kai arzheimer

Since April 2021, I have added 80 new titles to the bibliography. This brings the total number of entries to 1101. Going through my files, this number should probably be 1102, but who cares?

More than half of the new titles came out in 2021, and almost 25 per cent were published in the first three months of 2022, which is probably a record. The equivalent number for last year was 18 per cent.

Journals keep messing with publication years. “Online first” is now the default, but editors keep assigning article to issues, which in my view are an increasingly meaningless concept. When was the last time that you went to the library to have a look at a bound piece of dead tree (full of stuff that has been available as PDF for years)? Exactly. Still, I occasionally update publication years.

If we ignore the details, 2018 (110 titles) is still the high watermark for publications on the radical right. 2013 remains as the median publication year, and a staggering 34 per cent of all titles in the bibliography have been published in the 2017-2022 period.

78 of the 80 new entries are journal articles, which must be another all-time high. West European Politics returns to the top spot, and it’s another strong showing from Electoral Studies, Elsevier boycott or not. Taking a longer view, West European Politics remains the most important journal with 61 titles in the bibliography, but the importance of the European Journal of Political Research (2nd place with 57 titles) has waned a bit in recent years.

Last year, I began looking not just at the titles but also at the abstracts to get an idea what the texts are about. This year, I did the same, but also gave full lemmatisation of texts (via the excellent udpipe package) a shot.

The result is still not perfect. Udpipe recognises Europe as a (proper) noun and European as an adjective but does not assign them to the same lemma. So I ran lemmatize_words (from the textstem package) on the results, which at least merges singular and plural forms. As per the usual procedure, I removed topic-specific common words (“right”, “radical”, “extreme” etc.). I should probably also remove “political”. But you don’t care about the technology. You want a wordcloud, and you get a wordcloud.

“Party” once more stands out, and “vote”, voter, and “electoral” are also quite prominent. “Movement” as an alternative object of study is much rarer, which neatly illustrates the slant of the bibliography. “Support” is more general and even more popular. Then there is the usual verbiage with which we pad out our articles: “analysis”, “research”, “article”, “study”, “evidence”, and my old favourite, “suggest”. “Immigrant” and “immigration” should be grouped together, but even so they are less prominent than “Europe” and “European”. “Welfare” and “social” are also important, just as they were last year.

If you look closely, you will also spot the words “alternative”, “Germany”, and “AfD”. Unsurprisingly that’s because there is a lot of stuff (some 15 or 16 titles by my count) that at least peripherally touches on the AfD.

Just for the fun of it, I subjected the texts to a wordfish analysis. Wordfish is quite good at finding an underlying single dimension that is responsible for the frequency of words in a given set of texts.

As it turns out, there seems to be such a dimension. The y-axis shows how likely the appearance of a word is in general. That’s why the prominent words from the cloud make another appearance at the top of the plot.

The more interesting dimension is the x-axis, which shows the strength of the association of a given word with the underlying dimension. On the left-hand side of the plot, there are words such as leaders/leadership and organisational (both with a British and a heathen spelling) that seem to be associated with parties and other groups, and also (slightly further to the right) with their environment. Here, we are clearly in meso/macro land. Conversely, on the very right, you will find words associated with individuals, or with the effect of the environment on individuals (survey, immigration, economic, salience). This fits rather neatly with the two kinds of research that tend to go into the bibliography.

The second plot orders the texts by their position on the underlying dimension. Almost all the articles in the upper half of the graph make massive use of micro data. Articles in the lower half are more concerned with party organisations and party systems, content analysis, aggregate data and conceptual work. Have a look for yourself – the pattern is surprisingly clear.

Because that was still not enough fun, I ran the LexRank algorithm on the abstracts to create one-sentence summaries, which I then turned into a video so that you can lie back and stare aimlessly at other people’s research drifting past you really quick. That is surprisingly relaxing.

For the 80 titles, there are 140 unique author names and 129 unique given names. Inferring gender from first names is always tricky, especially if one is trying to do it algorithmically. After dealing with some well-known false positives (looking at you, Andrea, Daniele, and Mattia) and some staring at people’s websites, I ended up with 37 (almost unique) female names, as opposed to 94 non-unique male names, which amounts to a female share of 28 per cent, almost the same as two years ago and slightly less than in 2021.

It’s worth mentioning that this methodology is far from perfect, because it does not account for the number of publications a person is involved in. But anyway, here is the ever popular cloud of authors’ first names. Not a pretty picture.

So, if you are female, please send me your work on right-wing radicalism. The men do it. All. The. Time.

Here is a full list of all that is new in the bibliography. Click here to download/import these new titles into your reference management software.

• Abou-Chadi, Tarik and Simon Hix. “Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right? Education, class, multiparty competition, and redistribution in Western Europe.” The British Journal of Sociology 72.1 (2021): 79–92. doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12834
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  In this article, we revisit the main claims of Part Four of Thomas Piketty{“}s Capital and Ideology and especially the changing support coalitions for parties of the left. Piketty{“}s core argument in this part of the book is that the left now represents the highly educated and that, as a result, the redistributive preferences of the working class do not find representation in today{“}s party systems. We address these claims building on existing political science research that has investigated the transformation of politics in advanced capitalist societies. We argue, first, that the educational divide cannot be adequately analyzed by looking at a left and a right bloc, but crucially needs to pay attention to the rise of green/left-libertarian and radical right parties. Second, we contend that the new middle classes that support parties of the left are largely in favor of economic redistribution. Analyzing data from the European Social Survey in 11 West European countries from 2002 to 2018, we show that the effect of education on voting left or right is indeed largely driven by green/left-libertarian and radical right parties, while there is little empirical evidence that social democratic parties represent the educational elite. We also find that redistributive preferences remain at the heart of voting behavior and that, especially for educated voters, these preferences determine whether someone votes for a party of the left rather than the right.

  @Article{abou-chadi-hix-2021,
  author = {Tarik Abou-Chadi and Simon Hix},
  title = {Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right? Education, class, multiparty competition, and redistribution in Western Europe},
  journal = {The British Journal of Sociology},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {72},
  number = {1},
  pages = {79--92},
  abstract = {In this article, we revisit the main claims of Part Four of Thomas Piketty{"}s Capital and Ideology and especially the changing support coalitions for parties of the left. Piketty{"}s core argument in this part of the book is that the left now represents the highly educated and that,
  as a result, the redistributive preferences of the working class do not find representation in today{"}s party systems. We address these claims building on existing political science research that has investigated the transformation of politics in advanced capitalist societies. We
  argue, first, that the educational divide cannot be adequately analyzed by looking at a left and a right bloc, but crucially needs to pay attention to the rise of green/left-libertarian and radical right parties. Second, we contend that the new middle classes that support parties
  of the left are largely in favor of economic redistribution. Analyzing data from the European Social Survey in 11 West European countries from 2002 to 2018, we show that the effect of education on voting left or right is indeed largely driven by green/left-libertarian and radical
  right parties, while there is little empirical evidence that social democratic parties represent the educational elite. We also find that redistributive preferences remain at the heart of voting behavior and that, especially for educated voters, these preferences determine whether
  someone votes for a party of the left rather than the right.},
  doi = {10.1111/1468-4446.12834},
  }

• Afonso, Alexandre. “Correlates of Aggregate Support for the Radical Right in Portugal.” Research & Politics 8.3 (2021): 205316802110294. doi:10.1177/20531680211029416
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  This article explains variation in local aggregate support for the populist radical right in Portugal, a country long considered immune to the rise of this political force. Using local electoral results of the 2021 presidential election, I find positive statistical associations between the radical right vote share and the share of social assistance benefit recipients, as well as with the size of the local Roma minority. I also show that the effect of the percentage of social assistance recipients is conditioned on a higher size of the local Roma minority. In contrast, factors such as unemployment, average income levels or the share of immigrants and their change over time do not explain variation in radical right vote shares. The research points to the presence of outgroups that can be construed as {“}outsiders{“} as a relevant factor explaining aggregate support for the radical right in contexts where the salience of immigration is low.

  @Article{afonso-2021,
  author = {Alexandre Afonso},
  title = {Correlates of Aggregate Support for the Radical Right in Portugal},
  journal = {Research \& Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {205316802110294},
  abstract = {This article explains variation in local aggregate support for the populist radical right in Portugal, a country long considered immune to the rise of this political force. Using local electoral results of the 2021 presidential election, I find positive statistical associations
  between the radical right vote share and the share of social assistance benefit recipients, as well as with the size of the local Roma minority. I also show that the effect of the percentage of social assistance recipients is conditioned on a higher size of the local Roma minority.
  In contrast, factors such as unemployment, average income levels or the share of immigrants and their change over time do not explain variation in radical right vote shares. The research points to the presence of outgroups that can be construed as {"}outsiders{"} as a relevant factor
  explaining aggregate support for the radical right in contexts where the salience of immigration is low.},
  doi = {10.1177/20531680211029416},
  }

• Albertazzi, Daniele, Donatella Bonansinga, and Mattia Zulianello. “The Right-Wing Alliance at the Time of the Covid-19 Pandemic: All Change?.” Contemporary Italian Politics online first (2021): 1–15. doi:10.1080/23248823.2021.1916857
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The growth of populist radical right parties at the expense of Berlusconi{“}s Forza Italia (FI) has recently reconfigured the right in Italy. Changes in power relations created for the Lega (League), Fratelli d{“}Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) and FI, different competitive pressures, resulting in distinctive – and often conflicting – responses to the pandemic. Based on the analysis of these parties{“} Twitter accounts and on survey data, this article examines how right-wing actors positioned themselves vis à vis the government, and each other, throughout 2020. Eventually, the League became the government{“}s most vocal critic, forcing FdI to follow suit; meanwhile, FI reinvented itself as a moderate, pro-EU party. Despite these changes, our analysis also stresses continuity, insofar as the alliance continued to craft its message around taxation, the EU, immigration and law/order, as it had done in the past. It also continued to enjoy electoral support similar to that of recent decades.

  @Article{albertazzi-bonansinga-zulianello-2021,
  author = {Daniele Albertazzi and Donatella Bonansinga and Mattia Zulianello},
  title = {The Right-Wing Alliance at the Time of the Covid-19 Pandemic: All Change?},
  journal = {Contemporary Italian Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  pages = {1--15},
  abstract = {The growth of populist radical right parties at the expense of Berlusconi{"}s Forza Italia (FI) has recently reconfigured the right in Italy. Changes in power relations created for the Lega (League), Fratelli d{"}Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) and FI, different competitive pressures,
  resulting in distinctive - and often conflicting - responses to the pandemic. Based on the analysis of these parties{"} Twitter accounts and on survey data, this article examines how right-wing actors positioned themselves vis à vis the government, and each other, throughout 2020.
  Eventually, the League became the government{"}s most vocal critic, forcing FdI to follow suit; meanwhile, FI reinvented itself as a moderate, pro-EU party. Despite these changes, our analysis also stresses continuity, insofar as the alliance continued to craft its message around
  taxation, the EU, immigration and law/order, as it had done in the past. It also continued to enjoy electoral support similar to that of recent decades.},
  doi = {10.1080/23248823.2021.1916857},
  }

• Albertazzi, Daniele and Mattia Zulianello. “Populist Electoral Competition in Italy: The Impact of Sub-National Contextual Factors.” Contemporary Italian Politics 13.1 (2021): 4–30. doi:10.1080/23248823.2020.1871186
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  This article investigates the impact of sub-national contextual variations on the performance of populist actors in a country in which several electorally relevant populist parties exist: Italy. By employing a multi-model Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of the 2018 Italian general election, it explores the extent to which factors such as the distribution of {“}economic losers{“} and the impact of migration, political discontent and societal malaise have influenced the performance of the Lega (League) and the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star Movement, M5s). The study shows that, while the League has thrived especially in areas characterized by {“}cultural backlash{“}, but also in contexts characterized by Euroscepticism and societal malaise, the success of the M5s cannot be explained without reference to poor economic and institutional performances. Moreover, by stressing the advantages of assessing sub-national variations, the study encourages us to move away from one-size-fits-all grand narratives that see some factors (or combination of factors) as necessarily impacting populist performance throughout national territories in a consistent manner.

  @Article{albertazzi-zulianello-2021,
  author = {Daniele Albertazzi and Mattia Zulianello},
  title = {Populist Electoral Competition in Italy: The Impact of Sub-National Contextual Factors},
  journal = {Contemporary Italian Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {13},
  number = {1},
  pages = {4--30},
  abstract = {This article investigates the impact of sub-national contextual variations on the performance of populist actors in a country in which several electorally relevant populist parties exist: Italy. By employing a multi-model Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of the 2018 Italian
  general election, it explores the extent to which factors such as the distribution of {"}economic losers{"} and the impact of migration, political discontent and societal malaise have influenced the performance of the Lega (League) and the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star Movement,
  M5s). The study shows that, while the League has thrived especially in areas characterized by {"}cultural backlash{"}, but also in contexts characterized by Euroscepticism and societal malaise, the success of the M5s cannot be explained without reference to poor economic and
  institutional performances. Moreover, by stressing the advantages of assessing sub-national variations, the study encourages us to move away from one-size-fits-all grand narratives that see some factors (or combination of factors) as necessarily impacting populist performance
  throughout national territories in a consistent manner.},
  doi = {10.1080/23248823.2020.1871186},
  }

• Ortiz Barquero, Pablo, Antonia Marïa Ruiz Jimënez, and Manuel Tomäs Gonzälez-Fernändez. “Ideological Voting for Radical Right Parties in Europe.” Acta Politica online first (2021). doi:10.1057/s41269-021-00213-8
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The aim of this research is to examine to what extent the electoral support for radical right parties (RRPs) is driven by {“}policy voting{“} and to compare this support with that of centre-right parties. Using the European Election Study 2019, we focus on six party systems: Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom. Our analyses reveal that party preferences for RRPs are better explained by policy considerations than by other alternative explanations (e.g. by {“}globalization losers{“} or {“}protest voting{“}). Additionally, the results show that although preferences for both party families are mainly rooted in {“}policy voting{“}, notable differences emerge when looking at the role of specific policy dimensions. Overall, these findings suggest that the support for RRPs cannot be understood fundamentally as a mere reaction against economic pauperization or political dissatisfaction but instead as an ideological decision based on rational choice models.

  @Article{barquero-jimenez-gonzalez-fernandez-2021,
  author = {Pablo {Ortiz Barquero} and Antonia Mar\"ia {Ruiz Jim{\"e}nez} and Manuel Tom{\"a}s Gonz{\"a}lez-Fern{\"a}ndez},
  title = {Ideological Voting for Radical Right Parties in Europe},
  journal = {Acta Politica},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {The aim of this research is to examine to what extent the electoral support for radical right parties (RRPs) is driven by {"}policy voting{"} and to compare this support with that of centre-right parties. Using the European Election Study 2019, we focus on six party systems: Spain,
  Italy, France, Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom. Our analyses reveal that party preferences for RRPs are better explained by policy considerations than by other alternative explanations (e.g. by {"}globalization losers{"} or {"}protest voting{"}). Additionally, the results show
  that although preferences for both party families are mainly rooted in {"}policy voting{"}, notable differences emerge when looking at the role of specific policy dimensions. Overall, these findings suggest that the support for RRPs cannot be understood fundamentally as a mere reaction
  against economic pauperization or political dissatisfaction but instead as an ideological decision based on rational choice models.},
  doi = {10.1057/s41269-021-00213-8},
  }

• Ben-Shitrit, Lihi, Julia Elad-Strenger, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. “”Pinkwashing” the radical-right: Gender and the mainstreaming of radical-right policies and actions.” European Journal of Political Research 61.1 (2022): 86–110. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12442
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Across the globe, women are increasingly more visible as leaders and activists in radical-right parties and movements. Does women{“}s visibility in radical-right politics, both institutionalized and non-institutionalized, affect public acceptance of radical-right agendas? The present paper proposes a {“}radical-right gender mainstreaming model{“}, arguing that women in radical-right politics are perceived by the general public through a prism of feminine gender stereotypes, which counteract radical-right parties{“} and movements{“} masculine stereotypes, thus {“}softening{“} their image and making them more acceptable to the general public. Across four experimental studies conducted in the Israeli context, we find strong evidence that women{“}s visibility as radical-right parliamentary representatives (Studies 1a and 1b) and as radical-right political activists (Studies 2a and 2b) increases acceptance of and support for these parties{“} and movements{“} agenda, particularly among women. We further demonstrate that these effects are mediated by the attribution of feminine stereotypes (warmth) to women versus men political actors. Implications of these findings are discussed.

  @Article{ben-shitrit-elad-strenger-hirsch-hoefler-2022,
  author = {Lihi Ben-Shitrit and Julia Elad-Strenger and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler},
  title = {{"}Pinkwashing{"} the radical-right: Gender and the mainstreaming of radical-right policies and actions},
  journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {61},
  number = {1},
  pages = {86--110},
  abstract = {Across the globe, women are increasingly more visible as leaders and activists in radical-right parties and movements. Does women{"}s visibility in radical-right politics, both institutionalized and non-institutionalized, affect public acceptance of radical-right agendas? The
  present paper proposes a {"}radical-right gender mainstreaming model{"}, arguing that women in radical-right politics are perceived by the general public through a prism of feminine gender stereotypes, which counteract radical-right parties{"} and movements{"} masculine stereotypes, thus
  {"}softening{"} their image and making them more acceptable to the general public. Across four experimental studies conducted in the Israeli context, we find strong evidence that women{"}s visibility as radical-right parliamentary representatives (Studies 1a and 1b) and as radical-right
  political activists (Studies 2a and 2b) increases acceptance of and support for these parties{"} and movements{"} agenda, particularly among women. We further demonstrate that these effects are mediated by the attribution of feminine stereotypes (warmth) to women versus men political
  actors. Implications of these findings are discussed.},
  doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12442},
  }

• Bolet, Diane. “Drinking Alone: Local Socio-Cultural Degradation and Radical Right Support-The Case of British Pub Closures.” Comparative Political Studies 54.9 (2021): 1653–1692. doi:10.1177/0010414021997158
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Little is known about how local context influences radical right voting. This paper advances the theory that the degradation of local socio-cultural hubs is linked to radical right support by contributing to loss of community and cultural identity. I examine this thesis by exploiting an original dataset on British community pub closures. I argue that the disappearance of community pubs triggers social isolation and signals the decline of the British working class condition, which is associated with UKIP support. Combining district-level data with UK panel data (2013-2016), I show that individuals living in districts that experience one additional community pub closure (relative to the total number of pubs per district) are more likely to support UKIP than any other party by 4.3 percentage points. The effect is magnified under conditions of material deprivation. This paper highlights the significance of local socio-cultural degradation as a mechanism to explain radical right support.

  @Article{bolet-2021,
  author = {Diane Bolet},
  title = {Drinking Alone: Local Socio-Cultural Degradation and Radical Right Support-The Case of British Pub Closures},
  journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {54},
  number = {9},
  pages = {1653--1692},
  abstract = {Little is known about how local context influences radical right voting. This paper advances the theory that the degradation of local socio-cultural hubs is linked to radical right support by contributing to loss of community and cultural identity. I examine this thesis by
  exploiting an original dataset on British community pub closures. I argue that the disappearance of community pubs triggers social isolation and signals the decline of the British working class condition, which is associated with UKIP support. Combining district-level data with UK
  panel data (2013-2016), I show that individuals living in districts that experience one additional community pub closure (relative to the total number of pubs per district) are more likely to support UKIP than any other party by 4.3 percentage points. The effect is magnified under
  conditions of material deprivation. This paper highlights the significance of local socio-cultural degradation as a mechanism to explain radical right support.},
  doi = {10.1177/0010414021997158},
  }

• Bolin, Niklas, Stefan Dahlberg, and Sofie Blombäck. “The Stigmatisation Effect of the Radical Right on Voters” Assessment of Political Proposals.” West European Politics online first (2022): 1–22. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.2019977
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Despite the continued electoral progress of the radical right, there are reasons to believe that its full electoral potential has yet to be revealed. Previous research suggests that it suffers from a stigmatisation effect and that many voters will find its proposals less compelling compared to if they were presented by a mainstream party even for policy issues they agree upon. This study employs a unique survey design, with two experiments conducted seven years apart, on a panel of Swedish voters. The aim is to evaluate whether proposals are assessed differently dependent on who the sender is and whether the effect diminishes as the cordon sanitaire of the party weakens. The results show that proposals are less liked if the sender is the radical right. This effect persists even after a weakening of the ostracisation of the radical right as well as for different types of political issues.

  @Article{bolin-dahlberg-blombaeck-2022,
  author = {Niklas Bolin and Stefan Dahlberg and Sofie Blomb{\"a}ck},
  title = {The Stigmatisation Effect of the Radical Right on Voters{"} Assessment of Political Proposals},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {online first},
  pages = {1--22},
  abstract = {Despite the continued electoral progress of the radical right, there are reasons to believe that its full electoral potential has yet to be revealed. Previous research suggests that it suffers from a stigmatisation effect and that many voters will find its proposals less
  compelling compared to if they were presented by a mainstream party even for policy issues they agree upon. This study employs a unique survey design, with two experiments conducted seven years apart, on a panel of Swedish voters. The aim is to evaluate whether proposals are
  assessed differently dependent on who the sender is and whether the effect diminishes as the cordon sanitaire of the party weakens. The results show that proposals are less liked if the sender is the radical right. This effect persists even after a weakening of the ostracisation of
  the radical right as well as for different types of political issues.},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.2019977},
  }

• Busemeyer, Marius R., Philip Rathgeb, and Alexander H. J. Sahm. “Authoritarian Values and the Welfare State: the Social Policy Preferences of Radical Right Voters.” West European Politics 45.1 (2021): 77–101. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.1886497
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  What kind of welfare state do voters of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) want and how do their preferences differ from voters of mainstream left- and right-wing parties? In this paper, we draw on an original, representative survey of public opinion on education and related social policies in eight Western European countries to measure (1) support for social transfers, (2) support for workfare and (3) support for social investment. Challenging the view that PRRPs turned into pro-welfare parties, our results indicate that their voters want a particularistic-authoritarian welfare state, displaying moderate support only for {“}deserving{“} benefit recipients (e.g. the elderly), while revealing strong support for a workfare approach and little support for social investment. These findings have important implications for contemporary debates about the future of capitalism and the welfare state.

  @Article{busemeyer-rathgeb-sahm-2021,
  author = {Marius R. Busemeyer and Philip Rathgeb and Alexander H. J. Sahm},
  title = {Authoritarian Values and the Welfare State: the Social Policy Preferences of Radical Right Voters},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {45},
  number = {1},
  pages = {77--101},
  abstract = {What kind of welfare state do voters of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) want and how do their preferences differ from voters of mainstream left- and right-wing parties? In this paper, we draw on an original, representative survey of public opinion on education and related
  social policies in eight Western European countries to measure (1) support for social transfers, (2) support for workfare and (3) support for social investment. Challenging the view that PRRPs turned into pro-welfare parties, our results indicate that their voters want a
  particularistic-authoritarian welfare state, displaying moderate support only for {"}deserving{"} benefit recipients (e.g. the elderly), while revealing strong support for a workfare approach and little support for social investment. These findings have important implications for
  contemporary debates about the future of capitalism and the welfare state.},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.1886497},
  }

• Capaul, Raphael and Christian Ewert. “Moderation of Radical Right-wing Populist Parties in Western European Governments – A Comparative Analysis.” Swiss Political Science Review 27.4 (2021): 778–798. doi:10.1111/spsr.12491
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  {More and more Western European radical right-wing populist parties participate in the governments of their respective countries. At least some of these parties moderate-that is, become less radical-once they join the government; others, however, do not. Although the literature has addressed such moderation, the conditions that lead to it have not been analyzed comprehensively. In this paper, we use a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA

  @Article{capaul-ewert-2021,
  author = {Raphael Capaul and Christian Ewert},
  title = {Moderation of Radical Right-wing Populist Parties in Western European Governments - A Comparative Analysis},
  journal = {Swiss Political Science Review},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {27},
  number = {4},
  pages = {778--798},
  abstract = {More and more Western European radical right-wing populist parties participate in the governments of their respective countries. At least some of these parties moderate-that is, become less radical-once they join the government; others, however, do not. Although the literature has
  addressed such moderation, the conditions that lead to it have not been analyzed comprehensively. In this paper, we use a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA, N = 14) to determine what conditions are consistently associated with moderation across cases. We find that
  the degree of governmental responsibility a party takes over is as important as its internal dynamic. In a ruling coalition, compromises must be found, which can create high internal tensions within the radical right-wing populist party. Joining government can thus have its price:
  a crisis of party identity and a strong compulsion to moderate.},
  doi = {10.1111/spsr.12491},
  }

• Carvalho, João. “Understanding the Emergence of Extreme Right Parties in Portugal in the Late 2010s.” Parliamentary Affairs online first (2022). doi:10.1093/pa/gsac001
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  After more than four decades of immunity to the extreme-right party family, this Portuguese exceptionalism came to an end after the electoral breakthrough of the Chega party in the 2019 general elections. Drawing on a case study approach, this article discusses different explanations for the timing of Chega{“}s emergence in Portuguese mainstream politics in the late 2010s. Considering this late success, Portugal can be seen as a crucial case study to assess the available theories. This investigation employs a popular schema that implies the distinction between explanations focused on {“}demand-side{“} factors (the protest voting thesis and the public salience of immigration) from those concerned with {“}supply-side{“} factors (the spatial competition theory and internal supply factors). Through the employment of the congruence method, this article highlights the interaction between party-centric factors as a more appropriate explanation for understanding the timing of Chega{“}s electoral breakthrough than demand-side approaches.

  @Article{carvalho-2022,
  author = {Jo{\~a}o Carvalho},
  title = {Understanding the Emergence of Extreme Right Parties in Portugal in the Late 2010s},
  journal = {Parliamentary Affairs},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {After more than four decades of immunity to the extreme-right party family, this Portuguese exceptionalism came to an end after the electoral breakthrough of the Chega party in the 2019 general elections. Drawing on a case study approach, this article discusses different
  explanations for the timing of Chega{"}s emergence in Portuguese mainstream politics in the late 2010s. Considering this late success, Portugal can be seen as a crucial case study to assess the available theories. This investigation employs a popular schema that implies the
  distinction between explanations focused on {"}demand-side{"} factors (the protest voting thesis and the public salience of immigration) from those concerned with {"}supply-side{"} factors (the spatial competition theory and internal supply factors). Through the employment of the
  congruence method, this article highlights the interaction between party-centric factors as a more appropriate explanation for understanding the timing of Chega{"}s electoral breakthrough than demand-side approaches.},
  doi = {10.1093/pa/gsac001},
  }

• Castelli Gattinara, Pietro, Caterina Froio, and Andrea L. P. Pirro. “Far-right Protest Mobilisation in Europe: Grievances, Opportunities and Resources.” European Journal of Political Research online first.nil (2021): nil. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12484
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  What explains far-right mobilisation in the protest arena? After decades of growing electoral support and policy influence, the far right is experiencing an increase in grassroots mobilisation. Scholars of social movements and political parties have devoted little attention to the determinants of far-right protest mobilisation in Europe. In this article, we bridge previous research on the far right and social movements to advance hypotheses on the drivers of far-right protest mobilisation based on grievances, opportunities and resource mobilisation models. We use an original dataset combining novel data on 4,845 far-right protest events in 11 East and West European countries (2008-2018), with existing measures accounting for the (political, economic and cultural) context of mobilisation. We find that classical approaches to collective action can be fruitfully applied to the study of the far right. Cultural grievances, notably concerns about immigration, as well as the availability of institutional access points in contexts characterised by divided government increase far-right protest mobilisation. But far-right protest mobilisation also rests on the organisational resources available to nativist collective actors, that is, the network in which they are embedded, their visibility in the media and elected officials. These findings have important implications to understand far-right success in advanced democracies. They show that far-right mobilisation in the protest arena not only rests on favourable circumstances, but also on whether far-right actors can profit from them. More broadly, the study links party politics and social movement research to grasp the far right{“}s modes of political contestation, locating research on this phenomenon at the intersection of political sociology and comparative politics.

  @Article{castelli-froio-pirro-2021,
  author = {Pietro {Castelli Gattinara} and Caterina Froio and Andrea L. P. Pirro},
  title = {Far-right Protest Mobilisation in Europe: Grievances, Opportunities and Resources},
  journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  number = {nil},
  pages = {nil},
  abstract = {What explains far-right mobilisation in the protest arena? After decades of growing electoral support and policy influence, the far right is experiencing an increase in grassroots mobilisation. Scholars of social movements and political parties have devoted little attention to the
  determinants of far-right protest mobilisation in Europe. In this article, we bridge previous research on the far right and social movements to advance hypotheses on the drivers of far-right protest mobilisation based on grievances, opportunities and resource mobilisation models.
  We use an original dataset combining novel data on 4,845 far-right protest events in 11 East and West European countries (2008-2018), with existing measures accounting for the (political, economic and cultural) context of mobilisation. We find that classical approaches to
  collective action can be fruitfully applied to the study of the far right. Cultural grievances, notably concerns about immigration, as well as the availability of institutional access points in contexts characterised by divided government increase far-right protest mobilisation.
  But far-right protest mobilisation also rests on the organisational resources available to nativist collective actors, that is, the network in which they are embedded, their visibility in the media and elected officials. These findings have important implications to understand
  far-right success in advanced democracies. They show that far-right mobilisation in the protest arena not only rests on favourable circumstances, but also on whether far-right actors can profit from them. More broadly, the study links party politics and social movement research to
  grasp the far right{"}s modes of political contestation, locating research on this phenomenon at the intersection of political sociology and comparative politics.},
  doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12484},
  }

• Chan, Ka Ming. “The Making of Radical-Right Voters: Persuasion and Contrast Effects in a Dynamic Political Context.” Political Psychology online first (2022). doi:10.1111/pops.12801
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Under what circumstances do first-time radical-right party (RRP) voters become more identified with the right-wing label? Also, when do they perceive the center-right party as more left wing and evaluate it more negatively? To answer these two intertwined questions, this article leverages the dynamic political context of Germany during the 2013-17 election cycle. In this election cycle, the political arena became abruptly polarized, as the refugee crisis took place and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) broke into 13 subnational parliaments. Using a unique longitudinal dataset, I find that first-time AfD voters experienced a persuasion effect in such a polarized environment, as they became slightly more right wing. In addition, I find a contrast effect among these voters, as they came to perceive the Christian Democratic Union as more left wing and judged it more negatively. These findings have important implications for understanding the psychological processes of first-time RRP voters in a multiparty system, as they show how a polarized environment can shape RRP voters{“} ideological identity and motivate them to see the mainstream center-right party as an outgroup.

  @Article{chan-2022,
  author = {Ka Ming Chan},
  title = {The Making of Radical-Right Voters: Persuasion and Contrast Effects in a Dynamic Political Context},
  journal = {Political Psychology},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {Under what circumstances do first-time radical-right party (RRP) voters become more identified with the right-wing label? Also, when do they perceive the center-right party as more left wing and evaluate it more negatively? To answer these two intertwined questions, this article
  leverages the dynamic political context of Germany during the 2013-17 election cycle. In this election cycle, the political arena became abruptly polarized, as the refugee crisis took place and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) broke into 13 subnational parliaments. Using a unique
  longitudinal dataset, I find that first-time AfD voters experienced a persuasion effect in such a polarized environment, as they became slightly more right wing. In addition, I find a contrast effect among these voters, as they came to perceive the Christian Democratic Union as
  more left wing and judged it more negatively. These findings have important implications for understanding the psychological processes of first-time RRP voters in a multiparty system, as they show how a polarized environment can shape RRP voters{"} ideological identity and motivate
  them to see the mainstream center-right party as an outgroup.},
  doi = {10.1111/pops.12801},
  }

• Chou, Mark, Benjamin Moffitt, and Rachel Busbridge. “The Localist Turn in Populism Studies.” Swiss Political Science Review nil.online first (2021): nil. doi:10.1111/spsr.12490
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  While the study of populism has typically focused on the national level, recent years have seen a growing body of research on populism{“}s local dimensions. Despite making important scholarly advances, this {“}localist turn{“} has yet to develop a systematic account of how populism intersects with localism. In this research note, we broach this gap. By exploring how right- and left-wing populisms conceptualize the {“}local{“}, as well as how localist sentiments can heighten or diminish the appeal of right and left populist politics, we establish a general framework to guide future inquiry into local manifestations of populist politics.

  @Article{chou-moffitt-busbridge-2021,
  author = {Mark Chou and Benjamin Moffitt and Rachel Busbridge},
  title = {The Localist Turn in Populism Studies},
  journal = {Swiss Political Science Review},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {nil},
  number = {online first},
  pages = {nil},
  abstract = {While the study of populism has typically focused on the national level, recent years have seen a growing body of research on populism{"}s local dimensions. Despite making important scholarly advances, this {"}localist turn{"} has yet to develop a systematic account of how populism
  intersects with localism. In this research note, we broach this gap. By exploring how right- and left-wing populisms conceptualize the {"}local{"}, as well as how localist sentiments can heighten or diminish the appeal of right and left populist politics, we establish a general
  framework to guide future inquiry into local manifestations of populist politics.},
  doi = {10.1111/spsr.12490},
  }

• Cools, Sara, Henning Finseraas, and Ole Rogeberg. “Local Immigration and Support for Anti-Immigration Parties: A Meta-Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science online first (2021). doi:10.1111/ajps.12613
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Does the share of immigrants in a community influence whether people vote for anti-immigration parties? We conduct a systematic review of the causal inference literature studying this question. We collect estimates from 20 studies and develop a new Bayesian meta-analysis framework to account for both between-study heterogeneity in effect sizes and the possibility of reporting bias. Although meta-analysis methods that do not adjust for reporting bias suggest a moderate effect of local immigration, our Bayesian model finds that the effect of local immigration on far-right voting is on average negligible once we account for reporting bias. However, the analysis also reveals a large heterogeneity in effects across contexts, suggesting that local immigration may be important for anti-immigration vote shares in certain settings.

  @Article{cools-finseraas-rogeberg-2021,
  author = {Sara Cools and Henning Finseraas and Ole Rogeberg},
  title = {Local Immigration and Support for Anti-Immigration Parties: A Meta-Analysis},
  journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {Does the share of immigrants in a community influence whether people vote for anti-immigration parties? We conduct a systematic review of the causal inference literature studying this question. We collect estimates from 20 studies and develop a new Bayesian meta-analysis framework
  to account for both between-study heterogeneity in effect sizes and the possibility of reporting bias. Although meta-analysis methods that do not adjust for reporting bias suggest a moderate effect of local immigration, our Bayesian model finds that the effect of local immigration
  on far-right voting is on average negligible once we account for reporting bias. However, the analysis also reveals a large heterogeneity in effects across contexts, suggesting that local immigration may be important for anti-immigration vote shares in certain settings.},
  doi = {10.1111/ajps.12613},
  }

• Cordero, Guillermo, Piotr Zagörski, and Josë Rama. “Give Me Your Least Educated: Immigration, Education and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.” Political Studies Review online first (2021). doi:10.1177/14789299211029110
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  This article deepens the analysis of the effects of immigration on the vote for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, focusing on education levels of both natives and immigrants. By analysing the immigrant population in 101 regions from 11 European countries, we show that in contexts with a large immigrant presence, the low-educated voters tend to support Populist Radical Right Parties to a greater degree than those who are more educated. However, when the ratio of skilled immigrants is high, also the more educated population tends to support these parties. Hence, our analysis adds insight into the relationship between immigration, education and Populist Radical Right Parties voting, highlighting the need of focusing at lower levels of aggregation and combining the characteristics of both foreign-born and host populations.

  @Article{cordero-zagorski-rama-2021,
  author = {Guillermo Cordero and Piotr Zag{\"o}rski and Jos{\"e} Rama},
  title = {Give Me Your Least Educated: Immigration, Education and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe},
  journal = {Political Studies Review},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {This article deepens the analysis of the effects of immigration on the vote for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, focusing on education levels of both natives and immigrants. By analysing the immigrant population in 101 regions from 11 European countries, we show that in
  contexts with a large immigrant presence, the low-educated voters tend to support Populist Radical Right Parties to a greater degree than those who are more educated. However, when the ratio of skilled immigrants is high, also the more educated population tends to support these
  parties. Hence, our analysis adds insight into the relationship between immigration, education and Populist Radical Right Parties voting, highlighting the need of focusing at lower levels of aggregation and combining the characteristics of both foreign-born and host populations.},
  doi = {10.1177/14789299211029110},
  }

• Cremer, Tobias. “A Religious Vaccination? How Christian Communities React To Right-Wing Populism in Germany, France and the Us.” Government and Opposition online first (2021): 1–21. doi:10.1017/gov.2021.18
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Right-wing populists across Western democracies have markedly increased references to Christianity in recent years. While there is much debate about how and why they have done so, less attention has been paid to how Christian communities react to this development. The present study addresses this gap through a comparative analysis of Christian responses to right-wing populist politics in Germany, France and the US. It relies on quantitative studies, survey data and the qualitative analysis of 39 in-depth interviews with right-wing populist leaders, mainstream party politicians and church officials. The findings of this analysis suggest a potential {“}religious vaccination effect{“} among Christian voters against right-wing populism but underline its connection to elite actor behaviour. Specifically, the availability of a {“}Christian alternative{“} in the party system, as well as religious leaders{“} willingness and ability to create a social taboo around the populist right seem critically to impact religious immunity to populism.

  @Article{cremer-2021,
  author = {Tobias Cremer},
  title = {A Religious Vaccination? How Christian Communities React To Right-Wing Populism in Germany, France and the Us},
  journal = {Government and Opposition},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  pages = {1--21},
  abstract = {Right-wing populists across Western democracies have markedly increased references to Christianity in recent years. While there is much debate about how and why they have done so, less attention has been paid to how Christian communities react to this development. The present
  study addresses this gap through a comparative analysis of Christian responses to right-wing populist politics in Germany, France and the US. It relies on quantitative studies, survey data and the qualitative analysis of 39 in-depth interviews with right-wing populist leaders,
  mainstream party politicians and church officials. The findings of this analysis suggest a potential {"}religious vaccination effect{"} among Christian voters against right-wing populism but underline its connection to elite actor behaviour. Specifically, the availability of a
  {"}Christian alternative{"} in the party system, as well as religious leaders{"} willingness and ability to create a social taboo around the populist right seem critically to impact religious immunity to populism.},
  doi = {10.1017/gov.2021.18},
  }

• de Jonge, L{a’e}onie. The Success and Failure of Right-Wing Populist Parties in the Benelux Countries. Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy. London, New York: Routledge, 2021.
  [BibTeX]

  @Book{de-jonge-2021,
  author = {L{\a'e}onie {de Jonge}},
  title = {The Success and Failure of Right-Wing Populist Parties in the Benelux Countries},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  year = {2021},
  series = {Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy},
  address = {London, New York},
  }

• Dehdari, Sirus H.. “Economic Distress and Support for Radical Right Parties-Evidence From Sweden.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2021). doi:10.1177/00104140211024301
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  This paper studies the effects of economic distress on support for radical right parties. Using Swedish election data, I show that one layoff notice among low-skilled native-born workers increases, on average, support for the Swedish radical right party the Sweden Democrats by 0.17-0.45 votes. The relationship between layoff notices and support for the Sweden Democrats is stronger in areas with a high share of low-skilled immigrants and in areas with a low share of high-skilled immigrants. These findings are in line with theories suggesting that economically distressed voters oppose immigration as they fear increased labor market competition. In addition, I use individual-level survey data to show that self-reported unemployment risk is positively associated with voting for the Sweden Democrats among low-skilled respondents while the opposite is true for high-skilled respondents, echoing the aggregate-level findings.

  @Article{dehdari-2021,
  author = {Sirus H. Dehdari},
  title = {Economic Distress and Support for Radical Right Parties-Evidence From Sweden},
  journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {This paper studies the effects of economic distress on support for radical right parties. Using Swedish election data, I show that one layoff notice among low-skilled native-born workers increases, on average, support for the Swedish radical right party the Sweden Democrats by
  0.17-0.45 votes. The relationship between layoff notices and support for the Sweden Democrats is stronger in areas with a high share of low-skilled immigrants and in areas with a low share of high-skilled immigrants. These findings are in line with theories suggesting that
  economically distressed voters oppose immigration as they fear increased labor market competition. In addition, I use individual-level survey data to show that self-reported unemployment risk is positively associated with voting for the Sweden Democrats among low-skilled
  respondents while the opposite is true for high-skilled respondents, echoing the aggregate-level findings.},
  doi = {10.1177/00104140211024301},
  }

• Deppisch, Larissa, Torsten Osigus, and Andreas Klärner. “How Rural Is Rural Populism? on the Spatial Understanding of Rurality for Analyses of Right‐wing Populist Election Success in Germany*.” Rural Sociology online first.nil (2021): ruso.12397. doi:10.1111/ruso.12397
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  In this article, the authors take up the thesis of the narrative that the support for right-wing populist election successes is located in rural areas. For the case of the German right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) the authors propose a complex definition of rurality, and perform a quantitative small-scale analysis of the national election results in Germany in 2017. They examine the potential connection between a high share of votes for the AfD and the rurality of a municipality. The results show that in eastern Germany, the fairly rural municipalities have comparatively high AfD vote shares, whereas in western Germany, the fairly rural and the non-rural municipalities have similar AfD vote shares. Therefore, it appears that the thesis that rural areas are the source of the support of right-wing populism applies to some, but not to all rural areas of Germany.

  @Article{deppisch-osigus-klaerner-2021,
  author = {Larissa Deppisch and Torsten Osigus and Andreas Kl{\"a}rner},
  title = {How Rural Is Rural Populism? on the Spatial Understanding of Rurality for Analyses of Right‐wing Populist Election Success in Germany*},
  journal = {Rural Sociology},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  number = {nil},
  pages = {ruso.12397},
  abstract = {In this article, the authors take up the thesis of the narrative that the support for right-wing populist election successes is located in rural areas. For the case of the German right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) the authors propose a complex definition
  of rurality, and perform a quantitative small-scale analysis of the national election results in Germany in 2017. They examine the potential connection between a high share of votes for the AfD and the rurality of a municipality. The results show that in eastern Germany, the fairly
  rural municipalities have comparatively high AfD vote shares, whereas in western Germany, the fairly rural and the non-rural municipalities have similar AfD vote shares. Therefore, it appears that the thesis that rural areas are the source of the support of right-wing populism
  applies to some, but not to all rural areas of Germany.},
  doi = {10.1111/ruso.12397},
  }

• van Elsas, Erika J., Armen Hakhverdian, and Wouter van der Brug. “United Against a Common Foe? The Nature and Origins of Euroscepticism Among Left-Wing and Right-Wing Citizens.” West European Politics 39.6 (2016): 1181–1204. doi:10.1080/01402382.2016.1175244
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  In Western European democracies opposition to the European Union is commonly found at the ideological extremes. Yet, the Euroscepticism of radical left-wing and radical right-wing parties has been shown to have distinct roots and manifestations. The article investigates whether these differences are mirrored at the citizen level. Using data from the European Election Study (2009/2014) and the European Social Survey (2008/2012) in 15 West European countries, it is found that left-wing and right-wing citizens not only differ in the object of their Euroscepticism, but also in their motivations for being sceptical of the EU. Left-wing Eurosceptics are dissatisfied with the current functioning of the EU, but do not oppose further European integration per se, while right-wing Eurosceptics categorically reject European integration. Euroscepticism among left-wing citizens is motivated by economic and cultural concerns, whereas for right-wing citizens Euroscepticism is solely anchored in cultural attitudes. These results refine the common {“}horseshoe{“} understanding of ideology and Euroscepticism.

  @Article{elsas-hakhverdian-brug-2016,
  author = {Erika J. {van Elsas} and Armen Hakhverdian and Wouter {van der Brug}},
  title = {United Against a Common Foe? The Nature and Origins of Euroscepticism Among Left-Wing and Right-Wing Citizens},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  year = {2016},
  volume = {39},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1181--1204},
  abstract = {In Western European democracies opposition to the European Union is commonly found at the ideological extremes. Yet, the Euroscepticism of radical left-wing and radical right-wing parties has been shown to have distinct roots and manifestations. The article investigates whether
  these differences are mirrored at the citizen level. Using data from the European Election Study (2009/2014) and the European Social Survey (2008/2012) in 15 West European countries, it is found that left-wing and right-wing citizens not only differ in the object of their
  Euroscepticism, but also in their motivations for being sceptical of the EU. Left-wing Eurosceptics are dissatisfied with the current functioning of the EU, but do not oppose further European integration per se, while right-wing Eurosceptics categorically reject European
  integration. Euroscepticism among left-wing citizens is motivated by economic and cultural concerns, whereas for right-wing citizens Euroscepticism is solely anchored in cultural attitudes. These results refine the common {"}horseshoe{"} understanding of ideology and Euroscepticism.},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2016.1175244},
  }

• Enggist, Matthias and Michael Pinggera. “Radical Right Parties and Their Welfare State Stances – Not So Blurry After All?.” West European Politics online first (2021): 1–22. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.1902115
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Recent literature shows that radical right parties (RRPs) present moderate or blurry economic stances. However, this paper argues that this blurriness is restricted to only one of the two main conflicts of contemporary welfare politics, namely questions centring on welfare generosity. In contrast, when it comes to the goals and principles the welfare state should meet, RRPs take a clear stance favouring consumption policies such as old age pensions over social investment, in accordance with their voters{“} preferences. The empirical analysis based on new, fine-grained coding of welfare stances in party manifestos and original data on voters{“} perceptions of party stances in seven European countries supports this argument. RRPs de-emphasise how much welfare state they want while consistently and clearly defending the traditional welfare state{“}s consumptive focus against recalibration proposals. These findings have important implications for party competition and welfare politics.

  @Article{enggist-pinggera-2021,
  author = {Matthias Enggist and Michael Pinggera},
  title = {Radical Right Parties and Their Welfare State Stances - Not So Blurry After All?},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  number = {0},
  pages = {1--22},
  abstract = {Recent literature shows that radical right parties (RRPs) present moderate or blurry economic stances. However, this paper argues that this blurriness is restricted to only one of the two main conflicts of contemporary welfare politics, namely questions centring on welfare
  generosity. In contrast, when it comes to the goals and principles the welfare state should meet, RRPs take a clear stance favouring consumption policies such as old age pensions over social investment, in accordance with their voters{"} preferences. The empirical analysis based on
  new, fine-grained coding of welfare stances in party manifestos and original data on voters{"} perceptions of party stances in seven European countries supports this argument. RRPs de-emphasise how much welfare state they want while consistently and clearly defending the traditional
  welfare state{"}s consumptive focus against recalibration proposals. These findings have important implications for party competition and welfare politics.},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.1902115},
  }

• Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz. “The Impact of Radical Right Parties on Family Benefits.” West European Politics 45.1 (2021): 154–176. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.1936944
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Radical right parties have gained access to government across Europe, yet scholarly work on how they shape welfare states remains scarce. Therefore, this article examines how radical right parties affect family benefits. Combining pro-natalist views with a commitment to traditional gender roles, these parties seek to support family incomes without altering the traditional intra-family division of labour. Radical right governance should therefore correlate positively with spending on family allowances, but negatively with childcare expenditures. However, generous family allowances may become less attractive and childcare spending more attractive to the radical right as immigrant populations increase. An analysis of 26 European countries between 1980 and 2015 shows a negative, yet noisy, effect of the radical right on childcare expenditures. By contrast, effects on family allowances are negligible. Further analysis also uncovers that radical right governance is associated with larger gaps between spending on family allowances and spending on childcare.

  @Article{ennser-jedenastik-2021,
  author = {Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik},
  title = {The Impact of Radical Right Parties on Family Benefits},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {45},
  number = {1},
  pages = {154--176},
  abstract = {Radical right parties have gained access to government across Europe, yet scholarly work on how they shape welfare states remains scarce. Therefore, this article examines how radical right parties affect family benefits. Combining pro-natalist views with a commitment to
  traditional gender roles, these parties seek to support family incomes without altering the traditional intra-family division of labour. Radical right governance should therefore correlate positively with spending on family allowances, but negatively with childcare expenditures.
  However, generous family allowances may become less attractive and childcare spending more attractive to the radical right as immigrant populations increase. An analysis of 26 European countries between 1980 and 2015 shows a negative, yet noisy, effect of the radical right on
  childcare expenditures. By contrast, effects on family allowances are negligible. Further analysis also uncovers that radical right governance is associated with larger gaps between spending on family allowances and spending on childcare.},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.1936944},
  }

• o, S. and Kristian Kongsh o. “The implosion of radical right populism and the path forward for social democracy: Evidence from the 2019 Danish national election.” Scandinavian Political Studies online first (2022). doi:10.1111/1467-9477.12225
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The collapse of the Danish People’s Party (DPP) was pivotal for the Danish 2019 election since a substantial bloc of their previous voters moved to the Social Democratic Party (SDP). This provides an interesting countermovement to the trend of mainstream left parties losing voters to populist or radical right-wing parties across European countries. This paper seeks to explain the driving issues in this voter movement, thereby shedding light on how mainstream left parties can turn the tables vis-à-vis their new right-wing challengers. Specifically, we focus on the traditional or first-dimension issues of welfare and redistribution versus the second-dimension issue of immigration. The simultaneous left-wing turn on welfare and redistribution and right-wing turn on immigration of the Danish SDP has provided room for varying interpretations of the election result. This paper utilizes new survey data to analyze the voter movements from and to the SDP with a special focus on defectors from the DPP. We find that attitudes toward welfare and redistribution were pivotal in moving voters from the DPP to the SDP. Meanwhile, the SDP has not completely “neutralized” the issue of immigration, which still tends to induce these voters to remain loyal to the DPP. We do not find support for the claim that immigration attitudes condition the extent to which redistributive preferences increase the likelihood of switching to the SDP. The SDP’s right turn on immigration, moreover, seems to push voters to the immigration-friendly (center-left wing) support parties.

  @Article{etzerodt-kongshoj-2022,
  author = {S{\o}ren Frank Etzerodt and Kristian Kongsh{\o}j},
  title = {The implosion of radical right populism and the path forward for social democracy: Evidence from the 2019 Danish national election},
  journal = {Scandinavian Political Studies},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {The collapse of the Danish People's Party (DPP) was pivotal for the Danish 2019 election since a substantial bloc of their previous voters moved to the Social Democratic Party (SDP). This provides an interesting countermovement to the trend of mainstream left parties losing voters
  to populist or radical right-wing parties across European countries. This paper seeks to explain the driving issues in this voter movement, thereby shedding light on how mainstream left parties can turn the tables vis-à-vis their new right-wing challengers. Specifically, we focus
  on the traditional or first-dimension issues of welfare and redistribution versus the second-dimension issue of immigration. The simultaneous left-wing turn on welfare and redistribution and right-wing turn on immigration of the Danish SDP has provided room for varying
  interpretations of the election result. This paper utilizes new survey data to analyze the voter movements from and to the SDP with a special focus on defectors from the DPP. We find that attitudes toward welfare and redistribution were pivotal in moving voters from the DPP to the
  SDP. Meanwhile, the SDP has not completely “neutralized” the issue of immigration, which still tends to induce these voters to remain loyal to the DPP. We do not find support for the claim that immigration attitudes condition the extent to which redistributive preferences
  increase the likelihood of switching to the SDP. The SDP's right turn on immigration, moreover, seems to push voters to the immigration-friendly (center-left wing) support parties.},
  doi = {10.1111/1467-9477.12225},
  }

• Favero, Adrian. “Charisma in Right-Wing Populism: Comparing the View of the Leader and Followers within the Swiss People’s Party.” Swiss Political Science Review online first (2022). doi:10.1111/spsr.12510
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The ‘charismatic leader’ is a recurring topic within the literature on populist radical right parties (PRRPs), arguing that charisma is important for the success of these parties. However, most studies assess charismatic leadership only through the perception of the leaders’ followers and make no statement on the leaders’ perspectives and their role for party institutionalisation. This article compares the supply and the demand sides of charisma by drawing on interviews with the so-called charismatic leader of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) – Christoph Blocher – and local, regional and national party representatives. The article shows that assessing both perspectives contributes to a better understanding of charisma and its importance for internal leadership in institutionalised PRRPs. The case of the SVP further demonstrates that successful party institutionalisation and a strong internal organisational structure make the party’s durability less dependent on the charismatic leader and could lead to efforts of depersonalisation.

  @Article{favero-2022,
  author = {Adrian Favero},
  title = {Charisma in Right-Wing Populism: Comparing the View of the Leader and Followers within the Swiss People’s Party},
  journal = {Swiss Political Science Review},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {The ‘charismatic leader’ is a recurring topic within the literature on populist radical right parties (PRRPs), arguing that charisma is important for the success of these parties. However, most studies assess charismatic leadership only through the perception of the leaders'
  followers and make no statement on the leaders' perspectives and their role for party institutionalisation. This article compares the supply and the demand sides of charisma by drawing on interviews with the so-called charismatic leader of the Swiss People's Party (SVP) –
  Christoph Blocher – and local, regional and national party representatives. The article shows that assessing both perspectives contributes to a better understanding of charisma and its importance for internal leadership in institutionalised PRRPs. The case of the SVP further
  demonstrates that successful party institutionalisation and a strong internal organisational structure make the party's durability less dependent on the charismatic leader and could lead to efforts of depersonalisation.},
  doi = {10.1111/spsr.12510},
  }

• Froio, Caterina and Bharath Ganesh. “The Transnationalisation of Far Right Discourse on Twitter.” European Societies 21.4 (2018): 513–539. doi:10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  How transnational are the audiences of far right parties and movements on Twitter? While an increasing number of contributions addresses the topic of transnationalism in far right politics, few systematic investigations exist on the actors and discourses favored in transnational exchanges on social media. Building on the literature on the far right, social movements, transnationalism and the Internet, the paper addresses this gap by studying the initiators and the issues that are favored in online exchanges between audiences of far right organizations, e.g. political parties and movements across France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. We use a new dataset on the activities of far right Twitter users that is analyzed through a mixed methods approach. Using social network analysis, we detect transnational links between far right organizations across countries based on retweets from audiences of far right Twitter users. Retweets are qualitatively coded for content and compared to the content retweeted within national communities. Finally, using a logistic regression, we quantify the level to which specific issues and organizations enjoy high levels of attention across borders. Subsequently, we use discourse analysis to qualitatively reconstruct the interpretative frames accompanying these patterns. We find that although social media are often ascribed much power in favoring transnational exchanges between far right organizations, there is little evidence of this. Only a few issues (anti-immigration and nativist interpretations of the economy) garner transnational far right audiences on Twitter. In addition, we find that more than movements, political parties play a prominent role in the construction of a transnational far right discourse.

  @Article{froio-ganesh-2018,
  author = {Caterina Froio and Bharath Ganesh},
  title = {The Transnationalisation of Far Right Discourse on Twitter},
  journal = {European Societies},
  year = {2018},
  volume = {21},
  number = {4},
  pages = {513--539},
  abstract = {How transnational are the audiences of far right parties and movements on Twitter? While an increasing number of contributions addresses the topic of transnationalism in far right politics, few systematic investigations exist on the actors and discourses favored in transnational
  exchanges on social media. Building on the literature on the far right, social movements, transnationalism and the Internet, the paper addresses this gap by studying the initiators and the issues that are favored in online exchanges between audiences of far right organizations,
  e.g. political parties and movements across France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. We use a new dataset on the activities of far right Twitter users that is analyzed through a mixed methods approach. Using social network analysis, we detect transnational links between far
  right organizations across countries based on retweets from audiences of far right Twitter users. Retweets are qualitatively coded for content and compared to the content retweeted within national communities. Finally, using a logistic regression, we quantify the level to which
  specific issues and organizations enjoy high levels of attention across borders. Subsequently, we use discourse analysis to qualitatively reconstruct the interpretative frames accompanying these patterns. We find that although social media are often ascribed much power in favoring
  transnational exchanges between far right organizations, there is little evidence of this. Only a few issues (anti-immigration and nativist interpretations of the economy) garner transnational far right audiences on Twitter. In addition, we find that more than movements, political
  parties play a prominent role in the construction of a transnational far right discourse.},
  doi = {10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295},
  }

• Gattinara, Pietro Castelli and Andrea L. P. Pirro. “The Far Right as Social Movement.” European Societies 21.4 (2019): 447–462. doi:10.1080/14616696.2018.1494301
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The literature on the far right is trying to connect with social movement studies. Scholars from different social scientific backgrounds are increasingly acknowledging that extra-parliamentary grassroots activism is part of the alliance and conflict structure of nativist collective actors. The recent rise in far-right street politics – or, precisely, its re-emergence with seemingly different clothes – should encourage the study of the inter-relations between party and non-party collective actors. As a case in point, the far right not only includes political parties geared towards elections and public office but also social movements or {“}networks of networks{“} that aim to mobilise public support, and a conglomeration of subcultural groups and groupuscules. By putting forward a three-part metric to analyse mobilisation factors at the macro, meso, and micro levels, this piece and the Special Issue it introduces bring the (inter-)relations between far-right parties, movements, and subcultures frontstage, and elaborate on nativist collective action across different arenas of contention.

  @Article{gattinara-pirro-2019,
  author = {Pietro Castelli Gattinara and Andrea L. P. Pirro},
  title = {The Far Right as Social Movement},
  journal = {European Societies},
  year = {2019},
  volume = {21},
  number = {4},
  pages = {447--462},
  abstract = {The literature on the far right is trying to connect with social movement studies. Scholars from different social scientific backgrounds are increasingly acknowledging that extra-parliamentary grassroots activism is part of the alliance and conflict structure of nativist
  collective actors. The recent rise in far-right street politics - or, precisely, its re-emergence with seemingly different clothes - should encourage the study of the inter-relations between party and non-party collective actors. As a case in point, the far right not only includes
  political parties geared towards elections and public office but also social movements or {"}networks of networks{"} that aim to mobilise public support, and a conglomeration of subcultural groups and groupuscules. By putting forward a three-part metric to analyse mobilisation factors
  at the macro, meso, and micro levels, this piece and the Special Issue it introduces bring the (inter-)relations between far-right parties, movements, and subcultures frontstage, and elaborate on nativist collective action across different arenas of contention.},
  doi = {10.1080/14616696.2018.1494301},
  }

• de Geus, Roosmarijn and Elizabeth Ralph-Morrow. “An Every Man, Not for Every Woman: Nigel Farage and the Radical Right Gender Gap.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties online first (2021): 1–18. doi:10.1080/17457289.2021.1968410
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Support for the populist radical right (PRR) has surged across Europe. Existing studies on female support for the PRR are mostly cross-national in nature and have found that neither social-demographic nor attitudinal differences satisfactorily explain the gender gap in PRR support. Here we focus on the gender gap in support for UKIP and the Brexit Party, two parties that have significantly shaped British politics. Using data covering two European Parliamentary and three General Elections, we show that a gender gap exists in PRR support, but that it varies over time. In line with comparative studies, we find little evidence to suggest that social-demographic or attitudinal differences explain the gender gap in PRR support. Instead, we show that party leadership is crucial. Women in the British electorate hold negative opinions on Nigel Farage and this explains the gender gap in PRR support in Britain.

  @Article{geus-ralph-morrow-2021,
  author = {Roosmarijn {de Geus} and Elizabeth Ralph-Morrow},
  title = {An Every Man, Not for Every Woman: Nigel Farage and the Radical Right Gender Gap},
  journal = {Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  pages = {1--18},
  abstract = {Support for the populist radical right (PRR) has surged across Europe. Existing studies on female support for the PRR are mostly cross-national in nature and have found that neither social-demographic nor attitudinal differences satisfactorily explain the gender gap in PRR
  support. Here we focus on the gender gap in support for UKIP and the Brexit Party, two parties that have significantly shaped British politics. Using data covering two European Parliamentary and three General Elections, we show that a gender gap exists in PRR support, but that it
  varies over time. In line with comparative studies, we find little evidence to suggest that social-demographic or attitudinal differences explain the gender gap in PRR support. Instead, we show that party leadership is crucial. Women in the British electorate hold negative opinions
  on Nigel Farage and this explains the gender gap in PRR support in Britain.},
  doi = {10.1080/17457289.2021.1968410},
  }

• Gherghina, Sergiu and Jean-Benoit Pilet. “Do Populist Parties Support Referendums? A Comparative Analysis of Election Manifestos in Europe.” Electoral Studies 74 (2021): online first. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102419
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Earlier research refers to populist parties as being advocates of a greater use of referendum. Yet, there has been no large-scale systematic test of this claim. This article addresses this gap in the literature and tests the relationship between populism and greater use for referendums in party manifestos. It analyzes 824 manifestos of 187 populist and non-populist parties in 27 Member States of the European Union between 1994 and 2018. We test if populist parties are virtually all in favor of a greater use of referendums and whether they would talk about referendums much more than non-populist parties.

  @Article{gherghina-pilet-2021,
  author = {Sergiu Gherghina and Jean-Benoit Pilet},
  title = {Do Populist Parties Support Referendums? A Comparative Analysis of Election Manifestos in Europe},
  journal = {Electoral Studies},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {74},
  pages = {online first},
  abstract = {Earlier research refers to populist parties as being advocates of a greater use of referendum. Yet, there has been no large-scale systematic test of this claim. This article addresses this gap in the literature and tests the relationship between populism and greater use for
  referendums in party manifestos. It analyzes 824 manifestos of 187 populist and non-populist parties in 27 Member States of the European Union between 1994 and 2018. We test if populist parties are virtually all in favor of a greater use of referendums and whether they would talk
  about referendums much more than non-populist parties.},
  doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102419},
  }

• Green, Jane, Timothy Hellwig, and Edward Fieldhouse. “Who Gets What: The Economy, Relative Gains and Brexit.” British Journal of Political Science 52.1 (2022): 320–338. doi:10.1017/S0007123420000551
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  There has been a lively debate about the economic and cultural-based drivers of support for populism. This article argues that economic concerns matter, but that they are realized through the relative gains and losses of social groups. Using new survey items in a large representative survey administered in Britain, it shows that citizens{“} economic assessments of the ethnic minority out-group – in relation to the group{“}s situation 12 months ago and to assessments of the economic conditions of the white British in-group – are a predictor of support for Brexit. The results, which are robust to prior referendum vote, immigration attitudes and cultural sentiment, extend across income groups and national identity strength. Extending the analysis to a comparison of geographic in- and out-groups between local communities and London lends additional support to the argument. The implications of relative group-based economics are important for understanding Brexit and the economic sources of support for populism more broadly.

  @Article{green-hellwig-fieldhouse-2022,
  author = {Jane Green and Timothy Hellwig and Edward Fieldhouse},
  title = {Who Gets What: The Economy, Relative Gains and Brexit},
  journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {52},
  number = {1},
  pages = {320--338},
  abstract = {There has been a lively debate about the economic and cultural-based drivers of support for populism. This article argues that economic concerns matter, but that they are realized through the relative gains and losses of social groups. Using new survey items in a large
  representative survey administered in Britain, it shows that citizens{"} economic assessments of the ethnic minority out-group - in relation to the group{"}s situation 12 months ago and to assessments of the economic conditions of the white British in-group - are a predictor of support
  for Brexit. The results, which are robust to prior referendum vote, immigration attitudes and cultural sentiment, extend across income groups and national identity strength. Extending the analysis to a comparison of geographic in- and out-groups between local communities and London
  lends additional support to the argument. The implications of relative group-based economics are important for understanding Brexit and the economic sources of support for populism more broadly.},
  doi = {10.1017/S0007123420000551},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  }

• Hackenesch, Christine, Maximilian Högl, Hannes Öhler, and Aline Burni. “Populist Radical Right Parties” Impact on European Foreign Aid Spending.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies online first (2022). doi:10.1111/jcms.13308
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Since the early 2000s, populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have more than doubled their electoral support in Europe. Previous research found that PRRPs impact migration policy. However, little is known about whether they also impact other fields of domestic and foreign policy. Using a cross-country panel analysis, we test to what extent the rise of PRRPs has influenced European foreign aid spending. We find that while the rise of PRRPs has not been associated with an overall reduction in foreign aid, it has led to changes in how aid moneys are spent. PRRP strength is linked to a higher share of aid for migration-containment objectives, and less aid for addressing climate change and for multilateral organizations. Our analysis thereby provides evidence that the {“}electoral threat{“} of PRRPs puts mainstream parties under pressure not only with regard to migration but also in relation to the climate-development nexus and aid for multilateralism.

  @Article{hackenesch-hoegl-oehler-burni-2022,
  author = {Christine Hackenesch and Maximilian H{\"o}gl and Hannes {\"O}hler and Aline Burni},
  title = {Populist Radical Right Parties{"} Impact on European Foreign Aid Spending},
  journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {Since the early 2000s, populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have more than doubled their electoral support in Europe. Previous research found that PRRPs impact migration policy. However, little is known about whether they also impact other fields of domestic and foreign policy.
  Using a cross-country panel analysis, we test to what extent the rise of PRRPs has influenced European foreign aid spending. We find that while the rise of PRRPs has not been associated with an overall reduction in foreign aid, it has led to changes in how aid moneys are spent.
  PRRP strength is linked to a higher share of aid for migration-containment objectives, and less aid for addressing climate change and for multilateral organizations. Our analysis thereby provides evidence that the {"}electoral threat{"} of PRRPs puts mainstream parties under pressure
  not only with regard to migration but also in relation to the climate-development nexus and aid for multilateralism.},
  doi = {10.1111/jcms.13308},
  }

• Haffert, Lukas. “The Long-Term Effects of Oppression: Prussia, Political Catholicism, and the Alternative für Deutschland.” American Political Science Review online first (2021): 1–20. doi:10.1017/s0003055421001040
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Contemporary political behavior is often affected by historical legacies, but the specific mechanisms through which these legacies are transmitted are difficult to pin down. This paper argues that historical political conflicts can affect political behavior over several generations when they trigger an enduring organizational mobilization. It studies how the oppression of German Catholics in the nineteenth century led to a regionally differentiated mobilization of political Catholicism that still affects political support for the radical right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) today. Using newly collected data on historical oppression events, it shows that Catholic regions where oppression was intense saw greater mobilization of Catholic lay organizations than Catholic regions where oppression was milder and show lower support for the AfD today. The paper thus contributes to the literature on the historical determinants of political behavior as well as to the question of which regional context effects strengthen or weaken the radical right.

  @Article{haffert-2021,
  author = {Lukas Haffert},
  title = {The Long-Term Effects of Oppression: Prussia, Political Catholicism, and the Alternative f{\"u}r Deutschland},
  journal = {American Political Science Review},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  pages = {1--20},
  abstract = {Contemporary political behavior is often affected by historical legacies, but the specific mechanisms through which these legacies are transmitted are difficult to pin down. This paper argues that historical political conflicts can affect political behavior over several
  generations when they trigger an enduring organizational mobilization. It studies how the oppression of German Catholics in the nineteenth century led to a regionally differentiated mobilization of political Catholicism that still affects political support for the radical right
  Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) today. Using newly collected data on historical oppression events, it shows that Catholic regions where oppression was intense saw greater mobilization of Catholic lay organizations than Catholic regions where oppression was milder and show lower
  support for the AfD today. The paper thus contributes to the literature on the historical determinants of political behavior as well as to the question of which regional context effects strengthen or weaken the radical right.},
  doi = {10.1017/s0003055421001040},
  }

• Hagemeister, Felix. “Populism and Propagation of Far-Right Extremism.” European Journal of Political Economy online first (2021). doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102116
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Under which conditions does populist success propagate far-right extremism? This paper examines how an information shock about the acceptance of xenophobic positions spurs an increase in far-right protests in more liberal areas in Germany. Using staggered state elections between 2014 and 2017 as a quasi-natural experiment and leveraging novel data, I show that far-right protests are unleashed in more liberal areas which were {“}shocked{“} by the surprising state-level results of the newly emerging right-wing populist AfD party ({“}Alternative für Deutschland{“}). The effect is sizeable, but depends on surprise. When success of the populist party is severely underestimated, a municipality with a populist vote share 10 percentage points below state average faces a roughly 30 percent increase of the mean likelihood of an additional far- right protest. The effect materializes only after the rightward shift of the AfD and vanishes when polling institutions correctly estimate the populist party{“}s success.

  @Article{hagemeister-2021,
  author = {Felix Hagemeister},
  title = {Populism and Propagation of Far-Right Extremism},
  journal = {European Journal of Political Economy},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {Under which conditions does populist success propagate far-right extremism? This paper examines how an information shock about the acceptance of xenophobic positions spurs an increase in far-right protests in more liberal areas in Germany. Using staggered state elections between
  2014 and 2017 as a quasi-natural experiment and leveraging novel data, I show that far-right protests are unleashed in more liberal areas which were {"}shocked{"} by the surprising state-level results of the newly emerging right-wing populist AfD party ({"}Alternative für Deutschland{"}).
  The effect is sizeable, but depends on surprise. When success of the populist party is severely underestimated, a municipality with a populist vote share 10 percentage points below state average faces a roughly 30 percent increase of the mean likelihood of an additional far- right
  protest. The effect materializes only after the rightward shift of the AfD and vanishes when polling institutions correctly estimate the populist party{"}s success.},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102116},
  }

• Han, Kyung Joon and Eric Graig Castater. “It”s Not Just Where You Stand, It”s How You Got There: Social Pacts and Manual Worker Support for Radical Right-wing Parties.” European Politics and Society online first (2021): 1–25. doi:10.1080/23745118.2021.1973214
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  We utilize the literature on social pacts to argue that governments can reduce manual worker support for the radical right by engaging in an inclusive process of decision-making with unions. Our analysis examines 11 Western European countries between 1999 and 2017 and employs a Heckman selection model. We find that when left or mainstream right governments complete social pact agreements, manual workers become less likely to support radical right-wing parties (RRPs); but when such governments fail to convert social pact proposals into social pact agreements, manual workers become more likely to support RRPs. We also find that social pact agreements have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under mainstream right governments, but that failed social pact proposals have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under left governments; and that the social pact formation process matters more for the RRP support of manual workers who belong to a union than those who do not. Our results suggest that manual worker support for the radical right is not only a function of issue voting or socioeconomic and policy outcomes, but also features of the policymaking process.

  @Article{han-castater-2021,
  author = {Kyung Joon Han and Eric Graig Castater},
  title = {It{"}s Not Just Where You Stand, It{"}s How You Got There: Social Pacts and Manual Worker Support for Radical Right-wing Parties},
  journal = {European Politics and Society},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  pages = {1--25},
  abstract = {We utilize the literature on social pacts to argue that governments can reduce manual worker support for the radical right by engaging in an inclusive process of decision-making with unions. Our analysis examines 11 Western European countries between 1999 and 2017 and employs a
  Heckman selection model. We find that when left or mainstream right governments complete social pact agreements, manual workers become less likely to support radical right-wing parties (RRPs); but when such governments fail to convert social pact proposals into social pact
  agreements, manual workers become more likely to support RRPs. We also find that social pact agreements have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under mainstream right governments, but that failed social pact proposals have a greater
  effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under left governments; and that the social pact formation process matters more for the RRP support of manual workers who belong to a union than those who do not. Our results suggest that manual worker support
  for the radical right is not only a function of issue voting or socioeconomic and policy outcomes, but also features of the policymaking process.},
  doi = {10.1080/23745118.2021.1973214},
  }

• Hartmann, Jörg, Karin Kurz, and Holger Lengfeld. “Modernization Losers” Revenge? Income Mobility and Support for Right- and Left-Wing Populist Parties in Germany.” European Sociological Review online first (2021). doi:10.1093/esr/jcab024
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Against the backdrop of rising support for right- and left-wing populist parties in Europe, a long-standing argument has been that the more vulnerable strata of society are deprived by structural economic change as well as increasing social inequality and express their grievances by voting for radical and populist parties. Previous research has tested the thesis either based on cross-sectional data and vague proxies for past income developments or used objective short-term measures of income changes. In this study, we propose a more thorough test using longitudinal data and measures of objective relative deprivation, objective absolute deprivation, and subjective deprivation. Using SOEP data for 2016, our results show little support that those with lower incomes identify more with the populist right-wing AfD in Germany. Furthermore, we find no evidence that objectively falling behind is associated with more support for the AfD and the populist left-wing party die Linke among the less well off. Rather, support for the AfD is highest among the less well-off with stable incomes and the less well-off who perceive their incomes as having been unstable. For die Linke, support is highest among the less well-off who experienced absolute income gains and the less well-off who perceive their incomes as having been upwardly or downwardly mobile.

  @Article{hartmann-kurz-lengfeld-2021,
  author = {J{\"o}rg Hartmann and Karin Kurz and Holger Lengfeld},
  title = {Modernization Losers{"} Revenge? Income Mobility and Support for Right- and Left-Wing Populist Parties in Germany},
  journal = {European Sociological Review},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {Against the backdrop of rising support for right- and left-wing populist parties in Europe, a long-standing argument has been that the more vulnerable strata of society are deprived by structural economic change as well as increasing social inequality and express their grievances
  by voting for radical and populist parties. Previous research has tested the thesis either based on cross-sectional data and vague proxies for past income developments or used objective short-term measures of income changes. In this study, we propose a more thorough test using
  longitudinal data and measures of objective relative deprivation, objective absolute deprivation, and subjective deprivation. Using SOEP data for 2016, our results show little support that those with lower incomes identify more with the populist right-wing AfD in Germany.
  Furthermore, we find no evidence that objectively falling behind is associated with more support for the AfD and the populist left-wing party die Linke among the less well off. Rather, support for the AfD is highest among the less well-off with stable incomes and the less well-off
  who perceive their incomes as having been unstable. For die Linke, support is highest among the less well-off who experienced absolute income gains and the less well-off who perceive their incomes as having been upwardly or downwardly mobile.},
  doi = {10.1093/esr/jcab024},
  }

• Heinze, Anna-Sophie. “Zwischen Etablierung und Mainstreaming: Zum Stand der Forschung zu Populismus und Rechtsradikalismus.” Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft online first (2022). doi:10.1007/s12286-022-00517-9
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Über kaum ein anderes Phänomen wurde in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten so viel diskutiert und publiziert wie über den Populismus. Dabei dreht sich die öffentliche und wissenschaftliche Debatte vor allem um rechten, weniger um linken Populismus. Dies ist vor dem Hintergrund der wachsenden Bedeutung (populistischer) rechtsradikaler Parteien, Bewegungen und Akteure weltweit kaum verwunderlich. In der Politikwissenschaft existiert bereits eine nahezu unüberschaubare Vielzahl an internationaler Forschung zu den Merkmalen, Erfolgsfaktoren und dem Einfluss jener Parteienfamilie (einen ersten Überblick erlaubt die Bibliographie von Arzheimer 2021). Trotz der enormen theoretischen, methodischen und empirischen Vielfalt der Studien können diese teilweise nur noch wenig Neues dazu beitragen, wie der wachsenden Bedeutung des Rechtspopulismus begegnet werden kann. Das Ziel des vorliegenden Artikels ist es daher, die bisherigen Erkenntnisse der Forschung zu Populismus und Rechtsradikalismus möglichst umfassend darzustellen, ihre Grenzen aufzuzeigen und zukünftige Forschungsperspektiven zu skizzieren. Da hierbei freilich nicht auf alle Arbeiten gleichermaßen eingegangen werden kann, wird der Fokus auf generellen Forschungstrends und -desideraten liegen.

  @Article{heinze-2022,
  author = {Anna-Sophie Heinze},
  title = {Zwischen Etablierung und Mainstreaming: Zum Stand der Forschung zu Populismus und Rechtsradikalismus},
  journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {Über kaum ein anderes Phänomen wurde in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten so viel diskutiert und publiziert wie über den Populismus. Dabei dreht sich die öffentliche und wissenschaftliche Debatte vor allem um rechten, weniger um linken Populismus. Dies ist vor dem Hintergrund der
  wachsenden Bedeutung (populistischer) rechtsradikaler Parteien, Bewegungen und Akteure weltweit kaum verwunderlich. In der Politikwissenschaft existiert bereits eine nahezu unüberschaubare Vielzahl an internationaler Forschung zu den Merkmalen, Erfolgsfaktoren und dem Einfluss
  jener Parteienfamilie (einen ersten Überblick erlaubt die Bibliographie von Arzheimer 2021). Trotz der enormen theoretischen, methodischen und empirischen Vielfalt der Studien können diese teilweise nur noch wenig Neues dazu beitragen, wie der wachsenden Bedeutung des
  Rechtspopulismus begegnet werden kann. Das Ziel des vorliegenden Artikels ist es daher, die bisherigen Erkenntnisse der Forschung zu Populismus und Rechtsradikalismus möglichst umfassend darzustellen, ihre Grenzen aufzuzeigen und zukünftige Forschungsperspektiven zu skizzieren.
  Da hierbei freilich nicht auf alle Arbeiten gleichermaßen eingegangen werden kann, wird der Fokus auf generellen Forschungstrends und -desideraten liegen.},
  doi = {10.1007/s12286-022-00517-9},
  }

• Heinze, Anna-Sophie and Man a`e. “No Strong Leaders Needed? Afd Party Organisation Between Collective Leadership, Internal Democracy, and “Movement-Party” Strategy.” Politics and Governance 9.4 (2021): 263–274. doi:10.17645/pag.v9i4.4530
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  This article analyses the formal and lived organisation of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany). We show that the party is exceptional among what is usually understood as the populist radical right (PRR) party family, at least from an organisational perspective: The AfD sharply contradicts the {“}standard model{“} of PRR party organisation, which emphasises {“}charismatic{“} leadership and the centralisation of power as key features. Instead, studying the AfD{“}s efforts to adopt some elements of a mass-party organisation and its relatively decentralised decision-making underlines the importance of {“}movement-party{“} strategy, collective leadership, and internal democracy-concepts that are usually associated with Green and left-wing parties. Our analysis shows how the party{“}s organisation is essential for understanding its development more broadly as it reflects and reinforces sharp intra-party conflict. From this perspective, the case of the AfD sheds new light on the relationship between PRR party organisation and electoral success, indicating the importance of strong ties to parts of society over effective internal management as long as demand for anti-immigration parties is high. We conclude that even though AfD quickly built up a relatively inclusive organisational structure, the role of both its leadership and its rank-and-file is still a matter of controversy.

  @Article{heinze-weisskircher-2021,
  author = {Anna-Sophie Heinze and Man{\a`e}s Weisskircher},
  title = {No Strong Leaders Needed? Afd Party Organisation Between Collective Leadership, Internal Democracy, and {"}Movement-Party{"} Strategy},
  journal = {Politics and Governance},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {9},
  number = {4},
  pages = {263--274},
  abstract = {This article analyses the formal and lived organisation of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany). We show that the party is exceptional among what is usually understood as the populist radical right (PRR) party family, at least from an organisational
  perspective: The AfD sharply contradicts the {"}standard model{"} of PRR party organisation, which emphasises {"}charismatic{"} leadership and the centralisation of power as key features. Instead, studying the AfD{"}s efforts to adopt some elements of a mass-party organisation and its
  relatively decentralised decision-making underlines the importance of {"}movement-party{"} strategy, collective leadership, and internal democracy-concepts that are usually associated with Green and left-wing parties. Our analysis shows how the party{"}s organisation is essential for
  understanding its development more broadly as it reflects and reinforces sharp intra-party conflict. From this perspective, the case of the AfD sheds new light on the relationship between PRR party organisation and electoral success, indicating the importance of strong ties to
  parts of society over effective internal management as long as demand for anti-immigration parties is high. We conclude that even though AfD quickly built up a relatively inclusive organisational structure, the role of both its leadership and its rank-and-file is still a matter of
  controversy.},
  doi = {10.17645/pag.v9i4.4530},
  }

• Höhne, Benjamin. “How Democracy Works Within a Populist Party: Candidate Selection in the Alternative for Germany.” Government and Opposition online first (2021): 1–19. doi:10.1017/gov.2021.33
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Does the demand for more direct democracy by populist parties have any implications for their internal decision-making? To answer this question, a novel large-scale research project analyses the 2017 candidate selection of all Bundestag parties, including the populist Alternative for Germany. Some 1,334 individual nominations of seven parties are compared using quantitative indicators along three dimensions of intra-party democracy (IPD): competition between aspirants for candidacy, inclusion of members and nomination-related communication. It shows that the AfD is living up to its promise of practising grassroots democracy: in all results it ranks at the top by a wide margin. A new populist organizational model seems to have emerged following neither the classic hierarchical and leader-oriented mode of many other European right-wing populist parties nor the delegate assembly mode typical of German parties. Our further development of IPD concepts, newly elaborated measuring methods and surprising empirical evidence improve the understanding of democratic decision-making in populist parties.

  @Article{hoehne-2021,
  author = {Benjamin H{\"o}hne},
  title = {How Democracy Works Within a Populist Party: Candidate Selection in the Alternative for Germany},
  journal = {Government and Opposition},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  pages = {1--19},
  abstract = {Does the demand for more direct democracy by populist parties have any implications for their internal decision-making? To answer this question, a novel large-scale research project analyses the 2017 candidate selection of all Bundestag parties, including the populist Alternative
  for Germany. Some 1,334 individual nominations of seven parties are compared using quantitative indicators along three dimensions of intra-party democracy (IPD): competition between aspirants for candidacy, inclusion of members and nomination-related communication. It shows that
  the AfD is living up to its promise of practising grassroots democracy: in all results it ranks at the top by a wide margin. A new populist organizational model seems to have emerged following neither the classic hierarchical and leader-oriented mode of many other European
  right-wing populist parties nor the delegate assembly mode typical of German parties. Our further development of IPD concepts, newly elaborated measuring methods and surprising empirical evidence improve the understanding of democratic decision-making in populist parties.},
  doi = {10.1017/gov.2021.33},
  }

• Hunger, Sophia and Fred Paxton. “What”s in a buzzword? A systematic review of the state of populism research in political science.” Political Science Research and Methods (2021): online first. doi:10.1017/psrm.2021.44
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Although attention to populism is ever-increasing, the concept remains contested. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of populism research and identifies tendencies to a conflation of host ideologies and populism in political science through a two-step analysis. First, we conduct a quantitative review of 884 abstracts from 2004 to 2018 using text-as-data methods. We show that scholars sit at {“}separate tables,{“} divided by geographical foci, methods, and host ideologies. Next, our qualitative analysis of 50 articles finds a common conflation of populism with other ideologies, resulting in the analytical neglect of the former. We, therefore, urge researchers to properly distinguish populism from {“}what it travels with{“} and engage more strongly with the dynamic interlinkages between thin and thick ideologies.

  @Article{hunger-paxton-2021,
  author = {Sophia Hunger and Fred Paxton},
  title = {What{"}s in a buzzword? A systematic review of the state of populism research in political science},
  journal = {Political Science Research and Methods},
  year = {2021},
  pages = {online first},
  abstract = {Although attention to populism is ever-increasing, the concept remains contested. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of populism research and identifies tendencies to a conflation of host ideologies and populism in political science through a two-step analysis. First, we
  conduct a quantitative review of 884 abstracts from 2004 to 2018 using text-as-data methods. We show that scholars sit at {"}separate tables,{"} divided by geographical foci, methods, and host ideologies. Next, our qualitative analysis of 50 articles finds a common conflation of
  populism with other ideologies, resulting in the analytical neglect of the former. We, therefore, urge researchers to properly distinguish populism from {"}what it travels with{"} and engage more strongly with the dynamic interlinkages between thin and thick ideologies.},
  doi = {10.1017/psrm.2021.44},
  }

• Jacobs, Laura and Joost van Spanje. “Not All Terror Is Alike: How Right-Wing Extremist and Islamist Terror Threat Affect Anti-immigration Party Support.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research online first (2021). doi:10.1093/ijpor/edaa037
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Terror threat has been theorized to affect political attitudes. Most prior studies have focused exclusively on Islamist terror threat, while effects of right-wing extremist terrorism on voting behavior have been understudied. We argue that effects on the propensity to vote (PTV) for an anti-immigration party (AIP) depend on the type of threat and is moderated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and internal motivation to control prejudice (IMCP). Using a cross-country experiment in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (N = 1,187), we find that Islamist terror threat increases PTV for AIPs amongst voters high in RWA; similarly, right-wing extremist terror threat reduces PTV for AIPs amongst participants high in RWA. IMCP did not moderate the relationship between terror threat and PTV for an AIP.

  @Article{jacobs-spanje-2021b,
  author = {Laura Jacobs and Joost {van Spanje}},
  title = {Not All Terror Is Alike: How Right-Wing Extremist and Islamist Terror Threat Affect Anti-immigration Party Support},
  journal = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {Terror threat has been theorized to affect political attitudes. Most prior studies have focused exclusively on Islamist terror threat, while effects of right-wing extremist terrorism on voting behavior have been understudied. We argue that effects on the propensity to vote (PTV)
  for an anti-immigration party (AIP) depend on the type of threat and is moderated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and internal motivation to control prejudice (IMCP). Using a cross-country experiment in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (N = 1,187), we find that
  Islamist terror threat increases PTV for AIPs amongst voters high in RWA; similarly, right-wing extremist terror threat reduces PTV for AIPs amongst participants high in RWA. IMCP did not moderate the relationship between terror threat and PTV for an AIP.},
  doi = {10.1093/ijpor/edaa037},
  }

• Jennings, Will and Gerry Stoker. “The Divergent Dynamics of Cities and Towns: Geographical Polarisation and Brexit.” The Political Quarterly 90.S2 (2018): 155–166. doi:10.1111/1467-923x.12612
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  the brexit vote revealed a country divided by place, reflecting the diverging trajectories of economic development and politics taken by locations that have prospered in a globalised knowledge economy-predominantly cities-contrasted with places on the periphery, in towns and rural areas. The same dynamics are observed in the United States, where support for the Democratic party is increasingly concentrated in urban areas, while the Republicans have lately made electoral inroads across the rural and small-town America that is shrinking or stagnating in terms of its population and jobs-creating a polarised politics that is divided by demographics and geography. In Europe, there has been a clear spatial pattern in electoral support for populist parties and candidates.2 There are ways in which the British case has distinct features-due to its particular geography and institutions-but it largely reflects a wider trend where {“}place{“} is increasingly consequential for political change and public policy. While the EU referendum vote put the political divide between Britain{“}s towns and cities into the spotlight, this divide is the product of long-term forces of social and economic changes. In this chapter, we show how geographical polarisation has and continues to reshape British politics, in the diverging trends between those places that have experienced relative decline and those that have thrived. Not only do these changes have electoral consequences for the major parties in Westminster, they pose particular challenges in terms of public policy. Our argument proceeds as follows. Firstly, we demonstrate the trend towards geographical polarisation in voting behaviour, as the populations of big cities have voted in increasing numbers for Labour, while the residents of towns and rural areas increasingly have opted for the Conservatives. Secondly, we argue and show that this trend reflects economic as well as cultural forces: the schism between places reflects both divergent paths of demographic and economic change and related variation in the cultural and social outlooks of voters. Thirdly, we discuss the major challenge-amplified by Brexit-that this geographical polarisation presents for each of the parties as they seek to build electoral coalitions that reach beyond their existing strongholds. In concluding, we explore how the parties are presently responding to the place-based divergence of voting behaviour and policy problems.

  @Article{jennings-stoker-2018,
  author = {Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker},
  title = {The Divergent Dynamics of Cities and Towns: Geographical Polarisation and Brexit},
  journal = {The Political Quarterly},
  year = {2018},
  volume = {90},
  number = {S2},
  pages = {155--166},
  abstract = {the brexit vote revealed a country divided by place, reflecting the diverging trajectories of economic development and politics taken by locations that have prospered in a globalised knowledge economy-predominantly cities-contrasted with places on the periphery, in towns and rural areas. The same dynamics are observed in the United States, where support for the Democratic party is increasingly concentrated in urban areas, while the Republicans have lately made electoral inroads across the rural and small-town America that is shrinking or stagnating in terms of its population and jobs-creating a polarised politics that is divided by demographics and geography. In Europe, there has been a clear spatial pattern in electoral support for populist parties and candidates.2 There are ways in which the British case has distinct features-due to its particular geography and institutions-but it largely reflects a wider trend where {"}place{"} is increasingly consequential for political change and public policy. While the EU referendum vote put the political divide between Britain{"}s towns and cities into the spotlight, this divide is the product of long-term forces of social and economic changes. In this chapter, we show how geographical polarisation has and continues to reshape British politics, in the diverging trends between those places that have experienced relative decline and those that have thrived. Not only do these changes have electoral consequences for the major parties in Westminster, they pose particular challenges in terms of public policy. Our argument proceeds as follows. Firstly, we demonstrate the trend towards geographical polarisation in voting behaviour,
  as the populations of big cities have voted in increasing numbers for Labour, while the residents of towns and rural areas increasingly have opted for the Conservatives. Secondly, we argue and show that this trend reflects economic as well as cultural forces: the schism between places reflects both divergent paths of demographic and economic change and related variation in the cultural and social outlooks of voters. Thirdly, we discuss the major challenge-amplified by Brexit-that this geographical polarisation presents for each of the parties as they seek to build electoral coalitions that reach beyond their existing strongholds. In concluding, we explore how the parties are presently responding to the place-based divergence of voting behaviour and policy problems.},
  doi = {10.1111/1467-923x.12612},
  }

• de Jonge, L{a’e}onie. “The Curious Case of Belgium: Why is There no Right-Wing Populism in Wallonia?.” Government and Opposition online first (2020): 1–17. doi:10.1017/gov.2020.8
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Why are populist radical right parties (PRRPs) more successful in some countries than in others? This question is analysed here by focusing on Belgium. While Flanders (the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) was home to one of the strongest far-right movements in Europe, Wallonia (the southern, francophone part) has remained {“}immune{“} to such tendencies. The article argues that different historical experiences have given rise to a hostile political environment for PRRPs in Wallonia, where mainstream parties and the media have created a successful cordon sanitaire. In Flanders, mainstream parties and the media have gradually become more accommodative towards PRRPs. By emphasizing the sociopolitical context in which parties operate, the findings suggest that the reactions of mainstream parties and the media are crucial to understanding the success of PRRPs. The conclusion reflects on potential lessons to be drawn from the Belgian case for mainstream parties and media practitioners elsewhere.

  @Article{de-jonge-2020,
  author = {L{\a'e}onie {de Jonge}},
  title = {The Curious Case of Belgium: Why is There no Right-Wing Populism in Wallonia?},
  journal = {Government and Opposition},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {online first},
  pages = {1--17},
  abstract = {Why are populist radical right parties (PRRPs) more successful in some countries than in others? This question is analysed here by focusing on Belgium. While Flanders (the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) was home to one of the strongest far-right movements in Europe,
  Wallonia (the southern, francophone part) has remained {"}immune{"} to such tendencies. The article argues that different historical experiences have given rise to a hostile political environment for PRRPs in Wallonia, where mainstream parties and the media have created a successful
  cordon sanitaire. In Flanders, mainstream parties and the media have gradually become more accommodative towards PRRPs. By emphasizing the sociopolitical context in which parties operate, the findings suggest that the reactions of mainstream parties and the media are crucial to
  understanding the success of PRRPs. The conclusion reflects on potential lessons to be drawn from the Belgian case for mainstream parties and media practitioners elsewhere.},
  doi = {10.1017/gov.2020.8},
  }

• Heinze, Anna-Sophie and Man a`e. “How Political Parties Respond To Pariah Street Protest: the Case of Anti-Corona Mobilisation in Germany.” German Politics online first (2022): 1–22. doi:10.1080/09644008.2022.2042518
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  How do political parties respond to street protest by political outsiders widely considered to be {“}pariahs{“} (i.e. radical or extremist actors)? Bridging the literature on responses to {“}populist{“} radical right parties with insights from social movement studies, we propose a theoretical model that conceptualises potential party responses to pariah protest. Innovatively, our typology distinguishes between a set of formal and substantive responses to street mobilisation. Empirically, we apply this model by providing the first systematic study of how political parties have responded to the {“}anti-Corona{“} protests of Querdenken, contributing to social science research on the politics of the COVID-19 pandemic. Analysing the critical case of Germany, we underline the stark difference between how the populist radical right AfD and all other Bundestag parties respond to anti-Corona mobilisation, showing how political protest may sharpen the polarisation of party politics. Moreover, we highlight the more nuanced but still important differences in responses by established German parties. Theoretically, the article provides an analytical framework valuable in times of increasing street mobilisation by radical and extremist actors. Methodologically, our analysis relies on a systematic media analysis of articles from two major German newspapers. Empirically, it contributes to our understanding of the difficult but crucial relationship between the German protest and party arena during the COVID-19 pandemic.

  @Article{heinze-weisskircher-2022,
  author = {Anna-Sophie Heinze and Man{\a`e}s Weisskircher},
  title = {How Political Parties Respond To Pariah Street Protest: the Case of Anti-Corona Mobilisation in Germany},
  journal = {German Politics},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {online first},
  pages = {1--22},
  abstract = {How do political parties respond to street protest by political outsiders widely considered to be {"}pariahs{"} (i.e. radical or extremist actors)? Bridging the literature on responses to {"}populist{"} radical right parties with insights from social movement studies, we propose a
  theoretical model that conceptualises potential party responses to pariah protest. Innovatively, our typology distinguishes between a set of formal and substantive responses to street mobilisation. Empirically, we apply this model by providing the first systematic study of how
  political parties have responded to the {"}anti-Corona{"} protests of Querdenken, contributing to social science research on the politics of the COVID-19 pandemic. Analysing the critical case of Germany, we underline the stark difference between how the populist radical right AfD and
  all other Bundestag parties respond to anti-Corona mobilisation, showing how political protest may sharpen the polarisation of party politics. Moreover, we highlight the more nuanced but still important differences in responses by established German parties. Theoretically, the
  article provides an analytical framework valuable in times of increasing street mobilisation by radical and extremist actors. Methodologically, our analysis relies on a systematic media analysis of articles from two major German newspapers. Empirically, it contributes to our
  understanding of the difficult but crucial relationship between the German protest and party arena during the COVID-19 pandemic.},
  doi = {10.1080/09644008.2022.2042518},
  }

• Hoerner, Julian M., Alexander Jaax, and Toni Rodon. “The Long-Term Impact of the Location of Concentration Camps on Radical-Right Voting in Germany.” Research & Politics 6.4 (2019): 1–8. doi:10.1177/2053168019891376
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Of all atrocities committed by state actors in 20th century Europe, the systematic killings by Nazi Germany were arguably the most severe and best documented. While several studies have investigated the impact of the presence of concentration camps on surrounding communities in Germany and the occupied territories in terms of redistribution of wealth and property, the local-level impact on voting behaviour has not yet been explored. We investigated the impact of spatial proximity to a concentration camp between 1933 and 1945 on the likelihood of voting for far-right parties in the 2013 and 2017 federal elections. We find that proximity to a former concentration camp is associated with a higher vote share of such parties. A potential explanation for this finding could be a ‘memory satiation effect’, according to which voters who live in close proximity to former camps and are more frequently confronted with the past are more receptive to revisionist historical accounts questioning the centrality of the Holocaust in the German culture of remembrance.

  @Article{hoerner-jaax-rodon-2019,
  author = {Julian M. Hoerner and Alexander Jaax and Toni Rodon},
  title = {The Long-Term Impact of the Location of Concentration Camps on Radical-Right Voting in Germany},
  journal = {Research \& Politics},
  year = {2019},
  volume = {6},
  number = {4},
  abstract = {Of all atrocities committed by state actors in 20th century Europe, the systematic killings by Nazi Germany were arguably the most severe and best documented. While several studies have investigated the impact of the presence of concentration camps on surrounding communities in
  Germany and the occupied territories in terms of redistribution of wealth and property, the local-level impact on voting behaviour has not yet been explored. We investigated the impact of spatial proximity to a concentration camp between 1933 and 1945 on the likelihood of voting
  for far-right parties in the 2013 and 2017 federal elections. We find that proximity to a former concentration camp is associated with a higher vote share of such parties. A potential explanation for this finding could be a ‘memory satiation effect’, according to which voters
  who live in close proximity to former camps and are more frequently confronted with the past are more receptive to revisionist historical accounts questioning the centrality of the Holocaust in the German culture of remembrance.},
  pages = {1--8},
  doi = {10.1177/2053168019891376},
  }

• Kamenova, Valeriya. “Internal Democracy in Populist Right Parties: The Process of Party Policy Development in the Alternative for Germany.” European Political Science Review 13.4 (2021): 488–505. doi:10.1017/S1755773921000217
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  For the past decade, populist left- and right-wing parties have been on the rise in Europe. Yet, there are only a few studies on the internal organizational dynamics of these parties. Drawing on a new and unique data from fieldwork observations and interviews with party members from the Alternative for Germany (AfD), this article examines the internal democratic mechanisms in policy formation. The AfD displays a high degree of internal participation – an important but contrasting addition to the comparative research on radical right parties, which fail to sustain a democratic internal organization and consistently adopt mechanisms to centralize power in the leadership. The findings from this field research suggest that populist parties may actually engage in meaningful intra-party democracy and internal deliberative practices to invigorate the connections between citizens and their party representatives.

  @Article{kamenova-2021,
  author = {Valeriya Kamenova},
  title = {Internal Democracy in Populist Right Parties: The Process of Party Policy Development in the Alternative for Germany},
  journal = {European Political Science Review},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {13},
  number = {4},
  pages = {488--505},
  abstract = {For the past decade, populist left- and right-wing parties have been on the rise in Europe. Yet, there are only a few studies on the internal organizational dynamics of these parties. Drawing on a new and unique data from fieldwork observations and interviews with party members
  from the Alternative for Germany (AfD), this article examines the internal democratic mechanisms in policy formation. The AfD displays a high degree of internal participation - an important but contrasting addition to the comparative research on radical right parties, which fail to
  sustain a democratic internal organization and consistently adopt mechanisms to centralize power in the leadership. The findings from this field research suggest that populist parties may actually engage in meaningful intra-party democracy and internal deliberative practices to
  invigorate the connections between citizens and their party representatives.},
  doi = {10.1017/S1755773921000217},
  }

• Klein, Ofra and Andrea L. P. Pirro. “Reverting Trajectories? UKIP”s Organisational and Discursive Change After the Brexit Referendum.” Information, Communication & Society online first (2020): 1–19. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2020.1792532
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The article focuses on the transformation of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) after the 2016 Brexit referendum. It describes how, after securing its chief political demand, UKIP opened up to grassroots far-right politics and assesses whether this strategy involved a concomitant shift towards a more radical discourse. Against a backdrop of organisational change, the findings refine the notion that a far-right turn within its ranks led to a significant shift in the (online) communication of the party towards issues like immigration, Islam, and gender. Indeed, these issues were mostly {“}outsourced{“} to the cultural wing of the party, War Plan Purple. The article therefore critically links changes in UKIP{“}s organisation with shifts in online communication, adding new insights into the unorthodox politics and forms of mobilisation of the far right.

  @Article{klein-pirro-2020,
  author = {Ofra Klein and Andrea L. P. Pirro},
  title = {Reverting Trajectories? UKIP{"}s Organisational and Discursive Change After the Brexit Referendum},
  journal = {Information, Communication \& Society},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {online first},
  pages = {1--19},
  abstract = {The article focuses on the transformation of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) after the 2016 Brexit referendum. It describes how, after securing its chief political demand, UKIP opened up to grassroots far-right politics and assesses whether this strategy involved a concomitant
  shift towards a more radical discourse. Against a backdrop of organisational change, the findings refine the notion that a far-right turn within its ranks led to a significant shift in the (online) communication of the party towards issues like immigration, Islam, and gender.
  Indeed, these issues were mostly {"}outsourced{"} to the cultural wing of the party, War Plan Purple. The article therefore critically links changes in UKIP{"}s organisation with shifts in online communication, adding new insights into the unorthodox politics and forms of mobilisation of
  the far right.},
  doi = {10.1080/1369118X.2020.1792532},
  }

• Kokkonen, Andrej and Jonas Linde. “Nativist Attitudes and Opportunistic Support for Democracy.” West European Politics online first (2021): 1–24. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.2007459
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Do nativists differ from other citizens in their attitudes towards democracy? In this article it is demonstrated that nativism goes hand in hand with preferences for a type of democracy where the interests of the natives should prevail, even at the cost of diminished minority rights, checks and balances, and other constraints on executive power. Liberal representative democracy is not for nativists. It is also shown that nativists seem to believe that the end justifies the means when it comes to different forms of decision making, and that this opportunistic trait usually translates into support for more direct democracy and scepticism towards representative democracy, because nativists tend to believe that they are in the majority (even if they are not). This article concludes that this tendency may in fact be a blessing of sorts, as it keeps nativists from supporting alternatives to democracy.

  @Article{kokkonen-linde-2021,
  author = {Andrej Kokkonen and Jonas Linde},
  title = {Nativist Attitudes and Opportunistic Support for Democracy},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  pages = {1--24},
  abstract = {Do nativists differ from other citizens in their attitudes towards democracy? In this article it is demonstrated that nativism goes hand in hand with preferences for a type of democracy where the interests of the natives should prevail, even at the cost of diminished minority
  rights, checks and balances, and other constraints on executive power. Liberal representative democracy is not for nativists. It is also shown that nativists seem to believe that the end justifies the means when it comes to different forms of decision making, and that this
  opportunistic trait usually translates into support for more direct democracy and scepticism towards representative democracy, because nativists tend to believe that they are in the majority (even if they are not). This article concludes that this tendency may in fact be a blessing
  of sorts, as it keeps nativists from supporting alternatives to democracy.},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.2007459},
  }

• Krause, Werner and Heiko Giebler. “Shifting Welfare Policy Positions: the Impact of Radical Right Populist Party Success Beyond Migration Politics.” Representation 56.3 (2019): 331–348. doi:10.1080/00344893.2019.1661871
  [BibTeX] [Abstract] [URL]
  

  Political parties respond strategically to the electoral success of radical right populist parties (RRPPs). While previous research has focused on programmatic responses on cultural conflict issues, we are expanding the research on policy position adaption to the economic left-right issue of welfare-state politics. Actual and potential supporters of RRPPs do not only feel threatened by migration or liberal conceptions of society but are also often confronted with real or perceived socio-economic decline. Therefore, we argue that established parties do not only react by changing their socio-cultural policy offers but also by adjusting their welfare state policy positions. Based on parties{“} voter potentials and issue ownership theory, we investigate whether such changes are especially pronounced for left-of-center parties. Analysing data from 18 West European countries since 1985, we find that non-RRPPs indeed advocate more leftist positions on welfare state policies in response to increasing electoral support for RRPPs. This effect is especially pronounced for economically left-of-centre parties as these parties might consider this to be a promising strategy to win back voters from the populist radical right.

  @Article{krause-giebler-2019,
  author = {Werner Krause and Heiko Giebler},
  title = {Shifting Welfare Policy Positions: the Impact of Radical Right Populist Party Success Beyond Migration Politics},
  journal = {Representation},
  year = {2019},
  volume = {56},
  number = {3},
  pages = {331--348},
  abstract = {Political parties respond strategically to the electoral success of radical right populist parties (RRPPs). While previous research has focused on programmatic responses on cultural conflict issues, we are expanding the research on policy position adaption to the economic
  left-right issue of welfare-state politics. Actual and potential supporters of RRPPs do not only feel threatened by migration or liberal conceptions of society but are also often confronted with real or perceived socio-economic decline. Therefore, we argue that established parties
  do not only react by changing their socio-cultural policy offers but also by adjusting their welfare state policy positions. Based on parties{"} voter potentials and issue ownership theory, we investigate whether such changes are especially pronounced for left-of-center parties.
  Analysing data from 18 West European countries since 1985, we find that non-RRPPs indeed advocate more leftist positions on welfare state policies in response to increasing electoral support for RRPPs. This effect is especially pronounced for economically left-of-centre parties as
  these parties might consider this to be a promising strategy to win back voters from the populist radical right.},
  doi = {10.1080/00344893.2019.1661871},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2019.1661871},
  }

• Marcinkiewicz, Kamil and Ruth Dassonneville. “Do religious voters support populist radical right parties? Opposite effects in Western and East-Central Europe.” Party Politics online first (2021). doi:10.1177/1354068820985187
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The rise of populist radical right parties fuels a discussion about the roots of their success. Existing research has demonstrated the relevance of gender, education and income for explaining the far-right vote. The present study contributes to the aforementioned debate by focusing on the role of religiosity. The data collected in the eighth round of the European Social Survey (2016) allow examining in more detail the political relevance of attendance at religious services and other measures of religious devotion. This study focuses in particular on 15 countries, 11 from Western Europe and 4 from East-Central Europe. In none of the Western European countries is there evidence of a positive relationship between religiosity and vote for a populist radical right party. In fact, in many countries of this region more religious voters are substantively less inclined to support far-right movements. The situation is different in parts of East-Central Europe. In Poland, and to a weaker extent also in Hungary, the probability of a vote for right-wing populists increases with religiosity.

  @Article{marcinkiewicz-dassonneville-2021,
  author = {Kamil Marcinkiewicz and Ruth Dassonneville},
  title = {Do religious voters support populist radical right parties? Opposite effects in Western and East-Central Europe},
  journal = {Party Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {The rise of populist radical right parties fuels a discussion about the roots of their success. Existing research has demonstrated the relevance of gender, education and income for explaining the far-right vote. The present study contributes to the aforementioned debate by
  focusing on the role of religiosity. The data collected in the eighth round of the European Social Survey (2016) allow examining in more detail the political relevance of attendance at religious services and other measures of religious devotion. This study focuses in particular on
  15 countries, 11 from Western Europe and 4 from East-Central Europe. In none of the Western European countries is there evidence of a positive relationship between religiosity and vote for a populist radical right party. In fact, in many countries of this region more religious
  voters are substantively less inclined to support far-right movements. The situation is different in parts of East-Central Europe. In Poland, and to a weaker extent also in Hungary, the probability of a vote for right-wing populists increases with religiosity.},
  doi = {10.1177/1354068820985187},
  }

• Marcos-Marne, Hugo, Carolina Plaza-Colodro, and Ciaran O”Flynn. “Populism and new radical-right parties: The case of VOX.” Politics online first (2021). doi:10.1177/02633957211019587
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The populist radical-right label brings together parties characterised by their adherence to populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. While the relevance of the label to the family is unquestioned, its popularity, combined with the theoretical affinity between the three core elements, may cause radical-right parties to be systematically considered populist without further examination. This article posits that whether a radical-right party is populist is an open empirical question, and to demonstrate this, we test the importance of populism in the discourse and electoral success of a new radical-right party, Spain{“}s VOX. Our empirical strategy is based on the holistic grading of core political discourses, and the analysis of innovative survey data that includes populist attitudes and voting intention. Our results indicate that, despite the existence of certain populist elements in both the supply and demand sides of the electoral competition, these should be considered supplemental and subordinate to nationalist and traditionalist elements, which are central to explaining both the discourse and electoral success of VOX. We believe that our findings are a cautionary note against assuming that all radical-right parties are populist, and an invitation to improve empirical techniques able to separate populism, nativism, and authoritarianism in political discourses.

  @Article{marcos-marne-plaza-colodro-oflynn-2021,
  author = {Hugo Marcos-Marne and Carolina Plaza-Colodro and Ciaran O"Flynn},
  title = {Populism and new radical-right parties: The case of VOX},
  journal = {Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {The populist radical-right label brings together parties characterised by their adherence to populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. While the relevance of the label to the family is unquestioned, its popularity, combined with the theoretical affinity between the three core
  elements, may cause radical-right parties to be systematically considered populist without further examination. This article posits that whether a radical-right party is populist is an open empirical question, and to demonstrate this, we test the importance of populism in the
  discourse and electoral success of a new radical-right party, Spain{"}s VOX. Our empirical strategy is based on the holistic grading of core political discourses, and the analysis of innovative survey data that includes populist attitudes and voting intention. Our results indicate
  that, despite the existence of certain populist elements in both the supply and demand sides of the electoral competition, these should be considered supplemental and subordinate to nationalist and traditionalist elements, which are central to explaining both the discourse and
  electoral success of VOX. We believe that our findings are a cautionary note against assuming that all radical-right parties are populist, and an invitation to improve empirical techniques able to separate populism, nativism, and authoritarianism in political discourses.},
  doi = {10.1177/02633957211019587},
  }

• Maurer, Marcus, Pablo Jost, Marlene Schaaf, Michael Sülflow, and Simon Kruschinski. “How right-wing populists instrumentalize news media: Deliberate provocations, scandalizing media coverage, and public awareness for the Alternative for Germany (AfD).” The International Journal of Press/Politics online first (2022). doi:10.1177/19401612211072692
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The rise of right-wing populist parties in Western democracies is often attributed to populists{“} ability to instrumentalize news media by making deliberate provocations (e.g., verbal attacks on migrants or politicians from other parties) that generate media coverage and public awareness. To explain the success of populists{“} deliberate provocations, we drew from research on populism and scandal theory to develop a theoretical framework that we tested in two studies examining the rise of German right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) between January 2015 and December 2018. In Study 1, an input-output analysis of 17 deliberate provocations by AfD politicians in German news media revealed much more coverage about their attacks on migrants than about their attacks on political elites, although all were covered in predominantly scandalizing ways. Next, Study 2, involving media database research and an analysis of Google Trends data, showed that the provocations had increased overall media coverage about the AfD and influenced public awareness of the party

  @Article{maurer-jost-schaaf-suelflow-kruschinski-2022,
  author = {Marcus Maurer and Pablo Jost and Marlene Schaaf and Michael S{\"u}lflow and Simon Kruschinski},
  title = {How right-wing populists instrumentalize news media: Deliberate provocations, scandalizing media coverage, and public awareness for the Alternative for Germany (AfD)},
  journal = {The International Journal of Press/Politics},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {The rise of right-wing populist parties in Western democracies is often attributed to populists{"} ability to instrumentalize news media by making deliberate provocations (e.g., verbal attacks on migrants or politicians from other parties) that generate media coverage and public
  awareness. To explain the success of populists{"} deliberate provocations, we drew from research on populism and scandal theory to develop a theoretical framework that we tested in two studies examining the rise of German right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)
  between January 2015 and December 2018. In Study 1, an input-output analysis of 17 deliberate provocations by AfD politicians in German news media revealed much more coverage about their attacks on migrants than about their attacks on political elites, although all were covered in
  predominantly scandalizing ways. Next, Study 2, involving media database research and an analysis of Google Trends data, showed that the provocations had increased overall media coverage about the AfD and influenced public awareness of the party},
  doi = {10.1177/19401612211072692},
  }

• Milner, Helen V.. “Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right.” Comparative Political Studies 54.13 (2021): 2286–2320. doi:10.1177/0010414021997175
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  What are the political consequences of economic globalization? Since the 1990s, scholars of European party politics have noted the rise of extremist parties, especially right-wing populist ones, and the decline of mainstream left and right parties. This paper focuses on the association between globalization in terms of trade, capital and labor flows, technological change, and popular support for extreme right parties. I examine these relations at the regional and individual level in 15 advanced industrial democracies in Western Europe from 1990 to 2018. Globalization, especially in the form of trade, is associated with growing vote shares for extreme right parties. Technological change in the form of automation increases support for extreme right parties. The financial crisis enhanced support for populist right parties and strengthened the negative relationship between trade shocks and declining support for mainstream left parties. And the use of social welfare compensation seems unable to dampen these political trends.1

  @Article{milner-2021,
  author = {Helen V. Milner},
  title = {Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right},
  journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {54},
  number = {13},
  pages = {2286--2320},
  abstract = {What are the political consequences of economic globalization? Since the 1990s, scholars of European party politics have noted the rise of extremist parties, especially right-wing populist ones, and the decline of mainstream left and right parties. This paper focuses on the
  association between globalization in terms of trade, capital and labor flows, technological change, and popular support for extreme right parties. I examine these relations at the regional and individual level in 15 advanced industrial democracies in Western Europe from 1990 to
  2018. Globalization, especially in the form of trade, is associated with growing vote shares for extreme right parties. Technological change in the form of automation increases support for extreme right parties. The financial crisis enhanced support for populist right parties and
  strengthened the negative relationship between trade shocks and declining support for mainstream left parties. And the use of social welfare compensation seems unable to dampen these political trends.1},
  doi = {10.1177/0010414021997175},
  }

• Munis, Kal B.. “Us Over Here Versus Them Over There … Literally: Measuring Place Resentment in American Politics.” Political Behavior (2020): online first. doi:10.1007/s11109-020-09641-2
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Political scientists are accustomed to imagining electoral politics in geographical terms. For instance, there is a {“}red America{“} that largely covers the country{“}s expansive heartland and there is a {“}blue America{“} mostly confined to the coasts. Until recently, however, public opinion scholars had largely lost sight of the fact that the places where people live, and people{“}s identification with those places, shape public opinion and political behavior. This paper develops and validates a flexible psychometric scale measure of a key political psychological dimension of place: place resentment. Place resentment is hostility toward place-based outgroups perceived as enjoying undeserved benefits beyond those enjoyed by one{“}s place-based ingroup. Regression results indicate that males, ruralites, younger Americans, those high in place identity, and those high in racial resentment are more likely to harbor higher levels of place resentment.

  @Article{munis-2020,
  author = {B. Kal Munis},
  title = {Us Over Here Versus Them Over There ... Literally: Measuring Place Resentment in American Politics},
  journal = {Political Behavior},
  year = {2020},
  abstract = {Political scientists are accustomed to imagining electoral politics in geographical terms. For instance, there is a {"}red America{"} that largely covers the country{"}s expansive heartland and there is a {"}blue America{"} mostly confined to the coasts. Until recently, however, public
  opinion scholars had largely lost sight of the fact that the places where people live, and people{"}s identification with those places, shape public opinion and political behavior. This paper develops and validates a flexible psychometric scale measure of a key political
  psychological dimension of place: place resentment. Place resentment is hostility toward place-based outgroups perceived as enjoying undeserved benefits beyond those enjoyed by one{"}s place-based ingroup. Regression results indicate that males, ruralites, younger Americans, those
  high in place identity, and those high in racial resentment are more likely to harbor higher levels of place resentment.},
  pages = {online first},
  doi = {10.1007/s11109-020-09641-2},
  }

• Oesch, Daniel and Nathalie Vigna. “A Decline in the Social Status of the Working Class? Conflicting Evidence for 8 Western Countries, 1987-2017.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2021). doi:10.1177/00104140211047400
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The consensus view among political scientists is that the subjective social status of low-skilled workers has declined over the last decades, and this status loss of the working class is seen as contributing to the rise of the radical right. We examine the micro-foundation of this claim by tracing the evolution of subjective status for different social classes in Europe and the US. We use all available survey rounds of the International Social Survey Programme 1987-2017 and replicate findings with the European Social Survey 2002-2016. While unskilled workers perceive their status to be lower than members of the middle class everywhere, we find no relative or absolute fall in their subjective social status over time. Unskilled workers were at the bottom of the status hierarchy in the 1990s and 2010s. Our findings throw doubt on the narrative that sees workers{“} falling subjective social status as a prominent driver behind the rise of the radical right.

  @Article{oesch-vigna-2021,
  author = {Daniel Oesch and Nathalie Vigna},
  title = {A Decline in the Social Status of the Working Class? Conflicting Evidence for 8 Western Countries, 1987-2017},
  journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {The consensus view among political scientists is that the subjective social status of low-skilled workers has declined over the last decades, and this status loss of the working class is seen as contributing to the rise of the radical right. We examine the micro-foundation of this
  claim by tracing the evolution of subjective status for different social classes in Europe and the US. We use all available survey rounds of the International Social Survey Programme 1987-2017 and replicate findings with the European Social Survey 2002-2016. While unskilled workers
  perceive their status to be lower than members of the middle class everywhere, we find no relative or absolute fall in their subjective social status over time. Unskilled workers were at the bottom of the status hierarchy in the 1990s and 2010s. Our findings throw doubt on the
  narrative that sees workers{"} falling subjective social status as a prominent driver behind the rise of the radical right.},
  doi = {10.1177/00104140211047400},
  }

• Oshri, Odelia, Liran Harsgor, Reut Itzkovitch-Malka, and Or Tuttnauer. “Risk Aversion and the Gender Gap in the Vote for Populist Radical Right Parties.” American Journal of Political Science online first (2022). doi:10.1111/ajps.12696
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Previous research has established that men are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties (PRRPs) than women. This article shows how cross-national and temporal variations in PRRPs{“} electoral success interact with individuals{“} risk propensity to affect this gender gap. We hypothesize that gender differences in the electoral support of PRRPs stem from disparities in risk-taking. We conceptualize risk in terms of two components, social and electoral, and demonstrate that women are more risk-averse regarding both. Our analysis is based on public opinion data from 14 countries (2002-16) combined with macrolevel data on PRRPs{“} past parliamentary fortunes. To distinguish between the social and electoral components in risk-taking, we use the illustrative case study of Germany. Findings demonstrate that gender differences in risk-taking and, by implication, the differences between women{“}s and men{“}s responses to the electoral context are key to understanding the voting gender gap.

  @Article{oshri-harsgor-itzkovitch-malka-tuttnauer-2022,
  author = {Odelia Oshri and Liran Harsgor and Reut Itzkovitch-Malka and Or Tuttnauer},
  title = {Risk Aversion and the Gender Gap in the Vote for Populist Radical Right Parties},
  journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {Previous research has established that men are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties (PRRPs) than women. This article shows how cross-national and temporal variations in PRRPs{"} electoral success interact with individuals{"} risk propensity to affect this gender gap.
  We hypothesize that gender differences in the electoral support of PRRPs stem from disparities in risk-taking. We conceptualize risk in terms of two components, social and electoral, and demonstrate that women are more risk-averse regarding both. Our analysis is based on public
  opinion data from 14 countries (2002-16) combined with macrolevel data on PRRPs{"} past parliamentary fortunes. To distinguish between the social and electoral components in risk-taking, we use the illustrative case study of Germany. Findings demonstrate that gender differences in
  risk-taking and, by implication, the differences between women{"}s and men{"}s responses to the electoral context are key to understanding the voting gender gap.},
  doi = {10.1111/ajps.12696},
  }

• Otteni, Cyrill and Man a`e. “Global Warming and Polarization. Wind Turbines and the Electoral Success of the Greens and the Populist Radical Right.” European Journal of Political Research online first (2021). doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12487
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The increased salience of environmental concerns, first and foremost global warming, is one of the key developments of contemporary Western European politics. Still, the effects of global warming issues on electoral outcomes, party competition, and polarization remain poorly understood. Our article shows how the construction of wind turbines fuels conflict between its key proponents and opponents, Green and populist radical right parties. Contention over the issue contributes to the electoral success of both sides and therefore reinforces the new central divide between them. Drawing on a novel dataset, we investigate the impact of the construction of wind turbines on AfD and Green party electoral success in Germany. We employ a two-way fixed effects model, where the construction of wind turbines functions as the independent variable. We show that the construction of wind turbines boosts the electoral support of both their biggest supporters and their biggest opponents. Our results have important implications for understanding contemporary political conflict in Western Europe such as the electoral rise of the Greens and the populist radical right, the importance of issue salience, and the polarization of party systems

  @Article{otteni-weisskircher-2021,
  author = {Cyrill Otteni and Man{\a`e}s Weisskircher},
  title = {Global Warming and Polarization. Wind Turbines and the Electoral Success of the Greens and the Populist Radical Right},
  journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {The increased salience of environmental concerns, first and foremost global warming, is one of the key developments of contemporary Western European politics. Still, the effects of global warming issues on electoral outcomes, party competition, and polarization remain poorly
  understood. Our article shows how the construction of wind turbines fuels conflict between its key proponents and opponents, Green and populist radical right parties. Contention over the issue contributes to the electoral success of both sides and therefore reinforces the new
  central divide between them. Drawing on a novel dataset, we investigate the impact of the construction of wind turbines on AfD and Green party electoral success in Germany. We employ a two-way fixed effects model, where the construction of wind turbines functions as the independent
  variable. We show that the construction of wind turbines boosts the electoral support of both their biggest supporters and their biggest opponents. Our results have important implications for understanding contemporary political conflict in Western Europe such as the electoral rise
  of the Greens and the populist radical right, the importance of issue salience, and the polarization of party systems},
  doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12487},
  }

• Ozdemir, Ugur and Marc S. Jacob. “Values, Taboos, and Votes: How Basic Human Values Affect Populist Electoral Support.” Swiss Political Science Review online first (2022). doi:10.1111/spsr.12499
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  How do individuals{“} underlying value orientations affect populist voting? Building on the congruency model in social psychology, we theorize that voters holding non-conformist values feel closest to political actors who employ a taboo-breaking populist style in the political debate. Moreover, we hypothesize that security and universalism values feed into vote choices between right-wing and left-wing parties. Leveraging structural equation modeling (SEM) and data from the 2017 German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), we find that non-conformist values predict voting for the populist far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), but not for the left-wing populist The Left. Further, security and universalism values are associated with a higher probability of voting for not only populist but also mainstream parties. These findings point to the underlying role of basic human values in electoral support for populist parties and political behavior in general.

  @Article{ozdemir-jacob-2022,
  author = {Ugur Ozdemir and Marc S. Jacob},
  title = {Values, Taboos, and Votes: How Basic Human Values Affect Populist Electoral Support},
  journal = {Swiss Political Science Review},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {How do individuals{"} underlying value orientations affect populist voting? Building on the congruency model in social psychology, we theorize that voters holding non-conformist values feel closest to political actors who employ a taboo-breaking populist style in the political
  debate. Moreover, we hypothesize that security and universalism values feed into vote choices between right-wing and left-wing parties. Leveraging structural equation modeling (SEM) and data from the 2017 German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), we find that non-conformist values
  predict voting for the populist far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), but not for the left-wing populist The Left. Further, security and universalism values are associated with a higher probability of voting for not only populist but also mainstream parties. These findings point
  to the underlying role of basic human values in electoral support for populist parties and political behavior in general.},
  doi = {10.1111/spsr.12499},
  }

• Patana, Pauliina. “Residential Constraints and the Political Geography of the Populist Radical Right: Evidence From France.” Perspectives on Politics online first (2021): 1–18. doi:10.1017/s153759272100219x
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  What explains variation in populist radical right (PRR) support within Western democracies? Specifically, why is contemporary PRR support often and increasingly stronger in areas seemingly detached from the effects of globalization, transnationalism, or immigration, the key issues these parties emphasize? This study articulates a theory of residential constraints to deepen understanding of these spatial patterns. I hypothesize that when citizens are residentially constrained-that is, when their means of reacting to local conditions and {“}voting with their feet{“} are limited-they are more likely to support PRR parties. To test this claim, I use a multimethod research design and exploit both quantitative and qualitative evidence from France, an important case of long-standing and geographically divided PRR support. I demonstrate that the PRR performs well in areas where locals{“} access to services and opportunities is compromised and where opportunities and incentives to relocate are blocked by residential constraints. Residential constraints thus generate a set of relative economic grievances and render them highly salient in localities that may otherwise appear unaffected by more objective hardships and structural decay.

  @Article{patana-2021,
  author = {Pauliina Patana},
  title = {Residential Constraints and the Political Geography of the Populist Radical Right: Evidence From France},
  journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  pages = {1--18},
  abstract = {What explains variation in populist radical right (PRR) support within Western democracies? Specifically, why is contemporary PRR support often and increasingly stronger in areas seemingly detached from the effects of globalization, transnationalism, or immigration, the key issues
  these parties emphasize? This study articulates a theory of residential constraints to deepen understanding of these spatial patterns. I hypothesize that when citizens are residentially constrained-that is, when their means of reacting to local conditions and {"}voting with their
  feet{"} are limited-they are more likely to support PRR parties. To test this claim, I use a multimethod research design and exploit both quantitative and qualitative evidence from France, an important case of long-standing and geographically divided PRR support. I demonstrate that
  the PRR performs well in areas where locals{"} access to services and opportunities is compromised and where opportunities and incentives to relocate are blocked by residential constraints. Residential constraints thus generate a set of relative economic grievances and render them
  highly salient in localities that may otherwise appear unaffected by more objective hardships and structural decay.},
  doi = {10.1017/s153759272100219x},
  }

• Pellegata, Alessandro and Francesco Visconti. “Voting for a Social Europe? European Solidarity and Voting Behaviour in the 2019 European Elections.” European Union Politics 23.1 (2021): 79–99. doi:10.1177/14651165211035054
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  This article investigates whether public preferences for European solidarity are associated with vote choices in the 2019 European elections. After multiple crises, the politicisation of European Union affairs has increased, polarising voters and parties between those favouring the redistribution of risks across member states and those prioritising national responsibility in coping with the consequences of the crises. We expect pro-solidarity voters to be more prone to vote for green and radical-left parties and less prone to vote for conservative and radical-right parties. Testing these hypotheses in 10 European Union countries with original survey data, we find that green and radical-left parties profited from European solidarity voting only in some countries, while being pro-solidarity reduced the likelihood of voting for both moderate and radical-right parties in each sample country.

  @Article{pellegata-visconti-2021,
  author = {Alessandro Pellegata and Francesco Visconti},
  title = {Voting for a Social Europe? European Solidarity and Voting Behaviour in the 2019 European Elections},
  journal = {European Union Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {23},
  number = {1},
  pages = {79--99},
  abstract = {This article investigates whether public preferences for European solidarity are associated with vote choices in the 2019 European elections. After multiple crises, the politicisation of European Union affairs has increased, polarising voters and parties between those favouring
  the redistribution of risks across member states and those prioritising national responsibility in coping with the consequences of the crises. We expect pro-solidarity voters to be more prone to vote for green and radical-left parties and less prone to vote for conservative and
  radical-right parties. Testing these hypotheses in 10 European Union countries with original survey data, we find that green and radical-left parties profited from European solidarity voting only in some countries, while being pro-solidarity reduced the likelihood of voting for
  both moderate and radical-right parties in each sample country.},
  doi = {10.1177/14651165211035054},
  }

• Pirro, Andrea L. P.. The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, Impact, and Electoral Performance.. London: Routledge, 2015.
  [BibTeX]

  @Book{pirro-2015,
  author = {Andrea L. P. Pirro},
  title = {The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, Impact, and Electoral Performance.},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  year = {2015},
  address = {London},
  }

• Pirro, Andrea L. P. and Pietro Castelli Gattinara. “Movement Parties of the Far Right: the Organization and Strategies of Nativist Collective Actors.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 23.3 (2018): 367–383. doi:10.17813/1086-671x-23-3-367
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The scholarship on the far right has often interpreted nativist organizations as straddling the conceptual space between party and movement. These groups contest elections in order to gain representation in office, yet they also seek to mobilize public support to engage contentious issues like social movements. Despite theoretical commonalities, very little empirical research has focused on far-right {“}movement parties{“} as collective actors operating both in the protest and the electoral arenas. The article redresses this inconsistency by exploring the organizational and strategic configuration of two far-right collective actors-the Hungarian Jobbik and the Italian CasaPound. Deploying original interviews with high-ranking officials, the analysis enhances our understanding of the internal {“}supply side{“} of the far right as well as empirical knowledge on hybrid organizations that emerge from grassroots activism and successively organize to pursue the electoral option.

  @Article{pirro-gattinara-2018,
  author = {Andrea L. P. Pirro and Pietro Castelli Gattinara},
  title = {Movement Parties of the Far Right: the Organization and Strategies of Nativist Collective Actors},
  journal = {Mobilization: An International Quarterly},
  year = {2018},
  volume = {23},
  number = {3},
  pages = {367--383},
  abstract = {The scholarship on the far right has often interpreted nativist organizations as straddling the conceptual space between party and movement. These groups contest elections in order to gain representation in office, yet they also seek to mobilize public support to engage
  contentious issues like social movements. Despite theoretical commonalities, very little empirical research has focused on far-right {"}movement parties{"} as collective actors operating both in the protest and the electoral arenas. The article redresses this inconsistency by exploring
  the organizational and strategic configuration of two far-right collective actors-the Hungarian Jobbik and the Italian CasaPound. Deploying original interviews with high-ranking officials, the analysis enhances our understanding of the internal {"}supply side{"} of the far right as
  well as empirical knowledge on hybrid organizations that emerge from grassroots activism and successively organize to pursue the electoral option.},
  doi = {10.17813/1086-671x-23-3-367},
  }

• Pirro, Andrea LP and Stijn van Kessel. “Populist Eurosceptic Trajectories in Italy and the Netherlands During the European Crises.” Politics 38.3 (2018): 327–343. doi:10.1177/0263395718769511
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Multiple crises shook the European Union (EU) during the past decade. First, the economic and financial crises that unfolded since 2008 shook the foundations of the European project and its monetary union. Then, the inflow of migrants and asylum seekers into Europe in 2015 questioned the EU{“}s ability to jointly respond to common political issues. More recently, Brexit came across as the corollary of a prolonged legitimacy crisis. These crises have not only affected the course of European integration but also provided novel issues for political competition within the EU member states. At the party-political level, populist anti-establishment parties have traditionally listed among the principal interpreters and drivers of criticism towards {“}Europe{“}. In this article, we empirically address the changing Eurosceptic frames adopted by populist parties during these crises and speculate on the reverberation of these frames in respective party systems. For this purpose, we focus on two cases: Italy and the Netherlands. Both countries present instances of populist parties of different ideological persuasions within traditionally Europhile contexts. At the same time, both countries have been affected to very different extents by the recent crises, allowing us to examine how populist parties have responded to different political opportunities.

  @Article{pirro-kessel-2018,
  author = {Andrea LP Pirro and Stijn {van Kessel}},
  title = {Populist Eurosceptic Trajectories in Italy and the Netherlands During the European Crises},
  journal = {Politics},
  year = {2018},
  volume = {38},
  number = {3},
  pages = {327--343},
  abstract = {Multiple crises shook the European Union (EU) during the past decade. First, the economic and financial crises that unfolded since 2008 shook the foundations of the European project and its monetary union. Then, the inflow of migrants and asylum seekers into Europe in 2015
  questioned the EU{"}s ability to jointly respond to common political issues. More recently, Brexit came across as the corollary of a prolonged legitimacy crisis. These crises have not only affected the course of European integration but also provided novel issues for political
  competition within the EU member states. At the party-political level, populist anti-establishment parties have traditionally listed among the principal interpreters and drivers of criticism towards {"}Europe{"}. In this article, we empirically address the changing Eurosceptic frames
  adopted by populist parties during these crises and speculate on the reverberation of these frames in respective party systems. For this purpose, we focus on two cases: Italy and the Netherlands. Both countries present instances of populist parties of different ideological
  persuasions within traditionally Europhile contexts. At the same time, both countries have been affected to very different extents by the recent crises, allowing us to examine how populist parties have responded to different political opportunities.},
  doi = {10.1177/0263395718769511},
  }

• Pirro, Andrea L. P. and Mart a’i. “Populism Between Voting and Non-Electoral Participation.” West European Politics 44.3 (2021): 558–584. doi:10.1080/01402382.2020.1739451
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The article focuses on a neglected aspect of populist mobilisation, i.e. non-electoral participation (NEP), and elaborates on the extent to which populist party voters engage politically outside the polling station. The study addresses the question that populist parties and movements of the left and right originate from distinctive political experiences, and drive different forms of engagement with politics. The hypotheses are tested on NEP, based on populist party vote, social values and issue preferences relying on a unique cross-national survey. The findings significantly broaden our understanding of populist mobilisation and refine a number of notions related to the different logics of participation of the left and right. While challenging common understandings of populism as inherently distrustful and apathetic, and protest as an exclusive practice of the left, the study critically places NEP at the heart of populism in general, and populist right politics in particular.

  @Article{pirro-portos-2021,
  author = {Andrea L. P. Pirro and Mart{\a'\i}n Portos},
  title = {Populism Between Voting and Non-Electoral Participation},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {44},
  number = {3},
  pages = {558--584},
  abstract = {The article focuses on a neglected aspect of populist mobilisation, i.e. non-electoral participation (NEP), and elaborates on the extent to which populist party voters engage politically outside the polling station. The study addresses the question that populist parties and
  movements of the left and right originate from distinctive political experiences, and drive different forms of engagement with politics. The hypotheses are tested on NEP, based on populist party vote, social values and issue preferences relying on a unique cross-national survey.
  The findings significantly broaden our understanding of populist mobilisation and refine a number of notions related to the different logics of participation of the left and right. While challenging common understandings of populism as inherently distrustful and apathetic, and
  protest as an exclusive practice of the left, the study critically places NEP at the heart of populism in general, and populist right politics in particular.},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2020.1739451},
  }

• Pirro, Andrea L. P. and D{a’a}niel R. a’o. “Far-Right Activism in Hungary. Youth Participation in Jobbik and Its Network.” European Societies 21.4 (2019): 603–626. doi:10.1080/14616696.2018.1494292
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) qualifies as one of the most successful far-right organisations in contemporary Europe. Through its swift rise in popularity and entry to parliament, the {“}movement party{“} has been able to alter the Hungarian public discourse, existing patterns of party competition, additionally exerting effects on the government{“}s policy agenda. At least part of these effects should be attributed to Jobbik{“}s popularity among the youth; its overrepresentation among those aged below 30 is, by now, an established fact within national politics. The article argues for a broader understanding of youth participation in far-right politics and sets two principal research goals. First, to reconstruct the breeding ground of far-right youth activism at the grassroots level, by unveiling potential links between the subcultural, social movement, and party arenas. The study will chart far-right milieus in Hungary and their overlap with Jobbik: thus, it will introduce supply-side factors that contributed to its popularity among the youth. Second, we seek to investigate Jobbik{“}s appeal through the role of different elements used to justify joining a particular movement. The article uses primary data drawn from interviews and focus groups with students, and in-depth interviews with leaders of Jobbik.

  @Article{pirro-rona-2019,
  author = {Andrea L. P. Pirro and D{\a'a}niel R{\a'o}na},
  title = {Far-Right Activism in Hungary. Youth Participation in Jobbik and Its Network},
  journal = {European Societies},
  year = {2019},
  volume = {21},
  number = {4},
  pages = {603--626},
  abstract = {The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) qualifies as one of the most successful far-right organisations in contemporary Europe. Through its swift rise in popularity and entry to parliament, the {"}movement party{"} has been able to alter the Hungarian public discourse, existing
  patterns of party competition, additionally exerting effects on the government{"}s policy agenda. At least part of these effects should be attributed to Jobbik{"}s popularity among the youth; its overrepresentation among those aged below 30 is, by now, an established fact within
  national politics. The article argues for a broader understanding of youth participation in far-right politics and sets two principal research goals. First, to reconstruct the breeding ground of far-right youth activism at the grassroots level, by unveiling potential links between
  the subcultural, social movement, and party arenas. The study will chart far-right milieus in Hungary and their overlap with Jobbik: thus, it will introduce supply-side factors that contributed to its popularity among the youth. Second, we seek to investigate Jobbik{"}s appeal
  through the role of different elements used to justify joining a particular movement. The article uses primary data drawn from interviews and focus groups with students, and in-depth interviews with leaders of Jobbik.},
  doi = {10.1080/14616696.2018.1494292},
  }

• Roumanias, Costas, Lamprini Rori, and Vasiliki Georgiadou. “Far-Right Domino: Towards an Integrated Framework of Political Contagion.” Electoral Studies online first (2022). doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102442
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Predominant theories explain the electoral success of far right (FR) parties since the late 1990s within national boundaries. We offer an alternative approach to prevailing cross-national comparisons, by examining patterns of transnational diffusion through a novel integrated analytical framework of transmission of FR electoral habits and party strategies in Europe. Using a new regional database of national and European parliament elections, spanning 7,652 electoral outcomes from 2000 to 2017, we find evidence of spillovers of both FR vote and party positions. Contagion takes place between geographically and culturally proximate countries. Positive transmission is carried through foreign contextual factors in the short run and voting externalities in the long run. Impulse responses indicate that the transmission peaks 4-5 years after an unanticipated shock in foreign FR vote shares or policy positions. Our findings have policy implications for countering xenophobia, right-wing radicalism, and extremism: spillovers entail strong voting externalities which render national policies ineffective, highlighting the need for European-level policies, which can internalize these externalities.

  @Article{roumanias-rori-georgiadou-2022,
  author = {Costas Roumanias and Lamprini Rori and Vasiliki Georgiadou},
  title = {Far-Right Domino: Towards an Integrated Framework of Political Contagion},
  journal = {Electoral Studies},
  year = {2022},
  number = {online first},
  abstract = {Predominant theories explain the electoral success of far right (FR) parties since the late 1990s within national boundaries. We offer an alternative approach to prevailing cross-national comparisons, by examining patterns of transnational diffusion through a novel integrated
  analytical framework of transmission of FR electoral habits and party strategies in Europe. Using a new regional database of national and European parliament elections, spanning 7,652 electoral outcomes from 2000 to 2017, we find evidence of spillovers of both FR vote and party
  positions. Contagion takes place between geographically and culturally proximate countries. Positive transmission is carried through foreign contextual factors in the short run and voting externalities in the long run. Impulse responses indicate that the transmission peaks 4-5
  years after an unanticipated shock in foreign FR vote shares or policy positions. Our findings have policy implications for countering xenophobia, right-wing radicalism, and extremism: spillovers entail strong voting externalities which render national policies ineffective,
  highlighting the need for European-level policies, which can internalize these externalities.},
  doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102442},
  }

• Salomo, Katja. “The Residential Context As Source of Deprivation: Impacts on the Local Political Culture. Evidence From the East German State Thuringia.” Political Geography 69 (2019): 103–117. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.07.001
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Political geographers have long been aware of a deep rural-urban divide regarding party affiliation, voting behavior and political attitudes (Berry, Markee, Fowler, & Giewat, 2000; McKee & Teigen, 2009; Mellow & Trubowitz, 2005; Ormrod & Cole, 1996; Scala, Johnson, & Rogers, 2015). Exploring this gap has gained new urgency in the wake of the US-American presidential election of 2016 (Wuthnow, 2018) and the success of ultra-conservative politicians in {“}rural America{“} that started even earlier (Cramer, 2016). In Europe, the UK{“}s decision to leave the European Union – heavily informed by resentment towards immigration (Swales, 2016) – was imposed on metropolitan London by rural communities in England and Wales (Evans & Menon, 2017). In Germany, voters in the non-metropolitan and predominantly rural East Germany propelled a nationalist party (Alternative für Deutschland) into the Bundestag for the first time after the end of World War II, and have long since shown greater affinity to anti-immigrant, nationalist, anti-democratic views (Pfahl-Traughber, 2009). Illliberal views overrepresented in rural contexts drive some of the recent developments that are most threatening to established democracies in the western world.

  @Article{salomo-2019,
  author = {Katja Salomo},
  title = {The Residential Context As Source of Deprivation: Impacts on the Local Political Culture. Evidence From the East German State Thuringia},
  journal = {Political Geography},
  year = {2019},
  volume = {69},
  pages = {103--117},
  abstract = {Political geographers have long been aware of a deep rural-urban divide regarding party affiliation, voting behavior and political attitudes (Berry, Markee, Fowler, \& Giewat, 2000; McKee \& Teigen, 2009; Mellow \& Trubowitz, 2005; Ormrod \& Cole, 1996; Scala, Johnson, \& Rogers,
  2015). Exploring this gap has gained new urgency in the wake of the US-American presidential election of 2016 (Wuthnow, 2018) and the success of ultra-conservative politicians in {"}rural America{"} that started even earlier (Cramer, 2016). In Europe, the UK{"}s decision to leave the
  European Union - heavily informed by resentment towards immigration (Swales, 2016) - was imposed on metropolitan London by rural communities in England and Wales (Evans \& Menon, 2017). In Germany, voters in the non-metropolitan and predominantly rural East Germany propelled a
  nationalist party (Alternative für Deutschland) into the Bundestag for the first time after the end of World War II, and have long since shown greater affinity to anti-immigrant, nationalist, anti-democratic views (Pfahl-Traughber, 2009). Illliberal views overrepresented in rural
  contexts drive some of the recent developments that are most threatening to established democracies in the western world.},
  doi = {10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.07.001},
  }

• Schraff, Dominik and Ronja Sczepanski. “United Or Divided in Diversity? the Heterogeneous Effects of Ethnic Diversity on European and National Identities.” European Union Politics online first (2021). doi:10.1177/14651165211063770
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  In this article, we argue that the size and cultural proximity of immigrant populations in people{“}s residential surroundings shape national and European identities. This means that the type of migrant population activates cultural threat perceptions and opportunities for contact to varying degrees. Geocoded survey data from the Netherlands suggests that large non-Western immigrant shares are associated with more exclusive national identities, while mixed contexts with Western and non-Western populations show more inclusive identities. These results suggest that highly diverse areas with mixed immigrant populations hold a potential for more tolerance. In contrast, exclusive national identities become strongly pronounced under the presence of sizeable culturally distant immigrant groups.

  @Article{schraff-sczepanski-2021,
  author = {Dominik Schraff and Ronja Sczepanski},
  title = {United Or Divided in Diversity? the Heterogeneous Effects of Ethnic Diversity on European and National Identities},
  journal = {European Union Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {In this article, we argue that the size and cultural proximity of immigrant populations in people{"}s residential surroundings shape national and European identities. This means that the type of migrant population activates cultural threat perceptions and opportunities for contact
  to varying degrees. Geocoded survey data from the Netherlands suggests that large non-Western immigrant shares are associated with more exclusive national identities, while mixed contexts with Western and non-Western populations show more inclusive identities. These results suggest
  that highly diverse areas with mixed immigrant populations hold a potential for more tolerance. In contrast, exclusive national identities become strongly pronounced under the presence of sizeable culturally distant immigrant groups.},
  doi = {10.1177/14651165211063770},
  }

• Schulte-Cloos, Julia. “Political Potentials, Deep-Seated Nativism and the Success of the German AfD.” Frontiers in Political Science 3 (2022). doi:10.3389/fpos.2021.698085
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  The German populist radical right party {“}Alternative for Germany{“} (AfD) was founded amid various economic and political crises. This article argues that the electoral success of this political challenger, however, is rooted in more than the upsurge of populist resentments born out of these crises. Integrating theories about the activation of attitudes with arguments about the effects of exposure to local political contexts, I contend that the electoral success of the AfD reflects the mobilization of deep-seated nativist sentiments. To test these propositions, I draw on a large panel dataset of the AfD{“}s electoral returns at the municipal level (N = 10,694) which I link to pre-crises data on the marginal success of extreme-right parties. Exploiting variation between municipalities located within the same county (N = 294), I estimate a series of spatial simultaneous autoregressive error models by maximum likelihood estimation. The results show that the success of the AfD is rooted in the local prevalence of nativist sentiments that date prior to the crises that fomented the formation of the challenger party-an effect that becomes stronger in the course of the radicalization of the AfD. I further demonstrate that the populist right AfD is best able to broaden its electoral appeal among local communities with an extreme-right sub-culture, particularly in Eastern Germany. This suggests that even small extreme-right networks can act as a breeding ground for the populist right and help spread xenophobic and nativist sentiments among citizens.

  @Article{schulte-cloos-2022,
  author = {Julia Schulte-Cloos},
  title = {Political Potentials, Deep-Seated Nativism and the Success of the German AfD},
  journal = {Frontiers in Political Science},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {3},
  abstract = {The German populist radical right party {"}Alternative for Germany{"} (AfD) was founded amid various economic and political crises. This article argues that the electoral success of this political challenger, however, is rooted in more than the upsurge of populist resentments born out
  of these crises. Integrating theories about the activation of attitudes with arguments about the effects of exposure to local political contexts, I contend that the electoral success of the AfD reflects the mobilization of deep-seated nativist sentiments. To test these
  propositions, I draw on a large panel dataset of the AfD{"}s electoral returns at the municipal level (N = 10,694) which I link to pre-crises data on the marginal success of extreme-right parties. Exploiting variation between municipalities located within the same county (N = 294), I
  estimate a series of spatial simultaneous autoregressive error models by maximum likelihood estimation. The results show that the success of the AfD is rooted in the local prevalence of nativist sentiments that date prior to the crises that fomented the formation of the challenger
  party-an effect that becomes stronger in the course of the radicalization of the AfD. I further demonstrate that the populist right AfD is best able to broaden its electoral appeal among local communities with an extreme-right sub-culture, particularly in Eastern Germany. This
  suggests that even small extreme-right networks can act as a breeding ground for the populist right and help spread xenophobic and nativist sentiments among citizens.},
  doi = {10.3389/fpos.2021.698085},
  }

• Schulte-Cloos, Julia and Arndt Leininger. “Electoral Participation, Political Disaffection, and the Rise of the Populist Radical Right.” Party Politics online first (2021). doi:10.1177/1354068820985186
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Does the populist radical right benefit from increased electoral mobilization? Integrating theories of political grievances with accounts of party competition in Western Europe, we contend that the populist right gains advantage from increased electoral mobilization, but that this effect is conditional on political disaffection. We draw on a novel panel dataset (2009-2019) of more than 10,000 German municipalities and city districts to study the implications of turnout surges as a function of pre-existing levels of political disaffection in a difference-in-differences design. The results demonstrate that turnout surges benefit the populist right {“}Alternative für Deutschland{“} (AfD) in contexts of widespread political distrust. In contrast, increased mobilization acts to depress its electoral fortunes in communities marked by low baseline levels of political disaffection. In shedding light on the interplay between political disaffection and electoral mobilization, this study has important implications for understanding the surge of the populist right in established democracies.

  @Article{schulte-cloos-leininger-2021,
  author = {Julia Schulte-Cloos and Arndt Leininger},
  title = {Electoral Participation, Political Disaffection, and the Rise of the Populist Radical Right},
  journal = {Party Politics},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {Does the populist radical right benefit from increased electoral mobilization? Integrating theories of political grievances with accounts of party competition in Western Europe, we contend that the populist right gains advantage from increased electoral mobilization, but that this
  effect is conditional on political disaffection. We draw on a novel panel dataset (2009-2019) of more than 10,000 German municipalities and city districts to study the implications of turnout surges as a function of pre-existing levels of political disaffection in a
  difference-in-differences design. The results demonstrate that turnout surges benefit the populist right {"}Alternative für Deutschland{"} (AfD) in contexts of widespread political distrust. In contrast, increased mobilization acts to depress its electoral fortunes in communities
  marked by low baseline levels of political disaffection. In shedding light on the interplay between political disaffection and electoral mobilization, this study has important implications for understanding the surge of the populist right in established democracies.},
  doi = {10.1177/1354068820985186},
  }

• Sipma, Take and Carl C. Berning. “Economic Conditions and Populist Radical Right Voting: the Role of Issue Salience.” Electoral Studies 74.online first (2021). doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102416
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  In this article, we show with the European Election Study from nine Western European countries that issue salience of the economy and immigration contributes to our understanding of the puzzling relation between economic conditions and populist radical right support. In countries with relatively weak or worsening economic conditions, the economy is considered more salient, whereas immigration loses salience – also compared to other issues. Voters who perceive the economy as most important problem are less likely to opt for the populist radical right than people who perceive immigration or even other issues as most important. Populist radical right parties appear to not only win votes on the immigration issue, they also lose votes on the economic issue. Finally, in contrast to actual economic conditions, negative perceptions of the economy increases populist radical right voting, despite stronger salience of the economy and partly due to stronger salience of immigration compared to other issues.

  @Article{sipma-berning-2021,
  author = {Take Sipma and Carl C. Berning},
  title = {Economic Conditions and Populist Radical Right Voting: the Role of Issue Salience},
  journal = {Electoral Studies},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {74},
  number = {online first},
  abstract = {In this article, we show with the European Election Study from nine Western European countries that issue salience of the economy and immigration contributes to our understanding of the puzzling relation between economic conditions and populist radical right support. In countries
  with relatively weak or worsening economic conditions, the economy is considered more salient, whereas immigration loses salience - also compared to other issues. Voters who perceive the economy as most important problem are less likely to opt for the populist radical right than
  people who perceive immigration or even other issues as most important. Populist radical right parties appear to not only win votes on the immigration issue, they also lose votes on the economic issue. Finally, in contrast to actual economic conditions, negative perceptions of the
  economy increases populist radical right voting, despite stronger salience of the economy and partly due to stronger salience of immigration compared to other issues.},
  doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102416},
  }

• Spierings, Niels. “Homonationalism and Voting for the Populist Radical Right: Addressing Unanswered Questions by Zooming in on the Dutch Case.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 33.1 (2020): 171–182. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edaa005
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Anti-migration attitudes are at the heart of explaining who votes for Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Rydgren, 2008). PRR parties appeal to a {“}native{“} culture that they say should be protected against outsiders, and more recently, PRR politicians have been including gay citizens among those needing protection, particularly against Islam (Bracke, 2012; De Lange & Mügge, 2015). This strategy echoes what has been labeled {“}homonationalism{“}: Considering the acceptance of gay and lesbian citizens as part of what defines a nation and letting this acceptance serve as a barometer for who has a right to belong to that nation (cf. Puar, 2007; Schotten, 2016).

  @Article{spierings-2020,
  author = {Niels Spierings},
  title = {Homonationalism and Voting for the Populist Radical Right: Addressing Unanswered Questions by Zooming in on the Dutch Case},
  journal = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {33},
  number = {1},
  pages = {171--182},
  abstract = {Anti-migration attitudes are at the heart of explaining who votes for Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties (Lubbers, Gijsberts, \& Scheepers, 2002; Rydgren, 2008). PRR parties appeal to a {"}native{"} culture that they say should be protected against outsiders, and more recently, PRR
  politicians have been including gay citizens among those needing protection, particularly against Islam (Bracke, 2012; De Lange \& Mügge, 2015). This strategy echoes what has been labeled {"}homonationalism{"}: Considering the acceptance of gay and lesbian citizens as part of what
  defines a nation and letting this acceptance serve as a barometer for who has a right to belong to that nation (cf. Puar, 2007; Schotten, 2016).},
  doi = {10.1093/ijpor/edaa005},
  }

• Stankov, Nemanja and Slaven Živkov “c. “May the Lord Protect Our Country. Ethnic Relations As a Moderator Between Religiosity and Radical Right Vote.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies online first.nil (2021): 1–15. doi:10.1080/14782804.2021.1952167
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  While we know a lot about the typical type of radical right-wing (RRWP) voter, individual religiosity in explaining support for RRWPs has eluded consistent scholarly attention. The mixed results available from the scarce literature find both positive and negative associations between religiosity and RRWPs vote. The variation in these relationships is puzzling, especially if we consider how RRWPs often present themselves as guardians of native ethnic and religious identity. In this paper we argue that religiosity increases the chance of voting for RRWPs when ethnic relations are a salient issue in the political system. We test our theory using multilevel regression modeling on the European Social Survey, specifically Rounds 7, 8 and 9 and replicate our results based on the European Values Study from 2017. We find that religiosity is a significant predictor of the RRWP vote when there are salient ethnic relations in the political system, proxied by the presence of an ethnic minority party. On the other hand, in countries without minority parties, non-religious individuals are more likely to vote for RRWPs.

  @Article{stankov-zivkovic-2021,
  author = {Nemanja Stankov and Slaven {\v Z}ivkov \"c},
  title = {May the Lord Protect Our Country. Ethnic Relations As a Moderator Between Religiosity and Radical Right Vote},
  journal = {Journal of Contemporary European Studies},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  number = {nil},
  pages = {1--15},
  abstract = {While we know a lot about the typical type of radical right-wing (RRWP) voter, individual religiosity in explaining support for RRWPs has eluded consistent scholarly attention. The mixed results available from the scarce literature find both positive and negative associations
  between religiosity and RRWPs vote. The variation in these relationships is puzzling, especially if we consider how RRWPs often present themselves as guardians of native ethnic and religious identity. In this paper we argue that religiosity increases the chance of voting for RRWPs
  when ethnic relations are a salient issue in the political system. We test our theory using multilevel regression modeling on the European Social Survey, specifically Rounds 7, 8 and 9 and replicate our results based on the European Values Study from 2017. We find that religiosity
  is a significant predictor of the RRWP vote when there are salient ethnic relations in the political system, proxied by the presence of an ethnic minority party. On the other hand, in countries without minority parties, non-religious individuals are more likely to vote for RRWPs.},
  doi = {10.1080/14782804.2021.1952167},
  }

• Taggart, Paul and Andrea L. P. Pirro. “European Populism Before the Pandemic: Ideology, Euroscepticism, Electoral Performance, and Government Participation of 63 Parties In 30 Countries.” Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica online (2021): 1–24. doi:10.1017/ipo.2021.13
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  This contribution is conceived as a resource on the state of European populist parties before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. It reports on cross-national comparative findings generated by data collected from 30 European countries as to the state of populist parties in one calendar year (2019) and provides an extensive qualitative overview of the national cases. The article shows that while populist parties are preponderantly on the right, there is a significant degree of ideological variation among European populism. The data show significant diversity in their electoral performance but also that populist party participation in government is no longer a marginal phenomenon. The article ultimately elaborates on the various types of positions on European integration – from soft/hard Euroscepticism to lack thereof – and discusses the implications of their affiliation in the European Parliament.

  @Article{taggart-pirro-2021,
  author = {Paul Taggart and Andrea L. P. Pirro},
  title = {European Populism Before the Pandemic: Ideology, Euroscepticism, Electoral Performance, and Government Participation of 63 Parties In 30 Countries},
  journal = {Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica},
  year = {2021},
  pages = {1--24},
  volume = {online},
  abstract = {This contribution is conceived as a resource on the state of European populist parties before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. It reports on cross-national comparative findings generated by data collected from 30 European countries as to the state of populist parties in one
  calendar year (2019) and provides an extensive qualitative overview of the national cases. The article shows that while populist parties are preponderantly on the right, there is a significant degree of ideological variation among European populism. The data show significant
  diversity in their electoral performance but also that populist party participation in government is no longer a marginal phenomenon. The article ultimately elaborates on the various types of positions on European integration - from soft/hard Euroscepticism to lack thereof - and
  discusses the implications of their affiliation in the European Parliament.},
  doi = {10.1017/ipo.2021.13},
  }

• Turnbull-Dugarte, Stuart J. and Jos a’e. “When the US far-right sneezes, the European far-right catches a cold. Quasi-experimental evidence of electoral contagion from Spain.” Electoral Studies 76 (2022): online first. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102443
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Does the electoral defeat of a far-right party abroad influence support for similar parties at home? In this paper we posit, and test, the theoretical argument that signals of viability and popularity akin to bandwagon and titanic effects operate beyond the confines of national boundaries to cause voters to update domestic preferences based on comparable party performance abroad. By exploiting the quasi-experimental setting provided by the coincidental timing of Donald Trump’s 2020 electoral defeat with the Spanish sociological study’s monthly barometer data collection, we provide robust causal evidence to show that Trump’s electoral loss in the US had a negative contagious spillover effect on self-reported support for the Spanish far-right. Empirically we estimate intent-to-treat effects based on the as good as random exposure to the electoral results to isolate the impact of Trump’s defeat on the voting intentions for Spain’s new far-right party, VOX. Our results – which are robust to various modelling approaches including covariate adjustment, regional fixed effects, placebo issues, and nearest-neighbour matching – demonstrate that Trump’s defeat to Joe Biden had a sizeable negative effect on expressed support for VOX. The contagion effect is substantive: equal to 3 to 6 percentage-points among the general population and 11 percentage-points among former right-wing voters. Our findings make an important contribution to the broader literature on electoral behaviour as they indicate that the electoral success of ideologically symmetrical parties abroad can play a role in understanding a party’s domestic success by serving as an important information signal of these parties’ electoral viability.

  @Article{turnbull-dugarte-rama-2022,
  author = {Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte and Jos{\a'e} Rama},
  title = {When the US far-right sneezes, the European far-right catches a cold. Quasi-experimental evidence of electoral contagion from Spain},
  journal = {Electoral Studies},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {76},
  pages = {online first},
  abstract = {Does the electoral defeat of a far-right party abroad influence support for similar parties at home? In this paper we posit, and test, the theoretical argument that signals of viability and popularity akin to bandwagon and titanic effects operate beyond the confines of national
  boundaries to cause voters to update domestic preferences based on comparable party performance abroad. By exploiting the quasi-experimental setting provided by the coincidental timing of Donald Trump's 2020 electoral defeat with the Spanish sociological study's monthly barometer
  data collection, we provide robust causal evidence to show that Trump's electoral loss in the US had a negative contagious spillover effect on self-reported support for the Spanish far-right. Empirically we estimate intent-to-treat effects based on the as good as random exposure to
  the electoral results to isolate the impact of Trump's defeat on the voting intentions for Spain's new far-right party, VOX. Our results - which are robust to various modelling approaches including covariate adjustment, regional fixed effects, placebo issues, and nearest-neighbour
  matching - demonstrate that Trump's defeat to Joe Biden had a sizeable negative effect on expressed support for VOX. The contagion effect is substantive: equal to 3 to 6 percentage-points among the general population and 11 percentage-points among former right-wing voters. Our
  findings make an important contribution to the broader literature on electoral behaviour as they indicate that the electoral success of ideologically symmetrical parties abroad can play a role in understanding a party's domestic success by serving as an important information signal
  of these parties' electoral viability.},
  doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102443},
  }

• Valentim, Vicente and Tobias Widmann. “Does Radical-Right Success Make the Political Debate More Negative?: Evidence from Emotional Rhetoric in German State Parliaments.” Political Behavior online first (2021). doi:10.1007/s11109-021-09697-8
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Political rhetoric has important effects on the quality of democracy, but we know very little about what causes variation in the tone of the political debate. We investigate how radical-right success affects the way the remaining politicians discuss political issues. Using an original dictionary, we measure different positive and negative emotions in a newly collected dataset of speeches in German state parliaments. Taking advantage of variation in the timing of elections when radical-right politicians enter these parliaments, we find that politicians of other parties respond to radical-right success by using more positive, instead of negative, emotions. The analyses suggest that this finding may be the result of a strategy by the remaining politicians to distance themselves from radical-right discourse. Our findings highlight how radical-right success can create incentives for other politicians to enforce democratic norms that radical-right politicians breach.

  @Article{valentim-widmann-2021,
  author = {Vicente Valentim and Tobias Widmann},
  title = {Does Radical-Right Success Make the Political Debate More Negative?: Evidence from Emotional Rhetoric in German State Parliaments},
  journal = {Political Behavior},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {online first},
  abstract = {Political rhetoric has important effects on the quality of democracy, but we know very little about what causes variation in the tone of the political debate. We investigate how radical-right success affects the way the remaining politicians discuss political issues. Using an
  original dictionary, we measure different positive and negative emotions in a newly collected dataset of speeches in German state parliaments. Taking advantage of variation in the timing of elections when radical-right politicians enter these parliaments, we find that politicians
  of other parties respond to radical-right success by using more positive, instead of negative, emotions. The analyses suggest that this finding may be the result of a strategy by the remaining politicians to distance themselves from radical-right discourse. Our findings highlight
  how radical-right success can create incentives for other politicians to enforce democratic norms that radical-right politicians breach.},
  doi = {10.1007/s11109-021-09697-8},
  }

• Vlandas, Tim and Daphne Halikiopoulou. “Welfare state policies and far right party support: moderating “insecurity effects” among different social groups.” West European Politics 45.1 (2022): 24–49. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.1886498
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  This article examines the interplay between social risks, welfare state policies and far right voting. Distinguishing between compensatory and protective policies and using data from seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) and social policy datasets, the article tests a range of hypotheses about the extent to which welfare state policies moderate the insecurities that drive particular social groups to vote for the far right. Empirical findings confirm theoretical expectations that several welfare state policies reduce the likelihood of supporting the far right among individuals exposed to high risks including the unemployed, pensioners, low-income workers, employees on temporary contracts, individuals in large families, and individuals who are disabled/permanently sick. These findings suggest that in order to understand why some individuals vote for the far right, one should not only focus on their risk-driven grievances, but also on policies that may moderate these risks.

  @Article{vlandas-halikiopoulou-2022,
  author = {Tim Vlandas and Daphne Halikiopoulou},
  title = {Welfare state policies and far right party support: moderating {"}insecurity effects{"} among different social groups},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {45},
  number = {1},
  pages = {24--49},
  abstract = {This article examines the interplay between social risks, welfare state policies and far right voting. Distinguishing between compensatory and protective policies and using data from seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) and social policy datasets, the article tests a
  range of hypotheses about the extent to which welfare state policies moderate the insecurities that drive particular social groups to vote for the far right. Empirical findings confirm theoretical expectations that several welfare state policies reduce the likelihood of supporting
  the far right among individuals exposed to high risks including the unemployed, pensioners, low-income workers, employees on temporary contracts, individuals in large families, and individuals who are disabled/permanently sick. These findings suggest that in order to understand why
  some individuals vote for the far right, one should not only focus on their risk-driven grievances, but also on policies that may moderate these risks.},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.1886498},
  }

• Vrakopoulos, Christos. “Political and Ideological Normalization: Quality of Government, Mainstream-right Ideological Positions and Extreme-right Support.” European Political Science Review 14.1 (2022): 56–73. doi:10.1017/S1755773921000308
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  This article aims to explain the variation in the electoral support for extreme-right parties (ERPs) in Europe. The extant literature on the far-right party family does not answer this question specifically with regard to the extreme-right variants for two main reasons. Firstly, theories did not expect the electoral success of these parties in post-war Europe due to their anti-democratic profiles and association with fascism. Secondly, despite the fact that they acknowledge the differences between the parties under the far-right umbrella – namely, the extreme and the radical – they normally do not take these differences into account, and if so, they focus on the radical-right parties. This article shows that electoral support for ERPs is associated with low quality of government and highly conservative mainstream-right parties. The former creates political legitimization for anti-democratic parties and the latter ideological normalization of extreme right.

  @Article{vrakopoulos-2022,
  author = {Christos Vrakopoulos},
  title = {Political and Ideological Normalization: Quality of Government, Mainstream-right Ideological Positions and Extreme-right Support},
  journal = {European Political Science Review},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {14},
  number = {1},
  pages = {56--73},
  abstract = {This article aims to explain the variation in the electoral support for extreme-right parties (ERPs) in Europe. The extant literature on the far-right party family does not answer this question specifically with regard to the extreme-right variants for two main reasons. Firstly,
  theories did not expect the electoral success of these parties in post-war Europe due to their anti-democratic profiles and association with fascism. Secondly, despite the fact that they acknowledge the differences between the parties under the far-right umbrella - namely, the
  extreme and the radical - they normally do not take these differences into account, and if so, they focus on the radical-right parties. This article shows that electoral support for ERPs is associated with low quality of government and highly conservative mainstream-right parties.
  The former creates political legitimization for anti-democratic parties and the latter ideological normalization of extreme right.},
  doi = {10.1017/S1755773921000308},
  }

• Xia, Weiqian. “Mediators Explaining Radical Right Voting Patterns of Christians in Europe: Attitudes Toward Immigrants, Values, Or Social Capital?.” Social Science Research 97 (2021): online first. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2021.102575
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Previous studies show that radical right parties in Europe receive relatively low levels of supports from Christian voters, despite that Christian value is highlighted in the European radical right agenda. However, the mechanism remains largely untested. The study investigates the factors underlying Christians voting or not voting for populist radical right parties across Europe, using Round 8 European Social Survey data. It is shown that there is no general relationship between Christian religiosity and radical right voting across European countries. In most countries, Christians are neither more nor less likely to vote for the radical right parties compared to the non-religious. When Christians are underrepresented in radical right supporters, it can hardly be explained by tolerance towards immigrants, pro-social values or social capital presumed to be fostered by Christian religion and church engagement. In some other cases, where Christians are more likely to vote for radical right parties, it is likely to be driven by anti-immigrant attitudes, authoritarian values and moral conservative values. In addition, Christians could have been more mobilizable for radical right parties due to their authoritarian and moral conservative values, which have not been fully capitalized. The study suggests that Christian religiosity does not serve as an {“}antidote{“} to the radical right. Tolerance towards immigrants, pro-social values or social capital are rarely the mechanisms driving European Christians away from supporting radical right parties.

  @Article{xia-2021,
  author = {Weiqian Xia},
  title = {Mediators Explaining Radical Right Voting Patterns of Christians in Europe: Attitudes Toward Immigrants, Values, Or Social Capital?},
  journal = {Social Science Research},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {97},
  pages = {online first},
  abstract = {Previous studies show that radical right parties in Europe receive relatively low levels of supports from Christian voters, despite that Christian value is highlighted in the European radical right agenda. However, the mechanism remains largely untested. The study investigates the
  factors underlying Christians voting or not voting for populist radical right parties across Europe, using Round 8 European Social Survey data. It is shown that there is no general relationship between Christian religiosity and radical right voting across European countries. In
  most countries, Christians are neither more nor less likely to vote for the radical right parties compared to the non-religious. When Christians are underrepresented in radical right supporters, it can hardly be explained by tolerance towards immigrants, pro-social values or social
  capital presumed to be fostered by Christian religion and church engagement. In some other cases, where Christians are more likely to vote for radical right parties, it is likely to be driven by anti-immigrant attitudes, authoritarian values and moral conservative values. In
  addition, Christians could have been more mobilizable for radical right parties due to their authoritarian and moral conservative values, which have not been fully capitalized. The study suggests that Christian religiosity does not serve as an {"}antidote{"} to the radical right.
  Tolerance towards immigrants, pro-social values or social capital are rarely the mechanisms driving European Christians away from supporting radical right parties.},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ssresearch.2021.102575},
  }

• Yoder, Jennifer A.. “”Revenge of the East”?.” German Politics and Society 38.2 (2020): 35–58. doi:10.3167/gps.2020.380202
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  This article examines the ways the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has claimed to supply eastern voters with important elements of political representation that they demand. Rather than seeking {“}revenge,{“} which would suggest voting purely out of protest against a government or policy, the evidence examined in this article suggests that some voters in the East support the AfD to express something else. The reactions of some of the other political parties in the wake of recent elections suggest that they have begun to pay more attention to their roles in the electorate and to the various dimensions of political representation.

  @Article{yoder-2020,
  author = {Jennifer A. Yoder},
  title = {{"}Revenge of the East{"}?},
  journal = {German Politics and Society},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {38},
  number = {2},
  pages = {35--58},
  abstract = {This article examines the ways the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has claimed to supply eastern voters with important elements of political representation that they demand. Rather than seeking {"}revenge,{"} which would suggest voting purely out of protest against a government or
  policy, the evidence examined in this article suggests that some voters in the East support the AfD to express something else. The reactions of some of the other political parties in the wake of recent elections suggest that they have begun to pay more attention to their roles in
  the electorate and to the various dimensions of political representation.},
  doi = {10.3167/gps.2020.380202},
  }

• Zulianello, Mattia and Erik Gahner Larsen. “Populist Parties in European Parliament Elections: A New Dataset On Left, Right and Valence Populism From 1979 to 2019.” Electoral Studies 71 (2021): online first. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102312
  [BibTeX] [Abstract]
  

  Despite the increasing interest in populism, there is a lack of comparative and longterm evidence on the electoral performance of populist parties. We address this gap by using a novel dataset covering 92 populist parties in the European Parliament elections from 1979 to 2019. Specifically, we provide aggregate data on the electoral performance of all populist parties as well as the three ideational varieties of populism, i.e. right-wing, left-wing and valence populist parties. We show that there is significant variation both across countries as well as between the ideational varieties of populism. Most notably, while the success of left-wing and valence populists is concentrated in specific areas, right-wing populist parties have consolidated as key players in the vast majority of EU countries.

  @Article{zulianello-larsen-2021,
  author = {Mattia Zulianello and Erik Gahner Larsen},
  title = {Populist Parties in European Parliament Elections: A New Dataset On Left, Right and Valence Populism From 1979 to 2019},
  journal = {Electoral Studies},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {71},
  pages = {online first},
  abstract = {Despite the increasing interest in populism, there is a lack of comparative and longterm evidence on the electoral performance of populist parties. We address this gap by using a novel dataset covering 92 populist parties in the European Parliament elections from 1979 to 2019.
  Specifically, we provide aggregate data on the electoral performance of all populist parties as well as the three ideational varieties of populism, i.e. right-wing, left-wing and valence populist parties. We show that there is significant variation both across countries as well as
  between the ideational varieties of populism. Most notably, while the success of left-wing and valence populists is concentrated in specific areas, right-wing populist parties have consolidated as key players in the vast majority of EU countries.},
  doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102312},
  }