governments can reduce manual worker support for the radical right by engaging in an inclusive process of decision-making with unions. Our analysis examines 11 Western European countries between 1999 and 2017 and employs a
    Heckman selection model. We find that when left or mainstream right governments complete social pact agreements, manual workers become less likely to support radical right-wing parties (RRPs); but when such governments fail to convert social pact proposals into social pact
    agreements, manual workers become more likely to support RRPs. We also find that social pact agreements have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under mainstream right governments, but that failed social pact proposals have a greater
    effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under left governments; and that the social pact formation process matters more for the RRP support of manual workers who belong to a union than those who do not. Our results suggest that manual worker support
    for the radical right is not only a function of issue voting or socioeconomic and policy outcomes, but also features of the policymaking process.},
    doi = {10.1080/23745118.2021.1973214},
    }

  • Hartmann, Jörg, Karin Kurz, and Holger Lengfeld. “Modernization Losers” Revenge? Income Mobility and Support for Right- and Left-Wing Populist Parties in Germany.” European Sociological Review online first (2021). doi:10.1093/esr/jcab024
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Against the backdrop of rising support for right- and left-wing populist parties in Europe, a long-standing argument has been that the more vulnerable strata of society are deprived by structural economic change as well as increasing social inequality and express their grievances by voting for radical and populist parties. Previous research has tested the thesis either based on cross-sectional data and vague proxies for past income developments or used objective short-term measures of income changes. In this study, we propose a more thorough test using longitudinal data and measures of objective relative deprivation, objective absolute deprivation, and subjective deprivation. Using SOEP data for 2016, our results show little support that those with lower incomes identify more with the populist right-wing AfD in Germany. Furthermore, we find no evidence that objectively falling behind is associated with more support for the AfD and the populist left-wing party die Linke among the less well off. Rather, support for the AfD is highest among the less well-off with stable incomes and the less well-off who perceive their incomes as having been unstable. For die Linke, support is highest among the less well-off who experienced absolute income gains and the less well-off who perceive their incomes as having been upwardly or downwardly mobile.

    @Article{hartmann-kurz-lengfeld-2021,
    author = {J{\"o}rg Hartmann and Karin Kurz and Holger Lengfeld},
    title = {Modernization Losers{"} Revenge? Income Mobility and Support for Right- and Left-Wing Populist Parties in Germany},
    journal = {European Sociological Review},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Against the backdrop of rising support for right- and left-wing populist parties in Europe, a long-standing argument has been that the more vulnerable strata of society are deprived by structural economic change as well as increasing social inequality and express their grievances
    by voting for radical and populist parties. Previous research has tested the thesis either based on cross-sectional data and vague proxies for past income developments or used objective short-term measures of income changes. In this study, we propose a more thorough test using
    longitudinal data and measures of objective relative deprivation, objective absolute deprivation, and subjective deprivation. Using SOEP data for 2016, our results show little support that those with lower incomes identify more with the populist right-wing AfD in Germany.
    Furthermore, we find no evidence that objectively falling behind is associated with more support for the AfD and the populist left-wing party die Linke among the less well off. Rather, support for the AfD is highest among the less well-off with stable incomes and the less well-off
    who perceive their incomes as having been unstable. For die Linke, support is highest among the less well-off who experienced absolute income gains and the less well-off who perceive their incomes as having been upwardly or downwardly mobile.},
    doi = {10.1093/esr/jcab024},
    }

  • Heinze, Anna-Sophie. “Zwischen Etablierung und Mainstreaming: Zum Stand der Forschung zu Populismus und Rechtsradikalismus.” Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft online first (2022). doi:10.1007/s12286-022-00517-9
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Über kaum ein anderes Phänomen wurde in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten so viel diskutiert und publiziert wie über den Populismus. Dabei dreht sich die öffentliche und wissenschaftliche Debatte vor allem um rechten, weniger um linken Populismus. Dies ist vor dem Hintergrund der wachsenden Bedeutung (populistischer) rechtsradikaler Parteien, Bewegungen und Akteure weltweit kaum verwunderlich. In der Politikwissenschaft existiert bereits eine nahezu unüberschaubare Vielzahl an internationaler Forschung zu den Merkmalen, Erfolgsfaktoren und dem Einfluss jener Parteienfamilie (einen ersten Überblick erlaubt die Bibliographie von Arzheimer 2021). Trotz der enormen theoretischen, methodischen und empirischen Vielfalt der Studien können diese teilweise nur noch wenig Neues dazu beitragen, wie der wachsenden Bedeutung des Rechtspopulismus begegnet werden kann. Das Ziel des vorliegenden Artikels ist es daher, die bisherigen Erkenntnisse der Forschung zu Populismus und Rechtsradikalismus möglichst umfassend darzustellen, ihre Grenzen aufzuzeigen und zukünftige Forschungsperspektiven zu skizzieren. Da hierbei freilich nicht auf alle Arbeiten gleichermaßen eingegangen werden kann, wird der Fokus auf generellen Forschungstrends und -desideraten liegen.

    @Article{heinze-2022,
    author = {Anna-Sophie Heinze},
    title = {Zwischen Etablierung und Mainstreaming: Zum Stand der Forschung zu Populismus und Rechtsradikalismus},
    journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Über kaum ein anderes Phänomen wurde in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten so viel diskutiert und publiziert wie über den Populismus. Dabei dreht sich die öffentliche und wissenschaftliche Debatte vor allem um rechten, weniger um linken Populismus. Dies ist vor dem Hintergrund der
    wachsenden Bedeutung (populistischer) rechtsradikaler Parteien, Bewegungen und Akteure weltweit kaum verwunderlich. In der Politikwissenschaft existiert bereits eine nahezu unüberschaubare Vielzahl an internationaler Forschung zu den Merkmalen, Erfolgsfaktoren und dem Einfluss
    jener Parteienfamilie (einen ersten Überblick erlaubt die Bibliographie von Arzheimer 2021). Trotz der enormen theoretischen, methodischen und empirischen Vielfalt der Studien können diese teilweise nur noch wenig Neues dazu beitragen, wie der wachsenden Bedeutung des
    Rechtspopulismus begegnet werden kann. Das Ziel des vorliegenden Artikels ist es daher, die bisherigen Erkenntnisse der Forschung zu Populismus und Rechtsradikalismus möglichst umfassend darzustellen, ihre Grenzen aufzuzeigen und zukünftige Forschungsperspektiven zu skizzieren.
    Da hierbei freilich nicht auf alle Arbeiten gleichermaßen eingegangen werden kann, wird der Fokus auf generellen Forschungstrends und -desideraten liegen.},
    doi = {10.1007/s12286-022-00517-9},
    }

  • Heinze, Anna-Sophie and Man a`e. “No Strong Leaders Needed? Afd Party Organisation Between Collective Leadership, Internal Democracy, and “Movement-Party” Strategy.” Politics and Governance 9.4 (2021): 263–274. doi:10.17645/pag.v9i4.4530
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article analyses the formal and lived organisation of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany). We show that the party is exceptional among what is usually understood as the populist radical right (PRR) party family, at least from an organisational perspective: The AfD sharply contradicts the {“}standard model{“} of PRR party organisation, which emphasises {“}charismatic{“} leadership and the centralisation of power as key features. Instead, studying the AfD{“}s efforts to adopt some elements of a mass-party organisation and its relatively decentralised decision-making underlines the importance of {“}movement-party{“} strategy, collective leadership, and internal democracy-concepts that are usually associated with Green and left-wing parties. Our analysis shows how the party{“}s organisation is essential for understanding its development more broadly as it reflects and reinforces sharp intra-party conflict. From this perspective, the case of the AfD sheds new light on the relationship between PRR party organisation and electoral success, indicating the importance of strong ties to parts of society over effective internal management as long as demand for anti-immigration parties is high. We conclude that even though AfD quickly built up a relatively inclusive organisational structure, the role of both its leadership and its rank-and-file is still a matter of controversy.

    @Article{heinze-weisskircher-2021,
    author = {Anna-Sophie Heinze and Man{\a`e}s Weisskircher},
    title = {No Strong Leaders Needed? Afd Party Organisation Between Collective Leadership, Internal Democracy, and {"}Movement-Party{"} Strategy},
    journal = {Politics and Governance},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {9},
    number = {4},
    pages = {263--274},
    abstract = {This article analyses the formal and lived organisation of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany). We show that the party is exceptional among what is usually understood as the populist radical right (PRR) party family, at least from an organisational
    perspective: The AfD sharply contradicts the {"}standard model{"} of PRR party organisation, which emphasises {"}charismatic{"} leadership and the centralisation of power as key features. Instead, studying the AfD{"}s efforts to adopt some elements of a mass-party organisation and its
    relatively decentralised decision-making underlines the importance of {"}movement-party{"} strategy, collective leadership, and internal democracy-concepts that are usually associated with Green and left-wing parties. Our analysis shows how the party{"}s organisation is essential for
    understanding its development more broadly as it reflects and reinforces sharp intra-party conflict. From this perspective, the case of the AfD sheds new light on the relationship between PRR party organisation and electoral success, indicating the importance of strong ties to
    parts of society over effective internal management as long as demand for anti-immigration parties is high. We conclude that even though AfD quickly built up a relatively inclusive organisational structure, the role of both its leadership and its rank-and-file is still a matter of
    controversy.},
    doi = {10.17645/pag.v9i4.4530},
    }

  • Höhne, Benjamin. “How Democracy Works Within a Populist Party: Candidate Selection in the Alternative for Germany.” Government and Opposition online first (2021): 1–19. doi:10.1017/gov.2021.33
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Does the demand for more direct democracy by populist parties have any implications for their internal decision-making? To answer this question, a novel large-scale research project analyses the 2017 candidate selection of all Bundestag parties, including the populist Alternative for Germany. Some 1,334 individual nominations of seven parties are compared using quantitative indicators along three dimensions of intra-party democracy (IPD): competition between aspirants for candidacy, inclusion of members and nomination-related communication. It shows that the AfD is living up to its promise of practising grassroots democracy: in all results it ranks at the top by a wide margin. A new populist organizational model seems to have emerged following neither the classic hierarchical and leader-oriented mode of many other European right-wing populist parties nor the delegate assembly mode typical of German parties. Our further development of IPD concepts, newly elaborated measuring methods and surprising empirical evidence improve the understanding of democratic decision-making in populist parties.

    @Article{hoehne-2021,
    author = {Benjamin H{\"o}hne},
    title = {How Democracy Works Within a Populist Party: Candidate Selection in the Alternative for Germany},
    journal = {Government and Opposition},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--19},
    abstract = {Does the demand for more direct democracy by populist parties have any implications for their internal decision-making? To answer this question, a novel large-scale research project analyses the 2017 candidate selection of all Bundestag parties, including the populist Alternative
    for Germany. Some 1,334 individual nominations of seven parties are compared using quantitative indicators along three dimensions of intra-party democracy (IPD): competition between aspirants for candidacy, inclusion of members and nomination-related communication. It shows that
    the AfD is living up to its promise of practising grassroots democracy: in all results it ranks at the top by a wide margin. A new populist organizational model seems to have emerged following neither the classic hierarchical and leader-oriented mode of many other European
    right-wing populist parties nor the delegate assembly mode typical of German parties. Our further development of IPD concepts, newly elaborated measuring methods and surprising empirical evidence improve the understanding of democratic decision-making in populist parties.},
    doi = {10.1017/gov.2021.33},
    }

  • Hunger, Sophia and Fred Paxton. “What”s in a buzzword? A systematic review of the state of populism research in political science.” Political Science Research and Methods (2021): online first. doi:10.1017/psrm.2021.44
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Although attention to populism is ever-increasing, the concept remains contested. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of populism research and identifies tendencies to a conflation of host ideologies and populism in political science through a two-step analysis. First, we conduct a quantitative review of 884 abstracts from 2004 to 2018 using text-as-data methods. We show that scholars sit at {“}separate tables,{“} divided by geographical foci, methods, and host ideologies. Next, our qualitative analysis of 50 articles finds a common conflation of populism with other ideologies, resulting in the analytical neglect of the former. We, therefore, urge researchers to properly distinguish populism from {“}what it travels with{“} and engage more strongly with the dynamic interlinkages between thin and thick ideologies.

    @Article{hunger-paxton-2021,
    author = {Sophia Hunger and Fred Paxton},
    title = {What{"}s in a buzzword? A systematic review of the state of populism research in political science},
    journal = {Political Science Research and Methods},
    year = {2021},
    pages = {online first},
    abstract = {Although attention to populism is ever-increasing, the concept remains contested. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of populism research and identifies tendencies to a conflation of host ideologies and populism in political science through a two-step analysis. First, we
    conduct a quantitative review of 884 abstracts from 2004 to 2018 using text-as-data methods. We show that scholars sit at {"}separate tables,{"} divided by geographical foci, methods, and host ideologies. Next, our qualitative analysis of 50 articles finds a common conflation of
    populism with other ideologies, resulting in the analytical neglect of the former. We, therefore, urge researchers to properly distinguish populism from {"}what it travels with{"} and engage more strongly with the dynamic interlinkages between thin and thick ideologies.},
    doi = {10.1017/psrm.2021.44},
    }

  • Jacobs, Laura and Joost van Spanje. “Not All Terror Is Alike: How Right-Wing Extremist and Islamist Terror Threat Affect Anti-immigration Party Support.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research online first (2021). doi:10.1093/ijpor/edaa037
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Terror threat has been theorized to affect political attitudes. Most prior studies have focused exclusively on Islamist terror threat, while effects of right-wing extremist terrorism on voting behavior have been understudied. We argue that effects on the propensity to vote (PTV) for an anti-immigration party (AIP) depend on the type of threat and is moderated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and internal motivation to control prejudice (IMCP). Using a cross-country experiment in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (N = 1,187), we find that Islamist terror threat increases PTV for AIPs amongst voters high in RWA; similarly, right-wing extremist terror threat reduces PTV for AIPs amongst participants high in RWA. IMCP did not moderate the relationship between terror threat and PTV for an AIP.

    @Article{jacobs-spanje-2021b,
    author = {Laura Jacobs and Joost {van Spanje}},
    title = {Not All Terror Is Alike: How Right-Wing Extremist and Islamist Terror Threat Affect Anti-immigration Party Support},
    journal = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Terror threat has been theorized to affect political attitudes. Most prior studies have focused exclusively on Islamist terror threat, while effects of right-wing extremist terrorism on voting behavior have been understudied. We argue that effects on the propensity to vote (PTV)
    for an anti-immigration party (AIP) depend on the type of threat and is moderated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and internal motivation to control prejudice (IMCP). Using a cross-country experiment in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (N = 1,187), we find that
    Islamist terror threat increases PTV for AIPs amongst voters high in RWA; similarly, right-wing extremist terror threat reduces PTV for AIPs amongst participants high in RWA. IMCP did not moderate the relationship between terror threat and PTV for an AIP.},
    doi = {10.1093/ijpor/edaa037},
    }

  • Jennings, Will and Gerry Stoker. “The Divergent Dynamics of Cities and Towns: Geographical Polarisation and Brexit.” The Political Quarterly 90.S2 (2018): 155–166. doi:10.1111/1467-923x.12612
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    the brexit vote revealed a country divided by place, reflecting the diverging trajectories of economic development and politics taken by locations that have prospered in a globalised knowledge economy-predominantly cities-contrasted with places on the periphery, in towns and rural areas. The same dynamics are observed in the United States, where support for the Democratic party is increasingly concentrated in urban areas, while the Republicans have lately made electoral inroads across the rural and small-town America that is shrinking or stagnating in terms of its population and jobs-creating a polarised politics that is divided by demographics and geography. In Europe, there has been a clear spatial pattern in electoral support for populist parties and candidates.2 There are ways in which the British case has distinct features-due to its particular geography and institutions-but it largely reflects a wider trend where {“}place{“} is increasingly consequential for political change and public policy. While the EU referendum vote put the political divide between Britain{“}s towns and cities into the spotlight, this divide is the product of long-term forces of social and economic changes. In this chapter, we show how geographical polarisation has and continues to reshape British politics, in the diverging trends between those places that have experienced relative decline and those that have thrived. Not only do these changes have electoral consequences for the major parties in Westminster, they pose particular challenges in terms of public policy. Our argument proceeds as follows. Firstly, we demonstrate the trend towards geographical polarisation in voting behaviour, as the populations of big cities have voted in increasing numbers for Labour, while the residents of towns and rural areas increasingly have opted for the Conservatives. Secondly, we argue and show that this trend reflects economic as well as cultural forces: the schism between places reflects both divergent paths of demographic and economic change and related variation in the cultural and social outlooks of voters. Thirdly, we discuss the major challenge-amplified by Brexit-that this geographical polarisation presents for each of the parties as they seek to build electoral coalitions that reach beyond their existing strongholds. In concluding, we explore how the parties are presently responding to the place-based divergence of voting behaviour and policy problems.

    @Article{jennings-stoker-2018,
    author = {Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker},
    title = {The Divergent Dynamics of Cities and Towns: Geographical Polarisation and Brexit},
    journal = {The Political Quarterly},
    year = {2018},
    volume = {90},
    number = {S2},
    pages = {155--166},
    abstract = {the brexit vote revealed a country divided by place, reflecting the diverging trajectories of economic development and politics taken by locations that have prospered in a globalised knowledge economy-predominantly cities-contrasted with places on the periphery, in towns and rural areas. The same dynamics are observed in the United States, where support for the Democratic party is increasingly concentrated in urban areas, while the Republicans have lately made electoral inroads across the rural and small-town America that is shrinking or stagnating in terms of its population and jobs-creating a polarised politics that is divided by demographics and geography. In Europe, there has been a clear spatial pattern in electoral support for populist parties and candidates.2 There are ways in which the British case has distinct features-due to its particular geography and institutions-but it largely reflects a wider trend where {"}place{"} is increasingly consequential for political change and public policy. While the EU referendum vote put the political divide between Britain{"}s towns and cities into the spotlight, this divide is the product of long-term forces of social and economic changes. In this chapter, we show how geographical polarisation has and continues to reshape British politics, in the diverging trends between those places that have experienced relative decline and those that have thrived. Not only do these changes have electoral consequences for the major parties in Westminster, they pose particular challenges in terms of public policy. Our argument proceeds as follows. Firstly, we demonstrate the trend towards geographical polarisation in voting behaviour,
    as the populations of big cities have voted in increasing numbers for Labour, while the residents of towns and rural areas increasingly have opted for the Conservatives. Secondly, we argue and show that this trend reflects economic as well as cultural forces: the schism between places reflects both divergent paths of demographic and economic change and related variation in the cultural and social outlooks of voters. Thirdly, we discuss the major challenge-amplified by Brexit-that this geographical polarisation presents for each of the parties as they seek to build electoral coalitions that reach beyond their existing strongholds. In concluding, we explore how the parties are presently responding to the place-based divergence of voting behaviour and policy problems.},
    doi = {10.1111/1467-923x.12612},
    }

  • de Jonge, L{a’e}onie. “The Curious Case of Belgium: Why is There no Right-Wing Populism in Wallonia?.” Government and Opposition online first (2020): 1–17. doi:10.1017/gov.2020.8
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Why are populist radical right parties (PRRPs) more successful in some countries than in others? This question is analysed here by focusing on Belgium. While Flanders (the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) was home to one of the strongest far-right movements in Europe, Wallonia (the southern, francophone part) has remained {“}immune{“} to such tendencies. The article argues that different historical experiences have given rise to a hostile political environment for PRRPs in Wallonia, where mainstream parties and the media have created a successful cordon sanitaire. In Flanders, mainstream parties and the media have gradually become more accommodative towards PRRPs. By emphasizing the sociopolitical context in which parties operate, the findings suggest that the reactions of mainstream parties and the media are crucial to understanding the success of PRRPs. The conclusion reflects on potential lessons to be drawn from the Belgian case for mainstream parties and media practitioners elsewhere.

    @Article{de-jonge-2020,
    author = {L{\a'e}onie {de Jonge}},
    title = {The Curious Case of Belgium: Why is There no Right-Wing Populism in Wallonia?},
    journal = {Government and Opposition},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--17},
    abstract = {Why are populist radical right parties (PRRPs) more successful in some countries than in others? This question is analysed here by focusing on Belgium. While Flanders (the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) was home to one of the strongest far-right movements in Europe,
    Wallonia (the southern, francophone part) has remained {"}immune{"} to such tendencies. The article argues that different historical experiences have given rise to a hostile political environment for PRRPs in Wallonia, where mainstream parties and the media have created a successful
    cordon sanitaire. In Flanders, mainstream parties and the media have gradually become more accommodative towards PRRPs. By emphasizing the sociopolitical context in which parties operate, the findings suggest that the reactions of mainstream parties and the media are crucial to
    understanding the success of PRRPs. The conclusion reflects on potential lessons to be drawn from the Belgian case for mainstream parties and media practitioners elsewhere.},
    doi = {10.1017/gov.2020.8},
    }

  • Heinze, Anna-Sophie and Man a`e. “How Political Parties Respond To Pariah Street Protest: the Case of Anti-Corona Mobilisation in Germany.” German Politics online first (2022): 1–22. doi:10.1080/09644008.2022.2042518
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    How do political parties respond to street protest by political outsiders widely considered to be {“}pariahs{“} (i.e. radical or extremist actors)? Bridging the literature on responses to {“}populist{“} radical right parties with insights from social movement studies, we propose a theoretical model that conceptualises potential party responses to pariah protest. Innovatively, our typology distinguishes between a set of formal and substantive responses to street mobilisation. Empirically, we apply this model by providing the first systematic study of how political parties have responded to the {“}anti-Corona{“} protests of Querdenken, contributing to social science research on the politics of the COVID-19 pandemic. Analysing the critical case of Germany, we underline the stark difference between how the populist radical right AfD and all other Bundestag parties respond to anti-Corona mobilisation, showing how political protest may sharpen the polarisation of party politics. Moreover, we highlight the more nuanced but still important differences in responses by established German parties. Theoretically, the article provides an analytical framework valuable in times of increasing street mobilisation by radical and extremist actors. Methodologically, our analysis relies on a systematic media analysis of articles from two major German newspapers. Empirically, it contributes to our understanding of the difficult but crucial relationship between the German protest and party arena during the COVID-19 pandemic.

    @Article{heinze-weisskircher-2022,
    author = {Anna-Sophie Heinze and Man{\a`e}s Weisskircher},
    title = {How Political Parties Respond To Pariah Street Protest: the Case of Anti-Corona Mobilisation in Germany},
    journal = {German Politics},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--22},
    abstract = {How do political parties respond to street protest by political outsiders widely considered to be {"}pariahs{"} (i.e. radical or extremist actors)? Bridging the literature on responses to {"}populist{"} radical right parties with insights from social movement studies, we propose a
    theoretical model that conceptualises potential party responses to pariah protest. Innovatively, our typology distinguishes between a set of formal and substantive responses to street mobilisation. Empirically, we apply this model by providing the first systematic study of how
    political parties have responded to the {"}anti-Corona{"} protests of Querdenken, contributing to social science research on the politics of the COVID-19 pandemic. Analysing the critical case of Germany, we underline the stark difference between how the populist radical right AfD and
    all other Bundestag parties respond to anti-Corona mobilisation, showing how political protest may sharpen the polarisation of party politics. Moreover, we highlight the more nuanced but still important differences in responses by established German parties. Theoretically, the
    article provides an analytical framework valuable in times of increasing street mobilisation by radical and extremist actors. Methodologically, our analysis relies on a systematic media analysis of articles from two major German newspapers. Empirically, it contributes to our
    understanding of the difficult but crucial relationship between the German protest and party arena during the COVID-19 pandemic.},
    doi = {10.1080/09644008.2022.2042518},
    }

  • Hoerner, Julian M., Alexander Jaax, and Toni Rodon. “The Long-Term Impact of the Location of Concentration Camps on Radical-Right Voting in Germany.” Research & Politics 6.4 (2019): 1–8. doi:10.1177/2053168019891376
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Of all atrocities committed by state actors in 20th century Europe, the systematic killings by Nazi Germany were arguably the most severe and best documented. While several studies have investigated the impact of the presence of concentration camps on surrounding communities in Germany and the occupied territories in terms of redistribution of wealth and property, the local-level impact on voting behaviour has not yet been explored. We investigated the impact of spatial proximity to a concentration camp between 1933 and 1945 on the likelihood of voting for far-right parties in the 2013 and 2017 federal elections. We find that proximity to a former concentration camp is associated with a higher vote share of such parties. A potential explanation for this finding could be a ‘memory satiation effect’, according to which voters who live in close proximity to former camps and are more frequently confronted with the past are more receptive to revisionist historical accounts questioning the centrality of the Holocaust in the German culture of remembrance.

    @Article{hoerner-jaax-rodon-2019,
    author = {Julian M. Hoerner and Alexander Jaax and Toni Rodon},
    title = {The Long-Term Impact of the Location of Concentration Camps on Radical-Right Voting in Germany},
    journal = {Research \& Politics},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {6},
    number = {4},
    abstract = {Of all atrocities committed by state actors in 20th century Europe, the systematic killings by Nazi Germany were arguably the most severe and best documented. While several studies have investigated the impact of the presence of concentration camps on surrounding communities in
    Germany and the occupied territories in terms of redistribution of wealth and property, the local-level impact on voting behaviour has not yet been explored. We investigated the impact of spatial proximity to a concentration camp between 1933 and 1945 on the likelihood of voting
    for far-right parties in the 2013 and 2017 federal elections. We find that proximity to a former concentration camp is associated with a higher vote share of such parties. A potential explanation for this finding could be a ‘memory satiation effect’, according to which voters
    who live in close proximity to former camps and are more frequently confronted with the past are more receptive to revisionist historical accounts questioning the centrality of the Holocaust in the German culture of remembrance.},
    pages = {1--8},
    doi = {10.1177/2053168019891376},
    }

  • Kamenova, Valeriya. “Internal Democracy in Populist Right Parties: The Process of Party Policy Development in the Alternative for Germany.” European Political Science Review 13.4 (2021): 488–505. doi:10.1017/S1755773921000217
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    For the past decade, populist left- and right-wing parties have been on the rise in Europe. Yet, there are only a few studies on the internal organizational dynamics of these parties. Drawing on a new and unique data from fieldwork observations and interviews with party members from the Alternative for Germany (AfD), this article examines the internal democratic mechanisms in policy formation. The AfD displays a high degree of internal participation – an important but contrasting addition to the comparative research on radical right parties, which fail to sustain a democratic internal organization and consistently adopt mechanisms to centralize power in the leadership. The findings from this field research suggest that populist parties may actually engage in meaningful intra-party democracy and internal deliberative practices to invigorate the connections between citizens and their party representatives.

    @Article{kamenova-2021,
    author = {Valeriya Kamenova},
    title = {Internal Democracy in Populist Right Parties: The Process of Party Policy Development in the Alternative for Germany},
    journal = {European Political Science Review},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {13},
    number = {4},
    pages = {488--505},
    abstract = {For the past decade, populist left- and right-wing parties have been on the rise in Europe. Yet, there are only a few studies on the internal organizational dynamics of these parties. Drawing on a new and unique data from fieldwork observations and interviews with party members
    from the Alternative for Germany (AfD), this article examines the internal democratic mechanisms in policy formation. The AfD displays a high degree of internal participation - an important but contrasting addition to the comparative research on radical right parties, which fail to
    sustain a democratic internal organization and consistently adopt mechanisms to centralize power in the leadership. The findings from this field research suggest that populist parties may actually engage in meaningful intra-party democracy and internal deliberative practices to
    invigorate the connections between citizens and their party representatives.},
    doi = {10.1017/S1755773921000217},
    }

  • Klein, Ofra and Andrea L. P. Pirro. “Reverting Trajectories? UKIP”s Organisational and Discursive Change After the Brexit Referendum.” Information, Communication & Society online first (2020): 1–19. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2020.1792532
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The article focuses on the transformation of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) after the 2016 Brexit referendum. It describes how, after securing its chief political demand, UKIP opened up to grassroots far-right politics and assesses whether this strategy involved a concomitant shift towards a more radical discourse. Against a backdrop of organisational change, the findings refine the notion that a far-right turn within its ranks led to a significant shift in the (online) communication of the party towards issues like immigration, Islam, and gender. Indeed, these issues were mostly {“}outsourced{“} to the cultural wing of the party, War Plan Purple. The article therefore critically links changes in UKIP{“}s organisation with shifts in online communication, adding new insights into the unorthodox politics and forms of mobilisation of the far right.

    @Article{klein-pirro-2020,
    author = {Ofra Klein and Andrea L. P. Pirro},
    title = {Reverting Trajectories? UKIP{"}s Organisational and Discursive Change After the Brexit Referendum},
    journal = {Information, Communication \& Society},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--19},
    abstract = {The article focuses on the transformation of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) after the 2016 Brexit referendum. It describes how, after securing its chief political demand, UKIP opened up to grassroots far-right politics and assesses whether this strategy involved a concomitant
    shift towards a more radical discourse. Against a backdrop of organisational change, the findings refine the notion that a far-right turn within its ranks led to a significant shift in the (online) communication of the party towards issues like immigration, Islam, and gender.
    Indeed, these issues were mostly {"}outsourced{"} to the cultural wing of the party, War Plan Purple. The article therefore critically links changes in UKIP{"}s organisation with shifts in online communication, adding new insights into the unorthodox politics and forms of mobilisation of
    the far right.},
    doi = {10.1080/1369118X.2020.1792532},
    }

  • Kokkonen, Andrej and Jonas Linde. “Nativist Attitudes and Opportunistic Support for Democracy.” West European Politics online first (2021): 1–24. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.2007459
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Do nativists differ from other citizens in their attitudes towards democracy? In this article it is demonstrated that nativism goes hand in hand with preferences for a type of democracy where the interests of the natives should prevail, even at the cost of diminished minority rights, checks and balances, and other constraints on executive power. Liberal representative democracy is not for nativists. It is also shown that nativists seem to believe that the end justifies the means when it comes to different forms of decision making, and that this opportunistic trait usually translates into support for more direct democracy and scepticism towards representative democracy, because nativists tend to believe that they are in the majority (even if they are not). This article concludes that this tendency may in fact be a blessing of sorts, as it keeps nativists from supporting alternatives to democracy.

    @Article{kokkonen-linde-2021,
    author = {Andrej Kokkonen and Jonas Linde},
    title = {Nativist Attitudes and Opportunistic Support for Democracy},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--24},
    abstract = {Do nativists differ from other citizens in their attitudes towards democracy? In this article it is demonstrated that nativism goes hand in hand with preferences for a type of democracy where the interests of the natives should prevail, even at the cost of diminished minority
    rights, checks and balances, and other constraints on executive power. Liberal representative democracy is not for nativists. It is also shown that nativists seem to believe that the end justifies the means when it comes to different forms of decision making, and that this
    opportunistic trait usually translates into support for more direct democracy and scepticism towards representative democracy, because nativists tend to believe that they are in the majority (even if they are not). This article concludes that this tendency may in fact be a blessing
    of sorts, as it keeps nativists from supporting alternatives to democracy.},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.2007459},
    }

  • Krause, Werner and Heiko Giebler. “Shifting Welfare Policy Positions: the Impact of Radical Right Populist Party Success Beyond Migration Politics.” Representation 56.3 (2019): 331–348. doi:10.1080/00344893.2019.1661871
    [BibTeX] [Abstract] [URL]

    Political parties respond strategically to the electoral success of radical right populist parties (RRPPs). While previous research has focused on programmatic responses on cultural conflict issues, we are expanding the research on policy position adaption to the economic left-right issue of welfare-state politics. Actual and potential supporters of RRPPs do not only feel threatened by migration or liberal conceptions of society but are also often confronted with real or perceived socio-economic decline. Therefore, we argue that established parties do not only react by changing their socio-cultural policy offers but also by adjusting their welfare state policy positions. Based on parties{“} voter potentials and issue ownership theory, we investigate whether such changes are especially pronounced for left-of-center parties. Analysing data from 18 West European countries since 1985, we find that non-RRPPs indeed advocate more leftist positions on welfare state policies in response to increasing electoral support for RRPPs. This effect is especially pronounced for economically left-of-centre parties as these parties might consider this to be a promising strategy to win back voters from the populist radical right.

    @Article{krause-giebler-2019,
    author = {Werner Krause and Heiko Giebler},
    title = {Shifting Welfare Policy Positions: the Impact of Radical Right Populist Party Success Beyond Migration Politics},
    journal = {Representation},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {56},
    number = {3},
    pages = {331--348},
    abstract = {Political parties respond strategically to the electoral success of radical right populist parties (RRPPs). While previous research has focused on programmatic responses on cultural conflict issues, we are expanding the research on policy position adaption to the economic
    left-right issue of welfare-state politics. Actual and potential supporters of RRPPs do not only feel threatened by migration or liberal conceptions of society but are also often confronted with real or perceived socio-economic decline. Therefore, we argue that established parties
    do not only react by changing their socio-cultural policy offers but also by adjusting their welfare state policy positions. Based on parties{"} voter potentials and issue ownership theory, we investigate whether such changes are especially pronounced for left-of-center parties.
    Analysing data from 18 West European countries since 1985, we find that non-RRPPs indeed advocate more leftist positions on welfare state policies in response to increasing electoral support for RRPPs. This effect is especially pronounced for economically left-of-centre parties as
    these parties might consider this to be a promising strategy to win back voters from the populist radical right.},
    doi = {10.1080/00344893.2019.1661871},
    url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2019.1661871},
    }

  • Marcinkiewicz, Kamil and Ruth Dassonneville. “Do religious voters support populist radical right parties? Opposite effects in Western and East-Central Europe.” Party Politics online first (2021). doi:10.1177/1354068820985187
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The rise of populist radical right parties fuels a discussion about the roots of their success. Existing research has demonstrated the relevance of gender, education and income for explaining the far-right vote. The present study contributes to the aforementioned debate by focusing on the role of religiosity. The data collected in the eighth round of the European Social Survey (2016) allow examining in more detail the political relevance of attendance at religious services and other measures of religious devotion. This study focuses in particular on 15 countries, 11 from Western Europe and 4 from East-Central Europe. In none of the Western European countries is there evidence of a positive relationship between religiosity and vote for a populist radical right party. In fact, in many countries of this region more religious voters are substantively less inclined to support far-right movements. The situation is different in parts of East-Central Europe. In Poland, and to a weaker extent also in Hungary, the probability of a vote for right-wing populists increases with religiosity.

    @Article{marcinkiewicz-dassonneville-2021,
    author = {Kamil Marcinkiewicz and Ruth Dassonneville},
    title = {Do religious voters support populist radical right parties? Opposite effects in Western and East-Central Europe},
    journal = {Party Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The rise of populist radical right parties fuels a discussion about the roots of their success. Existing research has demonstrated the relevance of gender, education and income for explaining the far-right vote. The present study contributes to the aforementioned debate by
    focusing on the role of religiosity. The data collected in the eighth round of the European Social Survey (2016) allow examining in more detail the political relevance of attendance at religious services and other measures of religious devotion. This study focuses in particular on
    15 countries, 11 from Western Europe and 4 from East-Central Europe. In none of the Western European countries is there evidence of a positive relationship between religiosity and vote for a populist radical right party. In fact, in many countries of this region more religious
    voters are substantively less inclined to support far-right movements. The situation is different in parts of East-Central Europe. In Poland, and to a weaker extent also in Hungary, the probability of a vote for right-wing populists increases with religiosity.},
    doi = {10.1177/1354068820985187},
    }

  • Marcos-Marne, Hugo, Carolina Plaza-Colodro, and Ciaran O”Flynn. “Populism and new radical-right parties: The case of VOX.” Politics online first (2021). doi:10.1177/02633957211019587
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The populist radical-right label brings together parties characterised by their adherence to populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. While the relevance of the label to the family is unquestioned, its popularity, combined with the theoretical affinity between the three core elements, may cause radical-right parties to be systematically considered populist without further examination. This article posits that whether a radical-right party is populist is an open empirical question, and to demonstrate this, we test the importance of populism in the discourse and electoral success of a new radical-right party, Spain{“}s VOX. Our empirical strategy is based on the holistic grading of core political discourses, and the analysis of innovative survey data that includes populist attitudes and voting intention. Our results indicate that, despite the existence of certain populist elements in both the supply and demand sides of the electoral competition, these should be considered supplemental and subordinate to nationalist and traditionalist elements, which are central to explaining both the discourse and electoral success of VOX. We believe that our findings are a cautionary note against assuming that all radical-right parties are populist, and an invitation to improve empirical techniques able to separate populism, nativism, and authoritarianism in political discourses.

    @Article{marcos-marne-plaza-colodro-oflynn-2021,
    author = {Hugo Marcos-Marne and Carolina Plaza-Colodro and Ciaran O"Flynn},
    title = {Populism and new radical-right parties: The case of VOX},
    journal = {Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The populist radical-right label brings together parties characterised by their adherence to populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. While the relevance of the label to the family is unquestioned, its popularity, combined with the theoretical affinity between the three core
    elements, may cause radical-right parties to be systematically considered populist without further examination. This article posits that whether a radical-right party is populist is an open empirical question, and to demonstrate this, we test the importance of populism in the
    discourse and electoral success of a new radical-right party, Spain{"}s VOX. Our empirical strategy is based on the holistic grading of core political discourses, and the analysis of innovative survey data that includes populist attitudes and voting intention. Our results indicate
    that, despite the existence of certain populist elements in both the supply and demand sides of the electoral competition, these should be considered supplemental and subordinate to nationalist and traditionalist elements, which are central to explaining both the discourse and
    electoral success of VOX. We believe that our findings are a cautionary note against assuming that all radical-right parties are populist, and an invitation to improve empirical techniques able to separate populism, nativism, and authoritarianism in political discourses.},
    doi = {10.1177/02633957211019587},
    }

  • Maurer, Marcus, Pablo Jost, Marlene Schaaf, Michael Sülflow, and Simon Kruschinski. “How right-wing populists instrumentalize news media: Deliberate provocations, scandalizing media coverage, and public awareness for the Alternative for Germany (AfD).” The International Journal of Press/Politics online first (2022). doi:10.1177/19401612211072692
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The rise of right-wing populist parties in Western democracies is often attributed to populists{“} ability to instrumentalize news media by making deliberate provocations (e.g., verbal attacks on migrants or politicians from other parties) that generate media coverage and public awareness. To explain the success of populists{“} deliberate provocations, we drew from research on populism and scandal theory to develop a theoretical framework that we tested in two studies examining the rise of German right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) between January 2015 and December 2018. In Study 1, an input-output analysis of 17 deliberate provocations by AfD politicians in German news media revealed much more coverage about their attacks on migrants than about their attacks on political elites, although all were covered in predominantly scandalizing ways. Next, Study 2, involving media database research and an analysis of Google Trends data, showed that the provocations had increased overall media coverage about the AfD and influenced public awareness of the party

    @Article{maurer-jost-schaaf-suelflow-kruschinski-2022,
    author = {Marcus Maurer and Pablo Jost and Marlene Schaaf and Michael S{\"u}lflow and Simon Kruschinski},
    title = {How right-wing populists instrumentalize news media: Deliberate provocations, scandalizing media coverage, and public awareness for the Alternative for Germany (AfD)},
    journal = {The International Journal of Press/Politics},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The rise of right-wing populist parties in Western democracies is often attributed to populists{"} ability to instrumentalize news media by making deliberate provocations (e.g., verbal attacks on migrants or politicians from other parties) that generate media coverage and public
    awareness. To explain the success of populists{"} deliberate provocations, we drew from research on populism and scandal theory to develop a theoretical framework that we tested in two studies examining the rise of German right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)
    between January 2015 and December 2018. In Study 1, an input-output analysis of 17 deliberate provocations by AfD politicians in German news media revealed much more coverage about their attacks on migrants than about their attacks on political elites, although all were covered in
    predominantly scandalizing ways. Next, Study 2, involving media database research and an analysis of Google Trends data, showed that the provocations had increased overall media coverage about the AfD and influenced public awareness of the party},
    doi = {10.1177/19401612211072692},
    }

  • Milner, Helen V.. “Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right.” Comparative Political Studies 54.13 (2021): 2286–2320. doi:10.1177/0010414021997175
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    What are the political consequences of economic globalization? Since the 1990s, scholars of European party politics have noted the rise of extremist parties, especially right-wing populist ones, and the decline of mainstream left and right parties. This paper focuses on the association between globalization in terms of trade, capital and labor flows, technological change, and popular support for extreme right parties. I examine these relations at the regional and individual level in 15 advanced industrial democracies in Western Europe from 1990 to 2018. Globalization, especially in the form of trade, is associated with growing vote shares for extreme right parties. Technological change in the form of automation increases support for extreme right parties. The financial crisis enhanced support for populist right parties and strengthened the negative relationship between trade shocks and declining support for mainstream left parties. And the use of social welfare compensation seems unable to dampen these political trends.1

    @Article{milner-2021,
    author = {Helen V. Milner},
    title = {Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right},
    journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {54},
    number = {13},
    pages = {2286--2320},
    abstract = {What are the political consequences of economic globalization? Since the 1990s, scholars of European party politics have noted the rise of extremist parties, especially right-wing populist ones, and the decline of mainstream left and right parties. This paper focuses on the
    association between globalization in terms of trade, capital and labor flows, technological change, and popular support for extreme right parties. I examine these relations at the regional and individual level in 15 advanced industrial democracies in Western Europe from 1990 to
    2018. Globalization, especially in the form of trade, is associated with growing vote shares for extreme right parties. Technological change in the form of automation increases support for extreme right parties. The financial crisis enhanced support for populist right parties and
    strengthened the negative relationship between trade shocks and declining support for mainstream left parties. And the use of social welfare compensation seems unable to dampen these political trends.1},
    doi = {10.1177/0010414021997175},
    }

  • Munis, Kal B.. “Us Over Here Versus Them Over There … Literally: Measuring Place Resentment in American Politics.” Political Behavior (2020): online first. doi:10.1007/s11109-020-09641-2
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Political scientists are accustomed to imagining electoral politics in geographical terms. For instance, there is a {“}red America{“} that largely covers the country{“}s expansive heartland and there is a {“}blue America{“} mostly confined to the coasts. Until recently, however, public opinion scholars had largely lost sight of the fact that the places where people live, and people{“}s identification with those places, shape public opinion and political behavior. This paper develops and validates a flexible psychometric scale measure of a key political psychological dimension of place: place resentment. Place resentment is hostility toward place-based outgroups perceived as enjoying undeserved benefits beyond those enjoyed by one{“}s place-based ingroup. Regression results indicate that males, ruralites, younger Americans, those high in place identity, and those high in racial resentment are more likely to harbor higher levels of place resentment.

    @Article{munis-2020,
    author = {B. Kal Munis},
    title = {Us Over Here Versus Them Over There ... Literally: Measuring Place Resentment in American Politics},
    journal = {Political Behavior},
    year = {2020},
    abstract = {Political scientists are accustomed to imagining electoral politics in geographical terms. For instance, there is a {"}red America{"} that largely covers the country{"}s expansive heartland and there is a {"}blue America{"} mostly confined to the coasts. Until recently, however, public
    opinion scholars had largely lost sight of the fact that the places where people live, and people{"}s identification with those places, shape public opinion and political behavior. This paper develops and validates a flexible psychometric scale measure of a key political
    psychological dimension of place: place resentment. Place resentment is hostility toward place-based outgroups perceived as enjoying undeserved benefits beyond those enjoyed by one{"}s place-based ingroup. Regression results indicate that males, ruralites, younger Americans, those
    high in place identity, and those high in racial resentment are more likely to harbor higher levels of place resentment.},
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1007/s11109-020-09641-2},
    }

  • Oesch, Daniel and Nathalie Vigna. “A Decline in the Social Status of the Working Class? Conflicting Evidence for 8 Western Countries, 1987-2017.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2021). doi:10.1177/00104140211047400
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The consensus view among political scientists is that the subjective social status of low-skilled workers has declined over the last decades, and this status loss of the working class is seen as contributing to the rise of the radical right. We examine the micro-foundation of this claim by tracing the evolution of subjective status for different social classes in Europe and the US. We use all available survey rounds of the International Social Survey Programme 1987-2017 and replicate findings with the European Social Survey 2002-2016. While unskilled workers perceive their status to be lower than members of the middle class everywhere, we find no relative or absolute fall in their subjective social status over time. Unskilled workers were at the bottom of the status hierarchy in the 1990s and 2010s. Our findings throw doubt on the narrative that sees workers{“} falling subjective social status as a prominent driver behind the rise of the radical right.

    @Article{oesch-vigna-2021,
    author = {Daniel Oesch and Nathalie Vigna},
    title = {A Decline in the Social Status of the Working Class? Conflicting Evidence for 8 Western Countries, 1987-2017},
    journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The consensus view among political scientists is that the subjective social status of low-skilled workers has declined over the last decades, and this status loss of the working class is seen as contributing to the rise of the radical right. We examine the micro-foundation of this
    claim by tracing the evolution of subjective status for different social classes in Europe and the US. We use all available survey rounds of the International Social Survey Programme 1987-2017 and replicate findings with the European Social Survey 2002-2016. While unskilled workers
    perceive their status to be lower than members of the middle class everywhere, we find no relative or absolute fall in their subjective social status over time. Unskilled workers were at the bottom of the status hierarchy in the 1990s and 2010s. Our findings throw doubt on the
    narrative that sees workers{"} falling subjective social status as a prominent driver behind the rise of the radical right.},
    doi = {10.1177/00104140211047400},
    }

  • Oshri, Odelia, Liran Harsgor, Reut Itzkovitch-Malka, and Or Tuttnauer. “Risk Aversion and the Gender Gap in the Vote for Populist Radical Right Parties.” American Journal of Political Science online first (2022). doi:10.1111/ajps.12696
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Previous research has established that men are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties (PRRPs) than women. This article shows how cross-national and temporal variations in PRRPs{“} electoral success interact with individuals{“} risk propensity to affect this gender gap. We hypothesize that gender differences in the electoral support of PRRPs stem from disparities in risk-taking. We conceptualize risk in terms of two components, social and electoral, and demonstrate that women are more risk-averse regarding both. Our analysis is based on public opinion data from 14 countries (2002-16) combined with macrolevel data on PRRPs{“} past parliamentary fortunes. To distinguish between the social and electoral components in risk-taking, we use the illustrative case study of Germany. Findings demonstrate that gender differences in risk-taking and, by implication, the differences between women{“}s and men{“}s responses to the electoral context are key to understanding the voting gender gap.

    @Article{oshri-harsgor-itzkovitch-malka-tuttnauer-2022,
    author = {Odelia Oshri and Liran Harsgor and Reut Itzkovitch-Malka and Or Tuttnauer},
    title = {Risk Aversion and the Gender Gap in the Vote for Populist Radical Right Parties},
    journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Previous research has established that men are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties (PRRPs) than women. This article shows how cross-national and temporal variations in PRRPs{"} electoral success interact with individuals{"} risk propensity to affect this gender gap.
    We hypothesize that gender differences in the electoral support of PRRPs stem from disparities in risk-taking. We conceptualize risk in terms of two components, social and electoral, and demonstrate that women are more risk-averse regarding both. Our analysis is based on public
    opinion data from 14 countries (2002-16) combined with macrolevel data on PRRPs{"} past parliamentary fortunes. To distinguish between the social and electoral components in risk-taking, we use the illustrative case study of Germany. Findings demonstrate that gender differences in
    risk-taking and, by implication, the differences between women{"}s and men{"}s responses to the electoral context are key to understanding the voting gender gap.},
    doi = {10.1111/ajps.12696},
    }

  • Otteni, Cyrill and Man a`e. “Global Warming and Polarization. Wind Turbines and the Electoral Success of the Greens and the Populist Radical Right.” European Journal of Political Research online first (2021). doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12487
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The increased salience of environmental concerns, first and foremost global warming, is one of the key developments of contemporary Western European politics. Still, the effects of global warming issues on electoral outcomes, party competition, and polarization remain poorly understood. Our article shows how the construction of wind turbines fuels conflict between its key proponents and opponents, Green and populist radical right parties. Contention over the issue contributes to the electoral success of both sides and therefore reinforces the new central divide between them. Drawing on a novel dataset, we investigate the impact of the construction of wind turbines on AfD and Green party electoral success in Germany. We employ a two-way fixed effects model, where the construction of wind turbines functions as the independent variable. We show that the construction of wind turbines boosts the electoral support of both their biggest supporters and their biggest opponents. Our results have important implications for understanding contemporary political conflict in Western Europe such as the electoral rise of the Greens and the populist radical right, the importance of issue salience, and the polarization of party systems

    @Article{otteni-weisskircher-2021,
    author = {Cyrill Otteni and Man{\a`e}s Weisskircher},
    title = {Global Warming and Polarization. Wind Turbines and the Electoral Success of the Greens and the Populist Radical Right},
    journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The increased salience of environmental concerns, first and foremost global warming, is one of the key developments of contemporary Western European politics. Still, the effects of global warming issues on electoral outcomes, party competition, and polarization remain poorly
    understood. Our article shows how the construction of wind turbines fuels conflict between its key proponents and opponents, Green and populist radical right parties. Contention over the issue contributes to the electoral success of both sides and therefore reinforces the new
    central divide between them. Drawing on a novel dataset, we investigate the impact of the construction of wind turbines on AfD and Green party electoral success in Germany. We employ a two-way fixed effects model, where the construction of wind turbines functions as the independent
    variable. We show that the construction of wind turbines boosts the electoral support of both their biggest supporters and their biggest opponents. Our results have important implications for understanding contemporary political conflict in Western Europe such as the electoral rise
    of the Greens and the populist radical right, the importance of issue salience, and the polarization of party systems},
    doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12487},
    }

  • Ozdemir, Ugur and Marc S. Jacob. “Values, Taboos, and Votes: How Basic Human Values Affect Populist Electoral Support.” Swiss Political Science Review online first (2022). doi:10.1111/spsr.12499
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    How do individuals{“} underlying value orientations affect populist voting? Building on the congruency model in social psychology, we theorize that voters holding non-conformist values feel closest to political actors who employ a taboo-breaking populist style in the political debate. Moreover, we hypothesize that security and universalism values feed into vote choices between right-wing and left-wing parties. Leveraging structural equation modeling (SEM) and data from the 2017 German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), we find that non-conformist values predict voting for the populist far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), but not for the left-wing populist The Left. Further, security and universalism values are associated with a higher probability of voting for not only populist but also mainstream parties. These findings point to the underlying role of basic human values in electoral support for populist parties and political behavior in general.

    @Article{ozdemir-jacob-2022,
    author = {Ugur Ozdemir and Marc S. Jacob},
    title = {Values, Taboos, and Votes: How Basic Human Values Affect Populist Electoral Support},
    journal = {Swiss Political Science Review},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {How do individuals{"} underlying value orientations affect populist voting? Building on the congruency model in social psychology, we theorize that voters holding non-conformist values feel closest to political actors who employ a taboo-breaking populist style in the political
    debate. Moreover, we hypothesize that security and universalism values feed into vote choices between right-wing and left-wing parties. Leveraging structural equation modeling (SEM) and data from the 2017 German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), we find that non-conformist values
    predict voting for the populist far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), but not for the left-wing populist The Left. Further, security and universalism values are associated with a higher probability of voting for not only populist but also mainstream parties. These findings point
    to the underlying role of basic human values in electoral support for populist parties and political behavior in general.},
    doi = {10.1111/spsr.12499},
    }

  • Patana, Pauliina. “Residential Constraints and the Political Geography of the Populist Radical Right: Evidence From France.” Perspectives on Politics online first (2021): 1–18. doi:10.1017/s153759272100219x
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    What explains variation in populist radical right (PRR) support within Western democracies? Specifically, why is contemporary PRR support often and increasingly stronger in areas seemingly detached from the effects of globalization, transnationalism, or immigration, the key issues these parties emphasize? This study articulates a theory of residential constraints to deepen understanding of these spatial patterns. I hypothesize that when citizens are residentially constrained-that is, when their means of reacting to local conditions and {“}voting with their feet{“} are limited-they are more likely to support PRR parties. To test this claim, I use a multimethod research design and exploit both quantitative and qualitative evidence from France, an important case of long-standing and geographically divided PRR support. I demonstrate that the PRR performs well in areas where locals{“} access to services and opportunities is compromised and where opportunities and incentives to relocate are blocked by residential constraints. Residential constraints thus generate a set of relative economic grievances and render them highly salient in localities that may otherwise appear unaffected by more objective hardships and structural decay.

    @Article{patana-2021,
    author = {Pauliina Patana},
    title = {Residential Constraints and the Political Geography of the Populist Radical Right: Evidence From France},
    journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--18},
    abstract = {What explains variation in populist radical right (PRR) support within Western democracies? Specifically, why is contemporary PRR support often and increasingly stronger in areas seemingly detached from the effects of globalization, transnationalism, or immigration, the key issues
    these parties emphasize? This study articulates a theory of residential constraints to deepen understanding of these spatial patterns. I hypothesize that when citizens are residentially constrained-that is, when their means of reacting to local conditions and {"}voting with their
    feet{"} are limited-they are more likely to support PRR parties. To test this claim, I use a multimethod research design and exploit both quantitative and qualitative evidence from France, an important case of long-standing and geographically divided PRR support. I demonstrate that
    the PRR performs well in areas where locals{"} access to services and opportunities is compromised and where opportunities and incentives to relocate are blocked by residential constraints. Residential constraints thus generate a set of relative economic grievances and render them
    highly salient in localities that may otherwise appear unaffected by more objective hardships and structural decay.},
    doi = {10.1017/s153759272100219x},
    }

  • Pellegata, Alessandro and Francesco Visconti. “Voting for a Social Europe? European Solidarity and Voting Behaviour in the 2019 European Elections.” European Union Politics 23.1 (2021): 79–99. doi:10.1177/14651165211035054
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article investigates whether public preferences for European solidarity are associated with vote choices in the 2019 European elections. After multiple crises, the politicisation of European Union affairs has increased, polarising voters and parties between those favouring the redistribution of risks across member states and those prioritising national responsibility in coping with the consequences of the crises. We expect pro-solidarity voters to be more prone to vote for green and radical-left parties and less prone to vote for conservative and radical-right parties. Testing these hypotheses in 10 European Union countries with original survey data, we find that green and radical-left parties profited from European solidarity voting only in some countries, while being pro-solidarity reduced the likelihood of voting for both moderate and radical-right parties in each sample country.

    @Article{pellegata-visconti-2021,
    author = {Alessandro Pellegata and Francesco Visconti},
    title = {Voting for a Social Europe? European Solidarity and Voting Behaviour in the 2019 European Elections},
    journal = {European Union Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {23},
    number = {1},
    pages = {79--99},
    abstract = {This article investigates whether public preferences for European solidarity are associated with vote choices in the 2019 European elections. After multiple crises, the politicisation of European Union affairs has increased, polarising voters and parties between those favouring
    the redistribution of risks across member states and those prioritising national responsibility in coping with the consequences of the crises. We expect pro-solidarity voters to be more prone to vote for green and radical-left parties and less prone to vote for conservative and
    radical-right parties. Testing these hypotheses in 10 European Union countries with original survey data, we find that green and radical-left parties profited from European solidarity voting only in some countries, while being pro-solidarity reduced the likelihood of voting for
    both moderate and radical-right parties in each sample country.},
    doi = {10.1177/14651165211035054},
    }

  • Pirro, Andrea L. P.. The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, Impact, and Electoral Performance.. London: Routledge, 2015.
    [BibTeX]
    @Book{pirro-2015,
    author = {Andrea L. P. Pirro},
    title = {The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, Impact, and Electoral Performance.},
    publisher = {Routledge},
    year = {2015},
    address = {London},
    }

  • Pirro, Andrea L. P. and Pietro Castelli Gattinara. “Movement Parties of the Far Right: the Organization and Strategies of Nativist Collective Actors.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 23.3 (2018): 367–383. doi:10.17813/1086-671x-23-3-367
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The scholarship on the far right has often interpreted nativist organizations as straddling the conceptual space between party and movement. These groups contest elections in order to gain representation in office, yet they also seek to mobilize public support to engage contentious issues like social movements. Despite theoretical commonalities, very little empirical research has focused on far-right {“}movement parties{“} as collective actors operating both in the protest and the electoral arenas. The article redresses this inconsistency by exploring the organizational and strategic configuration of two far-right collective actors-the Hungarian Jobbik and the Italian CasaPound. Deploying original interviews with high-ranking officials, the analysis enhances our understanding of the internal {“}supply side{“} of the far right as well as empirical knowledge on hybrid organizations that emerge from grassroots activism and successively organize to pursue the electoral option.

    @Article{pirro-gattinara-2018,
    author = {Andrea L. P. Pirro and Pietro Castelli Gattinara},
    title = {Movement Parties of the Far Right: the Organization and Strategies of Nativist Collective Actors},
    journal = {Mobilization: An International Quarterly},
    year = {2018},
    volume = {23},
    number = {3},
    pages = {367--383},
    abstract = {The scholarship on the far right has often interpreted nativist organizations as straddling the conceptual space between party and movement. These groups contest elections in order to gain representation in office, yet they also seek to mobilize public support to engage
    contentious issues like social movements. Despite theoretical commonalities, very little empirical research has focused on far-right {"}movement parties{"} as collective actors operating both in the protest and the electoral arenas. The article redresses this inconsistency by exploring
    the organizational and strategic configuration of two far-right collective actors-the Hungarian Jobbik and the Italian CasaPound. Deploying original interviews with high-ranking officials, the analysis enhances our understanding of the internal {"}supply side{"} of the far right as
    well as empirical knowledge on hybrid organizations that emerge from grassroots activism and successively organize to pursue the electoral option.},
    doi = {10.17813/1086-671x-23-3-367},
    }

  • Pirro, Andrea LP and Stijn van Kessel. “Populist Eurosceptic Trajectories in Italy and the Netherlands During the European Crises.” Politics 38.3 (2018): 327–343. doi:10.1177/0263395718769511
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Multiple crises shook the European Union (EU) during the past decade. First, the economic and financial crises that unfolded since 2008 shook the foundations of the European project and its monetary union. Then, the inflow of migrants and asylum seekers into Europe in 2015 questioned the EU{“}s ability to jointly respond to common political issues. More recently, Brexit came across as the corollary of a prolonged legitimacy crisis. These crises have not only affected the course of European integration but also provided novel issues for political competition within the EU member states. At the party-political level, populist anti-establishment parties have traditionally listed among the principal interpreters and drivers of criticism towards {“}Europe{“}. In this article, we empirically address the changing Eurosceptic frames adopted by populist parties during these crises and speculate on the reverberation of these frames in respective party systems. For this purpose, we focus on two cases: Italy and the Netherlands. Both countries present instances of populist parties of different ideological persuasions within traditionally Europhile contexts. At the same time, both countries have been affected to very different extents by the recent crises, allowing us to examine how populist parties have responded to different political opportunities.

    @Article{pirro-kessel-2018,
    author = {Andrea LP Pirro and Stijn {van Kessel}},
    title = {Populist Eurosceptic Trajectories in Italy and the Netherlands During the European Crises},
    journal = {Politics},
    year = {2018},
    volume = {38},
    number = {3},
    pages = {327--343},
    abstract = {Multiple crises shook the European Union (EU) during the past decade. First, the economic and financial crises that unfolded since 2008 shook the foundations of the European project and its monetary union. Then, the inflow of migrants and asylum seekers into Europe in 2015
    questioned the EU{"}s ability to jointly respond to common political issues. More recently, Brexit came across as the corollary of a prolonged legitimacy crisis. These crises have not only affected the course of European integration but also provided novel issues for political
    competition within the EU member states. At the party-political level, populist anti-establishment parties have traditionally listed among the principal interpreters and drivers of criticism towards {"}Europe{"}. In this article, we empirically address the changing Eurosceptic frames
    adopted by populist parties during these crises and speculate on the reverberation of these frames in respective party systems. For this purpose, we focus on two cases: Italy and the Netherlands. Both countries present instances of populist parties of different ideological
    persuasions within traditionally Europhile contexts. At the same time, both countries have been affected to very different extents by the recent crises, allowing us to examine how populist parties have responded to different political opportunities.},
    doi = {10.1177/0263395718769511},
    }

  • Pirro, Andrea L. P. and Mart a’i. “Populism Between Voting and Non-Electoral Participation.” West European Politics 44.3 (2021): 558–584. doi:10.1080/01402382.2020.1739451
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The article focuses on a neglected aspect of populist mobilisation, i.e. non-electoral participation (NEP), and elaborates on the extent to which populist party voters engage politically outside the polling station. The study addresses the question that populist parties and movements of the left and right originate from distinctive political experiences, and drive different forms of engagement with politics. The hypotheses are tested on NEP, based on populist party vote, social values and issue preferences relying on a unique cross-national survey. The findings significantly broaden our understanding of populist mobilisation and refine a number of notions related to the different logics of participation of the left and right. While challenging common understandings of populism as inherently distrustful and apathetic, and protest as an exclusive practice of the left, the study critically places NEP at the heart of populism in general, and populist right politics in particular.

    @Article{pirro-portos-2021,
    author = {Andrea L. P. Pirro and Mart{\a'\i}n Portos},
    title = {Populism Between Voting and Non-Electoral Participation},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {44},
    number = {3},
    pages = {558--584},
    abstract = {The article focuses on a neglected aspect of populist mobilisation, i.e. non-electoral participation (NEP), and elaborates on the extent to which populist party voters engage politically outside the polling station. The study addresses the question that populist parties and
    movements of the left and right originate from distinctive political experiences, and drive different forms of engagement with politics. The hypotheses are tested on NEP, based on populist party vote, social values and issue preferences relying on a unique cross-national survey.
    The findings significantly broaden our understanding of populist mobilisation and refine a number of notions related to the different logics of participation of the left and right. While challenging common understandings of populism as inherently distrustful and apathetic, and
    protest as an exclusive practice of the left, the study critically places NEP at the heart of populism in general, and populist right politics in particular.},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2020.1739451},
    }

  • Pirro, Andrea L. P. and D{a’a}niel R. a’o. “Far-Right Activism in Hungary. Youth Participation in Jobbik and Its Network.” European Societies 21.4 (2019): 603–626. doi:10.1080/14616696.2018.1494292
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) qualifies as one of the most successful far-right organisations in contemporary Europe. Through its swift rise in popularity and entry to parliament, the {“}movement party{“} has been able to alter the Hungarian public discourse, existing patterns of party competition, additionally exerting effects on the government{“}s policy agenda. At least part of these effects should be attributed to Jobbik{“}s popularity among the youth; its overrepresentation among those aged below 30 is, by now, an established fact within national politics. The article argues for a broader understanding of youth participation in far-right politics and sets two principal research goals. First, to reconstruct the breeding ground of far-right youth activism at the grassroots level, by unveiling potential links between the subcultural, social movement, and party arenas. The study will chart far-right milieus in Hungary and their overlap with Jobbik: thus, it will introduce supply-side factors that contributed to its popularity among the youth. Second, we seek to investigate Jobbik{“}s appeal through the role of different elements used to justify joining a particular movement. The article uses primary data drawn from interviews and focus groups with students, and in-depth interviews with leaders of Jobbik.

    @Article{pirro-rona-2019,
    author = {Andrea L. P. Pirro and D{\a'a}niel R{\a'o}na},
    title = {Far-Right Activism in Hungary. Youth Participation in Jobbik and Its Network},
    journal = {European Societies},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {21},
    number = {4},
    pages = {603--626},
    abstract = {The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) qualifies as one of the most successful far-right organisations in contemporary Europe. Through its swift rise in popularity and entry to parliament, the {"}movement party{"} has been able to alter the Hungarian public discourse, existing
    patterns of party competition, additionally exerting effects on the government{"}s policy agenda. At least part of these effects should be attributed to Jobbik{"}s popularity among the youth; its overrepresentation among those aged below 30 is, by now, an established fact within
    national politics. The article argues for a broader understanding of youth participation in far-right politics and sets two principal research goals. First, to reconstruct the breeding ground of far-right youth activism at the grassroots level, by unveiling potential links between
    the subcultural, social movement, and party arenas. The study will chart far-right milieus in Hungary and their overlap with Jobbik: thus, it will introduce supply-side factors that contributed to its popularity among the youth. Second, we seek to investigate Jobbik{"}s appeal
    through the role of different elements used to justify joining a particular movement. The article uses primary data drawn from interviews and focus groups with students, and in-depth interviews with leaders of Jobbik.},
    doi = {10.1080/14616696.2018.1494292},
    }

  • Roumanias, Costas, Lamprini Rori, and Vasiliki Georgiadou. “Far-Right Domino: Towards an Integrated Framework of Political Contagion.” Electoral Studies online first (2022). doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102442
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Predominant theories explain the electoral success of far right (FR) parties since the late 1990s within national boundaries. We offer an alternative approach to prevailing cross-national comparisons, by examining patterns of transnational diffusion through a novel integrated analytical framework of transmission of FR electoral habits and party strategies in Europe. Using a new regional database of national and European parliament elections, spanning 7,652 electoral outcomes from 2000 to 2017, we find evidence of spillovers of both FR vote and party positions. Contagion takes place between geographically and culturally proximate countries. Positive transmission is carried through foreign contextual factors in the short run and voting externalities in the long run. Impulse responses indicate that the transmission peaks 4-5 years after an unanticipated shock in foreign FR vote shares or policy positions. Our findings have policy implications for countering xenophobia, right-wing radicalism, and extremism: spillovers entail strong voting externalities which render national policies ineffective, highlighting the need for European-level policies, which can internalize these externalities.

    @Article{roumanias-rori-georgiadou-2022,
    author = {Costas Roumanias and Lamprini Rori and Vasiliki Georgiadou},
    title = {Far-Right Domino: Towards an Integrated Framework of Political Contagion},
    journal = {Electoral Studies},
    year = {2022},
    number = {online first},
    abstract = {Predominant theories explain the electoral success of far right (FR) parties since the late 1990s within national boundaries. We offer an alternative approach to prevailing cross-national comparisons, by examining patterns of transnational diffusion through a novel integrated
    analytical framework of transmission of FR electoral habits and party strategies in Europe. Using a new regional database of national and European parliament elections, spanning 7,652 electoral outcomes from 2000 to 2017, we find evidence of spillovers of both FR vote and party
    positions. Contagion takes place between geographically and culturally proximate countries. Positive transmission is carried through foreign contextual factors in the short run and voting externalities in the long run. Impulse responses indicate that the transmission peaks 4-5
    years after an unanticipated shock in foreign FR vote shares or policy positions. Our findings have policy implications for countering xenophobia, right-wing radicalism, and extremism: spillovers entail strong voting externalities which render national policies ineffective,
    highlighting the need for European-level policies, which can internalize these externalities.},
    doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102442},
    }

  • Salomo, Katja. “The Residential Context As Source of Deprivation: Impacts on the Local Political Culture. Evidence From the East German State Thuringia.” Political Geography 69 (2019): 103–117. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.07.001
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Political geographers have long been aware of a deep rural-urban divide regarding party affiliation, voting behavior and political attitudes (Berry, Markee, Fowler, & Giewat, 2000; McKee & Teigen, 2009; Mellow & Trubowitz, 2005; Ormrod & Cole, 1996; Scala, Johnson, & Rogers, 2015). Exploring this gap has gained new urgency in the wake of the US-American presidential election of 2016 (Wuthnow, 2018) and the success of ultra-conservative politicians in {“}rural America{“} that started even earlier (Cramer, 2016). In Europe, the UK{“}s decision to leave the European Union – heavily informed by resentment towards immigration (Swales, 2016) – was imposed on metropolitan London by rural communities in England and Wales (Evans & Menon, 2017). In Germany, voters in the non-metropolitan and predominantly rural East Germany propelled a nationalist party (Alternative für Deutschland) into the Bundestag for the first time after the end of World War II, and have long since shown greater affinity to anti-immigrant, nationalist, anti-democratic views (Pfahl-Traughber, 2009). Illliberal views overrepresented in rural contexts drive some of the recent developments that are most threatening to established democracies in the western world.

    @Article{salomo-2019,
    author = {Katja Salomo},
    title = {The Residential Context As Source of Deprivation: Impacts on the Local Political Culture. Evidence From the East German State Thuringia},
    journal = {Political Geography},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {69},
    pages = {103--117},
    abstract = {Political geographers have long been aware of a deep rural-urban divide regarding party affiliation, voting behavior and political attitudes (Berry, Markee, Fowler, \& Giewat, 2000; McKee \& Teigen, 2009; Mellow \& Trubowitz, 2005; Ormrod \& Cole, 1996; Scala, Johnson, \& Rogers,
    2015). Exploring this gap has gained new urgency in the wake of the US-American presidential election of 2016 (Wuthnow, 2018) and the success of ultra-conservative politicians in {"}rural America{"} that started even earlier (Cramer, 2016). In Europe, the UK{"}s decision to leave the
    European Union - heavily informed by resentment towards immigration (Swales, 2016) - was imposed on metropolitan London by rural communities in England and Wales (Evans \& Menon, 2017). In Germany, voters in the non-metropolitan and predominantly rural East Germany propelled a
    nationalist party (Alternative für Deutschland) into the Bundestag for the first time after the end of World War II, and have long since shown greater affinity to anti-immigrant, nationalist, anti-democratic views (Pfahl-Traughber, 2009). Illliberal views overrepresented in rural
    contexts drive some of the recent developments that are most threatening to established democracies in the western world.},
    doi = {10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.07.001},
    }

  • Schraff, Dominik and Ronja Sczepanski. “United Or Divided in Diversity? the Heterogeneous Effects of Ethnic Diversity on European and National Identities.” European Union Politics online first (2021). doi:10.1177/14651165211063770
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    In this article, we argue that the size and cultural proximity of immigrant populations in people{“}s residential surroundings shape national and European identities. This means that the type of migrant population activates cultural threat perceptions and opportunities for contact to varying degrees. Geocoded survey data from the Netherlands suggests that large non-Western immigrant shares are associated with more exclusive national identities, while mixed contexts with Western and non-Western populations show more inclusive identities. These results suggest that highly diverse areas with mixed immigrant populations hold a potential for more tolerance. In contrast, exclusive national identities become strongly pronounced under the presence of sizeable culturally distant immigrant groups.

    @Article{schraff-sczepanski-2021,
    author = {Dominik Schraff and Ronja Sczepanski},
    title = {United Or Divided in Diversity? the Heterogeneous Effects of Ethnic Diversity on European and National Identities},
    journal = {European Union Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {In this article, we argue that the size and cultural proximity of immigrant populations in people{"}s residential surroundings shape national and European identities. This means that the type of migrant population activates cultural threat perceptions and opportunities for contact
    to varying degrees. Geocoded survey data from the Netherlands suggests that large non-Western immigrant shares are associated with more exclusive national identities, while mixed contexts with Western and non-Western populations show more inclusive identities. These results suggest
    that highly diverse areas with mixed immigrant populations hold a potential for more tolerance. In contrast, exclusive national identities become strongly pronounced under the presence of sizeable culturally distant immigrant groups.},
    doi = {10.1177/14651165211063770},
    }

  • Schulte-Cloos, Julia. “Political Potentials, Deep-Seated Nativism and the Success of the German AfD.” Frontiers in Political Science 3 (2022). doi:10.3389/fpos.2021.698085
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The German populist radical right party {“}Alternative for Germany{“} (AfD) was founded amid various economic and political crises. This article argues that the electoral success of this political challenger, however, is rooted in more than the upsurge of populist resentments born out of these crises. Integrating theories about the activation of attitudes with arguments about the effects of exposure to local political contexts, I contend that the electoral success of the AfD reflects the mobilization of deep-seated nativist sentiments. To test these propositions, I draw on a large panel dataset of the AfD{“}s electoral returns at the municipal level (N = 10,694) which I link to pre-crises data on the marginal success of extreme-right parties. Exploiting variation between municipalities located within the same county (N = 294), I estimate a series of spatial simultaneous autoregressive error models by maximum likelihood estimation. The results show that the success of the AfD is rooted in the local prevalence of nativist sentiments that date prior to the crises that fomented the formation of the challenger party-an effect that becomes stronger in the course of the radicalization of the AfD. I further demonstrate that the populist right AfD is best able to broaden its electoral appeal among local communities with an extreme-right sub-culture, particularly in Eastern Germany. This suggests that even small extreme-right networks can act as a breeding ground for the populist right and help spread xenophobic and nativist sentiments among citizens.

    @Article{schulte-cloos-2022,
    author = {Julia Schulte-Cloos},
    title = {Political Potentials, Deep-Seated Nativism and the Success of the German AfD},
    journal = {Frontiers in Political Science},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {3},
    abstract = {The German populist radical right party {"}Alternative for Germany{"} (AfD) was founded amid various economic and political crises. This article argues that the electoral success of this political challenger, however, is rooted in more than the upsurge of populist resentments born out
    of these crises. Integrating theories about the activation of attitudes with arguments about the effects of exposure to local political contexts, I contend that the electoral success of the AfD reflects the mobilization of deep-seated nativist sentiments. To test these
    propositions, I draw on a large panel dataset of the AfD{"}s electoral returns at the municipal level (N = 10,694) which I link to pre-crises data on the marginal success of extreme-right parties. Exploiting variation between municipalities located within the same county (N = 294), I
    estimate a series of spatial simultaneous autoregressive error models by maximum likelihood estimation. The results show that the success of the AfD is rooted in the local prevalence of nativist sentiments that date prior to the crises that fomented the formation of the challenger
    party-an effect that becomes stronger in the course of the radicalization of the AfD. I further demonstrate that the populist right AfD is best able to broaden its electoral appeal among local communities with an extreme-right sub-culture, particularly in Eastern Germany. This
    suggests that even small extreme-right networks can act as a breeding ground for the populist right and help spread xenophobic and nativist sentiments among citizens.},
    doi = {10.3389/fpos.2021.698085},
    }

  • Schulte-Cloos, Julia and Arndt Leininger. “Electoral Participation, Political Disaffection, and the Rise of the Populist Radical Right.” Party Politics online first (2021). doi:10.1177/1354068820985186
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Does the populist radical right benefit from increased electoral mobilization? Integrating theories of political grievances with accounts of party competition in Western Europe, we contend that the populist right gains advantage from increased electoral mobilization, but that this effect is conditional on political disaffection. We draw on a novel panel dataset (2009-2019) of more than 10,000 German municipalities and city districts to study the implications of turnout surges as a function of pre-existing levels of political disaffection in a difference-in-differences design. The results demonstrate that turnout surges benefit the populist right {“}Alternative für Deutschland{“} (AfD) in contexts of widespread political distrust. In contrast, increased mobilization acts to depress its electoral fortunes in communities marked by low baseline levels of political disaffection. In shedding light on the interplay between political disaffection and electoral mobilization, this study has important implications for understanding the surge of the populist right in established democracies.

    @Article{schulte-cloos-leininger-2021,
    author = {Julia Schulte-Cloos and Arndt Leininger},
    title = {Electoral Participation, Political Disaffection, and the Rise of the Populist Radical Right},
    journal = {Party Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Does the populist radical right benefit from increased electoral mobilization? Integrating theories of political grievances with accounts of party competition in Western Europe, we contend that the populist right gains advantage from increased electoral mobilization, but that this
    effect is conditional on political disaffection. We draw on a novel panel dataset (2009-2019) of more than 10,000 German municipalities and city districts to study the implications of turnout surges as a function of pre-existing levels of political disaffection in a
    difference-in-differences design. The results demonstrate that turnout surges benefit the populist right {"}Alternative für Deutschland{"} (AfD) in contexts of widespread political distrust. In contrast, increased mobilization acts to depress its electoral fortunes in communities
    marked by low baseline levels of political disaffection. In shedding light on the interplay between political disaffection and electoral mobilization, this study has important implications for understanding the surge of the populist right in established democracies.},
    doi = {10.1177/1354068820985186},
    }

  • Sipma, Take and Carl C. Berning. “Economic Conditions and Populist Radical Right Voting: the Role of Issue Salience.” Electoral Studies 74.online first (2021). doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102416
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    In this article, we show with the European Election Study from nine Western European countries that issue salience of the economy and immigration contributes to our understanding of the puzzling relation between economic conditions and populist radical right support. In countries with relatively weak or worsening economic conditions, the economy is considered more salient, whereas immigration loses salience – also compared to other issues. Voters who perceive the economy as most important problem are less likely to opt for the populist radical right than people who perceive immigration or even other issues as most important. Populist radical right parties appear to not only win votes on the immigration issue, they also lose votes on the economic issue. Finally, in contrast to actual economic conditions, negative perceptions of the economy increases populist radical right voting, despite stronger salience of the economy and partly due to stronger salience of immigration compared to other issues.

    @Article{sipma-berning-2021,
    author = {Take Sipma and Carl C. Berning},
    title = {Economic Conditions and Populist Radical Right Voting: the Role of Issue Salience},
    journal = {Electoral Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {74},
    number = {online first},
    abstract = {In this article, we show with the European Election Study from nine Western European countries that issue salience of the economy and immigration contributes to our understanding of the puzzling relation between economic conditions and populist radical right support. In countries
    with relatively weak or worsening economic conditions, the economy is considered more salient, whereas immigration loses salience - also compared to other issues. Voters who perceive the economy as most important problem are less likely to opt for the populist radical right than
    people who perceive immigration or even other issues as most important. Populist radical right parties appear to not only win votes on the immigration issue, they also lose votes on the economic issue. Finally, in contrast to actual economic conditions, negative perceptions of the
    economy increases populist radical right voting, despite stronger salience of the economy and partly due to stronger salience of immigration compared to other issues.},
    doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102416},
    }

  • Spierings, Niels. “Homonationalism and Voting for the Populist Radical Right: Addressing Unanswered Questions by Zooming in on the Dutch Case.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 33.1 (2020): 171–182. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edaa005
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Anti-migration attitudes are at the heart of explaining who votes for Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Rydgren, 2008). PRR parties appeal to a {“}native{“} culture that they say should be protected against outsiders, and more recently, PRR politicians have been including gay citizens among those needing protection, particularly against Islam (Bracke, 2012; De Lange & Mügge, 2015). This strategy echoes what has been labeled {“}homonationalism{“}: Considering the acceptance of gay and lesbian citizens as part of what defines a nation and letting this acceptance serve as a barometer for who has a right to belong to that nation (cf. Puar, 2007; Schotten, 2016).

    @Article{spierings-2020,
    author = {Niels Spierings},
    title = {Homonationalism and Voting for the Populist Radical Right: Addressing Unanswered Questions by Zooming in on the Dutch Case},
    journal = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {33},
    number = {1},
    pages = {171--182},
    abstract = {Anti-migration attitudes are at the heart of explaining who votes for Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties (Lubbers, Gijsberts, \& Scheepers, 2002; Rydgren, 2008). PRR parties appeal to a {"}native{"} culture that they say should be protected against outsiders, and more recently, PRR
    politicians have been including gay citizens among those needing protection, particularly against Islam (Bracke, 2012; De Lange \& Mügge, 2015). This strategy echoes what has been labeled {"}homonationalism{"}: Considering the acceptance of gay and lesbian citizens as part of what
    defines a nation and letting this acceptance serve as a barometer for who has a right to belong to that nation (cf. Puar, 2007; Schotten, 2016).},
    doi = {10.1093/ijpor/edaa005},
    }

  • Stankov, Nemanja and Slaven Živkov “c. “May the Lord Protect Our Country. Ethnic Relations As a Moderator Between Religiosity and Radical Right Vote.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies online first.nil (2021): 1–15. doi:10.1080/14782804.2021.1952167
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    While we know a lot about the typical type of radical right-wing (RRWP) voter, individual religiosity in explaining support for RRWPs has eluded consistent scholarly attention. The mixed results available from the scarce literature find both positive and negative associations between religiosity and RRWPs vote. The variation in these relationships is puzzling, especially if we consider how RRWPs often present themselves as guardians of native ethnic and religious identity. In this paper we argue that religiosity increases the chance of voting for RRWPs when ethnic relations are a salient issue in the political system. We test our theory using multilevel regression modeling on the European Social Survey, specifically Rounds 7, 8 and 9 and replicate our results based on the European Values Study from 2017. We find that religiosity is a significant predictor of the RRWP vote when there are salient ethnic relations in the political system, proxied by the presence of an ethnic minority party. On the other hand, in countries without minority parties, non-religious individuals are more likely to vote for RRWPs.

    @Article{stankov-zivkovic-2021,
    author = {Nemanja Stankov and Slaven {\v Z}ivkov \"c},
    title = {May the Lord Protect Our Country. Ethnic Relations As a Moderator Between Religiosity and Radical Right Vote},
    journal = {Journal of Contemporary European Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    number = {nil},
    pages = {1--15},
    abstract = {While we know a lot about the typical type of radical right-wing (RRWP) voter, individual religiosity in explaining support for RRWPs has eluded consistent scholarly attention. The mixed results available from the scarce literature find both positive and negative associations
    between religiosity and RRWPs vote. The variation in these relationships is puzzling, especially if we consider how RRWPs often present themselves as guardians of native ethnic and religious identity. In this paper we argue that religiosity increases the chance of voting for RRWPs
    when ethnic relations are a salient issue in the political system. We test our theory using multilevel regression modeling on the European Social Survey, specifically Rounds 7, 8 and 9 and replicate our results based on the European Values Study from 2017. We find that religiosity
    is a significant predictor of the RRWP vote when there are salient ethnic relations in the political system, proxied by the presence of an ethnic minority party. On the other hand, in countries without minority parties, non-religious individuals are more likely to vote for RRWPs.},
    doi = {10.1080/14782804.2021.1952167},
    }

  • Taggart, Paul and Andrea L. P. Pirro. “European Populism Before the Pandemic: Ideology, Euroscepticism, Electoral Performance, and Government Participation of 63 Parties In 30 Countries.” Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica online (2021): 1–24. doi:10.1017/ipo.2021.13
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This contribution is conceived as a resource on the state of European populist parties before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. It reports on cross-national comparative findings generated by data collected from 30 European countries as to the state of populist parties in one calendar year (2019) and provides an extensive qualitative overview of the national cases. The article shows that while populist parties are preponderantly on the right, there is a significant degree of ideological variation among European populism. The data show significant diversity in their electoral performance but also that populist party participation in government is no longer a marginal phenomenon. The article ultimately elaborates on the various types of positions on European integration – from soft/hard Euroscepticism to lack thereof – and discusses the implications of their affiliation in the European Parliament.

    @Article{taggart-pirro-2021,
    author = {Paul Taggart and Andrea L. P. Pirro},
    title = {European Populism Before the Pandemic: Ideology, Euroscepticism, Electoral Performance, and Government Participation of 63 Parties In 30 Countries},
    journal = {Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica},
    year = {2021},
    pages = {1--24},
    volume = {online},
    abstract = {This contribution is conceived as a resource on the state of European populist parties before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. It reports on cross-national comparative findings generated by data collected from 30 European countries as to the state of populist parties in one
    calendar year (2019) and provides an extensive qualitative overview of the national cases. The article shows that while populist parties are preponderantly on the right, there is a significant degree of ideological variation among European populism. The data show significant
    diversity in their electoral performance but also that populist party participation in government is no longer a marginal phenomenon. The article ultimately elaborates on the various types of positions on European integration - from soft/hard Euroscepticism to lack thereof - and
    discusses the implications of their affiliation in the European Parliament.},
    doi = {10.1017/ipo.2021.13},
    }

  • Turnbull-Dugarte, Stuart J. and Jos a’e. “When the US far-right sneezes, the European far-right catches a cold. Quasi-experimental evidence of electoral contagion from Spain.” Electoral Studies 76 (2022): online first. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102443
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Does the electoral defeat of a far-right party abroad influence support for similar parties at home? In this paper we posit, and test, the theoretical argument that signals of viability and popularity akin to bandwagon and titanic effects operate beyond the confines of national boundaries to cause voters to update domestic preferences based on comparable party performance abroad. By exploiting the quasi-experimental setting provided by the coincidental timing of Donald Trump’s 2020 electoral defeat with the Spanish sociological study’s monthly barometer data collection, we provide robust causal evidence to show that Trump’s electoral loss in the US had a negative contagious spillover effect on self-reported support for the Spanish far-right. Empirically we estimate intent-to-treat effects based on the as good as random exposure to the electoral results to isolate the impact of Trump’s defeat on the voting intentions for Spain’s new far-right party, VOX. Our results – which are robust to various modelling approaches including covariate adjustment, regional fixed effects, placebo issues, and nearest-neighbour matching – demonstrate that Trump’s defeat to Joe Biden had a sizeable negative effect on expressed support for VOX. The contagion effect is substantive: equal to 3 to 6 percentage-points among the general population and 11 percentage-points among former right-wing voters. Our findings make an important contribution to the broader literature on electoral behaviour as they indicate that the electoral success of ideologically symmetrical parties abroad can play a role in understanding a party’s domestic success by serving as an important information signal of these parties’ electoral viability.

    @Article{turnbull-dugarte-rama-2022,
    author = {Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte and Jos{\a'e} Rama},
    title = {When the US far-right sneezes, the European far-right catches a cold. Quasi-experimental evidence of electoral contagion from Spain},
    journal = {Electoral Studies},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {76},
    pages = {online first},
    abstract = {Does the electoral defeat of a far-right party abroad influence support for similar parties at home? In this paper we posit, and test, the theoretical argument that signals of viability and popularity akin to bandwagon and titanic effects operate beyond the confines of national
    boundaries to cause voters to update domestic preferences based on comparable party performance abroad. By exploiting the quasi-experimental setting provided by the coincidental timing of Donald Trump's 2020 electoral defeat with the Spanish sociological study's monthly barometer
    data collection, we provide robust causal evidence to show that Trump's electoral loss in the US had a negative contagious spillover effect on self-reported support for the Spanish far-right. Empirically we estimate intent-to-treat effects based on the as good as random exposure to
    the electoral results to isolate the impact of Trump's defeat on the voting intentions for Spain's new far-right party, VOX. Our results - which are robust to various modelling approaches including covariate adjustment, regional fixed effects, placebo issues, and nearest-neighbour
    matching - demonstrate that Trump's defeat to Joe Biden had a sizeable negative effect on expressed support for VOX. The contagion effect is substantive: equal to 3 to 6 percentage-points among the general population and 11 percentage-points among former right-wing voters. Our
    findings make an important contribution to the broader literature on electoral behaviour as they indicate that the electoral success of ideologically symmetrical parties abroad can play a role in understanding a party's domestic success by serving as an important information signal
    of these parties' electoral viability.},
    doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102443},
    }

  • Valentim, Vicente and Tobias Widmann. “Does Radical-Right Success Make the Political Debate More Negative?: Evidence from Emotional Rhetoric in German State Parliaments.” Political Behavior online first (2021). doi:10.1007/s11109-021-09697-8
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Political rhetoric has important effects on the quality of democracy, but we know very little about what causes variation in the tone of the political debate. We investigate how radical-right success affects the way the remaining politicians discuss political issues. Using an original dictionary, we measure different positive and negative emotions in a newly collected dataset of speeches in German state parliaments. Taking advantage of variation in the timing of elections when radical-right politicians enter these parliaments, we find that politicians of other parties respond to radical-right success by using more positive, instead of negative, emotions. The analyses suggest that this finding may be the result of a strategy by the remaining politicians to distance themselves from radical-right discourse. Our findings highlight how radical-right success can create incentives for other politicians to enforce democratic norms that radical-right politicians breach.

    @Article{valentim-widmann-2021,
    author = {Vicente Valentim and Tobias Widmann},
    title = {Does Radical-Right Success Make the Political Debate More Negative?: Evidence from Emotional Rhetoric in German State Parliaments},
    journal = {Political Behavior},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Political rhetoric has important effects on the quality of democracy, but we know very little about what causes variation in the tone of the political debate. We investigate how radical-right success affects the way the remaining politicians discuss political issues. Using an
    original dictionary, we measure different positive and negative emotions in a newly collected dataset of speeches in German state parliaments. Taking advantage of variation in the timing of elections when radical-right politicians enter these parliaments, we find that politicians
    of other parties respond to radical-right success by using more positive, instead of negative, emotions. The analyses suggest that this finding may be the result of a strategy by the remaining politicians to distance themselves from radical-right discourse. Our findings highlight
    how radical-right success can create incentives for other politicians to enforce democratic norms that radical-right politicians breach.},
    doi = {10.1007/s11109-021-09697-8},
    }

  • Vlandas, Tim and Daphne Halikiopoulou. “Welfare state policies and far right party support: moderating “insecurity effects” among different social groups.” West European Politics 45.1 (2022): 24–49. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.1886498
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article examines the interplay between social risks, welfare state policies and far right voting. Distinguishing between compensatory and protective policies and using data from seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) and social policy datasets, the article tests a range of hypotheses about the extent to which welfare state policies moderate the insecurities that drive particular social groups to vote for the far right. Empirical findings confirm theoretical expectations that several welfare state policies reduce the likelihood of supporting the far right among individuals exposed to high risks including the unemployed, pensioners, low-income workers, employees on temporary contracts, individuals in large families, and individuals who are disabled/permanently sick. These findings suggest that in order to understand why some individuals vote for the far right, one should not only focus on their risk-driven grievances, but also on policies that may moderate these risks.

    @Article{vlandas-halikiopoulou-2022,
    author = {Tim Vlandas and Daphne Halikiopoulou},
    title = {Welfare state policies and far right party support: moderating {"}insecurity effects{"} among different social groups},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {45},
    number = {1},
    pages = {24--49},
    abstract = {This article examines the interplay between social risks, welfare state policies and far right voting. Distinguishing between compensatory and protective policies and using data from seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) and social policy datasets, the article tests a
    range of hypotheses about the extent to which welfare state policies moderate the insecurities that drive particular social groups to vote for the far right. Empirical findings confirm theoretical expectations that several welfare state policies reduce the likelihood of supporting
    the far right among individuals exposed to high risks including the unemployed, pensioners, low-income workers, employees on temporary contracts, individuals in large families, and individuals who are disabled/permanently sick. These findings suggest that in order to understand why
    some individuals vote for the far right, one should not only focus on their risk-driven grievances, but also on policies that may moderate these risks.},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.1886498},
    }

  • Vrakopoulos, Christos. “Political and Ideological Normalization: Quality of Government, Mainstream-right Ideological Positions and Extreme-right Support.” European Political Science Review 14.1 (2022): 56–73. doi:10.1017/S1755773921000308
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article aims to explain the variation in the electoral support for extreme-right parties (ERPs) in Europe. The extant literature on the far-right party family does not answer this question specifically with regard to the extreme-right variants for two main reasons. Firstly, theories did not expect the electoral success of these parties in post-war Europe due to their anti-democratic profiles and association with fascism. Secondly, despite the fact that they acknowledge the differences between the parties under the far-right umbrella – namely, the extreme and the radical – they normally do not take these differences into account, and if so, they focus on the radical-right parties. This article shows that electoral support for ERPs is associated with low quality of government and highly conservative mainstream-right parties. The former creates political legitimization for anti-democratic parties and the latter ideological normalization of extreme right.

    @Article{vrakopoulos-2022,
    author = {Christos Vrakopoulos},
    title = {Political and Ideological Normalization: Quality of Government, Mainstream-right Ideological Positions and Extreme-right Support},
    journal = {European Political Science Review},
    year = {2022},
    volume = {14},
    number = {1},
    pages = {56--73},
    abstract = {This article aims to explain the variation in the electoral support for extreme-right parties (ERPs) in Europe. The extant literature on the far-right party family does not answer this question specifically with regard to the extreme-right variants for two main reasons. Firstly,
    theories did not expect the electoral success of these parties in post-war Europe due to their anti-democratic profiles and association with fascism. Secondly, despite the fact that they acknowledge the differences between the parties under the far-right umbrella - namely, the
    extreme and the radical - they normally do not take these differences into account, and if so, they focus on the radical-right parties. This article shows that electoral support for ERPs is associated with low quality of government and highly conservative mainstream-right parties.
    The former creates political legitimization for anti-democratic parties and the latter ideological normalization of extreme right.},
    doi = {10.1017/S1755773921000308},
    }

  • Xia, Weiqian. “Mediators Explaining Radical Right Voting Patterns of Christians in Europe: Attitudes Toward Immigrants, Values, Or Social Capital?.” Social Science Research 97 (2021): online first. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2021.102575
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Previous studies show that radical right parties in Europe receive relatively low levels of supports from Christian voters, despite that Christian value is highlighted in the European radical right agenda. However, the mechanism remains largely untested. The study investigates the factors underlying Christians voting or not voting for populist radical right parties across Europe, using Round 8 European Social Survey data. It is shown that there is no general relationship between Christian religiosity and radical right voting across European countries. In most countries, Christians are neither more nor less likely to vote for the radical right parties compared to the non-religious. When Christians are underrepresented in radical right supporters, it can hardly be explained by tolerance towards immigrants, pro-social values or social capital presumed to be fostered by Christian religion and church engagement. In some other cases, where Christians are more likely to vote for radical right parties, it is likely to be driven by anti-immigrant attitudes, authoritarian values and moral conservative values. In addition, Christians could have been more mobilizable for radical right parties due to their authoritarian and moral conservative values, which have not been fully capitalized. The study suggests that Christian religiosity does not serve as an {“}antidote{“} to the radical right. Tolerance towards immigrants, pro-social values or social capital are rarely the mechanisms driving European Christians away from supporting radical right parties.

    @Article{xia-2021,
    author = {Weiqian Xia},
    title = {Mediators Explaining Radical Right Voting Patterns of Christians in Europe: Attitudes Toward Immigrants, Values, Or Social Capital?},
    journal = {Social Science Research},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {97},
    pages = {online first},
    abstract = {Previous studies show that radical right parties in Europe receive relatively low levels of supports from Christian voters, despite that Christian value is highlighted in the European radical right agenda. However, the mechanism remains largely untested. The study investigates the
    factors underlying Christians voting or not voting for populist radical right parties across Europe, using Round 8 European Social Survey data. It is shown that there is no general relationship between Christian religiosity and radical right voting across European countries. In
    most countries, Christians are neither more nor less likely to vote for the radical right parties compared to the non-religious. When Christians are underrepresented in radical right supporters, it can hardly be explained by tolerance towards immigrants, pro-social values or social
    capital presumed to be fostered by Christian religion and church engagement. In some other cases, where Christians are more likely to vote for radical right parties, it is likely to be driven by anti-immigrant attitudes, authoritarian values and moral conservative values. In
    addition, Christians could have been more mobilizable for radical right parties due to their authoritarian and moral conservative values, which have not been fully capitalized. The study suggests that Christian religiosity does not serve as an {"}antidote{"} to the radical right.
    Tolerance towards immigrants, pro-social values or social capital are rarely the mechanisms driving European Christians away from supporting radical right parties.},
    doi = {10.1016/j.ssresearch.2021.102575},
    }

  • Yoder, Jennifer A.. “”Revenge of the East”?.” German Politics and Society 38.2 (2020): 35–58. doi:10.3167/gps.2020.380202
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article examines the ways the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has claimed to supply eastern voters with important elements of political representation that they demand. Rather than seeking {“}revenge,{“} which would suggest voting purely out of protest against a government or policy, the evidence examined in this article suggests that some voters in the East support the AfD to express something else. The reactions of some of the other political parties in the wake of recent elections suggest that they have begun to pay more attention to their roles in the electorate and to the various dimensions of political representation.

    @Article{yoder-2020,
    author = {Jennifer A. Yoder},
    title = {{"}Revenge of the East{"}?},
    journal = {German Politics and Society},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {38},
    number = {2},
    pages = {35--58},
    abstract = {This article examines the ways the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has claimed to supply eastern voters with important elements of political representation that they demand. Rather than seeking {"}revenge,{"} which would suggest voting purely out of protest against a government or
    policy, the evidence examined in this article suggests that some voters in the East support the AfD to express something else. The reactions of some of the other political parties in the wake of recent elections suggest that they have begun to pay more attention to their roles in
    the electorate and to the various dimensions of political representation.},
    doi = {10.3167/gps.2020.380202},
    }

  • Zulianello, Mattia and Erik Gahner Larsen. “Populist Parties in European Parliament Elections: A New Dataset On Left, Right and Valence Populism From 1979 to 2019.” Electoral Studies 71 (2021): online first. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102312
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Despite the increasing interest in populism, there is a lack of comparative and longterm evidence on the electoral performance of populist parties. We address this gap by using a novel dataset covering 92 populist parties in the European Parliament elections from 1979 to 2019. Specifically, we provide aggregate data on the electoral performance of all populist parties as well as the three ideational varieties of populism, i.e. right-wing, left-wing and valence populist parties. We show that there is significant variation both across countries as well as between the ideational varieties of populism. Most notably, while the success of left-wing and valence populists is concentrated in specific areas, right-wing populist parties have consolidated as key players in the vast majority of EU countries.

    @Article{zulianello-larsen-2021,
    author = {Mattia Zulianello and Erik Gahner Larsen},
    title = {Populist Parties in European Parliament Elections: A New Dataset On Left, Right and Valence Populism From 1979 to 2019},
    journal = {Electoral Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {71},
    pages = {online first},
    abstract = {Despite the increasing interest in populism, there is a lack of comparative and longterm evidence on the electoral performance of populist parties. We address this gap by using a novel dataset covering 92 populist parties in the European Parliament elections from 1979 to 2019.
    Specifically, we provide aggregate data on the electoral performance of all populist parties as well as the three ideational varieties of populism, i.e. right-wing, left-wing and valence populist parties. We show that there is significant variation both across countries as well as
    between the ideational varieties of populism. Most notably, while the success of left-wing and valence populists is concentrated in specific areas, right-wing populist parties have consolidated as key players in the vast majority of EU countries.},
    doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102312},
    }

 

May 032021
 
Are you having a good pandemic? Mine is ok. My job is secure, my surroundings are pleasant, and I have so far avoided the plague. Spending a lot of time in the box room in front of my computer is not so different from my normal life. I do not really miss the commute, remote teaching is going better than expected, and online faculty meetings are shorter and more productive than the real thing. When they are not, there is always the second screen or a wonky (cough!) connection.

The spring 2021 (second pandemic) update of the Radical Right Bibliography

Watch this video on YouTube.

But while I’m in a better position than many others, my productivity has taken a hit. At the same time, the number of things that absolutely need doing is up. Which is why there was no winter update of the far right bibliography. Conversely, some of you have been very productive, which is why we are having a bumper spring update of the Eclectic, Erratic Bibliography on the Extreme Right (in (Western) Europe)™. You can download the latest version here in a format that most reference software can import.

If you are aware of any titles that should be in the bibliography, please send me the reference (and the PDF if you have it). And: yes, self-nomination is absolutely fine. And: no, there is not guarantee that I include a reference.

What is new in research on the radical right?

Since April 2020, I have added 78 new titles to the bibliography. This brings the total number of entries to 1032. Most of the new titles are fairly recent and where only published in the last couple of years or so.

Publication yearn
202045
202114
201910
20183
20171
20151
20141
20131
20091
20031

This is in line with a trend in previous editions. Last year, just under 20 per cent of the titles included in the bibliography had been published since 2017. This year, it is 25 per cent of titles that have been published since 2018. The median publication year is now 2013, and the modal publication year is 2018. Like the universe itself, the field is expanding at an accelerating rate.

Publication years of titles on the radical right

Publications on the radical right over time

69 of the 78 new entries were published in (peer-reviewed) journals. This further contributes to the bibliography’s long-standing bias towards articles, which at least partly reflects the development of the field. In previous analyses, the European Journal of Political Research and West European Politics popped up as the most important journals for research on the Radical Right. In this recent crop, other journals with a European focus as well as more comparative journals dominate. Whether this is a trend or a fluke remains to be seen.

Journaln
Comparative Political Studies6
Electoral Studies5
European Political Science Review3
European Politics and Society3
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies3
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties3
Political Studies3
Acta Politica2
Comparative European Politics2
Europe-Asia Studies2
European Societies2
Government and Opposition2
International Journal of Public Opinion Research2
Journal of European Integration2
Party Politics2
Politics and Governance2

What are the new topics in radical right research?

Here is a quick visualisation of the words that dominate the titles and abstracts. Because stuff like “right-wing”, “radical” or “extreme” is more or less the selection criterion, I removed these terms. I should have applied some stemming (see “party/parties”, “voters/voting”) but did not, because stems look ugly, and common stemmers still treat “European”, “Europe”, and “EU” as three different things. Full lemmatisation might be a viable alternative by now, but I was too lazy to look into that.

Click for a bigger version

Topics in research on the radical right

Even so, the focus on parties and voters is pretty obvious. “Immigration” and “Europe” are also hardly surprising. What I did not expect as the large number of items concerned with support, or the number of contributions dealing with Germany and the AfD. Also, “welfare” is quite prominent but did not feature at all last year (when I based the cloud on titles only).

To get a better idea what the different contributions are about, I calculated the (Euclidian) distances between texts based on their vocabulary and ran the result through a classical MDS. In the top right corner, there are outliers: Im 2021 writes about how different types of employment moderate the effect of welfare chauvinism, and Vadlamannati 2020 studies the moderating effect of welfare regimes on the link between refugees flows and radical right support. In other words, the political economy vibe is strong in this corner.

The Far Right Bibliography: the second pandemic (aka spring 2021) update 6

But the true outliers are three collaborations between Lisanne Wichgers (in two cases), Laura Jacobs and Joost van Spanje, which appear all over the place. The first 2020 text is about frame use in politics and journalism in the Netherlands, the second one about the consequences of hate speech prosecution in Holland, whereas the Jacobs/van Spanje collaboration is also concerned with hate speech and electoral results but has a comparative outlook.

Once you (mentally) remove these outliers, some of the groupings in the big cluster also make some sense – see e.g. the relative proximity of Heinze 2020, Weisskircher 2020, and Rauchfleisch Kaiser 2020 who all deal with the far right in Germany. The rest is left as an exercise to the reader.

Gender of radical right researchers

Here is the ever popular cloud of authors’ first names. Unlike last year, I refrained from colour-coding them as either pink or navy blue, but it is pretty clear that Andres and Jonas have replaced Christian and David.

Click for a bigger version

Given names of radical right researchers

Last year, the female share of unique authors was a meagre 28 per cent. This year, we’re up to (…. drum roll ….) 31 per cent. Better than nothing, but still not good. I have also re-run the analysis for the 1990-2021. The figure is weighted by publications in a given year and relies on an algorithmic classification of given names that overestimates the share of women in the database. Here is the updated graph. Progress is glacial, to say the least.

The Far Right Bibliography: the second pandemic (aka spring 2021) update 7

Share of female researchers over time (weighted by publications)

Show us the latest titles in radical right research

These are all the new titles in their full glory. Click here to download/import the new titles into your reference management software.

  • Abts, Koen, Emmanuel Dalle Mulle, Stijn Kessel, and Elie Michel. “The Welfare Agenda of the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe: Combining Welfare Chauvinism, Producerism and Populism*.” Swiss Political Science Review online first (2021). doi:10.1111/spsr.12428
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Recent scholarship on the populist radical right tends to imprecisely describe the welfare agenda of this party family with reference to its key ideological characteristics of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. We propose an alternative analytical framework that considers the multidimensionality of welfare state positions and the {“}deservingness criteria{“} that underlie ideas about welfare entitlement. Applying this framework to a sample of four European populist radical right parties, we conclude that three interrelated frames inform their welfare agenda. These parties, we argue, advocate social closure not only on the basis of the deservingness criterion of identity (welfare chauvinism), but also on criteria of control, attitude, and reciprocity (welfare producerism) and on an antagonism between the people and the establishment (welfare populism). Understanding the welfare agenda of the populist radical right requires us to move beyond welfare chauvinism and to reconsider the concept of welfare producerism and its interaction with welfare chauvinism.

    @Article{abts-mulle-kessel-michel-2021,
    author = {Koen Abts and Emmanuel Dalle Mulle and Stijn Kessel and Elie Michel},
    title = {The Welfare Agenda of the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe: Combining Welfare Chauvinism, Producerism and Populism*},
    journal = {Swiss Political Science Review},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Recent scholarship on the populist radical right tends to imprecisely describe the welfare agenda of this party family with reference to its key ideological characteristics of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. We propose an alternative analytical framework that considers
    the multidimensionality of welfare state positions and the {"}deservingness criteria{"} that underlie ideas about welfare entitlement. Applying this framework to a sample of four European populist radical right parties, we conclude that three interrelated frames inform their welfare
    agenda. These parties, we argue, advocate social closure not only on the basis of the deservingness criterion of identity (welfare chauvinism), but also on criteria of control, attitude, and reciprocity (welfare producerism) and on an antagonism between the people and the
    establishment (welfare populism). Understanding the welfare agenda of the populist radical right requires us to move beyond welfare chauvinism and to reconsider the concept of welfare producerism and its interaction with welfare chauvinism.},
    doi = {10.1111/spsr.12428},
    }

  • Allen, Trevor J. and Sara Wallace Goodman. “Individual- and party-level determinants of far-right support among women in Western Europe.” European Political Science Review 13.2 (2021): 135–150. doi:10.1017/S1755773920000405
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Support for Western Europe’s far-right is majority-male. However, given the sweeping success of the party family, literature on this ‘gender gap’ belies support given to the radical right by millions of women. We examine differences between men and women’s support for far-right parties, focusing on workplace experience, positions on economic and cultural issues, and features of far-right parties themselves. We find that the received scholarship on blue-collar support for far-right populists is a largely male phenomenon, and women in routine nonmanual (i.e. service, sales, and clerical) work are more likely than those in blue-collar work to support the far-right. Moreover, while men who support the far-right tend to be conservative on other moral issues, certain liberal positions predict far-right support among women, at both the voter and party level. Our analysis suggests that gender differences may obscure the socio-structural and attitudinal bases of support for far-right parties and have broader implications for comparative political behavior and gender and politics.

    @Article{allen-goodman-2021,
    author = {Trevor J. Allen and Sara Wallace Goodman},
    title = {Individual- and party-level determinants of far-right support among women in Western Europe},
    journal = {European Political Science Review},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {13},
    number = {2},
    pages = {135–150},
    abstract = {Support for Western Europe’s far-right is majority-male. However, given the sweeping success of the party family, literature on this ‘gender gap’ belies support given to the radical right by millions of women. We examine differences between men and women’s support for
    far-right parties, focusing on workplace experience, positions on economic and cultural issues, and features of far-right parties themselves. We find that the received scholarship on blue-collar support for far-right populists is a largely male phenomenon, and women in routine
    nonmanual (i.e. service, sales, and clerical) work are more likely than those in blue-collar work to support the far-right. Moreover, while men who support the far-right tend to be conservative on other moral issues, certain liberal positions predict far-right support among women,
    at both the voter and party level. Our analysis suggests that gender differences may obscure the socio-structural and attitudinal bases of support for far-right parties and have broader implications for comparative political behavior and gender and politics.},
    doi = {10.1017/S1755773920000405},
    }

  • Art, David. “The Myth of Global Populism.” Perspectives on Politics (2020): 1–13. doi:10.1017/S1537592720003552
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The {“}rise of global populism{“} has become a primary metanarrative for the previous decade in advanced industrial democracies, but I argue that it is a deeply misleading one. Nativism-not populism-is the defining feature of both radical right parties in Western Europe and of radical right politicians like Donald Trump in the United States. The tide of {“}left-wing populism{“} in Europe receded quickly, as did its promise of returning power to the people through online voting and policy deliberation. The erosion of democracy in states like Hungary has not been the result of populism, but rather of the deliberate practice of competitive authoritarianism. Calling these disparate phenomena {“}populist{“} obscures their core features and mistakenly attaches normatively redeeming qualities to nativists and authoritarians.

    @Article{art-2020,
    author = {David Art},
    title = {The Myth of Global Populism},
    journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
    year = {2020},
    pages = {1--13},
    abstract = {The {"}rise of global populism{"} has become a primary metanarrative for the previous decade in advanced industrial democracies, but I argue that it is a deeply misleading one. Nativism-not populism-is the defining feature of both radical right parties in Western Europe and of radical
    right politicians like Donald Trump in the United States. The tide of {"}left-wing populism{"} in Europe receded quickly, as did its promise of returning power to the people through online voting and policy deliberation. The erosion of democracy in states like Hungary has not been the
    result of populism, but rather of the deliberate practice of competitive authoritarianism. Calling these disparate phenomena {"}populist{"} obscures their core features and mistakenly attaches normatively redeeming qualities to nativists and authoritarians.},
    doi = {10.1017/S1537592720003552},
    }

  • Auers, Daunis and Andres Kasekamp. “Explaining the Electoral Failure of Extreme-Right Parties in Estonia and Latvia.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17.2 (2009): 241–254. doi:10.1080/14782800903108718
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Extreme-right political parties have achieved significant electoral success in Europe in recent years. This paper considers why this electoral success has not been replicated in contemporary Estonia and Latvia. The paper begins with a discussion of the necessary background conditions for the success of extreme-right movements, finding that they do largely exist in Estonia and Latvia. The paper then moves on to map the rising levels of extreme-right mobilisation among both titular and Russian-speaking parts of the population. We examine two hypotheses to explain the electoral failure of extreme-right parties: (1) The institutional hypothesis argues that the party and electoral laws check extreme-right party electoral success; (2) The competition hypothesis contends that political parties lack the membership and traditions that act as constraints on party behaviour. As a result, mainstream parties are free to adopt the radical rhetoric of extreme-right movements and parties.

    @Article{auers-kasekamp-2009,
    author = {Daunis Auers and Andres Kasekamp},
    title = {Explaining the Electoral Failure of Extreme-Right Parties in Estonia and Latvia},
    journal = {Journal of Contemporary European Studies},
    year = {2009},
    volume = {17},
    number = {2},
    pages = {241--254},
    abstract = {Extreme-right political parties have achieved significant electoral success in Europe in recent years. This paper considers why this electoral success has not been replicated in contemporary Estonia and Latvia. The paper begins with a discussion of the necessary background
    conditions for the success of extreme-right movements, finding that they do largely exist in Estonia and Latvia. The paper then moves on to map the rising levels of extreme-right mobilisation among both titular and Russian-speaking parts of the population. We examine two hypotheses
    to explain the electoral failure of extreme-right parties: (1) The institutional hypothesis argues that the party and electoral laws check extreme-right party electoral success; (2) The competition hypothesis contends that political parties lack the membership and traditions that
    act as constraints on party behaviour. As a result, mainstream parties are free to adopt the radical rhetoric of extreme-right movements and parties.},
    doi = {10.1080/14782800903108718},
    }

  • Auers, Daunis and Andres Kasekamp. “Comparing Radical-Right Populism in Estonia and Latvia.” Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse. Eds. Mral, Brigitte, Majid KhosraviNik, and Ruth Wodak. Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. 235–248.
    [BibTeX]
    @InCollection{auers-kasekamp-2013,
    author = {Daunis Auers and Andres Kasekamp},
    title = {Comparing Radical-Right Populism in Estonia and Latvia},
    booktitle = {Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse},
    editor = {Brigitte Mral and Majid KhosraviNik and Ruth Wodak},
    publisher = {Bloomsbury Academic},
    year = {2013},
    pages = {235--248},
    }

  • Backlund, Anders and Ann-Cathrine Jungar. “Populist Radical Right Party-Voter Policy Representation in Western Europe.” Representation 55.4 (2019): 393–413. doi:10.1080/00344893.2019.1674911
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    In this study we assess policy representation by populist radical right (PRR) parties in ten West European countries. Going beyond aggregate left-right or socio-cultural (GAL-TAN) dimensions of political conflict, we study representation on policy issues related to the PRR parties{“} core ideological features nativism, populism, and authoritarianism. Analysing data from party expert and voter surveys, we find that the PRR parties provide largely unique policy positions that are congruent with their voters{“} preferences in terms of their opposition to immigration and the European Union. By contrast, the parties are less representative in terms of their value conservative and authoritarian positions on gay rights and civil liberties. The findings have relevance for our understanding of party strategy, voter behaviour, and the dimensionality of political competition.

    @Article{backlund-jungar-2019,
    author = {Anders Backlund and Ann-Cathrine Jungar},
    title = {Populist Radical Right Party-Voter Policy Representation in Western Europe},
    journal = {Representation},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {55},
    number = {4},
    pages = {393--413},
    abstract = {In this study we assess policy representation by populist radical right (PRR) parties in ten West European countries. Going beyond aggregate left-right or socio-cultural (GAL-TAN) dimensions of political conflict, we study representation on policy issues related to the PRR
    parties{"} core ideological features nativism, populism, and authoritarianism. Analysing data from party expert and voter surveys, we find that the PRR parties provide largely unique policy positions that are congruent with their voters{"} preferences in terms of their opposition to
    immigration and the European Union. By contrast, the parties are less representative in terms of their value conservative and authoritarian positions on gay rights and civil liberties. The findings have relevance for our understanding of party strategy, voter behaviour, and the
    dimensionality of political competition.},
    doi = {10.1080/00344893.2019.1674911},
    }

  • Berning, Carl C. and Conrad Ziller. “Green Versus Radical Right As the New Political Divide? The European Parliament Election 2019 in Germany.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies online first (2020). doi:10.1111/jcms.13080
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{berning-ziller-2020,
    author = {Carl C. Berning and Conrad Ziller},
    title = {Green Versus Radical Right As the New Political Divide? The European Parliament Election 2019 in Germany},
    journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    doi = {10.1111/jcms.13080},
    }

  • Betz, Hans-Georg and Fabian Habersack. “Regional Nativism in East Germany. The Case of the AfD.” The People and the Nation. Populism and Ethno-Territorial Politics in Europe. Eds. Heinisch, Reinhard, Emanuele Massetti, and Oscar Mazzoleni. London: Routledge, 2019. 110–135.
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This chapter argues that the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is a typical radical right-wing populist party, which promotes an emphatically nativist discourse and examines the particular features that distinguish the Eastern part of Germany from the rest of the country. It explores to what degree understanding Eastern Germany{“}s regional idiosyncrasies might help to explain the AfD{“}s disproportionate appeal there. Political success tends to invite rivalries, internal strife, power struggles, and programmatic trench warfare. This was also the case with the AfD following the European elections. Contemporary radical right-wing populism is a composite of two ideational elements: populism and nativism. The AfD{“}s growing appeal after 2015 was largely owed to the new leaders{“} ability to frame their discourse in a way that resonated with widespread and enduring undercurrents in German public opinion. The sociologist Robert Jansen defines populism as a political project that mobilizes ordinary people into contentious political action while {“}articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people{“}.

    @InCollection{betz-habersack-2019,
    author = {Hans-Georg Betz and Fabian Habersack},
    title = {Regional Nativism in East Germany. The Case of the AfD},
    booktitle = {The People and the Nation. Populism and Ethno-Territorial Politics in Europe},
    publisher = {Routledge},
    year = {2019},
    editor = {Reinhard Heinisch and Emanuele Massetti and Oscar Mazzoleni},
    pages = {110--135},
    address = {London},
    abstract = {This chapter argues that the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is a typical radical right-wing populist party, which promotes an emphatically nativist discourse and examines the particular features that distinguish the Eastern part of Germany from the rest of the country. It explores
    to what degree understanding Eastern Germany{"}s regional idiosyncrasies might help to explain the AfD{"}s disproportionate appeal there. Political success tends to invite rivalries, internal strife, power struggles, and programmatic trench warfare. This was also the case with the AfD
    following the European elections. Contemporary radical right-wing populism is a composite of two ideational elements: populism and nativism. The AfD{"}s growing appeal after 2015 was largely owed to the new leaders{"} ability to frame their discourse in a way that resonated with
    widespread and enduring undercurrents in German public opinion. The sociologist Robert Jansen defines populism as a political project that mobilizes ordinary people into contentious political action while {"}articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary
    people{"}.},
    }

  • Bichay, Nicolas. “Public Campaign Financing and the Rise of Radical-Right Parties.” Electoral Studies (2020): online first. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102159
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    While public campaign financing is often thought of as a way to {“}level the playing field{“} of elections, I argue that such policies may have unintended second-order consequences. Namely, that increasing the degree to which public funding drives political campaigns disproportionately aids radical-right parties. This is a counter-intuitive result, as public financing of elections has recently become an important issue for those on the political left as a method to restore power to the majority. Rather, it seems to aid not only those on the right, but those on the political fringe. Through a cross-national analysis of 328 lower-house elections in 20 advanced democracies, I demonstrate that public financing serves to significantly increase vote-share of the radical-right.

    @Article{bichay-2020,
    author = {Nicolas Bichay},
    title = {Public Campaign Financing and the Rise of Radical-Right Parties},
    journal = {Electoral Studies},
    year = {2020},
    pages = {online first},
    abstract = {While public campaign financing is often thought of as a way to {"}level the playing field{"} of elections, I argue that such policies may have unintended second-order consequences. Namely, that increasing the degree to which public funding drives political campaigns
    disproportionately aids radical-right parties. This is a counter-intuitive result, as public financing of elections has recently become an important issue for those on the political left as a method to restore power to the majority. Rather, it seems to aid not only those on the
    right, but those on the political fringe. Through a cross-national analysis of 328 lower-house elections in 20 advanced democracies, I demonstrate that public financing serves to significantly increase vote-share of the radical-right.},
    doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102159},
    }

  • Bornschier, Simon, Silja Häusermann, Delia Zollinger, and C. a’e. “How “Us” and “Them” Relates to Voting Behavior-Social Structure, Social Identities, and Electoral Choice.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2021). doi:10.1177/0010414021997504
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The last decades have seen the emergence of a divide pitting the new left against the far right in advanced democracies. We study how this universalism-particularism divide is crystallizing into a full-blown cleavage, complete with structural, political and identity elements. So far, little research exists on the identities that voters themselves perceive as relevant for drawing in- and out-group boundaries along this divide. Based on an original survey from Switzerland, a paradigmatic case of electoral realignment, we show that voters’ {“}objective{“} socio-demographic characteristics relate to distinctive, primarily culturally connoted identities. We then inquire into the degree to which these group identities have been politicized, that is, whether they divide new left and far right voters. Our results strongly suggest that the universalism-particularism {“}cleavage{“} not only bundles issues, but shapes how people think about who they are and where they stand in a group conflict that meshes economics and culture.

    @Article{bornschier-haeusermann-zollinger-colombo-2021,
    author = {Simon Bornschier and Silja H{\"a}usermann and Delia Zollinger and C{\a'e}line Colombo},
    title = {How {"}Us{"} and {"}Them{"} Relates to Voting Behavior-Social Structure, Social Identities, and Electoral Choice},
    journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The last decades have seen the emergence of a divide pitting the new left against the far right in advanced democracies. We study how this universalism-particularism divide is crystallizing into a full-blown cleavage, complete with structural, political and identity elements. So
    far, little research exists on the identities that voters themselves perceive as relevant for drawing in- and out-group boundaries along this divide. Based on an original survey from Switzerland, a paradigmatic case of electoral realignment, we show that voters' {"}objective{"}
    socio-demographic characteristics relate to distinctive, primarily culturally connoted identities. We then inquire into the degree to which these group identities have been politicized, that is, whether they divide new left and far right voters. Our results strongly suggest that
    the universalism-particularism {"}cleavage{"} not only bundles issues, but shapes how people think about who they are and where they stand in a group conflict that meshes economics and culture.},
    doi = {10.1177/0010414021997504},
    }

  • Brils, Tobias, Jasper Muis, and Teodora Gaidyt?. “Dissecting Electoral Support for the Far Right: A Comparison between Mature and Post-Communist European Democracies.” Government and Opposition (2020): online first. doi:10.1017/gov.2020.17
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article investigates three explanations for electoral support for the far right – {“}cultural backlash{“}, {“}economic grievances{“} and {“}protest voting{“} – in a novel way. Our main contribution is that we contrast far-right voters with voters of centre-right parties, traditional left-wing parties and abstainers. Equally innovative is the comparison between mature and post-communist democracies. Using European Social Survey data (2014-16), we conclude that anti-immigration attitudes are most important in distinguishing far-right voters from all other groups. Yet, these differences are significantly smaller in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, far-right voters are not the so-called socioeconomic {“}losers of globalization{“}: this is only true when compared with centre-right voters. Concerning protest voting, distrust of supranational governance particularly enhances far-right voting. Overall, our study concludes that more fine-grained distinctions pay off and avoid misleading generalizations about {“}European far-right voters{“} often presented in public debates.

    @Article{brils-muis-gaidyte-2020,
    author = {Tobias Brils and Jasper Muis and Teodora Gaidyt?},
    title = {Dissecting Electoral Support for the Far Right: A Comparison between Mature and Post-Communist European Democracies},
    journal = {Government and Opposition},
    year = {2020},
    pages = {online first},
    abstract = {This article investigates three explanations for electoral support for the far right - {"}cultural backlash{"}, {"}economic grievances{"} and {"}protest voting{"} - in a novel way. Our main contribution is that we contrast far-right voters with voters of centre-right parties, traditional
    left-wing parties and abstainers. Equally innovative is the comparison between mature and post-communist democracies. Using European Social Survey data (2014-16), we conclude that anti-immigration attitudes are most important in distinguishing far-right voters from all other
    groups. Yet, these differences are significantly smaller in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, far-right voters are not the so-called socioeconomic {"}losers of globalization{"}: this is only true when compared with centre-right voters. Concerning protest voting, distrust of supranational
    governance particularly enhances far-right voting. Overall, our study concludes that more fine-grained distinctions pay off and avoid misleading generalizations about {"}European far-right voters{"} often presented in public debates.},
    doi = {10.1017/gov.2020.17},
    }

  • Carella, Leonardo and Robert Ford. “The Status Stratification of Radical Right Support: Reconsidering the Occupational Profile of Ukip”s Electorate.” Electoral Studies 67.online first (2020). doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102214
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Drawing on Weber{“}s conceptualisation of class and status as distinct principles of social order, this article argues that support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is better understood as a status-based phenomenon than a class-based one. Operationalising status as a function of social distance between occupational groups, we show that whilst class was a poor predictor of UKIP support in 2015, status scores were strongly and negatively correlated to the likelihood of supporting UKIP. The opposite is true for the Conservatives{“} and the Labour Party{“}s electorates, which were still much more strongly aligned on class lines. The effect of status on UKIP preference remains strong after controlling for educational qualifications, suggesting that the status scale taps into a deeper divide than simply an educational cleavage. Moreover, we find that status plays a similar role in predicting the likelihood of voting for right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in other Western European countries as well.

    @Article{carella-ford-2020,
    author = {Leonardo Carella and Robert Ford},
    title = {The Status Stratification of Radical Right Support: Reconsidering the Occupational Profile of Ukip{"}s Electorate},
    journal = {Electoral Studies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {67},
    number = {online first},
    abstract = {Drawing on Weber{"}s conceptualisation of class and status as distinct principles of social order, this article argues that support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is better understood as a status-based phenomenon than a class-based one. Operationalising status as a
    function of social distance between occupational groups, we show that whilst class was a poor predictor of UKIP support in 2015, status scores were strongly and negatively correlated to the likelihood of supporting UKIP. The opposite is true for the Conservatives{"} and the Labour
    Party{"}s electorates, which were still much more strongly aligned on class lines. The effect of status on UKIP preference remains strong after controlling for educational qualifications, suggesting that the status scale taps into a deeper divide than simply an educational cleavage.
    Moreover, we find that status plays a similar role in predicting the likelihood of voting for right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in other Western European countries as well.},
    doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102214},
    }

  • Castelli Gattinara, Pietro. “The Study of the Far Right and Its Three E”s: Why Scholarship Must Go Beyond Eurocentrism, Electoralism and Externalism.” French Politics 18.3 (2020): 314–333. doi:10.1057/s41253-020-00124-8
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Over the past decades, the far right has become one of the most studied phenomena in international political science, attracting more attention than all other party families combined. This article critically assesses the scholarly progress made so far and discusses what future research on the far right should focus on. It argues that although the number of studies has grown disproportionately, scholars have been slow in acknowledging that far-right politics have entered a new phase, where traditional aspects progressively lost momentum and new ones acquired central stage. To understand the transformations in the contemporary far right, scholars must address three shortcomings of international comparative research-Eurocentrism, Electoralism and Externalism. Today, we need to re-embed the study of the far right into the broader literature on party politics and political sociology, acknowledging the diversity that exists within the far right, its diffusion beyond (western) Europe and its mobilization outside the electoral arena.

    @Article{castelli-2020,
    author = {Pietro {Castelli Gattinara}},
    title = {The Study of the Far Right and Its Three E{"}s: Why Scholarship Must Go Beyond Eurocentrism, Electoralism and Externalism},
    journal = {French Politics},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {18},
    number = {3},
    pages = {314--333},
    abstract = {Over the past decades, the far right has become one of the most studied phenomena in international political science, attracting more attention than all other party families combined. This article critically assesses the scholarly progress made so far and discusses what future
    research on the far right should focus on. It argues that although the number of studies has grown disproportionately, scholars have been slow in acknowledging that far-right politics have entered a new phase, where traditional aspects progressively lost momentum and new ones
    acquired central stage. To understand the transformations in the contemporary far right, scholars must address three shortcomings of international comparative research-Eurocentrism, Electoralism and Externalism. Today, we need to re-embed the study of the far right into the broader
    literature on party politics and political sociology, acknowledging the diversity that exists within the far right, its diffusion beyond (western) Europe and its mobilization outside the electoral arena.},
    doi = {10.1057/s41253-020-00124-8},
    }

  • Chou, Winston, Rafaela Dancygier, Naoki Egami, and Amaney A. Jamal. “Competing for Loyalists? How Party Positioning Affects Populist Radical Right Voting.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2021). doi:10.1177/0010414021997166
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    As populist radical right parties muster increasing support in many democracies, an important question is how mainstream parties can recapture their voters. Focusing on Germany, we present original panel evidence that voters supporting the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)-the country’s largest populist radical right party-resemble partisan loyalists with entrenched anti-establishment views, seemingly beyond recapture by mainstream parties. Yet this loyalty does not only reflect anti-establishment voting, but also gridlocked party-issue positioning. Despite descriptive evidence of strong party loyalty, experimental evidence reveals that many AfD voters change allegiances when mainstream parties accommodate their preferences. However, for most parties this repositioning is extremely costly. While mainstream parties can attract populist radical right voters via restrictive immigration policies, they alienate their own voters in doing so. Examining position shifts across issue dimensions, parties, and voter groups, our research demonstrates that, absent significant changes in issue preferences or salience, the status quo is an equilibrium.

    @Article{chou-dancygier-egami-jamal-2021,
    author = {Winston Chou and Rafaela Dancygier and Naoki Egami and Amaney A. Jamal},
    title = {Competing for Loyalists? How Party Positioning Affects Populist Radical Right Voting},
    journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {As populist radical right parties muster increasing support in many democracies, an important question is how mainstream parties can recapture their voters. Focusing on Germany, we present original panel evidence that voters supporting the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)-the
    country's largest populist radical right party-resemble partisan loyalists with entrenched anti-establishment views, seemingly beyond recapture by mainstream parties. Yet this loyalty does not only reflect anti-establishment voting, but also gridlocked party-issue positioning.
    Despite descriptive evidence of strong party loyalty, experimental evidence reveals that many AfD voters change allegiances when mainstream parties accommodate their preferences. However, for most parties this repositioning is extremely costly. While mainstream parties can attract
    populist radical right voters via restrictive immigration policies, they alienate their own voters in doing so. Examining position shifts across issue dimensions, parties, and voter groups, our research demonstrates that, absent significant changes in issue preferences or salience,
    the status quo is an equilibrium.},
    doi = {10.1177/0010414021997166},
    }

  • Chueri, Juliana. “Social Policy Outcomes of Government Participation By Radical Right Parties.” Party Politics online first (2020). doi:10.1177/1354068820923496
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The literature has pointed to a change in radical right-wing parties{“} (RRWPs) position regarding the welfare state. Those parties have abandoned the neoliberal approach on distributive issues and have become defenders of social expenditure for deserving groups. Nevertheless, as RRWPs have joined with right-wing mainstream parties to form governments, their distributive policy position might cause conflict in a coalition. This study, therefore, addresses this puzzle by analysing the social policy outcomes of RRWPs{“} government participation. The conclusion is that those parties contribute to the welfare state retrenchment. However, policies are not affected evenly. Expenditure that targets groups regarded as undeserving by the radical right is retrenched the most.

    @Article{chueri-2020,
    author = {Juliana Chueri},
    title = {Social Policy Outcomes of Government Participation By Radical Right Parties},
    journal = {Party Politics},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The literature has pointed to a change in radical right-wing parties{"} (RRWPs) position regarding the welfare state. Those parties have abandoned the neoliberal approach on distributive issues and have become defenders of social expenditure for deserving groups. Nevertheless, as
    RRWPs have joined with right-wing mainstream parties to form governments, their distributive policy position might cause conflict in a coalition. This study, therefore, addresses this puzzle by analysing the social policy outcomes of RRWPs{"} government participation. The conclusion
    is that those parties contribute to the welfare state retrenchment. However, policies are not affected evenly. Expenditure that targets groups regarded as undeserving by the radical right is retrenched the most.},
    doi = {10.1177/1354068820923496},
    }

  • a’e, Hilde Coff R.. “The Impact of Candidates’ Vocal Expression on Policy Agreement and Candidate Support: Differences Between Populist Radical Right and Other Voters.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 30.4 (2020): 422–445. doi:10.1080/17457289.2018.1544905
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This study assesses to what extent the vocal expression used by political candidates relates to voters’ likelihood of agreeing with a policy and of voting for the candidate introducing the policy. Experimental video data with hypothetical candidates presenting migration policies were collected among a representative sample of the Dutch population (N = 4,727). The candidates delivered the policies using either a hard vocal expression (indicating a more aggressive, austere and dominant style) or a soft vocal expression (indicating a friendlier and more amicable style). The analysis reveals that using a hard (versus soft) vocal expression negatively affects the likelihood of supporting a candidate and agreeing with the policy, an effect which is significantly stronger among citizens who do not support the populist radical right Freedom Party (PVV) than among those who do support the PVV. This negative effect of a hard (versus soft) expression among those not supporting the PVV is significantly stronger when the presented policy on the integration of immigrants is moderate rather than restrictive.

    @Article{coffe-2020,
    author = {Hilde R. Coff{\a'e}},
    title = {The Impact of Candidates’ Vocal Expression on Policy Agreement and Candidate Support: Differences Between Populist Radical Right and Other Voters},
    journal = {Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {30},
    number = {4},
    pages = {422--445},
    abstract = {This study assesses to what extent the vocal expression used by political candidates relates to voters’ likelihood of agreeing with a policy and of voting for the candidate introducing the policy. Experimental video data with hypothetical candidates presenting migration policies
    were collected among a representative sample of the Dutch population (N = 4,727). The candidates delivered the policies using either a hard vocal expression (indicating a more aggressive, austere and dominant style) or a soft vocal expression (indicating a friendlier and more
    amicable style). The analysis reveals that using a hard (versus soft) vocal expression negatively affects the likelihood of supporting a candidate and agreeing with the policy, an effect which is significantly stronger among citizens who do not support the populist radical right
    Freedom Party (PVV) than among those who do support the PVV. This negative effect of a hard (versus soft) expression among those not supporting the PVV is significantly stronger when the presented policy on the integration of immigrants is moderate rather than restrictive.},
    doi = {10.1080/17457289.2018.1544905},
    }

  • Cohen, Denis. “Between Strategy and Protest. How Policy Demand, Political Dissatisfaction and Strategic Incentives Matter for Far-right Voting.” Political Science Research and Methods 8.4 (2020): 662–676. doi:10.1017/psrm.2019.21
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    What attracts voters to far-right parties? Emphasizing the repercussions of far-right parties{“} past achievements on the mobilization of voters{“} electoral demand, this paper develops an argument of context-dependent strategic far-right voting. Far-right parties seek to mobilize on a combination of demand for nativist policies and anti-establishment protest sentiment. Their capacity of doing so, however, critically depends on the strategic incentives they supply. My findings from a comparative analysis based on six waves of the European Election Study show that far-right parties{“} past attainment of legislative strength boosts the credibility of their policy appeal and broadens the scope of their protest appeal whereas their participation in government jeopardizes their capacity to mobilize on popular discontent.

    @Article{cohen-2020,
    author = {Denis Cohen},
    title = {Between Strategy and Protest. How Policy Demand, Political Dissatisfaction and Strategic Incentives Matter for Far-right Voting},
    journal = {Political Science Research and Methods},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {8},
    number = {4},
    pages = {662–676},
    abstract = {What attracts voters to far-right parties? Emphasizing the repercussions of far-right parties{"} past achievements on the mobilization of voters{"} electoral demand, this paper develops an argument of context-dependent strategic far-right voting. Far-right parties seek to mobilize on
    a combination of demand for nativist policies and anti-establishment protest sentiment. Their capacity of doing so, however, critically depends on the strategic incentives they supply. My findings from a comparative analysis based on six waves of the European Election Study show
    that far-right parties{"} past attainment of legislative strength boosts the credibility of their policy appeal and broadens the scope of their protest appeal whereas their participation in government jeopardizes their capacity to mobilize on popular discontent.},
    doi = {10.1017/psrm.2019.21},
    }

  • Dennison, James and Matthew Goodwin. “Immigration, Issue Ownership and the Rise of UKIP.” Parliamentary Affairs 68.Supplement 1 (2015): 168–187. doi:10.1093/pa/gsv034
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{dennison-goodwin-2015,
    author = {James Dennison and Matthew Goodwin},
    title = {Immigration, Issue Ownership and the Rise of UKIP},
    journal = {Parliamentary Affairs},
    year = {2015},
    volume = {68},
    number = {Supplement 1},
    pages = {168--187},
    doi = {10.1093/pa/gsv034},
    }

  • Down, Ian and Kyung Joon Han. “Far Right Parties and “Europe”. Societal Polarization and the Limits of EU Issue Contestation.” Journal of European Integration online first (2020): 1–17. doi:10.1080/07036337.2020.1728263
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Europe has experienced both marked growth in public support for far right parties and growth in public Euro-skepticism. While far right parties have become associated with particularly strident negative orientations towards the European Union (EU), there is considerable variation in the extent of their antipathy, and, in the extent to which they emphasize the EU. Here we examine the conditions under which far right parties can successfully leverage the EU issue to win votes. Specifically, we argue that the extent of societal polarization on the EU constitutes an important intermediating condition. Our findings indicate that individuals are more likely to vote far right when these parties contest the EU, but only if they do so in a context of societal polarization on the issue.

    @Article{down-han-2020,
    author = {Ian Down and Kyung Joon Han},
    title = {Far Right Parties and {"}Europe{"}. Societal Polarization and the Limits of EU Issue Contestation},
    journal = {Journal of European Integration},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--17},
    abstract = {Europe has experienced both marked growth in public support for far right parties and growth in public Euro-skepticism. While far right parties have become associated with particularly strident negative orientations towards the European Union (EU), there is considerable variation
    in the extent of their antipathy, and, in the extent to which they emphasize the EU. Here we examine the conditions under which far right parties can successfully leverage the EU issue to win votes. Specifically, we argue that the extent of societal polarization on the EU
    constitutes an important intermediating condition. Our findings indicate that individuals are more likely to vote far right when these parties contest the EU, but only if they do so in a context of societal polarization on the issue.},
    doi = {10.1080/07036337.2020.1728263},
    }

  • Evans, Jocelyn and Gilles Ivaldi. “Contextual Effects of Immigrant Presence on Populist Radical Right Support: Testing the Halo Effect.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2020). doi:10.1177/0010414020957677
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This paper examines the relationship between immigration and populist radical right (PRR) support, based on an analysis of the contextual effects of immigrant presence on Front National vote in France in 2017. Using a unique set of survey data geolocalising respondents at the subcommunal level, it finds evidence for the existence of a curvilinear {“}halo effect,{“} with substantial increases in the probability of PRR vote in areas surrounding communities with significantly higher-than-average immigrant populations, and independent of other socio-economic context, as well as individual socio-demographic characteristics. Most importantly, a path analysis confirms the presence of individual attitudinal mediators of this halo effect on PRR vote, thus testing the foundation of the halo, namely that the contextual effects of immigrant presence act on attitudes which drive PRR support. These findings provide a significant step forward in understanding the mechanisms linking subjective experience of immigration with voting for the populist radical right.

    @Article{evans-ivaldi-2020,
    author = {Jocelyn Evans and Gilles Ivaldi},
    title = {Contextual Effects of Immigrant Presence on Populist Radical Right Support: Testing the Halo Effect},
    journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {This paper examines the relationship between immigration and populist radical right (PRR) support, based on an analysis of the contextual effects of immigrant presence on Front National vote in France in 2017. Using a unique set of survey data geolocalising respondents at the
    subcommunal level, it finds evidence for the existence of a curvilinear {"}halo effect,{"} with substantial increases in the probability of PRR vote in areas surrounding communities with significantly higher-than-average immigrant populations, and independent of other socio-economic
    context, as well as individual socio-demographic characteristics. Most importantly, a path analysis confirms the presence of individual attitudinal mediators of this halo effect on PRR vote, thus testing the foundation of the halo, namely that the contextual effects of immigrant
    presence act on attitudes which drive PRR support. These findings provide a significant step forward in understanding the mechanisms linking subjective experience of immigration with voting for the populist radical right.},
    doi = {10.1177/0010414020957677},
    }

  • Frantzeskakis, Nikolaos and Yuko Sato. “Echoes of a Fading Past: Authoritarian Legacies and Far-right Voting.” Electoral Studies online first (2020). doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102163
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    In recent years, electoral support for the far-right has increased dramatically across the world. This phenomenon is especially acute in some new democracies; however, little attention has been devoted to the effects of the legacies of past authoritarian ideologies. We argue that the ideology of the past regime affects far-right support because voters that were politically socialized under authoritarianism will be biased against its ideological brand. To test this argument, we conduct an individual-level analysis across 20 countries between 1996 and 2018 using a difference-in-difference estimation and a country-level analysis using data from 39 democracies between 1980 and 2018. We demonstrate that voters socialized under right-wing dictatorships are less likely to support far-right parties compared to citizens that were socialized under different circumstances. Moreover, support for far-right parties is significantly lower in countries that transitioned from right-wing autocracies. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the far-right movement literature.

    @Article{frantzeskakis-sato-2020,
    author = {Nikolaos Frantzeskakis and Yuko Sato},
    title = {Echoes of a Fading Past: Authoritarian Legacies and Far-right Voting},
    journal = {Electoral Studies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {In recent years, electoral support for the far-right has increased dramatically across the world. This phenomenon is especially acute in some new democracies; however, little attention has been devoted to the effects of the legacies of past authoritarian ideologies. We argue that
    the ideology of the past regime affects far-right support because voters that were politically socialized under authoritarianism will be biased against its ideological brand. To test this argument, we conduct an individual-level analysis across 20 countries between 1996 and 2018
    using a difference-in-difference estimation and a country-level analysis using data from 39 democracies between 1980 and 2018. We demonstrate that voters socialized under right-wing dictatorships are less likely to support far-right parties compared to citizens that were socialized
    under different circumstances. Moreover, support for far-right parties is significantly lower in countries that transitioned from right-wing autocracies. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the far-right movement literature.},
    doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102163},
    }

  • Froio, Caterina, Pietro Castelli Gattinara, Giorgia Bulli, and Matteo Albanese. CasaPound Italia. Contemporary Extreme-Right Politics. London: Routledge, 2020.
    [BibTeX]
    @Book{froio-gattinara-bulli-albanese-2020,
    author = {Caterina Froio and Pietro Castelli Gattinara and Giorgia Bulli and Matteo Albanese},
    title = {CasaPound Italia. Contemporary Extreme-Right Politics},
    publisher = {Routledge},
    year = {2020},
    address = {London},
    }

  • Ganesh, Bharath and Caterina Froio. “A Europe Des Nations.” Journal of European Integration 42.5 (2020): 715–732. doi:10.1080/07036337.2020.1792462
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Contestation over European integration has been widely studied in the rhetoric of parties, leaders, and movements on the far right in a variety of media. Focusing on Twitter use by far right actors in Western Europe, we apply corpus-aided discourse analysis to explore how imaginative geographies are used to politicize Europe among their digital publics. We find that the idea of a crisis of cultural identity pervades imaginaries of Europe amongst far right digital publics. While Europe is presented as facing a crisis of cultural identity, we find that the far right articulates an aspirational imaginary of Europe, the {“}Europe des Nations{“} that rejects liberal-democratic pluralism in the EU and the {“}establishment{“}. We find that the contestation of Europe in far right digital publics relies on a crisis of cultural identity, representing a translation of Nouvelle Droite imaginaries of Europe into the social media space.

    @Article{ganesh-froio-2020,
    author = {Bharath Ganesh and Caterina Froio},
    title = {A Europe Des Nations},
    journal = {Journal of European Integration},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {42},
    number = {5},
    pages = {715--732},
    abstract = {Contestation over European integration has been widely studied in the rhetoric of parties, leaders, and movements on the far right in a variety of media. Focusing on Twitter use by far right actors in Western Europe, we apply corpus-aided discourse analysis to explore how
    imaginative geographies are used to politicize Europe among their digital publics. We find that the idea of a crisis of cultural identity pervades imaginaries of Europe amongst far right digital publics. While Europe is presented as facing a crisis of cultural identity, we find
    that the far right articulates an aspirational imaginary of Europe, the {"}Europe des Nations{"} that rejects liberal-democratic pluralism in the EU and the {"}establishment{"}. We find that the contestation of Europe in far right digital publics relies on a crisis of cultural identity,
    representing a translation of Nouvelle Droite imaginaries of Europe into the social media space.},
    doi = {10.1080/07036337.2020.1792462},
    }

  • Giebler, Heiko, Magdalena Hirsch, Benjamin Schürmann, and Susanne Veit. “Discontent With What? Linking Self-Centered and Society-Centered Discontent to Populist Party Support.” Political Studies online first (2020). doi:10.1177/0032321720932115
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Previous studies aimed at explaining populist support emphasize the crucial role of populist attitudes and ideology among the general population. With respect to the role of discontent and grievances as drivers of populist support—often at the heart of theoretical work on populism—however, empirical results are rather mixed. We argue that the apparent contradictions are partly due to insufficient conceptualization of discontent. We distinguish between societal-centered discontent, which is more based on a general, negative subjective assessment of society, and self-centered discontent that expresses a negative assessment of one’s personal situation. In line with our expectations, regression results for Germany confirm that society-centered discontent, but not self-centered discontent, is important for populist party support. Moreover, we find that society-centered discontent also moderates the relation between populist attitudes and populist support. We conclude that beyond ideologies, populism capitalizes on the cultivation of collective—but not individual—discontent.

    @Article{giebler-hirsch-schuermann-veit-2020,
    author = {Heiko Giebler and Magdalena Hirsch and Benjamin Sch{\"u}rmann and Susanne Veit},
    title = {Discontent With What? Linking Self-Centered and Society-Centered Discontent to Populist Party Support},
    journal = {Political Studies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Previous studies aimed at explaining populist support emphasize the crucial role of populist attitudes and ideology among the general population. With respect to the role of discontent and grievances as drivers of populist support—often at the heart of theoretical work on
    populism—however, empirical results are rather mixed. We argue that the apparent contradictions are partly due to insufficient conceptualization of discontent. We distinguish between societal-centered discontent, which is more based on a general, negative subjective assessment of
    society, and self-centered discontent that expresses a negative assessment of one’s personal situation. In line with our expectations, regression results for Germany confirm that society-centered discontent, but not self-centered discontent, is important for populist party
    support. Moreover, we find that society-centered discontent also moderates the relation between populist attitudes and populist support. We conclude that beyond ideologies, populism capitalizes on the cultivation of collective—but not individual—discontent.},
    doi = {10.1177/0032321720932115},
    }

  • Gwiazda, Anna. “Right-wing populism and feminist politics: The case of Law and Justice in Poland.” International Political Science Review online first (2020). doi:10.1177/0192512120948917
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article disentangles the complexity of right-wing populism and feminist politics using an original framework based on inputs (representative claims) and outputs (policies) to examine a Polish case. In 2015, the right-wing populist Law and Justice party (PiS) formed a single-party majority government led by a female prime minister after winning the elections. PiS is ideologically conservative, promotes traditional and national values and is supported by the Catholic Church. Additionally, it is hostile towards what it calls ‘gender-ideology’ and is reluctant to implement feminist policies. This article also reveals that PiS represents conservative women’s interests and advocates an aspect of conservative feminism, therefore possessing a duality in its claims and policies. Overall, this article draws inferences about the nexus between social conservatism, populism and feminism, and thus seeks to contribute to the scholarly literature by examining a timely issue against the backdrop of rising populism, illiberalism and anti-gender campaigns.

    @Article{gwiazda-2020,
    author = {Anna Gwiazda},
    title = {Right-wing populism and feminist politics: The case of Law and Justice in Poland},
    journal = {International Political Science Review},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {This article disentangles the complexity of right-wing populism and feminist politics using an original framework based on inputs (representative claims) and outputs (policies) to examine a Polish case. In 2015, the right-wing populist Law and Justice party (PiS) formed a
    single-party majority government led by a female prime minister after winning the elections. PiS is ideologically conservative, promotes traditional and national values and is supported by the Catholic Church. Additionally, it is hostile towards what it calls ‘gender-ideology’
    and is reluctant to implement feminist policies. This article also reveals that PiS represents conservative women’s interests and advocates an aspect of conservative feminism, therefore possessing a duality in its claims and policies. Overall, this article draws inferences about
    the nexus between social conservatism, populism and feminism, and thus seeks to contribute to the scholarly literature by examining a timely issue against the backdrop of rising populism, illiberalism and anti-gender campaigns.},
    doi = {10.1177/0192512120948917},
    }

  • Halikiopoulou, Daphne and Tim Vlandas. “When Economic and Cultural Interests Align: the Anti-Immigration Voter Coalitions Driving Far Right Party Success in Europe.” European Political Science Review 12.4 (2020): 427–448. doi:10.1017/s175577392000020x
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article contests the view that the strong positive correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and far right party success necessarily constitutes evidence in support of the cultural grievance thesis. We argue that the success of far right parties depends on their ability to mobilize a coalition of interests between their core supporters, that is voters with cultural grievances over immigration and the often larger group of voters with economic grievances over immigration. Using individual level data from eight rounds of the European Social Survey, our empirical analysis shows that while cultural concerns over immigration are a stronger predictor of far right party support, those who are concerned with the impact of immigration on the economy are important to the far right in numerical terms. Taken together, our findings suggest that economic grievances over immigration remain pivotal within the context of the transnational cleavage.

    @Article{halikiopoulou-vlandas-2020,
    author = {Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas},
    title = {When Economic and Cultural Interests Align: the Anti-Immigration Voter Coalitions Driving Far Right Party Success in Europe},
    journal = {European Political Science Review},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {12},
    number = {4},
    pages = {427--448},
    abstract = {This article contests the view that the strong positive correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and far right party success necessarily constitutes evidence in support of the cultural grievance thesis. We argue that the success of far right parties depends on their ability
    to mobilize a coalition of interests between their core supporters, that is voters with cultural grievances over immigration and the often larger group of voters with economic grievances over immigration. Using individual level data from eight rounds of the European Social Survey,
    our empirical analysis shows that while cultural concerns over immigration are a stronger predictor of far right party support, those who are concerned with the impact of immigration on the economy are important to the far right in numerical terms. Taken together, our findings
    suggest that economic grievances over immigration remain pivotal within the context of the transnational cleavage.},
    doi = {10.1017/s175577392000020x},
    }

  • Harteveld, Eelco, Wouter van der Brug, Sarah de Lange, and Tom van der Meer. “Multiple Roots of the Populist Radical Right: Support for the Dutch PVV in Cities and the Countryside.” European Journal of Political Research online first (2021). doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12452
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Populist radical right parties are considerably more popular in some areas (neighbourhoods, municipalities, regions) than others. They thrive in some cities, in some smaller towns and in some rural areas, but they are unsuccessful in other cities, small towns and rural areas. We seek to explain this regional variation by modelling at the individual level how citizens respond to local conditions. We argue that patterns of populist radical right support can be explained by anxiety in the face of social change. However, how social change manifests itself is different in rural and urban areas, so that variations in populist radical right support are rooted in different kinds of conditions. To analyse the effects of these conditions we use unique geo-referenced survey data from the Netherlands collected among a nationwide sample of 8,000 Dutch respondents. Our analyses demonstrate that the presence of immigrants (and increases therein) can explain why populist radical right parties are more popular in some urban areas than in others, but that it cannot explain variation across rural areas. In these areas, regional marginalization is an important predictor of support for populist radical right parties. Hence, to understand the support for the populist radical right, the heterogeneity of its electorate should be recognized

    @Article{harteveld-brug-lange-meer-2021,
    author = {Eelco Harteveld and Wouter {van der Brug} and Sarah {de Lange} and Tom {van der Meer}},
    title = {Multiple Roots of the Populist Radical Right: Support for the Dutch PVV in Cities and the Countryside},
    journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Populist radical right parties are considerably more popular in some areas (neighbourhoods, municipalities, regions) than others. They thrive in some cities, in some smaller towns and in some rural areas, but they are unsuccessful in other cities, small towns and rural areas. We
    seek to explain this regional variation by modelling at the individual level how citizens respond to local conditions. We argue that patterns of populist radical right support can be explained by anxiety in the face of social change. However, how social change manifests itself is
    different in rural and urban areas, so that variations in populist radical right support are rooted in different kinds of conditions. To analyse the effects of these conditions we use unique geo-referenced survey data from the Netherlands collected among a nationwide sample of
    8,000 Dutch respondents. Our analyses demonstrate that the presence of immigrants (and increases therein) can explain why populist radical right parties are more popular in some urban areas than in others, but that it cannot explain variation across rural areas. In these areas,
    regional marginalization is an important predictor of support for populist radical right parties. Hence, to understand the support for the populist radical right, the heterogeneity of its electorate should be recognized},
    doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12452},
    }

  • Harteveld, Eelco, Andrej Kokkonen, Jonas Linde, and Stefan Dahlberg. “A Tough Trade-off? The Asymmetrical Impact of Populist Radical Right Inclusion on Satisfaction With Democracy and Government.” European Political Science Review 13.1 (2021): 113–133. doi:10.1017/S1755773920000387
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Populist radical right (PRR) parties are increasingly included in coalition governments across Western Europe. How does such inclusion affect satisfaction with democracy (SWD) in these societies? While some citizens will feel democracy has grown more responsive, others will abhor the inclusion of such controversial parties. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002–2018) and panel data from the Netherlands, we investigate how nativists{“} and non-nativists{“} SWD depends on mainstream parties{“} strategies towards PRR parties. We show that the effect is asymmetrical: at moments of inclusion nativists become substantially more satisfied with democracy, while such satisfaction among non-nativists decreases less or not at all. This pattern, which we attribute to Easton{“}s {“}reservoir of goodwill{“}, that is, a buffer of political support generated by a track-record of good performance and responsiveness, can account for the seemingly contradictory increase in SWD in many Western European countries in times of populism.

    @Article{harteveld-kokkonen-linde-dahlberg-2021,
    author = {Eelco Harteveld and Andrej Kokkonen and Jonas Linde and Stefan Dahlberg},
    title = {A Tough Trade-off? The Asymmetrical Impact of Populist Radical Right Inclusion on Satisfaction With Democracy and Government},
    journal = {European Political Science Review},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {13},
    number = {1},
    pages = {113–133},
    abstract = {Populist radical right (PRR) parties are increasingly included in coalition governments across Western Europe. How does such inclusion affect satisfaction with democracy (SWD) in these societies? While some citizens will feel democracy has grown more responsive, others will abhor
    the inclusion of such controversial parties. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002–2018) and panel data from the Netherlands, we investigate how nativists{"} and non-nativists{"} SWD depends on mainstream parties{"} strategies towards PRR parties. We show that the effect is
    asymmetrical: at moments of inclusion nativists become substantially more satisfied with democracy, while such satisfaction among non-nativists decreases less or not at all. This pattern, which we attribute to Easton{"}s {"}reservoir of goodwill{"}, that is, a buffer of political support
    generated by a track-record of good performance and responsiveness, can account for the seemingly contradictory increase in SWD in many Western European countries in times of populism.},
    doi = {10.1017/S1755773920000387},
    }

  • Heinisch, Reinhard and Carsten Wegscheider. “Disentangling How Populism and Radical Host Ideologies Shape Citizens’ Conceptions of Democratic Decision-Making.” Politics and Governance 8.3 (2020): 32–44. doi:10.17645/pag.v8i3.2915
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    In this article, we aim to disentangle the extent to which citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making are shaped by populist attitudes or rather by radical left and right host ideologies. Following recent work by Landwehr and Steiner (2017), we distinguish four modes of decision-making embedded in different conceptions of democracy: trusteeship democracy, anti-pluralism, deliberative proceduralism, and majoritarianism. Drawing on data from Austria and Germany, we show that populism and radical host ideologies tap into different dimensions of democracy. While populism is primarily directed against representative forms of democratic decision-making, preferences for deliberative procedures and majority decisions appear entirely shaped by radical left and right host ideologies. Populism thus views decision-making based on the general will of the people as the only legitimate democratic procedure, whereas radical left and right host ideologies aim at involving the relevant group(s) of citizens. Further analyses of the interactions between populist attitudes and radical host ideologies confirm that the effects of populism remain robust and thus independent of the specific manifestations of radical host ideologies. These findings help to disentangle the causes of democratic discontent and to develop possible responses through democratic reforms that specifically and separately aim to mitigate populism and radical host ideologies.

    @Article{heinisch-wegscheider-2020,
    author = {Reinhard Heinisch and Carsten Wegscheider},
    title = {Disentangling How Populism and Radical Host Ideologies Shape Citizens’ Conceptions of Democratic Decision-Making},
    journal = {Politics and Governance},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {8},
    number = {3},
    pages = {32--44},
    abstract = {In this article, we aim to disentangle the extent to which citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making are shaped by populist attitudes or rather by radical left and right host ideologies. Following recent work by Landwehr and Steiner (2017), we distinguish four modes of
    decision-making embedded in different conceptions of democracy: trusteeship democracy, anti-pluralism, deliberative proceduralism, and majoritarianism. Drawing on data from Austria and Germany, we show that populism and radical host ideologies tap into different dimensions of
    democracy. While populism is primarily directed against representative forms of democratic decision-making, preferences for deliberative procedures and majority decisions appear entirely shaped by radical left and right host ideologies. Populism thus views decision-making based on
    the general will of the people as the only legitimate democratic procedure, whereas radical left and right host ideologies aim at involving the relevant group(s) of citizens. Further analyses of the interactions between populist attitudes and radical host ideologies confirm that
    the effects of populism remain robust and thus independent of the specific manifestations of radical host ideologies. These findings help to disentangle the causes of democratic discontent and to develop possible responses through democratic reforms that specifically and separately
    aim to mitigate populism and radical host ideologies.},
    doi = {10.17645/pag.v8i3.2915},
    }

  • Heinze, Anna-Sophie. Strategien gegen Rechtspopulismus? Der Umgang mit der AfD in Landesparlamenten.. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020.
    [BibTeX]
    @Book{heinze-2020b,
    author = {Anna-Sophie Heinze},
    title = {Strategien gegen Rechtspopulismus? Der Umgang mit der AfD in Landesparlamenten.},
    publisher = {Nomos},
    year = {2020},
    address = {Baden-Baden},
    }

  • Heinze, Anna-Sophie. “Zum schwierigen Umgang mit der AfD in den Parlamenten: Arbeitsweise, Reaktionen, Effekte.” Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft online first (2020). doi:10.1007/s41358-020-00245-0
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Der 2013 gegründeten {“}Alternative für Deutschland{“} (AfD) gelang es – anders als früheren Rechtsaußenparteien wie der NPD, DVU oder den Republikanern – in rasanter Geschwindigkeit in alle Landesparlamente, den Bundestag und das Europäische Parlament einzuziehen. Wenngleich die etablierten Parteien bereits viele Erfahrungen mit der AfD in den Parlamenten sammeln konnten, ist die Frage des {“}richtigen{“} Umgangs mit ihr bis heute Gegenstand heftiger Debatten. Vom parlamentarischen Verhalten der anderen Parteien hängt auch ab, welchen Einfluss die AfD dort direkt und indirekt ausüben kann.

    @Article{heinze-2020,
    author = {Anna-Sophie Heinze},
    title = {Zum schwierigen Umgang mit der AfD in den Parlamenten: Arbeitsweise, Reaktionen, Effekte},
    journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Politikwissenschaft},
    year = {2020},
    number = {online first},
    abstract = {Der 2013 gegründeten {"}Alternative für Deutschland{"} (AfD) gelang es - anders als früheren Rechtsaußenparteien wie der NPD, DVU oder den Republikanern - in rasanter Geschwindigkeit in alle Landesparlamente, den Bundestag und das Europäische Parlament einzuziehen. Wenngleich die
    etablierten Parteien bereits viele Erfahrungen mit der AfD in den Parlamenten sammeln konnten, ist die Frage des {"}richtigen{"} Umgangs mit ihr bis heute Gegenstand heftiger Debatten. Vom parlamentarischen Verhalten der anderen Parteien hängt auch ab, welchen Einfluss die AfD dort
    direkt und indirekt ausüben kann.},
    doi = {10.1007/s41358-020-00245-0},
    }

  • Im, Zhen Jie. “Welfare Chauvinism in Times of Labour Market Segmentation: How Different Employment Contracts Moderate the Impact of Welfare Chauvinism on Support for Radical Right Parties.” Comparative European Politics 19.1 (2021): 94–116. doi:10.1057/s41295-020-00224-3
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    I examine how different employment contracts moderate the impact of welfare chauvinist preferences on radical right support. Welfare chauvinism has become a cornerstone of radical right’s nativist electoral programme. Yet, there are mixed findings on how welfare chauvinist preferences affect radical right support. While some studies find a positive association, others find little correlation. One reason for such ambiguity is: voters who support welfare chauvinism may prioritise other competing issue preferences. They may thus vote for other parties, even if such parties do not offer welfare chauvinist programmes. From this perspective, the crucial question is: under what conditions do voters who support welfare chauvinism prefer the radical right? Among other reasons, I argue that they may do so when they experience economic risk from insecure employment contracts. Differences in employment protection legislation strictness for different employment contracts yield differences in employment security for these different contracts. Using cross-national data from the European Social Survey (Rounds 1 and 7), I find that employed workers, who support welfare chauvinism and have temporary contracts, vote most for radical right parties. I regard this finding as evidence that voters supporting welfare chauvinism prefer radical right parties under conditions of employment insecurity.

    @Article{im-2021,
    author = {Zhen Jie Im},
    title = {Welfare Chauvinism in Times of Labour Market Segmentation: How Different Employment Contracts Moderate the Impact of Welfare Chauvinism on Support for Radical Right Parties},
    journal = {Comparative European Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {19},
    number = {1},
    pages = {94--116},
    abstract = {I examine how different employment contracts moderate the impact of welfare chauvinist preferences on radical right support. Welfare chauvinism has become a cornerstone of radical right’s nativist electoral programme. Yet, there are mixed findings on how welfare chauvinist
    preferences affect radical right support. While some studies find a positive association, others find little correlation. One reason for such ambiguity is: voters who support welfare chauvinism may prioritise other competing issue preferences. They may thus vote for other parties,
    even if such parties do not offer welfare chauvinist programmes. From this perspective, the crucial question is: under what conditions do voters who support welfare chauvinism prefer the radical right? Among other reasons, I argue that they may do so when they experience economic
    risk from insecure employment contracts. Differences in employment protection legislation strictness for different employment contracts yield differences in employment security for these different contracts. Using cross-national data from the European Social Survey (Rounds 1 and
    7), I find that employed workers, who support welfare chauvinism and have temporary contracts, vote most for radical right parties. I regard this finding as evidence that voters supporting welfare chauvinism prefer radical right parties under conditions of employment insecurity.},
    doi = {10.1057/s41295-020-00224-3},
    }

  • Ivaldi, Gilles and Oscar Mazzoleni. “Economic Populism and Sovereigntism: the Economic Supply of European Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties.” European Politics and Society 21.2 (2019): 202–218. doi:10.1080/23745118.2019.1632583
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    While economic issues are increasingly salient in political mobilization by European radical right-wing populist parties, we are still in need of a definition of these parties{“} economic positions. This paper argues that the economic supply of radical right populist parties is best characterized by a mix of economic populism and sovereigntism, which forms the basis of a common mobilization frame. Economic populism refers to defence of the economic prosperity of the {“}heartland{“} against the elite and immigrants. Economic sovereigntism is seen, on the other hand, as a means of restoring the people{“}s well-being and the nation{“}s prosperity. To illustrate this argument, we conduct a qualitative analysis of five established European populist radical right parties. We demonstrate that, despite different socioeconomic stances, all parties under scrutiny share a common economic populist sovereigntist frame which claims to defend the self-identified economic interests and well-being of the people. We discuss the implications of our research for the broader understanding of populist mobilization.

    @Article{ivaldi-mazzoleni-2019,
    author = {Gilles Ivaldi and Oscar Mazzoleni},
    title = {Economic Populism and Sovereigntism: the Economic Supply of European Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties},
    journal = {European Politics and Society},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {21},
    number = {2},
    pages = {202--218},
    abstract = {While economic issues are increasingly salient in political mobilization by European radical right-wing populist parties, we are still in need of a definition of these parties{"} economic positions. This paper argues that the economic supply of radical right populist parties is best
    characterized by a mix of economic populism and sovereigntism, which forms the basis of a common mobilization frame. Economic populism refers to defence of the economic prosperity of the {"}heartland{"} against the elite and immigrants. Economic sovereigntism is seen, on the other
    hand, as a means of restoring the people{"}s well-being and the nation{"}s prosperity. To illustrate this argument, we conduct a qualitative analysis of five established European populist radical right parties. We demonstrate that, despite different socioeconomic stances, all parties
    under scrutiny share a common economic populist sovereigntist frame which claims to defend the self-identified economic interests and well-being of the people. We discuss the implications of our research for the broader understanding of populist mobilization.},
    doi = {10.1080/23745118.2019.1632583},
    }

  • Jacobs, Laura and Joost van Spanje. “Prosecuted, Yet Popular? Hate Speech Prosecution of Anti-Immigration Politicians in the News and Electoral Support.” Comparative European Politics online first (2020). doi:10.1057/s41295-020-00215-4
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Prosecuting anti-immigration party leaders for hate speech is theorized to yield electoral ramifications. We assess to what extent these trials are mediatized and whether news visibility of hate speech prosecution affects levels of anti-immigration party support. We compare four Western European countries (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) for which aggregate-level media and public opinion data are combined. We find that hate speech trials were highly mediatized, and dominated the headlines for protracted periods. This short-term news attention drives general news visibility for anti-immigration party actors. Thus, news about hate speech prosecution of anti-immigration politicians creates a reinforcing spiral of attention by increasing the general newsworthiness of a political actor. The findings seem to point to the cautious conclusion that hate speech prosecution is either directly or indirectly related to increased electoral support. While in France and Germany, general news visibility of anti-immigration party actors is associated with higher levels of electoral support, in the Netherlands and Belgium, news about hate speech prosecution has a weak and direct positive relationship with anti-immigration party support. This finding yields implications for political communication strategies of parties by suggesting that hate speech prosecution does not undermine the electoral performance of anti-immigration parties. In fact, initiating legal actions yields unintended effects by granting these parties a media platform.

    @Article{jacobs-spanje-2020,
    author = {Laura Jacobs and Joost {van Spanje}},
    title = {Prosecuted, Yet Popular? Hate Speech Prosecution of Anti-Immigration Politicians in the News and Electoral Support},
    journal = {Comparative European Politics},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Prosecuting anti-immigration party leaders for hate speech is theorized to yield electoral ramifications. We assess to what extent these trials are mediatized and whether news visibility of hate speech prosecution affects levels of anti-immigration party support. We compare four
    Western European countries (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) for which aggregate-level media and public opinion data are combined. We find that hate speech trials were highly mediatized, and dominated the headlines for protracted periods. This short-term news attention
    drives general news visibility for anti-immigration party actors. Thus, news about hate speech prosecution of anti-immigration politicians creates a reinforcing spiral of attention by increasing the general newsworthiness of a political actor. The findings seem to point to the
    cautious conclusion that hate speech prosecution is either directly or indirectly related to increased electoral support. While in France and Germany, general news visibility of anti-immigration party actors is associated with higher levels of electoral support, in the Netherlands
    and Belgium, news about hate speech prosecution has a weak and direct positive relationship with anti-immigration party support. This finding yields implications for political communication strategies of parties by suggesting that hate speech prosecution does not undermine the
    electoral performance of anti-immigration parties. In fact, initiating legal actions yields unintended effects by granting these parties a media platform.},
    doi = {10.1057/s41295-020-00215-4},
    }

  • Jacobs, Laura and Joost van Spanje. “Not All Terror Is Alike: How Right-Wing Extremist and Islamist Terror Threat Affect Anti-immigration Party Support.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research online first (2021). doi:10.1093/ijpor/edaa037
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Terror threat has been theorized to affect political attitudes. Most prior studies have focused exclusively on Islamist terror threat, while effects of right-wing extremist terrorism on voting behavior have been understudied. We argue that effects on the propensity to vote (PTV) for an anti-immigration party (AIP) depend on the type of threat and is moderated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and internal motivation to control prejudice (IMCP). Using a cross-country experiment in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (N = 1,187), we find that Islamist terror threat increases PTV for AIPs amongst voters high in RWA; similarly, right-wing extremist terror threat reduces PTV for AIPs amongst participants high in RWA. IMCP did not moderate the relationship between terror threat and PTV for an AIP.

    @Article{jacobs-spanje-2021,
    author = {Laura Jacobs and Joost {van Spanje}},
    title = {Not All Terror Is Alike: How Right-Wing Extremist and Islamist Terror Threat Affect Anti-immigration Party Support},
    journal = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Terror threat has been theorized to affect political attitudes. Most prior studies have focused exclusively on Islamist terror threat, while effects of right-wing extremist terrorism on voting behavior have been understudied. We argue that effects on the propensity to vote (PTV)
    for an anti-immigration party (AIP) depend on the type of threat and is moderated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and internal motivation to control prejudice (IMCP). Using a cross-country experiment in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (N = 1,187), we find that
    Islamist terror threat increases PTV for AIPs amongst voters high in RWA; similarly, right-wing extremist terror threat reduces PTV for AIPs amongst participants high in RWA. IMCP did not moderate the relationship between terror threat and PTV for an AIP.},
    doi = {10.1093/ijpor/edaa037},
    }

  • Kasekamp, Andres. “Extreme-right parties in contemporary Estonia.” Patterns of Prejudice 37.4 (2003): 401–414. doi:10.1080/0031322032000144483
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Kasekamp examines extreme-right political parties (ERPs) in Estonia since the restoration of independence in 1991. While nationalist sentiments have been widespread and political discourse has been dominated by the centre right, ERPs have not been successful. It is possible to identify two distinct generations of ERPs in Estonia with two different programmatic emphases: the first of 1992–8 could be labelled ‘anti-Soviet’; the second generation beginning in 1999 focuses on opposition to the European Union (EU) and as such has more in common with the ERPs in Western Europe than the first generation. Following Roger Eatwell’s model for the political breakthrough of ERPs, Kasekamp concludes that conducive conditions do not exist at present for such a breakthrough in Estonia, although opposition to the EU offers notable potential for future mobilization.

    @Article{kasekamp-2003,
    author = {Andres Kasekamp},
    title = {Extreme-right parties in contemporary Estonia},
    journal = {Patterns of Prejudice},
    year = {2003},
    volume = {37},
    number = {4},
    pages = {401--414},
    abstract = {Kasekamp examines extreme-right political parties (ERPs) in Estonia since the restoration of independence in 1991. While nationalist sentiments have been widespread and political discourse has been dominated by the centre right, ERPs have not been successful. It is possible to
    identify two distinct generations of ERPs in Estonia with two different programmatic emphases: the first of 1992–8 could be labelled ‘anti-Soviet’; the second generation beginning in 1999 focuses on opposition to the European Union (EU) and as such has more in common with the
    ERPs in Western Europe than the first generation. Following Roger Eatwell’s model for the political breakthrough of ERPs, Kasekamp concludes that conducive conditions do not exist at present for such a breakthrough in Estonia, although opposition to the EU offers notable
    potential for future mobilization.},
    doi = {10.1080/0031322032000144483},
    }

  • Kasekamp, Andres, Mari-Liis Madisson, and Louis Wierenga. “Discursive Opportunities for the Estonian Populist Radical Right in a Digital Society.” Problems of Post-Communism 66.1 (2019): 47–58. doi:10.1080/10758216.2018.1445973
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article analyzes the discursive opportunities, narratives, and dominant themes used by the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE), a new populist radical right party, to achieve increasing visibility. Applying thematic analysis of EKRE’s social media content, we identify four main groups of issues that have formed the mainstay of EKRE’s political communication and framed the narrative that social media channels have disseminated: an anti-Russian stance, Euroskepticism, promotion of family values, and an anti-refugee discourse. We conclude that EKRE has successfully capitalized on specific conditions in the public sphere to increase its popularity.

    @Article{kasekamp-madisson-wierenga-2019,
    author = {Andres Kasekamp and Mari-Liis Madisson and Louis Wierenga},
    title = {Discursive Opportunities for the Estonian Populist Radical Right in a Digital Society},
    journal = {Problems of Post-Communism},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {66},
    number = {1},
    pages = {47--58},
    abstract = {This article analyzes the discursive opportunities, narratives, and dominant themes used by the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE), a new populist radical right party, to achieve increasing visibility. Applying thematic analysis of EKRE’s social media content, we
    identify four main groups of issues that have formed the mainstay of EKRE’s political communication and framed the narrative that social media channels have disseminated: an anti-Russian stance, Euroskepticism, promotion of family values, and an anti-refugee discourse. We
    conclude that EKRE has successfully capitalized on specific conditions in the public sphere to increase its popularity.},
    doi = {10.1080/10758216.2018.1445973},
    }

  • Koning, Edward Anthony. “Breaking Through: How Anti-immigrant Parties Establish Themselves and the Implications for Their Study.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties online first (2020). doi:10.1080/17457289.2020.1785478
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    While the sizeable literature on anti-immigrant parties commonly invokes the term {“}breakthrough{“} in discussing their electoral fortunes, no existing study has subjected this concept to conceptual or empirical scrutiny. Based on an investigation of 54 anti-immigrant parties in seventeen Western European countries, this paper concludes that these parties indeed tend to establish themselves with rare breakthrough elections rather than by incremental growth, and to stay around once they achieve such success. Moreover, these breakthroughs are more likely when these parties have direct or indirect ties to the party system. On the one hand, these findings confirm an often invoked but so far untested suspicion about the way these parties establish themselves. On the other hand, they have important implications for their future study. They suggest that some elections are more important than others for understanding the success of anti-immigrant parties, and that it is potentially misleading to explain the failure of anti-immigrant politicians in some places as the necessary consequence of country-specific characteristics. Not only can one unpredictable election change everything, the failure of anti-immigrant politicians in the past might also pave the way for like-minded politicians in the future.

    @Article{koning-2020,
    author = {Edward Anthony Koning},
    title = {Breaking Through: How Anti-immigrant Parties Establish Themselves and the Implications for Their Study},
    journal = {Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {While the sizeable literature on anti-immigrant parties commonly invokes the term {"}breakthrough{"} in discussing their electoral fortunes, no existing study has subjected this concept to conceptual or empirical scrutiny. Based on an investigation of 54 anti-immigrant parties in
    seventeen Western European countries, this paper concludes that these parties indeed tend to establish themselves with rare breakthrough elections rather than by incremental growth, and to stay around once they achieve such success. Moreover, these breakthroughs are more likely
    when these parties have direct or indirect ties to the party system. On the one hand, these findings confirm an often invoked but so far untested suspicion about the way these parties establish themselves. On the other hand, they have important implications for their future study.
    They suggest that some elections are more important than others for understanding the success of anti-immigrant parties, and that it is potentially misleading to explain the failure of anti-immigrant politicians in some places as the necessary consequence of country-specific
    characteristics. Not only can one unpredictable election change everything, the failure of anti-immigrant politicians in the past might also pave the way for like-minded politicians in the future.},
    doi = {10.1080/17457289.2020.1785478},
    }

  • Kriesi, Hanspeter and Julia Schulte-Cloos. “Support for Radical Parties in Western Europe: Structural Conflicts and Political Dynamics.” Electoral Studies 65 (2020): online first. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102138
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Why is the populist radical left and right on the rise across western Europe? Integrating theories on changing socio-political conflict with arguments about crises of political representation, we contend that electoral support for radical right and radical left parties is rooted in two distinct sets of socio-structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is in both cases conditioned by the individual political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. Relying on the European Social Survey (ESS) covering the period from 2002 to 2016 and Parlgov data, we show that the lack of responsiveness of mainstream parties to the changing social conflict structure provides critical opportunities for new challengers from both the radical left and the radical right, while voters’ political discontent only works to heighten their success when these parties are in opposition. Our article contributes not only by offering an integrative account of the electoral appeal of the radical right and radical left parties. In emphasising the largely similar nature of short-term, political factors that condition the translation of the different sets of long-term, structural determinants into opting for these parties, critically, this article also contributes to understanding the electoral success of radical challengers across western Europe.

    @Article{kriesi-schulte-cloos-2020,
    author = {Hanspeter Kriesi and Julia Schulte-Cloos},
    title = {Support for Radical Parties in Western Europe: Structural Conflicts and Political Dynamics},
    journal = {Electoral Studies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {65},
    pages = {online first},
    abstract = {Why is the populist radical left and right on the rise across western Europe? Integrating theories on changing socio-political conflict with arguments about crises of political representation, we contend that electoral support for radical right and radical left parties is rooted
    in two distinct sets of socio-structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is in both cases conditioned by the individual political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. Relying on the European Social Survey (ESS) covering the period from
    2002 to 2016 and Parlgov data, we show that the lack of responsiveness of mainstream parties to the changing social conflict structure provides critical opportunities for new challengers from both the radical left and the radical right, while voters’ political discontent only
    works to heighten their success when these parties are in opposition. Our article contributes not only by offering an integrative account of the electoral appeal of the radical right and radical left parties. In emphasising the largely similar nature of short-term, political
    factors that condition the translation of the different sets of long-term, structural determinants into opting for these parties, critically, this article also contributes to understanding the electoral success of radical challengers across western Europe.},
    doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102138},
    }

  • Kurer, Thomas. “The Declining Middle: Occupational Change, Social Status, and the Populist Right.” Comparative Political Studies 53.10-11 (2020): 1798–1835. doi:10.1177/0010414020912283
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article investigates the political consequences of occupational change in times of rapid technological advancement and sheds light on the economic and cultural roots of right-wing populism. A growing body of research shows that the disadvantages of a transforming employment structure are strongly concentrated among semiskilled routine workers in the lower middle class. I argue that individual employment trajectories and relative shifts in the social hierarchy are key to better understand recent political disruptions. A perception of relative economic decline among politically powerful groups—not their impoverishment—drives support for conservative and, especially, right-wing populist parties. Individual-level panel data from three postindustrial democracies and original survey data demonstrate this relationship. A possible interpretation of the findings is that traditional welfare policy might be an ineffective remedy against the ascent of right-wing populism.

    @Article{kurer-2020,
    author = {Thomas Kurer},
    title = {The Declining Middle: Occupational Change, Social Status, and the Populist Right},
    journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {53},
    number = {10-11},
    pages = {1798--1835},
    abstract = {This article investigates the political consequences of occupational change in times of rapid technological advancement and sheds light on the economic and cultural roots of right-wing populism. A growing body of research shows that the disadvantages of a transforming employment
    structure are strongly concentrated among semiskilled routine workers in the lower middle class. I argue that individual employment trajectories and relative shifts in the social hierarchy are key to better understand recent political disruptions. A perception of relative economic
    decline among politically powerful groups—not their impoverishment—drives support for conservative and, especially, right-wing populist parties. Individual-level panel data from three postindustrial democracies and original survey data demonstrate this relationship. A possible
    interpretation of the findings is that traditional welfare policy might be an ineffective remedy against the ascent of right-wing populism.},
    doi = {10.1177/0010414020912283},
    }

  • Leininger, Arndt and Maurits J. Meijers. “Do Populist Parties Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence From Over 40 Years of Electoral History in 31 European Democracies.” Political Studies online first (2020). doi:10.1177/0032321720923257
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    While some consider populist parties to be a threat to liberal democracy, others have argued that populist parties may positively affect the quality of democracy by increasing political participation of citizens. This supposition, however, has hitherto not been subjected to rigorous empirical tests. The voter turnout literature, moreover, has primarily focused on stable institutional and party system characteristics – ignoring more dynamic determinants of voter turnout related to party competition. To fill this double gap in the literature, we examine the effect of populist parties, both left and right, on aggregate-level turnout in Western and Eastern European parliamentary elections. Based on a dataset on 315 elections in 31 European democracies since 1970s, we find that turnout is higher when populist parties are represented in parliament prior to an election in Eastern Europe, but not in Western Europe. These findings further our understanding of the relationship between populism, political participation and democracy.

    @Article{leininger-meijers-2020,
    author = {Arndt Leininger and Maurits J. Meijers},
    title = {Do Populist Parties Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence From Over 40 Years of Electoral History in 31 European Democracies},
    journal = {Political Studies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {While some consider populist parties to be a threat to liberal democracy, others have argued that populist parties may positively affect the quality of democracy by increasing political participation of citizens. This supposition, however, has hitherto not been subjected to
    rigorous empirical tests. The voter turnout literature, moreover, has primarily focused on stable institutional and party system characteristics – ignoring more dynamic determinants of voter turnout related to party competition. To fill this double gap in the literature, we
    examine the effect of populist parties, both left and right, on aggregate-level turnout in Western and Eastern European parliamentary elections. Based on a dataset on 315 elections in 31 European democracies since 1970s, we find that turnout is higher when populist parties are
    represented in parliament prior to an election in Eastern Europe, but not in Western Europe. These findings further our understanding of the relationship between populism, political participation and democracy.},
    doi = {10.1177/0032321720923257},
    }

  • Lorimer, Marta. “What Do They Talk About When They Talk About Europe? Euro-Ambivalence in Far Right Ideology.” Ethnic and Racial Studies (2020): online first. doi:10.1080/01419870.2020.1807035
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Euroscepticism is frequently presented as a key ideological feature of far right parties, however, this definition masks important variations between them. This paper argues that far right positions on Europe are characterized by long-standing ambivalence rather than straightforward opposition. While far right parties frequently oppose the EU, ideological flexibility, the malleability of European integration and the protean nature of Europe also lead them to display support towards certain aspects of it and towards Europe as a civilization. The argument is illustrated through a qualitative analysis of the party literature of the Movimento Sociale Italiano and the Front National. The analysis shows that these parties conceived of Europe as an identity, a space of liberty, an endangered heritage and a construction where national interests must be defended. In each theme, they offered ambivalent readings of Europe, oscillating between opposition and support depending on how Europe and the EU were defined.

    @Article{lorimer-2020b,
    author = {Marta Lorimer},
    title = {What Do They Talk About When They Talk About Europe? Euro-Ambivalence in Far Right Ideology},
    journal = {Ethnic and Racial Studies},
    year = {2020},
    pages = {online first},
    abstract = {Euroscepticism is frequently presented as a key ideological feature of far right parties, however, this definition masks important variations between them. This paper argues that far right positions on Europe are characterized by long-standing ambivalence rather than
    straightforward opposition. While far right parties frequently oppose the EU, ideological flexibility, the malleability of European integration and the protean nature of Europe also lead them to display support towards certain aspects of it and towards Europe as a civilization. The
    argument is illustrated through a qualitative analysis of the party literature of the Movimento Sociale Italiano and the Front National. The analysis shows that these parties conceived of Europe as an identity, a space of liberty, an endangered heritage and a construction where
    national interests must be defended. In each theme, they offered ambivalent readings of Europe, oscillating between opposition and support depending on how Europe and the EU were defined.},
    doi = {10.1080/01419870.2020.1807035},
    }

  • Lorimer, Marta. “Europe as Ideological Resource: The Case of the Rassemblement National.” Journal of European Public Policy online first (2020): 1–18. doi:10.1080/13501763.2020.1754885
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Ever since they first entered the European Parliament in 1979, the EU has proven to be a strong legitimising tool for far right parties, providing them with funding, visibility and a higher degree of credibility and respectability. While recent literature has explored some of these dynamics, the role of the far right{“}s ideological positioning on Europe as a source of public legitimacy has been neglected. This paper argues that as a relatively new and contentious political issue, Europe can function as a powerful ideological resource for far right parties by allowing them to convey a more acceptable political message. This argument is illustrated through a case study of two key aspects of the Rassemblement National{“}s ideological approach to the European Union: the party{“}s claim to be pro-European but anti-EU and its opposition to EU integration on grounds of sovereignty.

    @Article{lorimer-2020,
    author = {Marta Lorimer},
    title = {Europe as Ideological Resource: The Case of the Rassemblement National},
    journal = {Journal of European Public Policy},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--18},
    abstract = {Ever since they first entered the European Parliament in 1979, the EU has proven to be a strong legitimising tool for far right parties, providing them with funding, visibility and a higher degree of credibility and respectability. While recent literature has explored some of
    these dynamics, the role of the far right{"}s ideological positioning on Europe as a source of public legitimacy has been neglected. This paper argues that as a relatively new and contentious political issue, Europe can function as a powerful ideological resource for far right
    parties by allowing them to convey a more acceptable political message. This argument is illustrated through a case study of two key aspects of the Rassemblement National{"}s ideological approach to the European Union: the party{"}s claim to be pro-European but anti-EU and its
    opposition to EU integration on grounds of sovereignty.},
    doi = {10.1080/13501763.2020.1754885},
    }

  • Magni, Gabriele. “Economic Inequality, Immigrants and Selective Solidarity: From Perceived Lack of Opportunity to In-group Favoritism.” British Journal of Political Science (2020): online first. doi:10.1017/S0007123420000046
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    How does economic inequality affect support for redistribution to native citizens and immigrants? While prior studies have examined the separate effects of inequality and immigration on redistribution preferences, the interaction between inequality and communal identity has been largely overlooked. This article explains that inequality triggers selective solidarity. Individuals exposed to inequality become more supportive of redistribution – but only if the redistribution benefits native-born citizens. Inequality therefore reinforces the already popular opinion that native citizens deserve welfare priority and widens the gap between support for natives and support for immigrants. This study first provides cross-national evidence with survey data linked to contextual socio-economic indicators from advanced industrialized countries. To evaluate causally identified effects, it then presents the results of a survey experiment administered to a nationally representative sample of Italian citizens. The findings imply that economic inequality can increase support for populist radical right parties that advocate discrimination in access to welfare services based on native citizenship.

    @Article{magni-2020,
    author = {Gabriele Magni},
    title = {Economic Inequality, Immigrants and Selective Solidarity: From Perceived Lack of Opportunity to In-group Favoritism},
    journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
    year = {2020},
    pages = {online first},
    abstract = {How does economic inequality affect support for redistribution to native citizens and immigrants? While prior studies have examined the separate effects of inequality and immigration on redistribution preferences, the interaction between inequality and communal identity has been
    largely overlooked. This article explains that inequality triggers selective solidarity. Individuals exposed to inequality become more supportive of redistribution - but only if the redistribution benefits native-born citizens. Inequality therefore reinforces the already popular
    opinion that native citizens deserve welfare priority and widens the gap between support for natives and support for immigrants. This study first provides cross-national evidence with survey data linked to contextual socio-economic indicators from advanced industrialized countries.
    To evaluate causally identified effects, it then presents the results of a survey experiment administered to a nationally representative sample of Italian citizens. The findings imply that economic inequality can increase support for populist radical right parties that advocate
    discrimination in access to welfare services based on native citizenship.},
    doi = {10.1017/S0007123420000046},
    }

  • Mauk, Marlene. “Rebuilding Trust in Broken Systems? Populist Party Success and Citizens” Trust in Democratic Institutions.” Politics and Governance 8.3 (2020): 45–58. doi:10.17645/pag.v8i3.2896
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    What effect does the recent rise of populist parties harnessing an anti-system rhetoric have on political trust? Will citizens become disenchanted with and lose trust in the political system, or could populist party success even stimulate a growth of political trust? Arguing that populist parties may well be conceived as a corrective force giving voice to and addressing citizen concerns about the established political system, this contribution hypothesizes that populist party success will increase political trust among the general public, especially in countries lacking democratic quality, with weak corruption control, and meagre government performance. Empirically, it combines ParlGov data with survey data from the European Social Survey (2002–2016) as well as aggregate data from the Varieties-of-Democracy project and the World Development Indicators to investigate how political trust has changed in relation to the growing success of populist parties and how democratic quality, corruption control, and government performance have moderated this relationship in 23 European democracies. Its main findings indicate that, at least in the short run, political trust increases rather than decreases following populist party success and that this increase in trust is most pronounced in political systems that lack democratic quality, struggle with corruption, and deliver only meager government performance

    @Article{mauk-2020,
    author = {Marlene Mauk},
    title = {Rebuilding Trust in Broken Systems? Populist Party Success and Citizens{"} Trust in Democratic Institutions},
    journal = {Politics and Governance},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {8},
    number = {3},
    pages = {45--58},
    abstract = {What effect does the recent rise of populist parties harnessing an anti-system rhetoric have on political trust? Will citizens become disenchanted with and lose trust in the political system, or could populist party success even stimulate a growth of political trust? Arguing that
    populist parties may well be conceived as a corrective force giving voice to and addressing citizen concerns about the established political system, this contribution hypothesizes that populist party success will increase political trust among the general public, especially in
    countries lacking democratic quality, with weak corruption control, and meagre government performance. Empirically, it combines ParlGov data with survey data from the European Social Survey (2002–2016) as well as aggregate data from the Varieties-of-Democracy project and the
    World Development Indicators to investigate how political trust has changed in relation to the growing success of populist parties and how democratic quality, corruption control, and government performance have moderated this relationship in 23 European democracies. Its main
    findings indicate that, at least in the short run, political trust increases rather than decreases following populist party success and that this increase in trust is most pronounced in political systems that lack democratic quality, struggle with corruption, and deliver only
    meager government performance},
    doi = {10.17645/pag.v8i3.2896},
    }

  • Mazzoleni, Oscar and Gilles Ivaldi. “Economic Populist Sovereignism and Electoral Support for Radical Right-Wing Populism.” Political Studies nil.nil (2020): 3232172095856. doi:10.1177/0032321720958567
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Sovereignism is at the crux of the current wave of radical right-wing populism. Populist parties advocate {“}taking back control{“} and generally do so in the name of the {“}people{“}, pledging to restore economic well-being. This article argues that populism and sovereignism are inherently connected in radical right-wing populism politics through a set of values that emphasize popular and national sovereignty. To test the empirical validity of our proposition, we focus on two established European radical right-wing populist parties, namely the Rassemblement National in France and the Swiss People{“}s Party and use data from an original survey. We find that while Rassemblement National and Swiss People{“}s Party voters diverge in general economic orientations, they share similar economic populist sovereignist values that significantly shape electoral support for those parties. These findings suggest that economic populist sovereignism may represent an important driver of support for the radical right-wing populism, alongside other correlates of radical right- wing populism voting, such as perceived immigration threat.

    @Article{mazzoleni-ivaldi-2020,
    author = {Oscar Mazzoleni and Gilles Ivaldi},
    title = {Economic Populist Sovereignism and Electoral Support for Radical Right-Wing Populism},
    journal = {Political Studies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {nil},
    number = {nil},
    pages = {003232172095856},
    abstract = {Sovereignism is at the crux of the current wave of radical right-wing populism. Populist parties advocate {"}taking back control{"} and generally do so in the name of the {"}people{"}, pledging to restore economic well-being. This article argues that populism and sovereignism are
    inherently connected in radical right-wing populism politics through a set of values that emphasize popular and national sovereignty. To test the empirical validity of our proposition, we focus on two established European radical right-wing populist parties, namely the
    Rassemblement National in France and the Swiss People{"}s Party and use data from an original survey. We find that while Rassemblement National and Swiss People{"}s Party voters diverge in general economic orientations, they share similar economic populist sovereignist values that
    significantly shape electoral support for those parties. These findings suggest that economic populist sovereignism may represent an important driver of support for the radical right-wing populism, alongside other correlates of radical right- wing populism voting, such as perceived
    immigration threat.},
    doi = {10.1177/0032321720958567},
    }

  • Mendes, Mariana S. and James Dennison. “Explaining the emergence of the radical right in Spain and Portugal: salience, stigma and supply.” West European Politics 44.4 (2021): 752–775. doi:10.1080/01402382.2020.1777504
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Spain and Portugal have long been considered exceptions when it comes to the electoral success of radical right-wing parties in Europe. This scenario changed for both countries in 2019, with the extraordinary rise of Vox in Spain and the comparatively more modest election of one representative of Chega in Portugal. Their emergence – and the stark difference in the extents of their success – provides researchers with an ideal ‘edge-case’ and can be explained via a theoretical model that builds on and fuses previous explanatory models for radical right success. The Iberian cases demonstrate that radical right parties succeed when they (i) avoid the stigma of extremism, (ii) benefit from a gap in political supply on the right and (iii) cater to an unsatiated demand of voters on a salient sociocultural issue. While both countries had long been home to marginal far-right political forces, the stigma of extremism prevented them from being considered credible political alternatives. The appearance of new parties that emerged as a result of splits from the mainstream centre-right, in both cases reflecting a beleaguered political supply, gave the radical right an opportunity to avoid stigma, as we demonstrate through a news content analysis. However, whereas in Spain Vox could profit from both the Catalan independence challenge and the uptick in salience of immigration, which had previously been anomalously low in Iberia, Chega has not (yet) benefited from a similarly ripe political opportunity structure in Portugal.

    @Article{mendes-dennison-2021,
    author = {Mariana S. Mendes and James Dennison},
    title = {Explaining the emergence of the radical right in Spain and Portugal: salience, stigma and supply},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {44},
    number = {4},
    pages = {752--775},
    abstract = {Spain and Portugal have long been considered exceptions when it comes to the electoral success of radical right-wing parties in Europe. This scenario changed for both countries in 2019, with the extraordinary rise of Vox in Spain and the comparatively more modest election of one
    representative of Chega in Portugal. Their emergence – and the stark difference in the extents of their success – provides researchers with an ideal ‘edge-case’ and can be explained via a theoretical model that builds on and fuses previous explanatory models for radical
    right success. The Iberian cases demonstrate that radical right parties succeed when they (i) avoid the stigma of extremism, (ii) benefit from a gap in political supply on the right and (iii) cater to an unsatiated demand of voters on a salient sociocultural issue. While both
    countries had long been home to marginal far-right political forces, the stigma of extremism prevented them from being considered credible political alternatives. The appearance of new parties that emerged as a result of splits from the mainstream centre-right, in both cases
    reflecting a beleaguered political supply, gave the radical right an opportunity to avoid stigma, as we demonstrate through a news content analysis. However, whereas in Spain Vox could profit from both the Catalan independence challenge and the uptick in salience of immigration,
    which had previously been anomalously low in Iberia, Chega has not (yet) benefited from a similarly ripe political opportunity structure in Portugal.},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2020.1777504},
    }

  • Miller-Idriss, Cynthia. “The Global Dimensions of Populist Nationalism.” The International Spectator 54.2 (2019): 17–34. doi:10.1080/03932729.2019.1592870
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Populist nationalist movements have primarily been understood through their nationalist frames, even as the media and scholars alike frequently refer to {“}global{“} trends related to populism. But there are in fact global dimensions to populist nationalism that deserve more conceptual and analytical attention. Three ways in which populist nationalism intersects with the global include cross-national imitation of populist tactics; the use of populist rhetorical strategies that move from the framing of local interests against national policies to framings of national interests against the global; and the potential for transnational populist nationalist movements to emerge.

    @Article{miller-idriss-2019,
    author = {Cynthia Miller-Idriss},
    title = {The Global Dimensions of Populist Nationalism},
    journal = {The International Spectator},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {54},
    number = {2},
    pages = {17--34},
    abstract = {Populist nationalist movements have primarily been understood through their nationalist frames, even as the media and scholars alike frequently refer to {"}global{"} trends related to populism. But there are in fact global dimensions to populist nationalism that deserve more
    conceptual and analytical attention. Three ways in which populist nationalism intersects with the global include cross-national imitation of populist tactics; the use of populist rhetorical strategies that move from the framing of local interests against national policies to
    framings of national interests against the global; and the potential for transnational populist nationalist movements to emerge.},
    doi = {10.1080/03932729.2019.1592870},
    }

  • Pesthy, Maria, Matthias Mader, and Harald Schoen. “Why Is the AfD so Successful in Eastern Germany? An Analysis of the Ideational Foundations of the AfD Vote in the 2017 Federal Election.” Politische Vierteljahresschrift online first (2020).
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The Alternative for Germany party (AfD) has been more successful electorally in eastern than in western Germany. In this paper, we look at nativism coupled with populist attitudes as possible contributors to the 2017 federal electoral outcome. We compare two alternative mechanisms for the varying election results, the first being whether individuals living in eastern Germany are, on average, more nativist and populist inclined; the second, whether nativism and populism are more salient when these voters go to the polls. The results show that there indeed exists a slightly higher level of nativist and populist sentiment among the east German citizens than among the west Germans. This difference concerns older east Germans in particular, who were politically socialised during the German separation. Furthermore, elements of nativist and populist ideas explain electoral support for the AfD in both parts of the country, but nativism appears to be more relevant in the east. Overall, the analysis of the short-term campaign panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Study suggests that the inspected ideational foundations contribute to the east-west gap in AfD support without accounting for it completely.

    @Article{pesthy-mader-schoen-2020,
    author = {Maria Pesthy and Matthias Mader and Harald Schoen},
    title = {Why Is the AfD so Successful in Eastern Germany? An Analysis of the Ideational Foundations of the AfD Vote in the 2017 Federal Election},
    journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The Alternative for Germany party (AfD) has been more successful electorally in eastern than in western Germany. In this paper, we look at nativism coupled with populist attitudes as possible contributors to the 2017 federal electoral outcome. We compare two alternative mechanisms
    for the varying election results, the first being whether individuals living in eastern Germany are, on average, more nativist and populist inclined; the second, whether nativism and populism are more salient when these voters go to the polls. The results show that there indeed
    exists a slightly higher level of nativist and populist sentiment among the east German citizens than among the west Germans. This difference concerns older east Germans in particular, who were politically socialised during the German separation. Furthermore, elements of nativist
    and populist ideas explain electoral support for the AfD in both parts of the country, but nativism appears to be more relevant in the east. Overall, the analysis of the short-term campaign panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Study suggests that the inspected
    ideational foundations contribute to the east-west gap in AfD support without accounting for it completely.},
    }

  • Pytlas, Bartek. “Hijacking Europe: Counter‐european Strategies and Radical Right Mainstreaming During the Humanitarian Crisis Debate 2015-16*.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies online first (2020): jcms.13092. doi:10.1111/jcms.13092
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Radical right European contestation is analyzed mainly as claims denouncing European integration. Less focus is put on narratives suggesting how a supposed {“}truly European{“} political process should be and work. This paper explores how radical right actors use such counter‐European claims within their competition strategies. Computer‐assisted qualitative analysis of communication by Front National, Alternative for Germany and Fidesz during the humanitarian crisis debate 2015-16 demonstrates that radical right counter‐Europeanism constitutes a nuanced tactical resource deployed to normalize nativist supply in the name of Europe. Unlike Eurorejectionist FN, Fidesz and AfD redefined Europe in nativist terms, attempting to draw legitimacy from association with European identity and cooperation. Concurrently, both actors justified Euronativism not only as antithetical to current EU values and political principles, but mainly as their more fundamental practice juxtaposed against {“}not (truly) European elites{“}, effectively {“}hijacking{“} Europe from within. The findings deepen our understanding of radical right Europe‐contesting competition strategies.

    @Article{pytlas-2020,
    author = {Bartek Pytlas},
    title = {Hijacking Europe: Counter‐european Strategies and Radical Right Mainstreaming During the Humanitarian Crisis Debate 2015-16*},
    journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {jcms.13092},
    abstract = {Radical right European contestation is analyzed mainly as claims denouncing European integration. Less focus is put on narratives suggesting how a supposed {"}truly European{"} political process should be and work. This paper explores how radical right actors use such
    counter‐European claims within their competition strategies. Computer‐assisted qualitative analysis of communication by Front National, Alternative for Germany and Fidesz during the humanitarian crisis debate 2015-16 demonstrates that radical right counter‐Europeanism
    constitutes a nuanced tactical resource deployed to normalize nativist supply in the name of Europe. Unlike Eurorejectionist FN, Fidesz and AfD redefined Europe in nativist terms, attempting to draw legitimacy from association with European identity and cooperation. Concurrently,
    both actors justified Euronativism not only as antithetical to current EU values and political principles, but mainly as their more fundamental practice juxtaposed against {"}not (truly) European elites{"}, effectively {"}hijacking{"} Europe from within. The findings deepen our
    understanding of radical right Europe‐contesting competition strategies.},
    doi = {10.1111/jcms.13092},
    }

  • Pytlas, Bartek. “Hijacking Europe: Counter-European Strategies and Radical Right Mainstreaming during the Humanitarian Crisis Debate 2015-16*.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 59.2 (2021): 335–353.
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Radical right European contestation is analyzed mainly as claims denouncing European integration. Less focus is put on narratives suggesting how a supposed {“}truly European{“} political process should be and work. This paper explores how radical right actors use such counter-European claims within their competition strategies. Computer-assisted qualitative analysis of communication by Front National, Alternative for Germany and Fidesz during the humanitarian crisis debate 2015-16 demonstrates that radical right counter-Europeanism constitutes a nuanced tactical resource deployed to normalize nativist supply in the name of Europe. Unlike Eurorejectionist FN, Fidesz and AfD redefined Europe in nativist terms, attempting to draw legitimacy from association with European identity and cooperation. Concurrently, both actors justified Euronativism not only as antithetical to current EU values and political principles, but mainly as their more fundamental practice juxtaposed against {“}not (truly) European elites{“}, effectively {“}hijacking{“} Europe from within. The findings deepen our understanding of radical right Europe-contesting competition strategies.

    @Article{pytlas-2021,
    author = {Bartek Pytlas},
    title = {Hijacking Europe: Counter-European Strategies and Radical Right Mainstreaming during the Humanitarian Crisis Debate 2015-16*},
    journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {59},
    number = {2},
    pages = {335--353},
    abstract = {Radical right European contestation is analyzed mainly as claims denouncing European integration. Less focus is put on narratives suggesting how a supposed {"}truly European{"} political process should be and work. This paper explores how radical right actors use such counter-European
    claims within their competition strategies. Computer-assisted qualitative analysis of communication by Front National, Alternative for Germany and Fidesz during the humanitarian crisis debate 2015-16 demonstrates that radical right counter-Europeanism constitutes a nuanced tactical
    resource deployed to normalize nativist supply in the name of Europe. Unlike Eurorejectionist FN, Fidesz and AfD redefined Europe in nativist terms, attempting to draw legitimacy from association with European identity and cooperation. Concurrently, both actors justified
    Euronativism not only as antithetical to current EU values and political principles, but mainly as their more fundamental practice juxtaposed against {"}not (truly) European elites{"}, effectively {"}hijacking{"} Europe from within. The findings deepen our understanding of radical right
    Europe-contesting competition strategies.},
    }

  • Rauchfleisch, Adrian and Jonas Kaiser. “The German Far-right on YouTube: An Analysis of User Overlap and User Comments.” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 64.3 (2020): 373–396. doi:10.1080/08838151.2020.1799690
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This study focuses on the formation of far-right online communities on YouTube and whether the rise of three new actors (Pegida, Identitarian movement, AfD) can also be observed with user behavior on YouTube. We map the network of far-right, conspiracy and alternative media channels in the German-language YouTube sphere, how this network evolves over time and identify the topics that users discuss. Our analysis shows that the overall common denominator within the German far-right YouTube sphere is the refugee crisis and the problems associated with it. Furthermore, we show that the community is getting denser and more centralized over time.

    @Article{rauchfleisch-kaiser-2020,
    author = {Adrian Rauchfleisch and Jonas Kaiser},
    title = {The German Far-right on YouTube: An Analysis of User Overlap and User Comments},
    journal = {Journal of Broadcasting \& Electronic Media},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {64},
    number = {3},
    pages = {373--396},
    abstract = {This study focuses on the formation of far-right online communities on YouTube and whether the rise of three new actors (Pegida, Identitarian movement, AfD) can also be observed with user behavior on YouTube. We map the network of far-right, conspiracy and alternative media
    channels in the German-language YouTube sphere, how this network evolves over time and identify the topics that users discuss. Our analysis shows that the overall common denominator within the German far-right YouTube sphere is the refugee crisis and the problems associated with
    it. Furthermore, we show that the community is getting denser and more centralized over time.},
    doi = {10.1080/08838151.2020.1799690},
    }

  • Reinl, Ann-Kathrin and Constantin Schäfer. “How the 2017 Federal Election in Germany Affected Satisfaction with Democracy among AfD Voters.” German Politics online first (2020). doi:10.1080/09644008.2020.1741550
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Dissatisfaction with democracy is among the central determinants of voting for a populist radical right party, such as the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). At the same time, elections have been shown to increase political satisfaction, especially when voters see themselves as winners of the election. In this article, we ask, first, whether voters of the AfD have partly been reconciled with democracy during the 2017 federal election in Germany in which the party entered the Bundestag for the first time since its foundation. Second, we investigate which individual level factors conditioned the change in democratic satisfaction among AfD voters. Our empirical analysis, which is based on panel survey data from the 2017 Germany Longitudinal Election Studies (GLES), shows that AfD voters experienced a stronger increase in support for the political regime than any other voter group. Moreover, policy congruence with the AfD on socioeconomic issues as well as identifying with a party other than the AfD enhanced this boost in satisfaction with democracy. Our findings point to the importance of political representation and opportunities for protest-based voting behaviour regarding public support and the legitimacy of democratic political systems.

    @Article{reinl-schaefer-2020,
    author = {Ann-Kathrin Reinl and Constantin Sch{\"a}fer},
    title = {How the 2017 Federal Election in Germany Affected Satisfaction with Democracy among AfD Voters},
    journal = {German Politics},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Dissatisfaction with democracy is among the central determinants of voting for a populist radical right party, such as the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). At the same time, elections have been shown to increase political satisfaction, especially when voters see
    themselves as winners of the election. In this article, we ask, first, whether voters of the AfD have partly been reconciled with democracy during the 2017 federal election in Germany in which the party entered the Bundestag for the first time since its foundation. Second, we
    investigate which individual level factors conditioned the change in democratic satisfaction among AfD voters. Our empirical analysis, which is based on panel survey data from the 2017 Germany Longitudinal Election Studies (GLES), shows that AfD voters experienced a stronger
    increase in support for the political regime than any other voter group. Moreover, policy congruence with the AfD on socioeconomic issues as well as identifying with a party other than the AfD enhanced this boost in satisfaction with democracy. Our findings point to the importance
    of political representation and opportunities for protest-based voting behaviour regarding public support and the legitimacy of democratic political systems.},
    doi = {10.1080/09644008.2020.1741550},
    }

  • Arzheimer, Kai. “The Electoral Breakthrough of the AfD and the East-West Divide In German Politics.” From the Streets to Parliament? The Fourth Wave of Far-Right Politics in Germany. London: Routledge, 2021. .
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The radical right became a relevant party family in most west European polities in the 1990s and early 2000s, but Germany was a negative outlier up until very recently. Right-wing mobilisation success remained confinded to the local and regional level, as previous far-right parties never managed to escape from the shadow of “Grandpa’s Fascism”. This only changed with the rise, electoral breakthrough, and transformation of “Alternative for Germany” (AfD), which quickly became the dominant far-right actor. Germany’s “new” eastern states were crucial for the AfD’s ascendancy. In the east, the AfD began to experiment with nativist messages as early as 2014. Their electoral breakthroughs in the state elections of this year helped sustain the party through the wilderness year of 2015 and provided personel, ressources, and a template for the AfD’s transformation. Since its inception, support for the AfD in the east has been at least twice as high as in the west. This can be fully explained by substantively higher levels of nativist attitudes in the eastern population. As all alleged causes of this nativism are structural, the eastern states seem set to remain a stronghold for the far right in the medium- to long-term.

    @InCollection{arzheimer-2021,
    author = {Kai Arzheimer},
    title = {The Electoral Breakthrough of the AfD and the East-West Divide In German Politics},
    booktitle = {From the Streets to Parliament? The Fourth Wave of Far-Right Politics in Germany},
    publisher = {Routledge},
    year = {2021},
    address = {London},
    abstract = {The radical right became a relevant party family in most west European polities in the 1990s and early 2000s, but Germany was a negative outlier up until very recently. Right-wing mobilisation success remained confinded to the local and regional level, as previous far-right
    parties never managed to escape from the shadow of “Grandpa’s Fascism”. This only changed with the rise, electoral breakthrough, and transformation of “Alternative for Germany” (AfD), which quickly became the dominant far-right actor. Germany’s “new” eastern states
    were crucial for the AfD’s ascendancy. In the east, the AfD began to experiment with nativist messages as early as 2014. Their electoral breakthroughs in the state elections of this year helped sustain the party through the wilderness year of 2015 and provided personel,
    ressources, and a template for the AfD’s transformation. Since its inception, support for the AfD in the east has been at least twice as high as in the west. This can be fully explained by substantively higher levels of nativist attitudes in the eastern population. As all alleged
    causes of this nativism are structural, the eastern states seem set to remain a stronghold for the far right in the medium- to long-term.},
    }

  • Roumanias, Costas, Spyros Skouras, and Nicos Christodoulakis. “Crisis and extremism. How does an extreme far right emerge in a modern democracy? Evidence from Greece’s Golden Dawn.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties online first (2020). doi:10.1080/17457289.2020.1778007
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    We trace the rise of Golden Dawn, one of the most extreme and violent European far-right parties, from the fringe to a prominent position in Greek politics. We use regression analysis to show that its rise is associated with changes in voting behavior caused by the deep socioeconomic crisis the country went through after 2008. We show that the demand factors affecting the GD vote were triggered by structural changes in the supply side and the implosion of the two-party system that followed the signing of the bail-out agreement (Memorandum) with the country’s creditors. Our results have implications about the political manifestation of socioeconomic grievances and their effect on the far-right vote: whereas socioeconomic grievances usually contribute towards a latent dissatisfaction by the electorate, this might need a sudden supply-side trigger in order to manifest itself, giving little warning signs in advance.

    @Article{roumanias-skouras-christodoulakis-2020,
    author = {Costas Roumanias and Spyros Skouras and Nicos Christodoulakis},
    title = {Crisis and extremism. How does an extreme far right emerge in a modern democracy? Evidence from Greece’s Golden Dawn},
    journal = {Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {We trace the rise of Golden Dawn, one of the most extreme and violent European far-right parties, from the fringe to a prominent position in Greek politics. We use regression analysis to show that its rise is associated with changes in voting behavior caused by the deep
    socioeconomic crisis the country went through after 2008. We show that the demand factors affecting the GD vote were triggered by structural changes in the supply side and the implosion of the two-party system that followed the signing of the bail-out agreement (Memorandum) with
    the country’s creditors. Our results have implications about the political manifestation of socioeconomic grievances and their effect on the far-right vote: whereas socioeconomic grievances usually contribute towards a latent dissatisfaction by the electorate, this might need a
    sudden supply-side trigger in order to manifest itself, giving little warning signs in advance.},
    doi = {10.1080/17457289.2020.1778007},
    }

  • The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right. Ed. Rydgren, Jens. Oxford University Press, 2018. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.001.0001
    [BibTeX]
    @Book{rydgren-2018b,
    editor = {Jens Rydgren},
    title = {The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right},
    publisher = {Oxford University Press},
    year = {2018},
    doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.001.0001},
    }

  • Rydgren, Jens and Maria Tyrberg. “Contextual Explanations of Radical Right-Wing Party Support in Sweden: A Multilevel Analysis.” European Societies online first (2020): 1–26. doi:10.1080/14616696.2020.1793213
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    With the aim of studying the role of contextual factors for explaining within-country variation in the vote share of the radical right-wing party, the Sweden Democrats, in the 2014 Swedish election, we specify and test hypotheses pertaining to social marginality, ethnic threat, the contact hypothesis, and the halo effect. We study the variation in the electoral share of the Sweden Democrats at two different levels simultaneously by performing multilevel analyses to account for the ways in which voting districts are clustered within municipalities. The main finding from our analyses is the support for the ethnic threat hypothesis, where the vote share of the Sweden Democrats is significantly higher in those areas that have seen an increase in the foreign-born population, and to some extent also in ethnically diverse areas, contradicting previous research on ethnic minority presence in fine-grained contexts. The expectation that the vote share for the Sweden Democrats should be higher in socioeconomic marginalized districts is partly supported, but we find no evidence of a halo effect, where ethnically homogeneous areas that are geographically close to heterogeneous districts were expected to have a higher vote share for the Sweden Democrats.

    @Article{rydgren-tyrberg-2020,
    author = {Jens Rydgren and Maria Tyrberg},
    title = {Contextual Explanations of Radical Right-Wing Party Support in Sweden: A Multilevel Analysis},
    journal = {European Societies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--26},
    abstract = {With the aim of studying the role of contextual factors for explaining within-country variation in the vote share of the radical right-wing party, the Sweden Democrats, in the 2014 Swedish election, we specify and test hypotheses pertaining to social marginality, ethnic threat,
    the contact hypothesis, and the halo effect. We study the variation in the electoral share of the Sweden Democrats at two different levels simultaneously by performing multilevel analyses to account for the ways in which voting districts are clustered within municipalities. The
    main finding from our analyses is the support for the ethnic threat hypothesis, where the vote share of the Sweden Democrats is significantly higher in those areas that have seen an increase in the foreign-born population, and to some extent also in ethnically diverse areas,
    contradicting previous research on ethnic minority presence in fine-grained contexts. The expectation that the vote share for the Sweden Democrats should be higher in socioeconomic marginalized districts is partly supported, but we find no evidence of a halo effect, where
    ethnically homogeneous areas that are geographically close to heterogeneous districts were expected to have a higher vote share for the Sweden Democrats.},
    doi = {10.1080/14616696.2020.1793213},
    }

  • Santana, Andrës and Josë Rama. “Electoral Support for Left Wing Populist Parties in Europe: Addressing the Globalization Cleavage.” European Politics and Society 19.5 (2018): 558–576. doi:10.1080/23745118.2018.1482848
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Drawing on the European Electoral Study (EES) for the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, we analyse the electoral competition between left wing populist parties and their non-populist counterparts in the nine European countries where this type of competition has occurred. By using the EES, we hold constant the electoral level and the electoral system, the timing of the elections and the question wording. To our knowledge, this is one of the broadest comparative analyses of European left-wing populist parties so far. The focus on the competition between leftist parties draws attention to the key question of the vulnerabilities of the non-populist left vis à vis their populist competitors. We test a battery of bivariate clustered logistic models and find that the losers of globalization theories help account for left wing populist parties{“} support. However, the sociodemographic profile of these supporters does not fit the mainstream view on who these losers are. Moreover, we obtain strong support for the globalization cleavage theories: citizens who hold critical attitudes towards the EU and who perceive immigration as a threat to their {“}way of life{“} are more prone to support left wing populist parties than non-populist left parties. These findings apply both to the entire sample of countries and to each one of them individually.

    @Article{santana-rama-2018,
    author = {Andr{\"e}s Santana and Jos{\"e} Rama},
    title = {Electoral Support for Left Wing Populist Parties in Europe: Addressing the Globalization Cleavage},
    journal = {European Politics and Society},
    year = {2018},
    volume = {19},
    number = {5},
    pages = {558--576},
    abstract = {Drawing on the European Electoral Study (EES) for the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, we analyse the electoral competition between left wing populist parties and their non-populist counterparts in the nine European countries where this type of competition has occurred. By
    using the EES, we hold constant the electoral level and the electoral system, the timing of the elections and the question wording. To our knowledge, this is one of the broadest comparative analyses of European left-wing populist parties so far. The focus on the competition between
    leftist parties draws attention to the key question of the vulnerabilities of the non-populist left vis à vis their populist competitors. We test a battery of bivariate clustered logistic models and find that the losers of globalization theories help account for left wing populist
    parties{"} support. However, the sociodemographic profile of these supporters does not fit the mainstream view on who these losers are. Moreover, we obtain strong support for the globalization cleavage theories: citizens who hold critical attitudes towards the EU and who perceive
    immigration as a threat to their {"}way of life{"} are more prone to support left wing populist parties than non-populist left parties. These findings apply both to the entire sample of countries and to each one of them individually.},
    doi = {10.1080/23745118.2018.1482848},
    }

  • Schaub, Max, Johanna Gereke, and Delia Baldassarri. “Strangers in Hostile Lands: Exposure To Refugees and Right-Wing Support in Germany”s Eastern Regions.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2020). doi:10.1177/0010414020957675
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Does local exposure to refugees increase right-wing support? This paper studies a case uniquely suited to address this question: the allocation of refugees to the rural hinterlands of eastern Germany during the European refugee crisis. Similar to non-urban regions elsewhere, the area has had minimal previous exposure to foreigners, but distinctively leans towards the political right. Our data comprise electoral outcomes, and individual-level survey and behavioral measures. A policy allocating refugees following strict administrative rules and a matching procedure allow for causal identification. Our measurements confirm the presence of widespread anti-immigrant sentiments. However, these are unaffected by the presence of refugees in respondents{“} hometowns: on average, we record null effects for all outcomes, which we interpret as supporting a sociotropic perspective on immigration attitudes. Masked by these overall null findings, we observe convergence: local exposure to refugees appears to have pulled both right- and left-leaning individuals more towards the center.

    @Article{schaub-gereke-baldassarri-2020,
    author = {Max Schaub and Johanna Gereke and Delia Baldassarri},
    title = {Strangers in Hostile Lands: Exposure To Refugees and Right-Wing Support in Germany{"}s Eastern Regions},
    journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Does local exposure to refugees increase right-wing support? This paper studies a case uniquely suited to address this question: the allocation of refugees to the rural hinterlands of eastern Germany during the European refugee crisis. Similar to non-urban regions elsewhere, the
    area has had minimal previous exposure to foreigners, but distinctively leans towards the political right. Our data comprise electoral outcomes, and individual-level survey and behavioral measures. A policy allocating refugees following strict administrative rules and a matching
    procedure allow for causal identification. Our measurements confirm the presence of widespread anti-immigrant sentiments. However, these are unaffected by the presence of refugees in respondents{"} hometowns: on average, we record null effects for all outcomes, which we interpret as
    supporting a sociotropic perspective on immigration attitudes. Masked by these overall null findings, we observe convergence: local exposure to refugees appears to have pulled both right- and left-leaning individuals more towards the center.},
    doi = {10.1177/0010414020957675},
    }

  • van Spanje, Joost. Controlling the Electoral Marketplace: How Established Parties Ward Off Competition. Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
    [BibTeX]
    @Book{spanje-2019,
    author = {Joost {van Spanje}},
    title = {Controlling the Electoral Marketplace: How Established Parties Ward Off Competition},
    publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
    year = {2019},
    }

  • van Spanje, Joost and Rachid Azrout. “The Plight of the Discredited: Electoral Effects of Stigmatizing And Prosecuting an Anti-Immigration Politician.” Acta Politica online first (2021). doi:10.1057/s41269-021-00197-5
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The emergence of anti-immigration parties in mature democracies has triggered various reactions. These reactions, including stigmatization of these parties and prosecution of their members for hate speech, may have unintended consequences. What are the effects of these responses on the electoral support for these parties? Using an experimental approach, we confront a sample representative of the Dutch electorate with one of six versions of a manipulated news video about a new anti-immigration party. We find that stigmatization of the party reduces the propensity to vote for that party, and even more so if it is mentioned that a prominent member is prosecuted for hate speech than if not. Either way, the effect is moderated by anti-immigrant attitude and mediated by the partyâ??s perceived legitimacy.

    @Article{spanje-azrout-2021,
    author = {Joost {van Spanje} and Rachid Azrout},
    title = {The Plight of the Discredited: Electoral Effects of Stigmatizing And Prosecuting an Anti-Immigration Politician},
    journal = {Acta Politica},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The emergence of anti-immigration parties in mature democracies has triggered various reactions. These reactions, including stigmatization of these parties and prosecution of their members for hate speech, may have unintended consequences. What are the effects of these responses
    on the electoral support for these parties? Using an experimental approach, we confront a sample representative of the Dutch electorate with one of six versions of a manipulated news video about a new anti-immigration party. We find that stigmatization of the party reduces the
    propensity to vote for that party, and even more so if it is mentioned that a prominent member is prosecuted for hate speech than if not. Either way, the effect is moderated by anti-immigrant attitude and mediated by the party{\^a}??s perceived legitimacy.},
    doi = {10.1057/s41269-021-00197-5},
    }

  • Stefanovic, Djordje and Geoffrey Evans. “Multiple Winning Formulae? Far Right Voters and Parties in Eastern Europe.” Europe-Asia Studies 71.9 (2019): 1443–1473. doi:10.1080/09668136.2019.1653447
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Can theories explaining far right voting in Western Europe be extended to post-communist Eastern Europe? We address this question with a comparative demand-side analysis of far right parties and their voters in four post-communist countries: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia. Our findings indicate the emergence of two distinct types of far right party. While the Latvian and Lithuanian far right resemble the new radical right (NRR) model, the Bulgarian far right comes closer to the welfare chauvinist ideal type. The far right mobilised anti-Semitic voters in Latvia, Slovakia and Bulgaria. In all four cases, the far right was especially successful in capturing the votes of ethnic majority members who are the most opposed to their country{“}s formerly dominant ethnic group.

    @Article{stefanovic-evans-2019,
    author = {Djordje Stefanovic and Geoffrey Evans},
    title = {Multiple Winning Formulae? Far Right Voters and Parties in Eastern Europe},
    journal = {Europe-Asia Studies},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {71},
    number = {9},
    pages = {1443--1473},
    abstract = {Can theories explaining far right voting in Western Europe be extended to post-communist Eastern Europe? We address this question with a comparative demand-side analysis of far right parties and their voters in four post-communist countries: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and
    Slovakia. Our findings indicate the emergence of two distinct types of far right party. While the Latvian and Lithuanian far right resemble the new radical right (NRR) model, the Bulgarian far right comes closer to the welfare chauvinist ideal type. The far right mobilised
    anti-Semitic voters in Latvia, Slovakia and Bulgaria. In all four cases, the far right was especially successful in capturing the votes of ethnic majority members who are the most opposed to their country{"}s formerly dominant ethnic group.},
    doi = {10.1080/09668136.2019.1653447},
    }

  • Steiner, Nils D. and Sven Hillen. “Vote choices of left-authoritarians: Misperceived congruence and issue salience.” Electoral Studies 70 (2021): online first. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102280
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Often lacking parties with a corresponding profile, citizens with economically left and culturally authoritarian, or nationalist, policy orientations face a trade-off between congruence on economic and on cultural issues. How such left-authoritarian voters resolve this trade-off depends on which issues are more salient to them, previous research argues. We extend this line of research by considering the role of (mis-)perceived party positions. Using a survey in the context of the 2017 German election, we show how perceived congruence and issue importance interactively shape the left-authoritarian vote. Our findings indicate that many left-authoritarians vote for a party simply because they misperceive it to hold a congruent left-authoritarian position. In this case, issue importance matters little. Yet when voters are aware that parties match their position on only one dimension, vote choices are shaped by whether they care most about the economy or immigration. We discuss several implications.

    @Article{steiner-hillen-2021,
    author = {Nils D. Steiner and Sven Hillen},
    title = {Vote choices of left-authoritarians: Misperceived congruence and issue salience},
    journal = {Electoral Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {70},
    pages = {online first},
    abstract = {Often lacking parties with a corresponding profile, citizens with economically left and culturally authoritarian, or nationalist, policy orientations face a trade-off between congruence on economic and on cultural issues. How such left-authoritarian voters resolve this trade-off
    depends on which issues are more salient to them, previous research argues. We extend this line of research by considering the role of (mis-)perceived party positions. Using a survey in the context of the 2017 German election, we show how perceived congruence and issue importance
    interactively shape the left-authoritarian vote. Our findings indicate that many left-authoritarians vote for a party simply because they misperceive it to hold a congruent left-authoritarian position. In this case, issue importance matters little. Yet when voters are aware that
    parties match their position on only one dimension, vote choices are shaped by whether they care most about the economy or immigration. We discuss several implications.},
    doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102280},
    }

  • Stockemer, Daniel. The Front National in France: Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen. Springer, 2017.
    [BibTeX]
    @Book{stockemer-2017b,
    author = {Daniel Stockemer},
    title = {The Front National in France: Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen},
    publisher = {Springer},
    year = {2017},
    }

  • Stockemer, Daniel, Daphne Halikiopoulou, and Tim Vlandas. “Birds of a feather.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies online first (2020): 1–28. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2020.1770063
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article focuses on the prevalence of anti-immigration attitudes among the far-right electorate. Drawing on the distinction between the predictive power of immigration concerns, and the question of how widespread these concerns are among the far-right voter pool, we proceed in two steps. First, we assess the extent to which anti-immigration attitudes are a necessary condition for voting far-right; and second, we examine whether far-right voters with different levels of anti-immigration attitudes exhibit similar individual and attitudinal characteristics. Using data from the 8th wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) we find that, surprisingly, anti-immigration attitudes are not a necessary condition for voting for the far-right as approximately one third of far-right voters have no concerns over immigration. We further show that far-right voters with different levels of immigration concerns have different profiles when it comes to other predictors of the far right-vote including ideological affinity, attachment to the EU and government satisfaction. Our contribution is significant as we suggest that there are different routes to voting for the far right by groups with different grievances, including non- immigration related.

    @Article{stockemer-halikiopoulou-vlandas-2020,
    author = {Daniel Stockemer and Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas},
    title = {Birds of a feather},
    journal = {Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    pages = {1--28},
    abstract = {This article focuses on the prevalence of anti-immigration attitudes among the far-right electorate. Drawing on the distinction between the predictive power of immigration concerns, and the question of how widespread these concerns are among the far-right voter pool, we proceed in
    two steps. First, we assess the extent to which anti-immigration attitudes are a necessary condition for voting far-right; and second, we examine whether far-right voters with different levels of anti-immigration attitudes exhibit similar individual and attitudinal characteristics.
    Using data from the 8th wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) we find that, surprisingly, anti-immigration attitudes are not a necessary condition for voting for the far-right as approximately one third of far-right voters have no concerns over immigration. We further show that
    far-right voters with different levels of immigration concerns have different profiles when it comes to other predictors of the far right-vote including ideological affinity, attachment to the EU and government satisfaction. Our contribution is significant as we suggest that there
    are different routes to voting for the far right by groups with different grievances, including non- immigration related.},
    doi = {10.1080/1369183X.2020.1770063},
    }

  • a’n, Natasza Styczy. “Refugees Not Welcome. The Populist Radical Right in Poland and the Migration Crisis.” Visions and Revisions of Europe. Eds. Czerska-Shaw, Karolina, Marcin Galent, and Bożena Gierat-Biero. Studies in Euroculture. Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2018. 75–90.
    [BibTeX]
    @InCollection{styczynska-2018,
    author = {Natasza Styczy{\a'n}ska},
    title = {Refugees Not Welcome. The Populist Radical Right in Poland and the Migration Crisis},
    booktitle = {Visions and Revisions of Europe},
    publisher = {Universitätsverlag Göttingen},
    year = {2018},
    editor = {Karolina Czerska-Shaw and Marcin Galent and Bo{\.z}ena Gierat-Biero},
    number = {4},
    series = {Studies in Euroculture},
    pages = {75--90},
    address = {Göttingen},
    }

  • Tipaldou, Sofia and Katrin Uba. “The Russian Radical Right Movement and Immigration Policy: Do They Just Make Noise Or Have an Impact As Well?.” Europe-Asia Studies 66.7 (2014): 1080–1101. doi:10.1080/09668136.2014.927647
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article examines how, if at all, the mobilisation of the Russian Movement Against Illegal Immigration has had an impact on changes in Russian policies. Little is known about the outcomes of radical right movements in general or the Russian radical right in particular. The Movement Against Illegal Immigration has arguably played a role in shaping negative public attitudes towards immigration. On the other hand, the Russian government has not adopted any clear nationalistic anti-immigration policy frame. We show that disruptive events of Movement Against Illegal Immigration{“}s mobilisation have caused reactions in terms of the elite discourse on immigration and restrictive immigration legislation.

    @Article{tipaldou-uba-2014,
    author = {Sofia Tipaldou and Katrin Uba},
    title = {The Russian Radical Right Movement and Immigration Policy: Do They Just Make Noise Or Have an Impact As Well?},
    journal = {Europe-Asia Studies},
    year = {2014},
    volume = {66},
    number = {7},
    pages = {1080--1101},
    abstract = {This article examines how, if at all, the mobilisation of the Russian Movement Against Illegal Immigration has had an impact on changes in Russian policies. Little is known about the outcomes of radical right movements in general or the Russian radical right in particular. The
    Movement Against Illegal Immigration has arguably played a role in shaping negative public attitudes towards immigration. On the other hand, the Russian government has not adopted any clear nationalistic anti-immigration policy frame. We show that disruptive events of Movement
    Against Illegal Immigration{"}s mobilisation have caused reactions in terms of the elite discourse on immigration and restrictive immigration legislation.},
    doi = {10.1080/09668136.2014.927647},
    }

  • Tipaldou, Sofia and Katrin Uba. “Movement Adaptability in Dissimilar Settings: the Far Right in Greece and Russia.” European Societies 21.4 (2019): 563–582. doi:10.1080/14616696.2018.1494294
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article discusses how two similar far right movements in different political systems – Golden Dawn (GD) in democratic Greece and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) in authoritarian Russia – adapted their strategies and claims to better fit existing political contexts and how this affected the institutionalization of these movements. GD, a neo-Nazi movement formed in the 1980s, entered mainstream politics during the deep financial crisis of 2010, and since 2012 has consolidated its position as the third major opposition party. DPNI was founded in 2002; it had close connections with governing politicians and mobilized large xenophobic protests until it was banned in 2011. It then entered into a coalition with other far right groups under the banner of Russkie, cooperated with the liberals in the massive anti-fraud protests during 2011-2013, and tried to register as the Party of Nationalists, but failed and has now disbanded. While GD de-radicalized its anti-immigration claims to fit with the dominant discourse and exploited the financial crisis for its grass-root mobilization, DPNI changed its strategies and collaborated with its ideological opponents only after it had become very popular and faced with severe state repression. Our comparative analysis shows that far right movements adapt to their diverse environments in a manner similar to that of other anti-establishment movements regardless of context – whether within a democratic or non-democratic regime.

    @Article{tipaldou-uba-2019,
    author = {Sofia Tipaldou and Katrin Uba},
    title = {Movement Adaptability in Dissimilar Settings: the Far Right in Greece and Russia},
    journal = {European Societies},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {21},
    number = {4},
    pages = {563--582},
    abstract = {This article discusses how two similar far right movements in different political systems - Golden Dawn (GD) in democratic Greece and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) in authoritarian Russia - adapted their strategies and claims to better fit existing political
    contexts and how this affected the institutionalization of these movements. GD, a neo-Nazi movement formed in the 1980s, entered mainstream politics during the deep financial crisis of 2010, and since 2012 has consolidated its position as the third major opposition party. DPNI was
    founded in 2002; it had close connections with governing politicians and mobilized large xenophobic protests until it was banned in 2011. It then entered into a coalition with other far right groups under the banner of Russkie, cooperated with the liberals in the massive anti-fraud
    protests during 2011-2013, and tried to register as the Party of Nationalists, but failed and has now disbanded. While GD de-radicalized its anti-immigration claims to fit with the dominant discourse and exploited the financial crisis for its grass-root mobilization, DPNI changed
    its strategies and collaborated with its ideological opponents only after it had become very popular and faced with severe state repression. Our comparative analysis shows that far right movements adapt to their diverse environments in a manner similar to that of other
    anti-establishment movements regardless of context - whether within a democratic or non-democratic regime.},
    doi = {10.1080/14616696.2018.1494294},
    }

  • a’e, Jos and Andr a’e. “In the Name of the People: Left Populists Versus Right Populists.” European Politics and Society 21.1 (2020): 17–35. doi:10.1080/23745118.2019.1596583
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Using the 8th Round of the European Social Survey, we analyse the electoral competition between left-wing (LWPPs) and right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) in the six European countries where this type of competition has occurred (France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania and The Netherlands). By focusing on the competition between populist parties in the same sample of countries we can resolve what tells apart a LWPP voter from a RWPP voter. Thus, we study the factors that explain their different voting behaviour and confine our attention to the four main factors that affect populist competition: anti-elite attitudes, material deprivation, euro-scepticism and anti-immigration attitudes. Our results show that LWPPs and RWPPs voters are similar in their attitudes towards immigration and the European Union (EU) but differ in their attitudes towards elites and material deprivation.

    @Article{rama-santana-2020,
    author = {Jos{\a'e} Rama and Andr{\a'e}s Santana},
    title = {In the Name of the People: Left Populists Versus Right Populists},
    journal = {European Politics and Society},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {21},
    number = {1},
    pages = {17--35},
    abstract = {Using the 8th Round of the European Social Survey, we analyse the electoral competition between left-wing (LWPPs) and right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) in the six European countries where this type of competition has occurred (France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania and The
    Netherlands). By focusing on the competition between populist parties in the same sample of countries we can resolve what tells apart a LWPP voter from a RWPP voter. Thus, we study the factors that explain their different voting behaviour and confine our attention to the four main
    factors that affect populist competition: anti-elite attitudes, material deprivation, euro-scepticism and anti-immigration attitudes. Our results show that LWPPs and RWPPs voters are similar in their attitudes towards immigration and the European Union (EU) but differ in their
    attitudes towards elites and material deprivation.},
    doi = {10.1080/23745118.2019.1596583},
    }

  • Turnbull-Dugarte, Stuart J., Jos a’e, and Andr a’e. “The Baskerville”s Dog Suddenly Started Barking: Voting for Vox in the 2019 Spanish General Elections.” Political Research Exchange 2.1 (2020). doi:10.1080/2474736X.2020.1781543
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The electoral success of the new populist radical right-wing party, VOX, which achieved an unprecedent electoral result in the Spanish general elections of April 2019, brought an end to Spain{“}s exceptional status as a country free of the radical right. This article asks: who votes for VOX? Empirically, we present the first assessment of electoral support for VOX at the national level. Relying on national post-electoral survey data, our results show that the electoral profile of VOX{“}s supporters differs from that of populist radical right-wing parties from the rest of Europe. Support for VOX, much like the voters of their European contemporaries, tends to be markedly higher amongst males; economic status, however, has the reverse effect than that observed elsewhere on the continent, with individuals on the higher end of the income distribution more likely to have voted for VOX in the April 2019 general elections. Importantly, we establish that national identity plays a large role in explaining support for the new radical right-wing challenger and that the effect of identity is conditioned by negative evaluations of the political situation in Spain.

    @Article{turnbull-dugarte-rama-santana-2020,
    author = {Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte and Jos{\a'e} Rama and Andr{\a'e}s Santana},
    title = {The Baskerville{"}s Dog Suddenly Started Barking: Voting for Vox in the 2019 Spanish General Elections},
    journal = {Political Research Exchange},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {2},
    number = {1},
    abstract = {The electoral success of the new populist radical right-wing party, VOX, which achieved an unprecedent electoral result in the Spanish general elections of April 2019, brought an end to Spain{"}s exceptional status as a country free of the radical right. This article asks: who votes
    for VOX? Empirically, we present the first assessment of electoral support for VOX at the national level. Relying on national post-electoral survey data, our results show that the electoral profile of VOX{"}s supporters differs from that of populist radical right-wing parties from
    the rest of Europe. Support for VOX, much like the voters of their European contemporaries, tends to be markedly higher amongst males; economic status, however, has the reverse effect than that observed elsewhere on the continent, with individuals on the higher end of the income
    distribution more likely to have voted for VOX in the April 2019 general elections. Importantly, we establish that national identity plays a large role in explaining support for the new radical right-wing challenger and that the effect of identity is conditioned by negative
    evaluations of the political situation in Spain.},
    doi = {10.1080/2474736X.2020.1781543},
    }

  • Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya. “Welfare Chauvinism? Refugee Flows and Electoral Support for Populist-Right Parties in Industrial Democracies.” Social Science Quarterly 101.4 (2020): 1600–1626. doi:10.1111/ssqu.12838
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Objectives The objective of this article is to examine whether refugee flows are associated with an increase in electoral support for populist-right parties. The empirical evidence on this so far remains mixed. This article argues that refugee inflows alone are an inaccurate predictor of the success of populist-right parties. Rather, refugee inflows can lead to a rise in electoral support for populist-right parties where traditional welfare states are expansive-the so-called welfare chauvinism argument, wherein natives already dependent on high levels of social welfare are likely to see refugees as interlopers who free-ride on welfare and thereby threaten the welfare of locals. Methods This article deploys Tobit and OLS fixed effect estimators in panel data covering 27 OECD countries during the period 1990-2014 (25 years). Results There is no evidence to suggest that refugee inflows per se increase electoral support for populist-right parties. However, a positive effect of refugee inflows on electoral support for populist-right parties is conditional upon a higher degree of social welfare spending, which supports the propositions of {“}welfare chauvinism.{“} Moreover, support for populist-right parties increases when the degree of labor market regulation and welfare spending is high. These results are robust to alternative data, sample, and estimation techniques. Conclusion The results suggest that societies with higher levels of social protection through high taxes might fuel {“}welfare chauvinism,{“} in which the segments of native population fear significant welfare losses from inflow of refugees.

    @Article{vadlamannati-2020,
    author = {Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati},
    title = {Welfare Chauvinism? Refugee Flows and Electoral Support for Populist-Right Parties in Industrial Democracies},
    journal = {Social Science Quarterly},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {101},
    number = {4},
    pages = {1600--1626},
    abstract = {Objectives The objective of this article is to examine whether refugee flows are associated with an increase in electoral support for populist-right parties. The empirical evidence on this so far remains mixed. This article argues that refugee inflows alone are an inaccurate
    predictor of the success of populist-right parties. Rather, refugee inflows can lead to a rise in electoral support for populist-right parties where traditional welfare states are expansive-the so-called welfare chauvinism argument, wherein natives already dependent on high levels
    of social welfare are likely to see refugees as interlopers who free-ride on welfare and thereby threaten the welfare of locals. Methods This article deploys Tobit and OLS fixed effect estimators in panel data covering 27 OECD countries during the period 1990-2014 (25 years).
    Results There is no evidence to suggest that refugee inflows per se increase electoral support for populist-right parties. However, a positive effect of refugee inflows on electoral support for populist-right parties is conditional upon a higher degree of social welfare spending,
    which supports the propositions of {"}welfare chauvinism.{"} Moreover, support for populist-right parties increases when the degree of labor market regulation and welfare spending is high. These results are robust to alternative data, sample, and estimation techniques. Conclusion The
    results suggest that societies with higher levels of social protection through high taxes might fuel {"}welfare chauvinism,{"} in which the segments of native population fear significant welfare losses from inflow of refugees.},
    doi = {10.1111/ssqu.12838},
    }

  • Valentim, Vicente. “Parliamentary Representation and the Normalization of Radical Right Support.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2021). doi:10.1177/0010414021997159
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    How do stigmatized political preferences become normalized? I argue that the parliamentary representation of the radical right normalizes radical right support. Radical right politicians breach established social norms. Hence their supporters have an incentive to conceal that support. When the radical right enters parliament, however, its voters are likely to perceive that their views have been legitimized, becoming more likely to display their private preferences. I use three studies to test this argument. Study 1 employs a regression discontinuity comparing the underreport of voting for radical right parties (RRPs) above and below thresholds of parliamentary representation. Study 2 compares how much individuals report liking RRPs in post-electoral surveys depending on interview mode. Study 3 employs a difference-in-differences that looks into the underreport of UKIP vote before and after entering parliament. The results support the argument and highlight the role of political institutions in defining the acceptability of behaviors in society.

    @Article{valentim-2021,
    author = {Vicente Valentim},
    title = {Parliamentary Representation and the Normalization of Radical Right Support},
    journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
    year = {2021},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {How do stigmatized political preferences become normalized? I argue that the parliamentary representation of the radical right normalizes radical right support. Radical right politicians breach established social norms. Hence their supporters have an incentive to conceal that
    support. When the radical right enters parliament, however, its voters are likely to perceive that their views have been legitimized, becoming more likely to display their private preferences. I use three studies to test this argument. Study 1 employs a regression discontinuity
    comparing the underreport of voting for radical right parties (RRPs) above and below thresholds of parliamentary representation. Study 2 compares how much individuals report liking RRPs in post-electoral surveys depending on interview mode. Study 3 employs a
    difference-in-differences that looks into the underreport of UKIP vote before and after entering parliament. The results support the argument and highlight the role of political institutions in defining the acceptability of behaviors in society.},
    doi = {10.1177/0010414021997159},
    }

  • a`e, Man. “The Strength of Far-Right AfD in Eastern Germany: The East-West Divide and the Multiple Causes behind Populism.” The Political Quarterly (2020): online first. doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12859
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    This article sheds light on one of the key developments in recent German politics and relates it to the broader debate on the electoral success of the far right. The rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) is also a story about Germany’s internal political divide three decades after reunification, as the party has roughly twice as much support in the east than in the west. The article analyses the country’s east-west divide, strongly visible in widespread sentiments of societal marginalisation among eastern Germans. The key socio-structural differences between the east and the west relate to matters of economics, migration, and representation-and provide a setting suitable to AfD strength in the east. In explaining the party’s electoral success in eastern Germany, the article echoes recent scholarship which rejects narrow explanations for the strength of {“}populism{“}, and instead highlights its multiple causes.

    @Article{weisskircher-2020,
    author = {Man{\a`e}s Weisskircher},
    title = {The Strength of Far-Right AfD in Eastern Germany: The East-West Divide and the Multiple Causes behind Populism},
    journal = {The Political Quarterly},
    year = {2020},
    pages = {online first},
    abstract = {This article sheds light on one of the key developments in recent German politics and relates it to the broader debate on the electoral success of the far right. The rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) is also a story about Germany's internal
    political divide three decades after reunification, as the party has roughly twice as much support in the east than in the west. The article analyses the country's east-west divide, strongly visible in widespread sentiments of societal marginalisation among eastern Germans. The key
    socio-structural differences between the east and the west relate to matters of economics, migration, and representation-and provide a setting suitable to AfD strength in the east. In explaining the party's electoral success in eastern Germany, the article echoes recent scholarship
    which rejects narrow explanations for the strength of {"}populism{"}, and instead highlights its multiple causes.},
    doi = {10.1111/1467-923X.12859},
    }

  • Wichgers, Lisanne, Laura Jacobs, and Joost van Spanje. “The Battle of Frame Building: The Reciprocal Relationship between Journalists and Frame Sponsors.” The International Journal of Press/Politics online first (2020). doi:10.1177/1940161220942760
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The idea that journalists make use of framing is widespread. However, systematic studies of the role of frame sponsors-that is, nonmedia actors who advocate a certain frame package-in influencing the patterns in frame package use by journalists are limited. Which characteristics make frame sponsors successful in frame building, and why? In this study, we propose a new way of understanding the relationship between journalists and frame sponsors, by studying to what extent high authority and having a strong stake in an issue are important predictors of frame coverage, and whether a bidirectional relationship between frame sponsors and journalists can be discerned in frame building. We examine the two court cases against Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), for alleged hate speech (2009-2020). Based on a content analysis of media input, such as statements, social media posts, and press releases (N = 220) of relevant frame sponsors as well as news stories about the court cases (N = 691), we demonstrate that there is a reciprocal relationship between frame sponsors and journalists in frame building. Frame sponsors influence journalists in the use of frame packages, but framing in news reports also stimulates frame sponsors to communicate similar frame packages in the future. Actors with high levels of authority and a strong stake in the issue are more successful in getting their preferred frame packages across. By acknowledging the bidirectional relationship and expanding knowledge on who benefits most from this relationship, this study advances literature on frame building.

    @Article{wichgers-jacobs-spanje-2020,
    author = {Lisanne Wichgers and Laura Jacobs and Joost {van Spanje}},
    title = {The Battle of Frame Building: The Reciprocal Relationship between Journalists and Frame Sponsors},
    journal = {The International Journal of Press/Politics},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The idea that journalists make use of framing is widespread. However, systematic studies of the role of frame sponsors-that is, nonmedia actors who advocate a certain frame package-in influencing the patterns in frame package use by journalists are limited. Which characteristics
    make frame sponsors successful in frame building, and why? In this study, we propose a new way of understanding the relationship between journalists and frame sponsors, by studying to what extent high authority and having a strong stake in an issue are important predictors of frame
    coverage, and whether a bidirectional relationship between frame sponsors and journalists can be discerned in frame building. We examine the two court cases against Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), for alleged hate speech (2009-2020). Based on a content
    analysis of media input, such as statements, social media posts, and press releases (N = 220) of relevant frame sponsors as well as news stories about the court cases (N = 691), we demonstrate that there is a reciprocal relationship between frame sponsors and journalists in frame
    building. Frame sponsors influence journalists in the use of frame packages, but framing in news reports also stimulates frame sponsors to communicate similar frame packages in the future. Actors with high levels of authority and a strong stake in the issue are more successful in
    getting their preferred frame packages across. By acknowledging the bidirectional relationship and expanding knowledge on who benefits most from this relationship, this study advances literature on frame building.},
    doi = {10.1177/1940161220942760},
    }

  • Wichgers, Lisanne, Laura Jacobs, and Joost van Spanje. “Trial and Error: Hate Speech Prosecution and Its (unintended) Effects on Democratic Support.” Acta Politica online first (2020). doi:10.1057/s41269-020-00177-1
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    Due to its controversial nature, hate speech prosecution of anti-immigration politicians is likely to affect citizens{“} democratic support. Using a web experiment in which participants are exposed to a manipulated television news story about hate speech prosecution, we test these potential effects in the Dutch context. We demonstrate that effects on democratic support are driven by (dis)agreement with ideas expressed by the prosecuted politician in his alleged hate speech rather than by identification with his party. While a decision to not prosecute a politician does not seem to affect democratic support, a decision to prosecute a politician for hate speech decreases democratic support among citizens with anti-immigration attitudes, and increases democratic support among citizens with pro-immigration attitudes. Decisions to prosecute politicians for hate speech thus have important effects not just on supporters of the politician{“}s party, but also on other groups in society.

    @Article{wichgers-jacobs-spanje-2020b,
    author = {Lisanne Wichgers and Laura Jacobs and Joost {van Spanje}},
    title = {Trial and Error: Hate Speech Prosecution and Its (unintended) Effects on Democratic Support},
    journal = {Acta Politica},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {Due to its controversial nature, hate speech prosecution of anti-immigration politicians is likely to affect citizens{"} democratic support. Using a web experiment in which participants are exposed to a manipulated television news story about hate speech prosecution, we test these
    potential effects in the Dutch context. We demonstrate that effects on democratic support are driven by (dis)agreement with ideas expressed by the prosecuted politician in his alleged hate speech rather than by identification with his party. While a decision to not prosecute a
    politician does not seem to affect democratic support, a decision to prosecute a politician for hate speech decreases democratic support among citizens with anti-immigration attitudes, and increases democratic support among citizens with pro-immigration attitudes. Decisions to
    prosecute politicians for hate speech thus have important effects not just on supporters of the politician{"}s party, but also on other groups in society.},
    doi = {10.1057/s41269-020-00177-1},
    }

  • Wurthmann, Constantin L., Stefan Marschall, Vasiliki Triga, and Vasilis Manavopoulos. “Many Losers – One Winner? an Examination of Vote Switching To the Afd in the 2017 German Federal Election Using Vaa Data.” Party Politics online first (2020). doi:10.1177/1354068820914959
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The German federal election of 2017 saw significant losses for the two German mainstream parties (Volksparteien) and governing coalition partners, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). The major beneficiary was the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a right-populist party, which almost tripled its amount of votes received from the 2013 federal election. Making use of data from a Voting Advice Application, this article seeks to explore the AfD{“}s extraordinary electoral success with particular attention to the party{“}s capacity to attract voters from the two mainstream and traditionally powerful parties. Drawing on the literature on radical right-wing parties in Europe and tracking the route of AfD from a single-issue Eurosceptic party to a radical party with broader programmatic appeal, this work tests hypotheses regarding demographic, political and attitudinal determinants of voting for AfD, in general, and switching one{“}s vote to AfD from CDU/CSU or SPD more specifically. In line with previous literature, individual-level analyses show that voting for the AfD seems to be more tangentially related to demographic variables, such as sex, age and education and more strongly connected to political concerns, e.g. {“}conservative{“} self-placement and attitudes toward specific policies, immigration and Euroscepticism in particular.

    @Article{wurthmann-marschall-triga-manavopoulos-2020,
    author = {L. Constantin Wurthmann and Stefan Marschall and Vasiliki Triga and Vasilis Manavopoulos},
    title = {Many Losers - One Winner? an Examination of Vote Switching To the Afd in the 2017 German Federal Election Using Vaa Data},
    journal = {Party Politics},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    abstract = {The German federal election of 2017 saw significant losses for the two German mainstream parties (Volksparteien) and governing coalition partners, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). The major beneficiary was the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a
    right-populist party, which almost tripled its amount of votes received from the 2013 federal election. Making use of data from a Voting Advice Application, this article seeks to explore the AfD{"}s extraordinary electoral success with particular attention to the party{"}s capacity to
    attract voters from the two mainstream and traditionally powerful parties. Drawing on the literature on radical right-wing parties in Europe and tracking the route of AfD from a single-issue Eurosceptic party to a radical party with broader programmatic appeal, this work tests
    hypotheses regarding demographic, political and attitudinal determinants of voting for AfD, in general, and switching one{"}s vote to AfD from CDU/CSU or SPD more specifically. In line with previous literature, individual-level analyses show that voting for the AfD seems to be more
    tangentially related to demographic variables, such as sex, age and education and more strongly connected to political concerns, e.g. {"}conservative{"} self-placement and attitudes toward specific policies, immigration and Euroscepticism in particular.},
    doi = {10.1177/1354068820914959},
    }

  • a’o, Piotr Zag, Jose Rama, and Guillermo Cordero. “Young and Temporary: Youth Employment Insecurity and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe.” Government and Opposition (2019): 1–22. doi:10.1017/gov.2019.28
    [BibTeX] [Abstract]

    The recent success of right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in Europe has given rise to different explanations. Economic factors have proven to be significant mainly at the aggregate level. As for the individual level, it has been argued that the so-called {“}losers of globalization{“} – the less educated and less skilled, profiles with higher job insecurity – are more likely to support RPPs. Nevertheless, RPPs perform strikingly well in countries less affected by the Great Recession, gathering high levels of support among profiles not considered the losers of globalization. Moreover, the effect of age on support for RPPs is not clear, as, on the one hand, the young are better educated and skilled, but, on the other, they suffered the effects of the economic crisis more. To address this puzzle, we focus on the impact of unemployment and employment insecurity among the youth on voting for RPPs in 17 European countries. We find that youth support for RPPs can be explained by the precariousness of the youth labour market.

    @Article{zagorski-rama-cordero-2019,
    author = {Piotr Zag{\a'o}rski and Jose Rama and Guillermo Cordero},
    title = {Young and Temporary: Youth Employment Insecurity and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe},
    journal = {Government and Opposition},
    year = {2019},
    pages = {1--22},
    abstract = {The recent success of right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in Europe has given rise to different explanations. Economic factors have proven to be significant mainly at the aggregate level. As for the individual level, it has been argued that the so-called {"}losers of globalization{"} -
    the less educated and less skilled, profiles with higher job insecurity - are more likely to support RPPs. Nevertheless, RPPs perform strikingly well in countries less affected by the Great Recession, gathering high levels of support among profiles not considered the losers of
    globalization. Moreover, the effect of age on support for RPPs is not clear, as, on the one hand, the young are better educated and skilled, but, on the other, they suffered the effects of the economic crisis more. To address this puzzle, we focus on the impact of unemployment and
    employment insecurity among the youth on voting for RPPs in 17 European countries. We find that youth support for RPPs can be explained by the precariousness of the youth labour market.},
    doi = {10.1017/gov.2019.28},
    }

 

Apr 162020
 

What bibliography?

The Eclectic, Erratic Bibliography on the Extreme Right (in (Western) Europe)™ is a collection of references on far right parties & their voters. Most of the titles fall in to the field of Political Science (broadly defined), but some contributions from related disciplines (most notably sociology, psychology, and economy) are included, too. You a free to browse the bibliography, download it (most reference software can import this format), curse it – whatever floats your boat. If you are aware of any titles that should be in the bibliography, please send me the reference (and the PDF if you have it).

(Lazy? Just watch it)

The Radical Right Bibliography: Spring 2020 update

Watch this video on YouTube.

What is new?

Since November 2019, I have added 49 new titles to the bibliography. This brings the total number of entries to 955. Most of the new titles are fairly recent and were only published in the last couple of years or so.

Publication yearn
201928
202017
20182
20131
20171

This contributes to an interesting phenomenon: almost 20 per cent of the titles in the bibliography (which has existed in one form or another for more than two decades) were published after 2017. I might get better at spotting stuff, people might be more willing to send me pointers to their work, or (this my hunch) the literature is exploding.

Almost all (48) of them are articles that were published in (peer-reviewed) journals. This is in line with the bibliography’s existing bias towards articles: since the early 2000s, articles are outpacing any other type of publication.

Number of new publications on the radical right by year of publication

I’m not sure if this reflects my personal reading habits or a more general shift in publication practices. Here are the outlets in which the 48 articles were published. Again, this is broadly in line with past patterns.

Journaln
European Journal of Political Research4
Party Politics4
Political Psychology4
West European Politics4
Nations and Nationalism3
Social Science Quarterly3
Electoral Studies2
Journal of European Public Policy2
Politics2
Politische Vierteljahresschrift2
Comparative European Politics1
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences1
European Journal of Personality1
European Political Science1
French Politics1
German Politics1
Government and Opposition1
International Journal of Public Opinion Research1
Journal of Democracy1
Patterns of Prejudice1
Polish Political Science Review1
Political Analysis1
Political Behavior1
Political Geography1
Political Studies1
Scandinavian Political Studies1
SSRN Electronic Journal1
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations1

What are they writing about?

I made a quick word cloud from the titles and abstracts. Click on the image for a bigger and mildly interactive version. Like in previous updates, the adjective “radical” stands out, whereas “extreme” and is mentioned only once. This neatly reflects the influence of Cas Mudde’s typology, but also the realities of West European party politics, where openly anti-democratic ideas are not popular with voters.

Radical Right Bibliography April 2020 Update: Wordcloud

Click on the image to open a bigger and slightly more interactive version in a new tab

Populist(s) and populism are just as, well, popular. The same goes for party/parties. Some stemming would have made this more easily visible, but stems look really ugly in a word cloud (“the pie chart of text analysis” – I know). Europe, western, support, voting, immigration, and national are runners up. Pie chart or not, this makes it clear that the new entries contribute to the bibliography’s existing focus/bias (delete as appropriate) on .

 

Who is writing all these articles?

Last time ’round, the answer to that question was a resounding and depressing “Michael”. This time, it is an equally resounding/depressing “Christian”.

Radical Right Bibliography April 2020 update: first names of authors by gender

Only 29 of the 104 unique authors of the new crop are female, which amounts to 28 per cent. This has been bugging me for a long time, so I decided to have a look at the bigger picture, i.e. the 1990-2020 period that includes 97 per cent of all titles.

Because the number of authors is large, I used an algorithm that relies on US Social Security Administration baby name data to assign gender probabilities to names. This is not perfect and tends to overestimate the share of female authors, at least in a largely European context (looking at you, Andrea, Nicola, Matti, and even Reinhold (?)). I also decided to count each publication in which an author was involved in a given year as a case, i.e. I factored in the number of publications.

Radical Right Bibliography: share of female authors over time

The share varies considerably from year to year, so I added a lowess smoother. The results suggests a very slow but appreciable upward trend. However, the data also show that there was a period in the late 1990s/early 2000s, when the share of female authors was higher than it was over the last decade or so. This resonates with Sarah de Lange’s description of a worrying development in the field. So, if you are female, please send me your work on right-wing radicalism. The men do it. All. The. Time.

Show us the goods

These are all the new titles in their full glory. Click here to download/import them into your reference manager software.

  • Allen, Trevor J.. “Exit To the Right? Comparing Far Right Voters and Abstainers in Western Europe.” Electoral Studies 50 (2017): 103–115. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.09.012
    [BibTeX]
    @article{allen-2017b,
    author = {Trevor J. Allen},
    title = {Exit To the Right? Comparing Far Right Voters and Abstainers in Western Europe},
    journal = {Electoral Studies},
    year = {2017},
    volume = {50},
    pages = {103--115},
    doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.09.012},
    }

  • Bernhard, Laurent and Hanspeter Kriesi. “Populism in Election Times: a Comparative Analysis of 11 Countries in Western Europe.” West European Politics 42.6 (2019): 1188–1208. doi:10.1080/01402382.2019.1596694
    [BibTeX]
    @article{bernhard-kriesi-2019,
    author = {Laurent Bernhard and Hanspeter Kriesi},
    title = {Populism in Election Times: a Comparative Analysis of 11 Countries in Western Europe},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {42},
    number = {6},
    pages = {1188--1208},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2019.1596694},
    }

  • Bolet, Diane. “Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right Voting: Evidence From France.” European Journal of Political Research online first (2020). doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12378
    [BibTeX]
    @article{bolet-2020,
    author = {Diane Bolet},
    title = {Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right Voting: Evidence From France},
    journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12378},
    }

  • Bolin, Niklas and Nicholas Aylott. “Right-wing Populist Party Leadership in Sweden : One of a Kind Or One of the Crowd?.” Polish Political Science Review 7.1 (2019): 24–40. doi:10.2478/ppsr-2019-0002
    [BibTeX]
    @article{bolin-aylott-2019,
    author = {Niklas Bolin and Nicholas Aylott},
    title = {Right-wing Populist Party Leadership in Sweden : One of a Kind Or One of the Crowd?},
    journal = {Polish Political Science Review},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {7},
    number = {1},
    pages = {24--40},
    doi = {10.2478/ppsr-2019-0002},
    }

  • Bos, Linda, Christian Schemer, Nicoleta Corbu, Michael Hameleers, Ioannis Andreadis, Anne Schulz, Desirée Schmuck, Carsten Reinemann, and Nayla Fawzi. “The Effects of Populism as a Social Identity Frame on Persuasion and Mobilisation: Evidence From a 15-country Experiment.” European Journal of Political Research 59.1 (2020): 3–24. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12334
    [BibTeX]
    @article{bos-schemer-corbu-hameleers-andreadis-schulz-schmuck-reinemann-fawzi-2020,
    author = {Linda Bos and Christian Schemer and Nicoleta Corbu and Michael Hameleers and Ioannis Andreadis and Anne Schulz and Desir\'{e}e Schmuck and Carsten Reinemann and Nayla Fawzi},
    title = {The Effects of Populism as a Social Identity Frame on Persuasion and Mobilisation: Evidence From a 15-country Experiment},
    journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {59},
    number = {1},
    pages = {3--24},
    doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12334},
    }

  • Bustikova, Lenka. Extreme Reactions: Radical Right Mobilization in Eastern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
    [BibTeX]
    @book{bustikova-2019,
    author = {Lenka Bustikova},
    title = {Extreme Reactions: Radical Right Mobilization in Eastern Europe},
    publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
    year = {2019},
    address = {Cambridge},
    }

  • Bustikova, Lenka, David S. Siroky, Saud Alashri, and Sultan Alzahrani. “Predicting Partisan Responsiveness: A Probabilistic Text Mining Time-Series Approach.” Political Analysis 28.1 (2020): 47–64. doi:10.1017/pan.2019.18
    [BibTeX]
    @article{bustikova-siroky-alashri-alzahrani-2020,
    author = {Lenka Bustikova and David S. Siroky and Saud Alashri and Sultan Alzahrani},
    title = {Predicting Partisan Responsiveness: A Probabilistic Text Mining Time-Series Approach},
    journal = {Political Analysis},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {28},
    number = {1},
    pages = {47--64},
    doi = {10.1017/pan.2019.18},
    }

  • a’e, Hilde Coff. “Gender, gendered personality traits and radical right populist voting.” Politics 39.2 (2019): 170–185. doi:10.1177/0263395717745476
    [BibTeX]
    @article{coffe-2019,
    author = {Hilde Coff{\a'e}},
    title = {Gender, gendered personality traits and radical right populist voting},
    journal = {Politics},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {39},
    number = {2},
    pages = {170--185},
    doi = {10.1177/0263395717745476},
    }

  • D’Alimonte, Roberto. “How the Populists Won in Italy..” Journal of Democracy 30.1 (2019): 114–127.
    [BibTeX]
    @article{dalimonte-2019,
    author = {Roberto D'Alimonte},
    title = {How the Populists Won in Italy.},
    journal = {Journal of Democracy},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {30},
    number = {1},
    pages = {114--127},
    }

  • Davis, Nicholas T., Kirby Goidel, Christine S. Lipsmeyer, Guy D. Whitten, and Clifford Young. “Economic Vulnerability, Cultural Decline, and Nativism: Contingent and Indirect Effects.” Social Science Quarterly 100.2 (2019): 430–446. doi:10.1111/ssqu.12591
    [BibTeX]
    @article{davis-goidel-lipsmeyer-whitten-young-2019,
    author = {Nicholas T. Davis and Kirby Goidel and Christine S. Lipsmeyer and Guy D. Whitten and Clifford Young},
    title = {Economic Vulnerability, Cultural Decline, and Nativism: Contingent and Indirect Effects},
    journal = {Social Science Quarterly},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {100},
    number = {2},
    pages = {430--446},
    doi = {10.1111/ssqu.12591},
    }

  • Davis, Nicholas T., Kirby Goidel, Christine S. Lipsmeyer, Guy D. Whitten, and Clifford Young. “The Political Consequences of Nativism: The Impact of Nativist Sentiment on Party Support*.” Social Science Quarterly 100.2 (2019): 466–479. doi:10.1111/ssqu.12596
    [BibTeX]
    @article{davis-goidel-lipsmeyer-whitten-young-2019b,
    author = {Nicholas T. Davis and Kirby Goidel and Christine S. Lipsmeyer and Guy D. Whitten and Clifford Young},
    title = {The Political Consequences of Nativism: The Impact of Nativist Sentiment on Party Support*},
    journal = {Social Science Quarterly},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {100},
    number = {2},
    pages = {466--479},
    doi = {10.1111/ssqu.12596},
    }

  • Down, Ian and Kyung Joon Han. “Marginalisation Or Legitimation? Mainstream Party Positioning on Immigration and Support for Radical Right Parties.” West European Politics (2019): online first. doi:10.1080/01402382.2019.1674055
    [BibTeX]
    @article{down-han-2019,
    author = {Ian Down and Kyung Joon Han},
    title = {Marginalisation Or Legitimation? Mainstream Party Positioning on Immigration and Support for Radical Right Parties},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2019},
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2019.1674055},
    }

  • Engler, Sarah and David Weisstanner. “The Threat of Social Decline: Income Inequality and Radical Right Support.” Journal of European Public Policy online first (2020). doi:10.1080/13501763.2020.1733636
    [BibTeX]
    @article{engler-weisstanner-2020,
    author = {Sarah Engler and David Weisstanner},
    title = {The Threat of Social Decline: Income Inequality and Radical Right Support},
    journal = {Journal of European Public Policy},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    doi = {10.1080/13501763.2020.1733636},
    }

  • Evans, Geoffrey and Jonathan Mellon. “Immigration, Euroscepticism, and the rise and fall of UKIP.” Party Politics 25.1 (2019): 76–87. doi:10.1177/1354068818816969
    [BibTeX]
    @article{evans-mellon-2019,
    author = {Geoffrey Evans and Jonathan Mellon},
    title = {Immigration, Euroscepticism, and the rise and fall of UKIP},
    journal = {Party Politics},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {25},
    number = {1},
    pages = {76--87},
    doi = {10.1177/1354068818816969},
    }

  • Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Simon Otjes. “A hot topic? Immigration on the agenda in Western Europe.” Party Politics 25.3 (2019): 424–434. doi:10.1177/1354068817728211
    [BibTeX]
    @article{green-pedersen-otjes-2019,
    author = {Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Simon Otjes},
    title = {A hot topic? Immigration on the agenda in Western Europe},
    journal = {Party Politics},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {25},
    number = {3},
    pages = {424--434},
    doi = {10.1177/1354068817728211},
    }

  • Gründl, Johann and Julian Aichholzer. “Support for the Populist Radical Right: Between Uncertainty Avoidance and Risky Choice.” Political Psychology online first (2020). doi:10.1111/pops.12643
    [BibTeX]
    @article{gruendl-aichholzer-2020,
    author = {Johann Gr{\"u}ndl and Julian Aichholzer},
    title = {Support for the Populist Radical Right: Between Uncertainty Avoidance and Risky Choice},
    journal = {Political Psychology},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    doi = {10.1111/pops.12643},
    }

  • Halikiopoulou, Daphne and Tim Vlandas. “What Is New and What Is Nationalist About Europe’s New Nationalism? Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Europe.” Nations and Nationalism 25.2 (2019): 409–434. doi:10.1111/nana.12515
    [BibTeX]
    @article{halikiopoulou-vlandas-2019,
    author = {Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas},
    title = {What Is New and What Is Nationalist About Europe's New Nationalism? Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Europe},
    journal = {Nations and Nationalism},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {25},
    number = {2},
    pages = {409--434},
    doi = {10.1111/nana.12515},
    }

  • Haugsgjerd, Atle. “Moderation or radicalisation? How executive power affects right-wing populists’ satisfaction with democracy.” Electoral Studies 57 (2019): 31–45. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2018.09.008
    [BibTeX]
    @article{haugsgjerd-2019,
    author = {Atle Haugsgjerd},
    title = {Moderation or radicalisation? How executive power affects right-wing populists' satisfaction with democracy},
    journal = {Electoral Studies},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {57},
    pages = {31--45},
    doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2018.09.008},
    }

  • Hauwaert, Steven Van M.. “On Far Right Parties, Master Frames and Trans-National Diffusion: Understanding Far Right Party Development in Western Europe.” Comparative European Politics (2018): online first. doi:10.1057/s41295-017-0112-z
    [BibTeX]
    @article{hauwaert-2018b,
    author = {Steven M. Van Hauwaert},
    title = {On Far Right Parties, Master Frames and Trans-National Diffusion: Understanding Far Right Party Development in Western Europe},
    journal = {Comparative European Politics},
    year = {2018},
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1057/s41295-017-0112-z},
    }

  • Hauwaert, Steven Van M., Christian H. Schimpf, and Flavio Azevedo. “The Measurement of Populist Attitudes: Testing Cross-national Scales Using Item Response Theory.” Politics 40.1 (2020): 3–21. doi:10.1177/0263395719859306
    [BibTeX]
    @article{hauwaert-schimpf-azevedo-2020,
    author = {Steven M. Van Hauwaert and Christian H. Schimpf and Flavio Azevedo},
    title = {The Measurement of Populist Attitudes: Testing Cross-national Scales Using Item Response Theory},
    journal = {Politics},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {40},
    number = {1},
    pages = {3--21},
    doi = {10.1177/0263395719859306},
    }

  • Heinisch, Reinhard, Steven Saxonberg, Annika Werner, and Fabian Habersack. “The effect of radical right fringe parties on main parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Empirical evidence from manifesto data.” Party Politics (2019): online first. doi:10.1177/1354068819863620
    [BibTeX]
    @article{heinisch-saxonberg-werner-habersack-2019,
    author = {Reinhard Heinisch and Steven Saxonberg and Annika Werner and Fabian Habersack},
    title = {The effect of radical right fringe parties on main parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Empirical evidence from manifesto data},
    journal = {Party Politics},
    year = {2019},
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1177/1354068819863620},
    }

  • Hutchins, Rachel D. and Daphne Halikiopoulou. “Enemies of Liberty? Nationalism, Immigration, and the Framing of Terrorism in the Agenda of the Front National.” Nations and Nationalism 26.1 (2020): 67–84. doi:10.1111/nana.12555
    [BibTeX]
    @article{hutchins-halikiopoulou-2020,
    author = {Rachel D. Hutchins and Daphne Halikiopoulou},
    title = {Enemies of Liberty? Nationalism, Immigration, and the Framing of Terrorism in the Agenda of the Front National},
    journal = {Nations and Nationalism},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {26},
    number = {1},
    pages = {67--84},
    doi = {10.1111/nana.12555},
    }

  • Jacobs, Laura and Joost van Spanje. “Martyrs for Free Speech? Disentangling the Effects of Legal Prosecution of Anti-immigration Politicians on their Electoral Support.” Political Behavior (2019). doi:10.1007/s11109-019-09581-6
    [BibTeX]
    @article{jacobs-spanje-2019,
    author = {Laura Jacobs and Joost {van Spanje}},
    title = {Martyrs for Free Speech? Disentangling the Effects of Legal Prosecution of Anti-immigration Politicians on their Electoral Support},
    journal = {Political Behavior},
    year = {2019},
    doi = {10.1007/s11109-019-09581-6},
    }

  • Jylhä, Kirsti M., Jens Rydgren, and Pontus Strimling. “Radical Right-wing Voters From Right and Left: Comparing Sweden Democrat Voters Who Previously Voted for the Conservative Party Or the Social Democratic Party.” Scandinavian Political Studies 42.3-4 (2019): 220–244. doi:10.1111/1467-9477.12147
    [BibTeX]
    @article{jylhae-rydgren-strimling-2019,
    author = {Kirsti M. Jylh{\"a} and Jens Rydgren and Pontus Strimling},
    title = {Radical Right-wing Voters From Right and Left: Comparing Sweden Democrat Voters Who Previously Voted for the Conservative Party Or the Social Democratic Party},
    journal = {Scandinavian Political Studies},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {42},
    number = {3-4},
    pages = {220--244},
    doi = {10.1111/1467-9477.12147},
    }

  • Kende, Anna and P{a’e}ter Krek a’o. “Xenophobia, Prejudice, and Right-wing Populism in East-central Europe.” Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 34 (2020): 29–33. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.11.011
    [BibTeX]
    @article{kende-kreko-2020,
    author = {Anna Kende and P{\a'e}ter Krek{\a'o}},
    title = {Xenophobia, Prejudice, and Right-wing Populism in East-central Europe},
    journal = {Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {34},
    pages = {29--33},
    doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.11.011},
    }

  • van Kessel, Stijn, Nicola Chelotti, Helen Drake, Juan Roch, and Patricia Rodi. “Eager To Leave? Populist Radical Right Parties’ Responses To the UK’s Brexit Vote.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 22.1 (2020): 65–84. doi:10.1177/1369148119886213
    [BibTeX]
    @article{kessel-chelotti-drake-roch-rodi-2020,
    author = {Stijn {van Kessel} and Nicola Chelotti and Helen Drake and Juan Roch and Patricia Rodi},
    title = {Eager To Leave? Populist Radical Right Parties’ Responses To the UK's Brexit Vote},
    journal = {The British Journal of Politics and International Relations},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {22},
    number = {1},
    pages = {65--84},
    doi = {10.1177/1369148119886213},
    }

  • Lancaster, Caroline Marie. “Not So Radical After All: Ideological Diversity Among Radical Right Supporters and Its Implications.” Political Studies (2019): online first. doi:10.1177/0032321719870468
    [BibTeX]
    @article{lancaster-2019,
    author = {Caroline Marie Lancaster},
    title = {Not So Radical After All: Ideological Diversity Among Radical Right Supporters and Its Implications},
    journal = {Political Studies},
    year = {2019},
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1177/0032321719870468},
    }

  • Lubbers, Marcel. “What kind of nationalism sets the radical right and its electorate apart from the rest? Pride in the nation’s history as part of nationalist nostalgia.” Nations and Nationalism 25.2 (2019): 449–466. doi:10.1111/nana.12517
    [BibTeX]
    @article{lubbers-2019,
    author = {Marcel Lubbers},
    title = {What kind of nationalism sets the radical right and its electorate apart from the rest? Pride in the nation's history as part of nationalist nostalgia},
    journal = {Nations and Nationalism},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {25},
    number = {2},
    pages = {449--466},
    doi = {10.1111/nana.12517},
    }

  • Martin, Christian W.. “Electoral Participation and Right Wing Authoritarian Success – Evidence from the 2017 Federal Elections in Germany.” Politische Vierteljahresschrift 60.2 (2019): 245–271.
    [BibTeX]
    @article{martin-2019,
    author = {Christian W. Martin},
    title = {Electoral Participation and Right Wing Authoritarian Success – Evidence from the 2017 Federal Elections in Germany},
    journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {60},
    number = {2},
    pages = {245--271},
    }

  • Mayer, Sabrina J., Carl C. Berning, and David Johann. “The Two Dimensions of Narcissistic Personality and Support for the Radical Right: The Role of Right-wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and Anti-immigrant Sentiment.” European Journal of Personality (2020): online first. doi:10.1002/per.2228
    [BibTeX]
    @article{mayer-berning-johann-2020,
    author = {Sabrina J. Mayer and Carl C. Berning and David Johann},
    title = {The Two Dimensions of Narcissistic Personality and Support for the Radical Right: The Role of Right-wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and Anti-immigrant Sentiment},
    journal = {European Journal of Personality},
    year = {2020},
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1002/per.2228},
    }

  • Nijs, Tom, Tobias H. Stark, and Maykel Verkuyten. “Negative Intergroup Contact and Radical Right-Wing Voting: The Moderating Roles of Personal and Collective Self-Efficacy.” Political Psychology 40.5 (2019): 1057–1073. doi:10.1111/pops.12577
    [BibTeX]
    @article{nijs-stark-verkuyten-2019,
    author = {Tom Nijs and Tobias H. Stark and Maykel Verkuyten},
    title = {Negative Intergroup Contact and Radical Right-Wing Voting: The Moderating Roles of Personal and Collective Self-Efficacy},
    journal = {Political Psychology},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {40},
    number = {5},
    pages = {1057--1073},
    doi = {10.1111/pops.12577},
    }

  • Pytlas, Bartek. “Radical-right Narratives in Slovakia and Hungary: Historical Legacies, Mythic Overlaying and Contemporary Politics.” Patterns of Prejudice 47.2 (2013): 162–183. doi:10.1080/0031322X.2013.786199
    [BibTeX]
    @article{pytlas-2013,
    author = {Bartek Pytlas},
    title = {Radical-right Narratives in Slovakia and Hungary: Historical Legacies, Mythic Overlaying and Contemporary Politics},
    journal = {Patterns of Prejudice},
    year = {2013},
    volume = {47},
    number = {2},
    pages = {162--183},
    doi = {10.1080/0031322X.2013.786199},
    }

  • Rathgeb, Philip. “Makers Against Takers: the Socio-economic Ideology and Policy of the Austrian Freedom Party.” West European Politics online first (2020). doi:10.1080/01402382.2020.1720400
    [BibTeX]
    @article{rathgeb-2020,
    author = {Philip Rathgeb},
    title = {Makers Against Takers: the Socio-economic Ideology and Policy of the Austrian Freedom Party},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2020.1720400},
    }

  • Rothmund, Tobias, Laurits Bromme, and Fl a’a. “Justice for the People? How Justice Sensitivity Can Foster and Impair Support for Populist Radical-Right Parties and Politicians in the United States and in Germany.” Political Psychology (2020): online first. doi:10.1111/pops.12632
    [BibTeX]
    @article{rothmund-bromme-azevedo-2020,
    author = {Tobias Rothmund and Laurits Bromme and Fl{\a'a}vio Azevedo},
    title = {Justice for the People? How Justice Sensitivity Can Foster and Impair Support for Populist Radical-Right Parties and Politicians in the United States and in Germany},
    journal = {Political Psychology},
    year = {2020},
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1111/pops.12632},
    }

  • Rovny, Jan and Jonathan Polk. “Still Blurry? Economic Salience, Position and Voting for Radical Right Parties in Western Europe.” European Journal of Political Research (2019): online first. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12356
    [BibTeX]
    @article{rovny-polk-2019,
    author = {Jan Rovny and Jonathan Polk},
    title = {Still Blurry? Economic Salience, Position and Voting for Radical Right Parties in Western Europe},
    journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
    year = {2019},
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12356},
    }

  • Schaub, Max and Davide Morisi. “Voter Mobilisation in the Echo Chamber: Broadband Internet and the Rise of Populism in Europe.” European Journal of Political Research online first (2020). doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12373
    [BibTeX]
    @article{schaub-morisi-2020,
    author = {Max Schaub and Davide Morisi},
    title = {Voter Mobilisation in the Echo Chamber: Broadband Internet and the Rise of Populism in Europe},
    journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12373},
    }

  • Schmuck, Desirée and Jörg Matthes. “Voting “Against Islamization”? How Anti-Islamic Right-Wing, Populist Political Campaign Ads Influence Explicit and Implicit Attitudes Toward Muslims as Well as Voting Preferences.” Political Psychology 40.4 (2019): 739–757. doi:10.1111/pops.12557
    [BibTeX]
    @article{schmuck-matthes-2019,
    author = {Desir\'{e}e Schmuck and J{\"o}rg Matthes},
    title = {Voting {"}Against Islamization{"}? How Anti-Islamic Right-Wing, Populist Political Campaign Ads Influence Explicit and Implicit Attitudes Toward Muslims as Well as Voting Preferences},
    journal = {Political Psychology},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {40},
    number = {4},
    pages = {739--757},
    doi = {10.1111/pops.12557},
    }

  • Schulte-Cloos, Julia and Tobias Rüttenauer. “A Transformation From Within? Dynamics of Party Activists and the Rise of the German Afd.” SSRN Electronic Journal (2018). doi:10.2139/ssrn.3306183
    [BibTeX]
    @article{schulte-cloos-ruettenauer-2018,
    author = {Julia Schulte-Cloos and Tobias R{\"u}ttenauer},
    title = {A Transformation From Within? Dynamics of Party Activists and the Rise of the German Afd},
    journal = {SSRN Electronic Journal},
    year = {2018},
    doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3306183},
    }

  • Siegers, Pascal and Alexander Jedinger. “Religious Immunity To Populism: Christian Religiosity and Public Support for the Alternative for Germany.” German Politics (2020): online first. doi:10.1080/09644008.2020.1723002
    [BibTeX]
    @article{siegers-jedinger-2020,
    author = {Pascal Siegers and Alexander Jedinger},
    title = {Religious Immunity To Populism: Christian Religiosity and Public Support for the Alternative for Germany},
    journal = {German Politics},
    year = {2020},
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1080/09644008.2020.1723002},
    }

  • Spoon, Jae-Jae and Heike Klüver. “Responding To Far Right Challengers: Does Accommodation Pay Off?.” Journal of European Public Policy 27.2 (2020): 273–291. doi:10.1080/13501763.2019.1701530
    [BibTeX]
    @article{spoon-kluever-2020,
    author = {Jae-Jae Spoon and Heike Kl{\"u}ver},
    title = {Responding To Far Right Challengers: Does Accommodation Pay Off?},
    journal = {Journal of European Public Policy},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {27},
    number = {2},
    pages = {273--291},
    doi = {10.1080/13501763.2019.1701530},
    }

  • Stecker, Christian and Marc Debus. “Refugees Welcome? Zum Einfluss der Flüchtlingsunterbringung auf den Wahlerfolg der AfD bei der Bundestagswahl 2017 in Bayern.” Politische Vierteljahresschrift 60.2 (2019): 299–323. doi:10.1007/s11615-019-00151-3
    [BibTeX]
    @article{stecker-debus-2019,
    author = {Christian Stecker and Marc Debus},
    title = {Refugees Welcome? Zum Einfluss der Flüchtlingsunterbringung auf den Wahlerfolg der AfD bei der Bundestagswahl 2017 in Bayern},
    journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {60},
    number = {2},
    pages = {299--323},
    doi = {10.1007/s11615-019-00151-3},
    }

  • Stockemer, Daniel. “What Is Right-Wing Populism and How Does It Manifest Itself? an Analysis of the French National Front’s Facebook Posts and Sympathizers’ Facebook Comments.” French Politics 17.3 (2019): 340–354. doi:10.1057/s41253-019-00082-w
    [BibTeX]
    @article{stockemer-2019,
    author = {Daniel Stockemer},
    title = {What Is Right-Wing Populism and How Does It Manifest Itself? an Analysis of the French National Front's Facebook Posts and Sympathizers' Facebook Comments},
    journal = {French Politics},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {17},
    number = {3},
    pages = {340--354},
    doi = {10.1057/s41253-019-00082-w},
    }

  • Szöcsik, Edina and Alina Polyakova. “Euroscepticism and the Electoral Success of the Far Right: the Role of the Strategic Interaction Between Center and Far Right.” European Political Science 18.3 (2019): 400–420. doi:10.1057/s41304-018-0162-y
    [BibTeX]
    @article{szoecsik-polyakova-2019,
    author = {Edina Sz{\"o}csik and Alina Polyakova},
    title = {Euroscepticism and the Electoral Success of the Far Right: the Role of the Strategic Interaction Between Center and Far Right},
    journal = {European Political Science},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {18},
    number = {3},
    pages = {400--420},
    doi = {10.1057/s41304-018-0162-y},
    }

  • Wettstein, Martin, Anne Schulz, Marco Steenbergen, Christian Schemer, Philipp Müller, Dominique S. Wirz, and Werner Wirth. “Measuring Populism Across Nations: Testing for Measurement Invariance of an Inventory of Populist Attitudes.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research (2019). doi:10.1093/ijpor/edz018
    [BibTeX]
    @article{wettstein-schulz-steenbergen-schemer-mueller-wirz-wirth-2019,
    author = {Martin Wettstein and Anne Schulz and Marco Steenbergen and Christian Schemer and Philipp M{\"u}ller and Dominique S. Wirz and Werner Wirth},
    title = {Measuring Populism Across Nations: Testing for Measurement Invariance of an Inventory of Populist Attitudes},
    journal = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research},
    year = {2019},
    doi = {10.1093/ijpor/edz018},
    }

  • Whiteley, Paul, Erik Larsen, Matthew Goodwin, and Harold Clarke. “Party Activism in the Populist Radical Right: the Case of the Uk Independence Party.” Party Politics online first (2019). doi:10.1177/1354068819880142
    [BibTeX]
    @article{whiteley-larsen-goodwin-clarke-2019,
    author = {Paul Whiteley and Erik Larsen and Matthew Goodwin and Harold Clarke},
    title = {Party Activism in the Populist Radical Right: the Case of the Uk Independence Party},
    journal = {Party Politics},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {online first},
    doi = {10.1177/1354068819880142},
    }

  • van Wijk, Daniël, Gideon Bolt, and Jochem Tolsma. “Where does ethnic concentration matter for populist radical right support? An analysis of geographical scale and the halo effect.” Political Geography 77 (2020): online first. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102097
    [BibTeX]
    @article{wijk-bolt-tolsma-2020,
    author = {Dani{\"e}l {van Wijk} and Gideon Bolt and Jochem Tolsma},
    title = {Where does ethnic concentration matter for populist radical right support? An analysis of geographical scale and the halo effect},
    journal = {Political Geography},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {77},
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102097},
    }

  • Zulianello, Mattia. “Varieties of Populist Parties and Party Systems in Europe: From State-of-the-Art to the Application of a Novel Classification Scheme to 66 Parties in 33 Countries.” Government and Opposition (2019): 1–21. doi:10.1017/gov.2019.21
    [BibTeX]
    @article{zulianello-2019b,
    author = {Mattia Zulianello},
    title = {Varieties of Populist Parties and Party Systems in Europe: From State-of-the-Art to the Application of a Novel Classification Scheme to 66 Parties in 33 Countries},
    journal = {Government and Opposition},
    year = {2019},
    pages = {1--21},
    doi = {10.1017/gov.2019.21},
    publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
    }

  • Zhao, Yikai. “Testing the Measurement Invariance of Nativism.” Social Science Quarterly 100.2 (2019): 419–429. doi:10.1111/ssqu.12594
    [BibTeX]
    @article{zhao-2019,
    author = {Yikai Zhao},
    title = {Testing the Measurement Invariance of Nativism},
    journal = {Social Science Quarterly},
    year = {2019},
    volume = {100},
    number = {2},
    pages = {419--429},
    doi = {10.1111/ssqu.12594},
    }

  • van Kessel, Stijn, Javier Sajuria, and Steven Van M. Hauwaert. “Informed, Uninformed Or Misinformed? A Cross-national Analysis of Populist Party Supporters Across European Democracies.” West European Politics online first (2020). doi:10.1080/01402382.2019.1700448
    [BibTeX]
    @article{kessel-sajuria-hauwaert-2020,
    author = {Stijn {van Kessel} and Javier Sajuria and Steven M. Van Hauwaert},
    title = {Informed, Uninformed Or Misinformed? A Cross-national Analysis of Populist Party Supporters Across European Democracies},
    journal = {West European Politics},
    year = {2020},
    volume = {online first},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2019.1700448},
    }

Nov 192019
 
First names of 90 authors whose titles were added to the bibliography
Depending on your point of view, autumn is late this year. Or Christmas comes early. Either way, here is the winter 2019 edition of the Eclectic, Erratic Bibliography on the Extreme Right in Western Europe. And this is what you will want to know ?

How much is new in the bibliography?

Since March, I have collected a modest 53 new titles (which is actually one title more than last time around). Of these, 51 are articles, and just 2 are books. I obviously skimped on the chapters. On the other hand, I went a bit wild with pieces from French Politics this time because someone pointed me towards a whole host of older articles that I had not been aware of. The rest are basically the usual suspects plus a lot of one-hit wonders (Kyklos!?!).

Journaln
French Politics14
Research & Politics4
Electoral Studies3
Party Politics3
West European Politics3
American Political Science Review2
European Journal of Political Research2
European Sociological Review2
Acta Politica1
American Journal of Political Science1
Economic Policy1
European Political Science Review1
Frontiers in Psychology1
International Journal of Public Opinion Research1
Journal of Common Market Studies1
Journal of Political Ideologies1
Journal of the European Economic Association1
Kyklos1
Mass Communication and Society1
Media and Communication1
Nations and Nationalism1
Political Psychology1
Political Studies1
Representation1
The British Journal of Sociology1
World Political Science1

The French Politics tip-off explains the relatively large number of older articles. But the majority of the new additions (41) were published in the last couple of years. Here is yet another lengthy table:

.

Publication yearn
201925
20178
20188
20155
20142
20031
20081
20091
20121
20161

Even with this massive intake of older articles, more than half of all the titles in the bibliography were published within the last decade.

Items in the full bibliography by decade of publication

Items in the full bibliography by decade of publication

To put this into perspective, the bibliography began its life as the reference section of a book that came out in 2008. Thank you all for publishing and pointing me towards new research.

What about gender equality?

The publications were written by 90 distinct authors. I extracted the given names and send them through R’s gender package, using the SSA algorithm that uses name data from the US Social Security Administration. This is a bit hit and miss, so I had to fill in some NAs and to correct some well known false positives (Andrea Pirro, Jocelyn Evans etc.). The end result is appalling: there are just 17 women amongst the authors that I have added, or 19 per cent.

A wordcloud of first names is quite instructive:

First names of 90 authors whose titles were added to the bibliography

First names of 90 authors whose titles were added to the bibliography

Michael rules. I, we, you need to do better.

What are the writing about?

Everybody loves a word cloud, so here is one more that I made of the new titles’ titles:

Wordcloud of 53 new titles in the extreme right bibliography

Wordcloud of 53 new titles in the bibliography

There are few surprises here. The massive injection of articles published in French Politics shows in Marine Le Pen’s name (its constituent parts artfully distributed across the cloud), the (old) name of her party, and in words like “french” (d’oh!) and “presidential”. “Germany” also shows up quite often, reflecting the rise of the AfD.

More interesting is perhaps the use of “analysis”, “study”, “explaining”, and “evidence”: authors seem to feel the need to convince their readers. “Extreme” and “radical/radicalism” are old friends. External factors like “economic”, “contextual”, neighbourhood, and “immigration” also feature prominently.

Personally, I think that the “populism” part of the ongoing radical right saga is a lot less interesting than the nativist and authoritarian parts. But unsurprisingly, “populist” and “populism” are obviously important.

Where can I get all this stuff?

You can download bibliographical data for the new titles here (as BibTeX, which almost every program on the planet should be able to import). Or have a look at the end of this post for a nicely formatted list.

So: what’s next?

Honestly, I don’t know. I fully intend to update the bibliography once the sun returns, but when this happens and what will be in the next version is up to you: submit that paper, point me to that book, and remember (and help me to remember) that Women Also Know Stuff.

Coda: the goods

  • Aarøe, Lene, Michael Bang Petersen, and Kevin Arceneaux. “The Behavioral Immune System Shapes Political Intuitions: Why and How Individual Differences in Disgust Sensitivity Underlie Opposition to Immigration.” 111.2 (2017): 277-294. doi:10.1017/S0003055416000770
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ aaroe-petersen-arceneaux-2017,
    author  = {Aarøe, Lene and Petersen, Michael Bang and Arceneaux,
    Kevin},
    title = {The Behavioral Immune System Shapes Political Intuitions:
    Why and How Individual Differences in Disgust Sensitivity
    Underlie Opposition to Immigration},
    journaltitle  = {American Political Science Review},
    year = 2017,
    volume  = 111,
    number  = 2,
    pages = {277-294},
    doi = {10.1017/S0003055416000770}
    }

  • Allen, Trevor J.. “Exit To the Right? Comparing Far Right Voters and Abstainers in Western Europe.” Electoral Studies 50 (2017): 103-115. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.09.012
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ allen-2017b,
    author  = {Trevor J. Allen},
    title = {Exit To the Right? Comparing Far Right Voters and
    Abstainers in Western Europe},
    journal  = {Electoral Studies},
    year = 2017,
    volume  = 50,
    pages = {103-115},
    doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.09.012}
    }

  • Arzheimer, Kai. “Don’t mention the war! How populist right-wing radicalism became (almost) normal in Germany.” Journal of Common Market Studies (2019). doi:10.1111/jcms.12920
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ arzheimer-2019c,
    author  = {Arzheimer, Kai},
    title = {Don't mention the war! How populist right-wing radicalism
    became (almost) normal in Germany},
    journal  = {Journal of Common Market Studies},
    year = 2019,
    doi = {10.1111/jcms.12920}
    }

  • Arzheimer, Kai and Carl Berning. “How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and their voters veered to the radical right, 2013-2017.” Electoral Studies (2019): forthcoming. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2019.04.004
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ arzheimer-berning-2019,
    author  = {Arzheimer, Kai and Berning, Carl},
    title = {How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and their voters
    veered to the radical right, 2013-2017},
    journal  = {Electoral Studies},
    year = 2019,
    pages = {forthcoming},
    doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2019.04.004}
    }

  • Bastow, Steve. “The Front National Under Marine Le Pen: a Mainstream Political Party?.” 16.1 (2018): 19-37. doi:10.1057/s41253-017-0052-7
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ bastow-2018,
    author  = {Steve Bastow},
    title = {The Front National Under Marine Le Pen: a Mainstream
    Political Party?},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2018,
    volume  = 16,
    number  = 1,
    pages = {19-37},
    doi = {10.1057/s41253-017-0052-7}
    }

  • Bergman, Matthew E.. “Insights from the Quantification of the Study of Populism.” Representation 55.1 (2019): 21–30. doi:10.1080/00344893.2019.1572647
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ bergman-2019,
    author  = {Matthew E. Bergman},
    title = {Insights from the Quantification of the Study of
    Populism},
    journal  = {Representation},
    year = 2019,
    volume  = 55,
    number  = 1,
    pages = {21--30},
    publisher  = {Routledge},
    doi = {10.1080/00344893.2019.1572647}
    }

  • Bergman, Matthew E. and Henry Flatt. “Issue Diversification: Which Niche Parties Can Succeed Electorally by Broadening Their Agenda?.” Political Studies (2019): online first. doi:10.1177/0032321719865538
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ bergman-flatt-2019,
    author  = {Matthew E Bergman and Henry Flatt},
    title = {Issue Diversification: Which Niche Parties Can Succeed
    Electorally by Broadening Their Agenda?},
    journal  = {Political Studies},
    year = 2019,
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1177/0032321719865538}
    }

  • Bischof, Daniel and Markus Wagner. “Do Voters Polarize When Radical Parties Enter Parliament?.” American Journal of Political Science 63.4 (2019): 888-904. doi:10.1111/ajps.12449
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ bischof-wagner-2019,
    author  = {Bischof, Daniel and Wagner, Markus},
    title = {Do Voters Polarize When Radical Parties Enter
    Parliament?},
    journal  = {American Journal of Political Science},
    year = 2019,
    volume  = 63,
    number  = 4,
    pages = {888-904},
    doi = {10.1111/ajps.12449}
    }

  • Brouard, Sylvain and Martial Foucault. “Forecasting the Rise of the Front National During the 2014 Municipal Elections.” 12.4 (2014): 338-347. doi:10.1057/fp.2014.19
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ brouard-foucault-2014,
    author  = {Sylvain Brouard and Martial Foucault},
    title = {Forecasting the Rise of the Front National During the 2014
    Municipal Elections},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2014,
    volume  = 12,
    number  = 4,
    pages = {338-347},
    doi = {10.1057/fp.2014.19}
    }

  • Burgoon, Brian, Sam van Noort, Matthijs Rooduijn, and Geoffrey Underhill. “Positional Deprivation and Support for Radical Right and Radical Left Parties.” Economic Policy 34.97 (2018): 49-93. doi:10.1093/epolic/eiy017
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ burgoon-noort-rooduijn-underhill-2018,
    author  = {Brian Burgoon and Sam van Noort and Matthijs Rooduijn and
    Geoffrey Underhill},
    title = {Positional Deprivation and Support for Radical Right and
    Radical Left Parties},
    journal  = {Economic Policy},
    year = 2018,
    volume  = 34,
    number  = 97,
    pages = {49-93},
    doi = {10.1093/epolic/eiy017}
    }

  • Buzogány, Aron. “Civic engagement, political participation and the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe.” Party Politics (2019): online first. doi:10.1177/1354068819863630
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ buzogany-2019,
    author  = {Aron Buzogány},
    title = {Civic engagement, political participation and the radical
    right in Central and Eastern Europe},
    journal  = {Party Politics},
    year = 2019,
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1177/1354068819863630}
    }

  • Campus, Donatella. “Marine Le Pen’s Peopolisation: an Asset for Leadership Image-Building?.” 15.2 (2017): 147-165. doi:10.1057/s41253-017-0026-9
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ campus-2017,
    author  = {Donatella Campus},
    title = {Marine Le Pen's Peopolisation: an Asset for Leadership
    Image-Building?},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2017,
    volume  = 15,
    number  = 2,
    pages = {147-165},
    doi = {10.1057/s41253-017-0026-9}
    }

  • Caramani, Daniele and Luca Manucci. “National past and populism: the re-elaboration of fascism and its impact on right-wing populism in Western Europe.” West European Politics (2019): online first. doi:10.1080/01402382.2019.1596690
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ caramani-manucci-2019,
    author  = {Daniele Caramani and Luca Manucci},
    title = {National past and populism: the re-elaboration of fascism
    and its impact on right-wing populism in Western Europe},
    journal  = {West European Politics},
    year = 2019,
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2019.1596690}
    }

  • Carter, Elisabeth. “Right-Wing Extremism/Radicalism. Reconstructing the Concept.” Journal of Political Ideologies 23.2 (2018): 157-182. doi:10.1080/13569317.2018.1451227
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ carter-2018,
    author  = {Elisabeth Carter},
    title = {Right-Wing Extremism/Radicalism. Reconstructing the
    Concept},
    journal  = {Journal of Political Ideologies},
    year = 2018,
    volume  = 23,
    number  = 2,
    pages = {157-182},
    doi = {10.1080/13569317.2018.1451227}
    }

  • Daenekindt, Stijn, Willem de Koster, and Jeroen van der Waal. “How people organise cultural attitudes: cultural belief systems and the populist radical right.” West European Politics 40.4 (2017): 791-811. doi:10.1080/01402382.2016.1271970
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ daenekindt-koster-waal-2017,
    author  = {Stijn Daenekindt and Willem de Koster and Jeroen van der
    Waal},
    title = {How people organise cultural attitudes: cultural belief
    systems and the populist radical right},
    journal  = {West European Politics},
    year = 2017,
    volume  = 40,
    number  = 4,
    pages = {791-811},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2016.1271970}
    }

  • David, Quentin, Jean-Benoit Pilet, and Gilles Van Hamme. “Scale Matters in Contextual Analysis of Extreme Right Voting and Political Attitudes.” Kyklos 71.4 (2018): 509-536. doi:10.1111/kykl.12183
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ david-pilet-van-hamme-2018,
    author  = {David, Quentin and Pilet, Jean-Benoit and Van Hamme,
    Gilles},
    title = {Scale Matters in Contextual Analysis of Extreme Right
    Voting and Political Attitudes},
    journal  = {Kyklos},
    year = 2018,
    volume  = 71,
    number  = 4,
    pages = {509-536},
    doi = {10.1111/kykl.12183}
    }

  • Dennison, James. “How Issue Salience Explains the Rise of the Populist Right in Western Europe.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research (2019): online first. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edz022
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ dennison-2019,
    author  = {Dennison, James},
    title = {{How Issue Salience Explains the Rise of the Populist
    Right in Western Europe}},
    journal  = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research},
    year = 2019,
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1093/ijpor/edz022}
    }

  • Dumitrescu, Delia. “Up, Close and Personal: the New Front National Visual Strategy Under Marine Le Pen.” 15.1 (2017): 1-26. doi:10.1057/s41253-016-0012-7
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ dumitrescu-2017,
    author  = {Delia Dumitrescu},
    title = {Up, Close and Personal: the New Front National Visual
    Strategy Under Marine Le Pen},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2017,
    volume  = 15,
    number  = 1,
    pages = {1-26},
    doi = {10.1057/s41253-016-0012-7}
    }

  • Evans, Jocelyn and Gilles Ivaldi. “Forecasting the Extreme Right Vote in France (1984-2007).” 6.2 (2008): 137-151. doi:10.1057/fp.2008.1
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ evans-ivaldi-2008,
    author  = {Jocelyn Evans and Gilles Ivaldi},
    title = {Forecasting the Extreme Right Vote in France (1984-2007)},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2008,
    volume  = 6,
    number  = 2,
    pages = {137-151},
    doi = {10.1057/fp.2008.1}
    }

  • Evans, Jocelyn and Gilles Ivaldi. “Forecasting the Extreme-Right Vote At the 2012 Presidential Election: Evaluating Our Model.” 10.4 (2012): 378-382. doi:10.1057/fp.2012.17
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ evans-ivaldi-2012,
    author  = {Jocelyn Evans and Gilles Ivaldi},
    title = {Forecasting the Extreme-Right Vote At the 2012
    Presidential Election: Evaluating Our Model},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2012,
    volume  = 10,
    number  = 4,
    pages = {378-382},
    doi = {10.1057/fp.2012.17}
    }

  • Ferrín, Mónica, Moreno Mancosu, and Teresa M. Cappiali. “Terrorist Attacks and Europeans’ Attitudes Towards Immigrants: An Experimental Approach.” European Journal of Political Research (2019): online first. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12362
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ ferrin-mancosu-cappiali-2019,
    author  = {Ferrín, Mónica and Mancosu, Moreno and Cappiali, Teresa
    M.},
    title = {Terrorist Attacks and Europeans' Attitudes Towards
    Immigrants: An Experimental Approach},
    journal  = {European Journal of Political Research},
    year = 2019,
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12362}
    }

  • Gidron, Noam and Peter A. Hall. “The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots of the populist right.” The British Journal of Sociology 68.S1 (2017): S57-S84. doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12319
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ gidron-hall-2017,
    author  = {Gidron, Noam and Hall, Peter A.},
    title = {The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots
    of the populist right},
    journal  = {The British Journal of Sociology},
    year = 2017,
    volume  = 68,
    number  = {S1},
    pages = {S57-S84},
    doi = {10.1111/1468-4446.12319}
    }

  • Gingrich, Jane. “Did State Responses to Automation Matter for Voters?.” Research & Politics 6.1 (2019). doi:10.1177/2053168019832745
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ gingrich-2019,
    author  = {Jane Gingrich},
    title = {Did State Responses to Automation Matter for Voters?},
    journal  = {Research \& Politics},
    year = 2019,
    volume  = 6,
    number  = 1,
    doi = {10.1177/2053168019832745}
    }

  • Halla, Martin, Alexander F. Wagner, and Josef Zweimüller. “Immigration and Voting for the Far Right.” Journal of the European Economic Association 15.6 (2017): 1341-1385. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvx003
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ halla-wagner-zweimueller-2017,
    author  = {Martin Halla and Alexander F. Wagner and Josef
    Zweimüller},
    title = {Immigration and Voting for the Far Right},
    journal  = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
    year = 2017,
    volume  = 15,
    number  = 6,
    pages = {1341-1385},
    doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvx003}
    }

  • Hameleers, Michael. “Putting Our Own People First: The Content and Effects of Online Right-wing Populist Discourse Surrounding the European Refugee Crisis.” Mass Communication and Society (2019): online first. doi:10.1080/15205436.2019.1655768
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ hameleers-2019,
    author  = {Michael Hameleers},
    title = {Putting Our Own People First: The Content and Effects of
    Online Right-wing Populist Discourse Surrounding the
    European Refugee Crisis},
    journal  = {Mass Communication and Society},
    year = 2019,
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1080/15205436.2019.1655768}
    }

  • Hays, Jude, Junghyun Lim, and Jae-Jae Spoon. “The path from trade to right-wing populism in Europe.” 60 (2019). doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2019.04.002
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    @Article{ hays-lim-spoon-2019,
    author  = {Jude Hays and Junghyun Lim and Jae-Jae Spoon},
    title = {The path from trade to right-wing populism in Europe},
    journaltitle  = {Electoral Studies},
    year = 2019,
    volume  = 60,
    doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2019.04.002}
    }

  • Hobolt, Sara B. and Julian M. Hoerner. “The Mobilising Effect of Political Choice.” European Journal of Political Research (2019): online first. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12353
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ hobolt-hoerner-2019,
    author  = {Hobolt, Sara B. and Hoerner, Julian M.},
    title = {The Mobilising Effect of Political Choice},
    journal  = {European Journal of Political Research},
    year = 2019,
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12353}
    }

  • Im, Zhen Jie, Nonna Mayer, Bruno Palier, and Jan Rovny. “The \enquotelosers of automation: A Reservoir of Votes for the Radical Right?.” Research & Politics 6.1 (2019). doi:10.1177/2053168018822395
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ im-mayer-palier-rovny-2019,
    author  = {Zhen Jie Im and Nonna Mayer and Bruno Palier and Jan
    Rovny},
    title = {The \enquote{losers of automation}: A Reservoir of Votes
    for the Radical Right?},
    journal  = {Research \& Politics},
    year = 2019,
    volume  = 6,
    number  = 1,
    doi = {10.1177/2053168018822395}
    }

  • Ivaldi, Gilles. “Towards the Median Economic Crisis Voter? the New Leftist Economic Agenda of the Front National in France.” 13.4 (2015): 346-369. doi:10.1057/fp.2015.17
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ ivaldi-2015,
    author  = {Gilles Ivaldi},
    title = {Towards the Median Economic Crisis Voter? the New Leftist
    Economic Agenda of the Front National in France},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2015,
    volume  = 13,
    number  = 4,
    pages = {346-369},
    doi = {10.1057/fp.2015.17}
    }

  • Janssen, Heleen J., Maarten van Ham, Tom Kleinepier, and Jaap Nieuwenhuis. “A Micro-Scale Approach to Ethnic Minority Concentration in the Residential Environment and Voting for the Radical Right in The Netherlands.” European Sociological Review (2019). doi:10.1093/esr/jcz018
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ janssen-ham-kleinepier-nieuwenhuis-2019,
    author  = {Janssen, Heleen J. and van Ham, Maarten and Kleinepier,
    Tom and Nieuwenhuis, Jaap},
    title = {A Micro-Scale Approach to Ethnic Minority Concentration in
    the Residential Environment and Voting for the Radical
    Right in The Netherlands},
    journal  = {European Sociological Review},
    year = 2019,
    doi = {10.1093/esr/jcz018}
    }

  • Jérôme, Bruno and Véronique Jérôme-Speziari. “A Le Pen Vote Function for the 2002 Presidential Election: a Way To Reduce Uncertainty.” 1.2 (2003): 247-251. doi:10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200036
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ jerome-jerome-speziari-2003,
    author  = {Bruno J{\'e}rôme and V{\'e}ronique J{\'e}rôme-Speziari},
    title = {A Le Pen Vote Function for the 2002 Presidential Election:
    a Way To Reduce Uncertainty},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2003,
    volume  = 1,
    number  = 2,
    pages = {247-251},
    doi = {10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200036}
    }

  • Kurer, Thomas and Bruno Palier. “Shrinking and Shouting: the Political Revolt of the Declining Middle in Times of Employment Polarization.” Research & Politics 6.1 (2019). doi:10.1177/2053168019831164
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ kurer-palier-2019,
    author  = {Thomas Kurer and Bruno Palier},
    title = {Shrinking and Shouting: the Political Revolt of the
    Declining Middle in Times of Employment Polarization},
    journal  = {Research \& Politics},
    year = 2019,
    volume  = 6,
    number  = 1,
    doi = {10.1177/2053168019831164}
    }

  • Leidig, Eviane Cheng. “Immigrant, Nationalist and Proud. A Twitter Analysis of Indian Diaspora Supporters for Brexit and Trump.” Media and Communication 7.1 (2019): 77. doi:10.17645/mac.v7i1.1629
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ leidig-2019,
    author  = {Leidig, Eviane Cheng},
    title = {Immigrant, Nationalist and Proud. A Twitter Analysis of
    Indian Diaspora Supporters for Brexit and Trump},
    journal  = {Media and Communication},
    year = 2019,
    volume  = 7,
    number  = 1,
    pages = 77,
    doi = {10.17645/mac.v7i1.1629}
    }

  • Mader, Matthias and Harald Schoen. “The European refugee crisis, party competition, and voters’ responses in Germany.” West European Politics 42.1 (2019): 67-90. doi:10.1080/01402382.2018.1490484
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ mader-schoen-2019,
    author  = {Matthias Mader and Harald Schoen},
    title = {The European refugee crisis, party competition, and
    voters’ responses in Germany},
    journal  = {West European Politics},
    year = 2019,
    volume  = 42,
    number  = 1,
    pages = {67-90},
    doi = {10.1080/01402382.2018.1490484}
    }

  • Martig, Noemi and Julian Bernauer. “The Halo Effect: Perceptions of Diffuse Threat and SVP Vote Share.” World Political Science 14.1 (2018): 27-54. doi:10.1515/wps-2018-0002
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    @Article{ martig-bernauer-2018,
    author  = {Noemi Martig and Julian Bernauer},
    title = {The Halo Effect: Perceptions of Diffuse Threat and SVP
    Vote Share},
    journal  = {World Political Science},
    year = 2018,
    volume  = 14,
    number  = 1,
    pages = {27-54},
    doi = {10.1515/wps-2018-0002}
    }

  • Maxwell, Rahsaan. “Cosmopolitan Immigration Attitudes in Large European Cities: Contextual or Compositional Effects?.” American Political Science Review 113.2 (2019): 456-474. doi:10.1017/S0003055418000898
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ maxwell-2019,
    author  = {Maxwell, Rahsaan},
    doi = {10.1017/S0003055418000898},
    journal  = {American Political Science Review},
    number  = {2},
    pages = {456-474},
    title = {Cosmopolitan Immigration Attitudes in Large European
    Cities: Contextual or Compositional Effects?},
    volume  = {113},
    year = {2019}
    }

  • Mermat, Djamel. “‘sympathy for the Devil’? Walking the Tight Rope in the Study of the French National Front (2006-2008).” 7.1 (2009): 56-74. doi:10.1057/fp.2009.1
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ mermat-2009,
    author  = {Djamel Mermat},
    title = {'sympathy for the Devil'? Walking the Tight Rope in the
    Study of the French National Front (2006-2008)},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2009,
    volume  = 7,
    number  = 1,
    pages = {56-74},
    doi = {10.1057/fp.2009.1}
    }

  • Mondon, Aurelien. “Populism, the ‘people’ and the Illusion of Democracy – the Front National and Ukip in a Comparative Context.” 13.2 (2015): 141-156. doi:10.1057/fp.2015.6
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    @Article{ mondon-2015,
    author  = {Aurelien Mondon},
    title = {Populism, the 'people' and the Illusion of Democracy - the
    Front National and Ukip in a Comparative Context},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2015,
    volume  = 13,
    number  = 2,
    pages = {141-156},
    doi = {10.1057/fp.2015.6}
    }

  • Patana, Pauliina. “Changes in Local Context and Electoral Support for the Populist Radical Right: Evidence From Finland.” Party Politics (2019): online first. doi:10.1177/1354068818810283
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    @Article{ patana-2019,
    author  = {Pauliina Patana},
    title = {Changes in Local Context and Electoral Support for the
    Populist Radical Right: Evidence From Finland},
    journal  = {Party Politics},
    year = 2019,
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1177/1354068818810283}
    }

  • Pirro, Andrea L. P.. “Ballots and barricades enhanced: far-right ‘movement parties’ and movement-electoral interactions.” Nations and Nationalism 25.3 (2019): 782-802. doi:10.1111/nana.12483
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    @Article{ pirro-2019,
    author  = {Pirro, Andrea L. P.},
    title = {Ballots and barricades enhanced: far-right ‘movement
    parties’ and movement-electoral interactions},
    journal  = {Nations and Nationalism},
    year = 2019,
    volume  = 25,
    number  = 3,
    pages = {782-802},
    doi = {10.1111/nana.12483}
    }

  • Rees, Jonas H., Yann P. M. Rees, Jens H. Hellmann, and Andreas Zick. “Climate of Hate: Similar Correlates of Far Right Electoral Support and Right-Wing Hate Crimes in Germany.” Frontiers in Psychology 10 (2019): online first. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02328
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    @Article{ rees-rees-hellmann-zick-2019,
    author  = {Rees, Jonas H. and Rees, Yann P. M. and Hellmann, Jens H.
    and Zick, Andreas},
    title = {Climate of Hate: Similar Correlates of Far Right Electoral
    Support and Right-Wing Hate Crimes in Germany},
    journal  = {Frontiers in Psychology},
    year = 2019,
    volume  = 10,
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02328}
    }

  • Rooduijn, Matthijs. “What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist Parties.” European Political Science Review 10.3 (2018): 351-368. doi:10.1017/s1755773917000145
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ rooduijn-2018b,
    author  = {Matthijs Rooduijn},
    title = {What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing
    the Electorates of 15 Populist Parties},
    journal  = {European Political Science Review},
    year = 2018,
    volume  = 10,
    number  = 3,
    pages = {351-368},
    doi = {10.1017/s1755773917000145}
    }

  • Savelkoul, Michael, Joran Laméris, and Jochem Tolsma. “Neighbourhood Ethnic Composition and Voting for the Radical Right in The Netherlands. The Role of Perceived Neighbourhood Threat and Interethnic Neighbourhood Contact.” European Sociological Review 33.2 (2017): 209-224. doi:10.1093/esr/jcw055
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ savelkoul-lameris-tolsma-2017,
    author  = {Savelkoul, Michael and Laméris, Joran and Tolsma,
    Jochem},
    title = {Neighbourhood Ethnic Composition and Voting for the
    Radical Right in The Netherlands. The Role of Perceived
    Neighbourhood Threat and Interethnic Neighbourhood
    Contact},
    journal  = {European Sociological Review},
    year = 2017,
    volume  = 33,
    number  = 2,
    pages = {209-224},
    doi = {10.1093/esr/jcw055}
    }

  • Shekhovtsov, Anton. Russia and the Western Far Right. Tango Noir. London, New York: Routledge, 2018.
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    @Book{ sechovcov-2018,
    author  = {Shekhovtsov, Anton},
    title = {Russia and the Western Far Right. Tango Noir},
    publisher  = {Routledge},
    year = 2018,
    address  = {London, New York}
    }

  • Shehaj, Albana, Adrian J. Shin, and Ronald Inglehart. “Immigration and Right-Wing Populism: an Origin Story.” (2019). doi:10.1177/1354068819849888
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    @Article{ shehaj-shin-inglehart-2019,
    author  = {Albana Shehaj and Adrian J Shin and Ronald Inglehart},
    title = {Immigration and Right-Wing Populism: an Origin Story},
    journaltitle  = {Party Politics},
    year = 2019,
    doi = {10.1177/1354068819849888}
    }

  • Shields, James. “The Front National At the Polls: Transformational Elections Or the Status Quo Reaffirmed?.” 13.4 (2015): 415-433. doi:10.1057/fp.2015.15
    [BibTeX]
    @Article{ shields-2015,
    author  = {James Shields},
    title = {The Front National At the Polls: Transformational
    Elections Or the Status Quo Reaffirmed?},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2015,
    volume  = 13,
    number  = 4,
    pages = {415-433},
    doi = {10.1057/fp.2015.15}
    }

  • Sipma, Take and Marcel Lubbers. “Contextual-Level Unemployment and Support for Radical-Right Parties: a Meta-Analysis.” Acta Politica (2018): online first. doi:10.1057/s41269-018-0120-2
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    @Article{ sipma-lubbers-2018,
    author  = {Take Sipma and Marcel Lubbers},
    title = {Contextual-Level Unemployment and Support for
    Radical-Right Parties: a Meta-Analysis},
    journal  = {Acta Politica},
    year = 2018,
    pages = {online first},
    doi = {10.1057/s41269-018-0120-2}
    }

  • Stockemer, Daniel. “Who Are the Members of the French National Front? Evidence From Interview Research.” 12.1 (2014): 36-58. doi:10.1057/fp.2014.1
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    @Article{ stockemer-2014,
    author  = {Daniel Stockemer},
    title = {Who Are the Members of the French National Front? Evidence
    From Interview Research},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2014,
    volume  = 12,
    number  = 1,
    pages = {36-58},
    doi = {10.1057/fp.2014.1}
    }

  • Stockemer, Daniel and Abdelkarim Amengay. “The Voters of the Fn Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen: Continuity Or Change?.” 13.4 (2015): 370-390. doi:10.1057/fp.2015.16
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    @Article{ stockemer-amengay-2015,
    author  = {Daniel Stockemer and Abdelkarim Amengay},
    title = {The Voters of the Fn Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le
    Pen: Continuity Or Change?},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    year = 2015,
    volume  = 13,
    number  = 4,
    pages = {370-390},
    doi = {10.1057/fp.2015.16}
    }

  • Turnbull-Dugarte, Stuart J.. “Explaining the end of Spanish exceptionalism and electoral support for Vox.” Research & Politics 6.2 (2019): 2053168019851680. doi:10.1177/2053168019851680
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    @Article{ turnbull-dugarte-2019,
    author  = {Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte},
    title = {Explaining the end of Spanish exceptionalism and electoral
    support for Vox},
    journal  = {Research \& Politics},
    year = 2019,
    volume  = 6,
    number  = 2,
    pages = 2053168019851680,
    doi = {10.1177/2053168019851680}
    }

  • Zulianello, Mattia. Anti-System Parties. From Parliamentary Breakthrough to Government. Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2019.
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    @Book{ zulianello-2019,
    author  = {Zulianello, Mattia},
    title = {Anti-System Parties. From Parliamentary Breakthrough to
    Government},
    year = 2019,
    publisher  = {Routledge},
    address  = {Abingdon, New York}
    }

  • Mayer, Nonna. “The Closing of the Radical Right Gender Gap in France?.” 13.4 (2015): 391-414. doi:10.1057/fp.2015.18
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    @Article{ mayer-2015,
    author  = {Nonna Mayer},
    title = {The Closing of the Radical Right Gender Gap in France?},
    journaltitle  = {French Politics},
    volume  = {13},
    number  = {4},
    pages = {391-414},
    year = {2015},
    doi = {10.1057/fp.2015.18}
    }

  • Harell, Allison, Stuart Soroka, and Shanto Iyengar. “Locus of Control and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom.” Political Psychology 38.2 (2016): 245-260. doi:10.1111/pops.12338
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    @Article{ harell-soroka-iyengar-2016,
    author  = {Allison Harell and Stuart Soroka and Shanto Iyengar},
    title = {Locus of Control and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Canada,
    the United States, and the United Kingdom},
    journal  = {Political Psychology},
    volume  = {38},
    number  = {2},
    pages = {245-260},
    year = {2016},
    doi = {10.1111/pops.12338}
    }

Mar 142019
 
dogs in a libray: bibliography update March 2019

What’s new in the bibliography?

It’s that time of the year again. Once more, I have updated the Erratic Extreme/Far/Radical/Populist Right Bibliography. After the book-chapter heavy winter update, we are back to normal: the spring update brings four books, two chapters, and 45 journal articles. Most of these were published in 2018, but some are almost two decades old. Please keep pointing out relevant publications to me.

Far right bibliography: publication years of new additions

Publication years of the new additions to the bibliography

Who has written all the new stuff?

Far right bibliography update: authors

You know what they say about pictures and words. I thought I should give the new-ish wordcloud2 package a spin. Here is the result. Before you get too envious (or too haughty), please remember that scale is proportional to the number of publications, not the word count, and that additions to the bibliography happen on a non-systematic and utterly eccentric basis: if I come across something that interests me, it gets in, whether it is your very first article or your whole back catalogue.

The Far Right Bibliography: Spring 2019 Update

Watch this video on YouTube.

What is this new far right research about?

I stuffed the titles and (where I had them) abstracts into a dataset, forgot some obvious stop words (among? much? however?) and tried some lemmatisation (with mixed success). “Party”, “populist/populism”, and “radical” come out tops. Unsurprisingly, “immigration” is also prominent. But I find some of the smaller words more interesting. “Leave” is certainly a nod to Brexit. “Nord” is considerably smaller than “Lega”, reflecting the nationalisation (or at least the aspiration) of the former regionalists. “Unemployment” is certainly smaller than it would have been a decade or two ago. So is “extreme”. If you are interested in the fine print, click on the image for a larger, high-resolution version.

Far right bibliography March 2019 update: topics

Topics of the new additions to the Extreme/Far/Populist/Radical Right bibliography

Follow the robot

If you care about Extreme/Far/Populist/Radical Right research and if you are on Twitter, consider following the Radical Right Research Robot for random updates, serendipitous insights, and the occasional awkward pun.

New far right research: March 2019 update of the bibliography 8

I’m your friend

So: what titles exactly?

Here is the update, in all its glory:

Ackermann, Kathrin, Eros Zampieri, and Markus Freitag. 2018. “Personality and Voting for a Right-Wing Populist Party – Evidence from Switzerland.” Swiss Political Science Review 24 (4): 545–64. doi:10.1111/spsr.12330.

Albertazzi, Daniele. 2006a. “‘Back to Our Roots’ or Self-Confessed Manipulation? The Uses of the Past in the Lega Nord’s Positing of Padania.” National Identities 8 (1): 21–39. doi:10.1080/14608940600571222.

———. 2006b. “The Lega Dei Ticinesi. the Embodiment of Populism.” Politics 26 (2): 133–39. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9256.2006.00260.x.

———. 2016. “Going, Going, …Not Quite Gone yet? ‘Bossi’s Lega’ and the Survival of the Mass Party.” Contemporary Italian Politics 8 (2): 115–30. doi:10.1080/23248823.2016.1193349.

Albertazzi, Daniele, and Duncan McDonnell. 2005. “The Lega Nord in the Second Berlusconi Government: In a League of Its Own.” West European Politics 28 (5): 952–72. doi:10.1080/01402380500310600.

Albertazzi, Daniele, Arianna Giovannini, and Antonella Seddone. 2018. “‘No Regionalism Please, We Are Leghisti!’ the Transformation of the Italian Lega Nord Under the Leadership of Matteo Salvini.” Regional & Federal Studies 28 (5): 645–71. doi:10.1080/13597566.2018.1512977.

Albertazzi, Daniele, Duncan McDonnell, and James L. Newell. 2011. “Di Lotta E Di Governo: The Lega Nord and Rifondazione Comunista in Office.” Party Politics 17 (4): 471–87. doi:10.1177/1354068811400523.

Arzheimer, Kai. 2018. “Conceptual Confusion Is Not Always a Bad Thing: The Curious Case of European Radical Right Studies.” In Demokratie Und Entscheidung, edited by Karl Marker, Michael Roseneck, Annette Schmitt, and Jürgen Sirsch, 23–40. Wiesbaden: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-658-24529-0_3.

Bale, Tim. 2008. “Turning Round the Telescope. Centre-Right Parties and Immigration and Integration Policy in Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 15 (3): 315–30. doi:10.1080/13501760701847341.

Blok, E.A. Lisanne de, and T.W.G. Tom van der Meer. 2018. “The Puzzling Effect of Residential Neighbourhoods on the Vote for the Radical Right an Individual-Level Panel Study on the Mechanisms Behind Neighbourhood Effects on Voting for the Dutch Freedom Party, 2010-2013.” Electoral Studies 53: 122–32. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.04.003.

Carter, Elisabeth. 2018. “Right-Wing Extremism/Radicalism. Reconstructing the Concept.” Journal of Political Ideologies 23 (2): 157–82. doi:10.1080/13569317.2018.1451227.

Charalambous, Giorgos, and Panos Christoforou. 2019. “Far-Right Extremism and Populist Rhetoric: Greece and Cyprus During an Era of Crisis.” South European Society and Politics, 1–27. doi:10.1080/13608746.2018.1555957.

Dennison, James, and Andrew Geddes. 2018. “A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe.” The Political Quarterly, online first. doi:10.1111/1467-923x.12620.

Downes, James F., and Matthew Loveless. 2018. “Centre Right and Radical Right Party Competition in Europe: Strategic Emphasis on Immigration, Anti-Incumbency, and Economic Crisis.” Electoral Studies 54: 148–58. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2018.05.008.

Eger, Maureen A., and Sarah Valdez. 2018. “From Radical Right to Neo-Nationalist.” European Political Science. doi:10.1057/s41304-018-0160-0.

Elsas, Erika J. van. 2017. “Appealing to the ‘Losers’? The Electorates of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Eurosceptic Parties Compared, 1989-2014.” Electoral Studies 50: 68–79. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2017.09.013.

Fitzgerald, Jennifer. 2018. Close to Home. Local Ties and Voting Radical Right in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ford, Robert, and Matthew J. Goodwin. 2014. Revolt on the Right. Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain. London: Routledge.

Fremeaux, Isabelle, and Daniele Albertazzi. 2002. “Discursive Strategies Around ‘Community’ in Political Propaganda. the Case of Lega Nord.” National Identities 4 (2): 145–60. doi:10.1080/14608940220143835.

Froio, Caterina. 2018. “Race, Religion, or Culture? Framing Islam Between Racism and Neo-Racism in the Online Network of the French Far Right.” Perspectives on Politics 16 (3): 696–709. doi:10.1017/S1537592718001573.

Goodwin, Matthew J., and Caitlin Milazzo. 2005. UKIP. Inside the Campaign to Redraw the Map of British Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Pontus Odmalm. 2008. “Going Different Ways? Right-Wing Parties and the Immigrant Issue in Denmark and Sweden.” Journal of European Public Policy 15 (3): 367–81. doi:10.1080/13501760701847564.

Halikiopoulou, Daphne. 2018. “A Right-Wing Populist Momentum? A Review of 2017 Elections Across Europe.” Journal of Common Market Studies 56 (S1): 63–73. doi:10.1111/jcms.12769.
Jonge, Léonie de. 2019. “The Populist Radical Right and the Media in the Benelux: Friend or Foe?” The International Journal of Press/Politics 0 (0): online first. doi:10.1177/1940161218821098.

Kaufmann, Eric. 2019. “Can Narratives of White Identity Reduce Opposition to Immigration and Support for Hard Brexit? A Survey Experiment.” Political Studies 67 (1): 31–46. doi:10.1177/0032321717740489.

Krekó, Péter, and Gregor Mayer. 2015. “Transforming Hungary – Together? An Analysis of the Fidesz-Jobbik Relationship.” In The East European Radical Right in the Political Process, edited by Michael Minkenberg, 183–205. Routledge.

Lutz, Philipp. 2019. “Variation in Policy Success. Radical Right Populism and Migration Policy.” West European Politics 42 (3): 517–44. doi:10.1080/01402382.2018.1504509.
Marx, Paul, and Elias Naumann. 2018. “Do Right-Wing Parties Foster Welfare Chauvinistic Attitudes? A Longitudinal Study of the 2015 ‘Refugee Crisis’ in Germany.” Electoral Studies 52: 111–16. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.01.011.
Marx, Paul, and Gijs Schumacher. 2018. “Do Poor Citizens Vote for Redistribution, Against Immigration or Against the Establishment? A Conjoint Experiment in Denmark.” Scandinavian Political Studies 41 (3): 263–82. doi:10.1111/1467-9477.12119.
McDonnell, Duncan, and Annika Werner. 2018a. “Differently Eurosceptic: Radical Right Populist Parties and Their Supporters.” Journal of European Public Policy, 1–18. doi:10.1080/13501763.2018.1561743.
———. 2018b. “Respectable Radicals. Why Some Radical Right Parties in the European Parliament Forsake Policy Congruence.” Journal of European Public Policy 25 (5): 747–63. doi:10.1080/13501763.2017.1298659.
Miller-Idriss, Cynthia. 2009. Blood and Culture: Youth, Right-Wing Extremism, and National Belonging in Contemporary Germany. Durham: Duke University Press.

Olsen, Jonathan. 2018. “The Left Party and the Afd.” German Politics and Society 36 (1): 70–83. doi:10.3167/gps.2018.360104.

Pardos-Prado, Sergi, Bram Lancee, and Iñaki Sagarzazu. 2014. “Immigration and Electoral Change in Mainstream Political Space.” Political Behavior 36 (4): 847–75. doi:10.1007/s11109-013-9248-y.
Pytlas, Bartek. 2018. “Radical Right Politics in East and West. Distinctive yet Equivalent.” Sociology Compass 12: e12632. doi:10.1111/soc4.12632.
Rensmann, Lars. 2018. “Radical Right-Wing Populists in Parliament.” German Politics and Society 36 (3): 41–73. doi:10.3167/gps.2018.360303.

Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2018a. “State of the Field: How to Study Populism and Adjacent Topics? A Plea for Both More and Less Focus.” European Journal of Political Research, online first. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12314.

———. 2018b. “What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist Parties.” European Political Science Review 10 (3): 351–68. doi:10.1017/s1755773917000145.
Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Brian Burgoon. 2018. “The Paradox of Well-Being. Do Unfavorable Socioeconomic and Sociocultural Contexts Deepen or Dampen Radical Left and Right Voting Among the Less Well-Off?” Comparative Political Studies 51 (13): 1720–53. doi:10.1177/0010414017720707.
Rydgren, Jens, and Sara van der Meiden. 2018. “The Radical Right and the End of Swedish Exceptionalism.” European Political Science. doi:10.1057/s41304-018-0159-6.

Salzborn, Samuel. 2018. “Antisemitism in the ‘Alternative for Germany’ Party.” German Politics and Society 36 (3): 74–93. doi:10.3167/gps.2018.360304.

Szöcsik, Edina, and Alina Polyakova. 2018. “Euroscepticism and the Electoral Success of the Far Right: The Role of the Strategic Interaction Between Center and Far Right.” European Political Science. doi:10.1057/s41304-018-0162-y.
Vasilopoulos, Pavlos, George E. Marcus, and Martial Foucault. 2018. “Emotional Responses to the Charlie Hebdo Attacks. Addressing the Authoritarianism Puzzle.” Political Psychology, 557–75. doi:10.1111/pops.12439.
Vasilopoulos, Pavlos, George E. Marcus, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Martial Foucault. 2018. “Fear, Anger, and Voting for the Far Right: Evidence from the November 13, 2015 Paris Terror Attacks.” Political Psychology, online first. doi:10.1111/pops.12513.
Vlandas, Tim, and Daphne Halikiopoulou. 2018. “Does Unemployment Matter? Economic Insecurity, Labour Market Policies and the Far-Right Vote in Europe.” European Political Science. doi:10.1057/s41304-018-0161-z.
Voogd, Remko, and Ruth Dassonneville. 2018. “Are the Supporters of Populist Parties Loyal Voters? Dissatisfaction and Stable Voting for Populist Parties.” Government and Opposition, online first. doi:10.1017/gov.2018.24.
Widfeldt, Anders, and Heinz Brandenburg. 2018. “What Kind of Party Is the UK Independence Party? The Future of the Extreme Right in Britain or Just Another Tory Party?” Political Studies 66 (3): 577–600. doi:10.1177/0032321717723509.
Wijk, Daniël van, Gideon Bolt, and Ron Johnston. 2018. “Contextual Effects on Populist Radical Right Support: Consensual Neighbourhood Effects and the Dutch PVV.” European Sociological Review, December. doi:10.1093/esr/jcy049.

Wirz, Dominique S., Martin Wettstein, Anne Schulz, Philipp Müller, Christian Schemer, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, and Werner Wirth. 2018. “The Effects of Right-Wing Populist Communication on Emotions and Cognitions Toward Immigrants.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 23 (4): 496–516. doi:10.1177/1940161218788956.

Zulianello, Mattia. 2018. “Anti-System Parties Revisited: Concept Formation and Guidelines for Empirical Research.” Government and Opposition 53 (4): 653–81. doi:10.1017/gov.2017.12.
Zulianello, Mattia, Alessandro Albertini, and Diego Ceccobelli. 2018. “A Populist Zeitgeist? The Communication Strategies of Western and Latin American Political Leaders on Facebook.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 23 (4): 439–57. doi:10.1177/1940161218783836.
Jan 102019
 
Identifying topics in research papers with the newsmap package for R (or: how the Radical Right Research Robot became slightly less dumb) 9

Topic modelling does not work well for (my) research paper abstracts

The Radical Right Research Robot is a fun side project whose life began exactly one year ago. The Robot exists to promote the very large body of knowledge on Radical Right parties and their voters that social scientists have accumulated over decades. At its core is a loop that randomly selects one of the more than 800 titles on my online bibliography on the Extreme/Radical Right every few hours and spits it out on twitter.

Yet the little android’s aim was always for some sort of serendipity, and so it tries to extract meaning from the abstracts (where available), sometimes with rather funny consequences. The robots’s first idea was to make use (structural) topic modelling. There are some implementations available in R and the first results looked promising, but in the end, topic modelling did not find meaningful clusters of papers that could easily be labelled with a common theme. One possible reason is that the abstracts are short, and that there are relatively few (less than 400) of them. And so the Robot reverted to using a small and fairly arbitrary set of keywords for identifying topics.

This approach produced some embarrassing howlers like this one:

Or this one (clearly the robot has a thing for media studies – who doesn’t?):

There are two problems here: first, even a single instance of a keyword in a given abstract is enough to trigger a classification, and second, the bot’s pedestrian implementation would classify an abstract using the last keyword that it detected, even if it was the most peripheral of several hits. Not good enough for world domination, obviously.

Newsmap works reasonably well for classifying topics in research paper abstracts

Looking for an alternative solution, the robot came across newsmap (now also available within quanteda), a geographical news classifier developed by Kohei Watanabe. Newsmap is semi-supervised: it starts with a dictionary of proper nouns and adjectives that all refer to geographical entities, say

'France': [Paris, France, French*] 
'Germany': [German*, Berlin]
...

But newsmap is able to pick up additional words that also help to identify the respective country with high probability, e.g. “Macron”, “Merkel”, “Marseille”, “Hamburg”, or even “Lederhosen”. In a (limited) sense, it learns to identify geographical context even when the country in question is not mentioned explicitly.

But the algorithm is not restricted to geographical entities. It can also identify topics from a list. An so these days, the robot starts with a dictionary of seed words that is work in progress but looks mostly like this at the moment:

'religion & culture': [muslim*, islam*, relig*, cultur*]
'media': [TV, newspaper*, journalis*]
'group conflict': [group*,contact, prejudice, stereotyp*, competition]
...

Results are not perfect, but at least they are less embarrassing than those from the simple keyword approach. One remaining problem is that newsmap tags each abstract with (at most) one topic. In reality, any given article will refer to two or more themes in the literature. Topic models are much more attractive in this respect, because they treat each text as a mixture of topics, and so the robot may have to revisit them in the future.

Dec 162018
 
Extreme Right Bibliography: winter 2018 update 10
Christmas comes early this year for political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, and anyone else interested in research on the Extreme Right/Radical Right: the winter 2018 edition of the Extreme Right Bibliography is here. The latest iteration brings the total to 808 titles: 539 journal articles, 102 monographs, and 167 chapters.

Since the April edition, there have been 75 additions. About half of these, an unusually large number, are book chapters. This is because I have included just about every contribution to the excellent Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (edited by Jens Rydgren), including my own chapter on Explaining Electoral Support for the Radical Right.

Most new titles (56) have appeared only this year. Seven were published in 2017, and three are from 2016. The rest are older vintages (2006-2015) but have only recently come to my attention. I’m grateful to the many folks who sent me references, even if some of them did not make the list.

Extreme Right Bibliography: winter 2018 update 11

What are the prominent themes in these 75 additional contributions?

  • Only one is about euroscepticism
  • One other deals with gender issues, a venerable but still somewhat under-researched topic
  • Two more are about Social Media/Facebook
  • 11 have “immigration” in their title. No big surprise here
  • Populism features prominently, i.e. in more than 25 titles
  • Country/single party studies (including studies that look at a country and aim to generalise) abound, but there is comparative stuff, too.

In short, the field is thriving – just like the objects of our research ?.

The usual disclaimer applies: I maintain this list primarily for my own research but hope that others may find it useful, too. If you think that something should be on the list but currently isn’t (including your own research – don’t be shy), please send me an email, DM, or leave a comment here.