The Extreme
Right (or Radical Right, New Right, Populist Right) is one of my main research
interests. Here is a collection of blog posts on the Extreme Right (i.e. parties,
voters, policies) that I have written over the years. If this is relevant for you,
you might also be interested in the 900+ titles bibliography on the Extreme Right that I maintain and in this page, which summarises much of my work on the Extreme Right.
Das Journal Frankfurt hat mit Hajo Funke und mir über ein neurechtes Bildungsprojekt gesprochen, das sich als “Gegenuni” bezeichnet. Ein cleverer Etikettenschwindel.
Something new about protest voting and the radical right?
The debate about the role of discontent/protest for the radical right vote is somewhat stale, to say the least. For literal decades, van der Brug/Fennema/Tillie (2000) and van der Brug/Fennema (2003) have been my go-to references.
Their story is roughly this: yes, radical right voters are dissatisfied, but their unhappiness is ideological. They crave even tougher immigration policies (and possibly a more generally illiberal setup of politics and society).
While Wouter and friends were writing about West European countries of the 1990s, their core findings have been confirmed time and again with newer data. End of story.
So I was quite intrigued when I saw this new paper:
Cohen, D. (2020). Between Strategy and Protest. How Policy Demand, Political Dissatisfaction and Strategic Incentives Matter for Far-Right Voting. Political Science Research and Methods, 8(4), 662–676. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2019.21
Cohen’s argument is that both policy demands and discontent are relevant motives, whose relative importance depends on the circumstances, i.e. radical right representation in parliament and government participation. What’s also novel is that the students tasked with introducing the text got in touch with Cohen, who sent us a video showcasing the article’s highlights and some of his other research. That’s pandemic political science for you.
What we liked
We found the model/method slightly demanding, but quite elegant and intriguing. The main attraction is that the author tries to factor in the incentives and opportunities arising from the political context in which the radical right tries to mobilise their potential voters.
Jérémy-Günther-Heinz Jähnick / Lille – Meeting de Marine Le Pen pour l’élection présidentielle, le 26 mars 2017 à Lille Grand Palais (069) / Wikimedia Commons
This is something which is often talked about but that is rarely implemented in practice. Perhaps the most obvious distinction is between situations where the radical right is in office/opposition (the latter still very much the rule).
What we did not like so much
Students were not sure whether the (changing) indicator for disaffection is really valid, and pointed out that one should distinguish between mere dissatisfaction and demands for a fundamentally different political system. They also argued that propensity to vote is a useful indicator in general, but that an argument about strategic considerations really should be tested based on (reported) electoral choices.
Our main criticism was that legislative strength is measured by seat share in the last national (first order) election, whereas the dependent variable is voting behaviour in European (second order) elections. This seems conceptually dubious and also transforms parties operating under non-proportional national electoral systems (think UKIP and Rassemblement National) into outliers.
But even so, we liked the focus on the political context and opposition/government party status.
Why are women (mostly) immune to the radical right?
It’s a truth universally acknowledged that a woman in possession of a good brain is rarely in want of a male-dominated, chauvinist, sexist radical right party. Or something along these lines. Austen aside, for most radical right parties in (Western) Europe, the male-to-female ratio in their respective electorates is roughly 2:1. As far as I know, this is more than any other party family has to offer. In this 2015 paper, the authors (none of them of the female persuasion) argue that there are two complementary mechanisms that could account for this finding:
Mediation: men/women hold different attitudes (towards immigration/immigrants)
Moderation: the importance of such attitudes varies by gender
Their main result is that both mechanisms seem to contribute in roughly equal parts to the observable gender differences in far right support.
Harteveld, E., Brug, W. V. D., Dahlberg, S., & Kokkonen, A. (2015). The gender gap in populist radical-right voting: examining the demand side in western and eastern europe. Patterns of Prejudice, 49(1-2), 103–134. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2015.1024399
What we liked
Students really, really liked the topic of this paper. They were also intrigued that the authors name-checked the social construction of gender, but slightly disappointed that this had very little tangible consequences, as far as the analysis was concerned. Following our reading of Brils, Muis, and Gaidyte (2020), they also appreciated that the authors differentiate between the relatively well-known state of affairs in Western Europe and the potentially very different CEE world. They thought that the idea of moderation-by-gender (and more generally the idea of voter heterogeneity) was quite innovative and said that the authors’ interpretation of their tables was clear and easy to follow.
Jérémy-Günther-Heinz Jähnick / Lille – Meeting de Marine Le Pen pour l’élection présidentielle, le 26 mars 2017 à Lille Grand Palais (069) / Wikimedia Commons
What we did not like so much
In some (rare) instances, the interpretations were less than lucid. More importantly, a lot of stuff is happening in this paper, which is perhaps too much and results in a somewhat complex structure (where did the perceived left-right distance come from, and what do these findings mean, exactly?). After I have supplied them with industrial quantities of the Brambor-et-al. Kool Aid, my students are also allergic to any statements about the significance or insignificance of terms in interactive models and demand margins plots, fast. And are these really enough countries for multi-level modelling, particularly after splitting the sample?
But by and large, we were quite happy. This is an important topic, and the paper provides bold answers to some of the big questions attached to it.
The gamification of our personal and professional lives is a terrible idea. Elsevier is evil. More generally, the current model of academic publishing is unsustainable. And I’m a very happy chappy this afternoon. All these statements can be (and indeed are) simultaneously true.
Achim Goerres just sent me this little gem, which makes my Friday.
So our article on the changing motives of people voting for the AfD during a period in which the AfD radicalised quite a bit has been frequently cited (about 30 times) over the last months. Yay us!
Obviously, the 2018-2021 window is totally arbitrary. Also, comparing an article to others published in the same journal makes kind of sense (they should be, well, comparable), but the group of all Political Science articles published in the same year (or quarter) would probably be a more useful point of reference. Moreover, German universities are still sort-of-boycotting Elsevier, so I feel mildly bad about publishing with them. Plus we could not benefit from the DEAL agreements that would have waived the fees for going Open Access, because there is still no DEAL with evil Elsevier.
But hey, this article is one of my favourite children. It was a long time in the making. I’m happy that it finally found a good home at Electoral Studies, and I’m even happier that people read and cite it. 30 cites within 20 months is not bad for a piece published in a specialist journal. Eat your heart out, More General Interest Journal That Rejected Its Previous Incarnation.
I’m sad to hear that Ronald Inglehart has died. Hero worshipping is worse than useless, and great man/woman theories are just very bad sociology of knowledge. Having said that, Inglehart had an impact on the field of comparative political sociology that is hard to overestimate. He was enormously productive, and his work is cited far and wide. Inglehart’s publication list kicks off with an APSR article in 1967 that discusses backlash against European integration. In 2021 alone, he has/had one article in SMR, one in Party Politics, and a book with OUP. I’m sure that more of his manuscripts, which others now will have to revise, are currently working their way through the system.
Inglehart wrote about big ideas and about trends that swept the globe. He had a penchant for discovering (or reframing) issues that subsequently became hot, and shaped the way generations (hey, pun!) of social scientists thought about social change and its roots. What made this interesting was that he always linked these ideas to actual data.
Neither the data nor his interpretations were uncontroversial. In the mid-1990s, Bürklin, Klein & Russ claimed that his critics had already “filled libraries” refuting his claims about the silent revolution, and that was probably literally true. But the man ploughed on, unperturbed.
I have only seen Inglehart once, from afar, half a lifetime ago when he was doing a whistle-stop tour of European universities promoting (I think) Modernization & Postmodernization, so I have no personal memories of him. But many others who knew him as a friend, collaborator, teacher, mentor, or even as a fellow parent from camp are paying their tributes.
Germany’s former top domestic spy is a controversial person for various reasons. In 2018, he left his office under a cloud (in fact, narrowly escaping a promotion) and has been commented on political issues from the sidelines ever since then. Now, a regional CDU chapter in Thuringia has selected him as a candidate for the upcoming Bundestag election. Almost everyone is unhappy, and the discussion is going on as we speak.
Is anti-immigration sentiment behind the radical right vote in all of Europe?
It’s been a mere three decades since 1990, or as we old-timers are prone to say, a generation. But for some (cough) Europeanists, the CEE countries are still either terra incognita or just an extension of their western counterparts. While much of the best work on the Radical Right in Europe is comparative, this comparison is often confined to the same 12 or 15 countries that counted as European when the field emerged in the 1980s and 1990s.
In this part of the continent, the importance of nativism, and more specifically, anti-immigrant sentiment, for the Radical Right vote is well established. But how relevant are concerns over immigration in the east, where net immigration is a very recent phenomenon? That is the question that Brils, Muis, and Gaidytė are addressing in this recent contribution. Their analysis is based on ESS data from 16 European countries that were collected shortly before or during the so-called refugee crisis of 2015/16.
Brils, T., Muis, J., & Gaidytė, T. (2020). Dissecting Electoral Support for the Far Right: A Comparison Between Mature and Post-Communist European Democracies. Government and Opposition, online first. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2020.17
What we liked
Students were happy that someone actually bothered to look how the immigration issue played out in different parts of Europe. They were also impressed that the authors grouped vote choices into four broad categories (far right, centre right, left, non-voters) instead of studying an alleged binary choice between the far right and everything else. Treating non-voters as a group in its own right was seen as an improvement over the analysis of a tripolar space. Using fairly recent data on an issue that is still highly salient was also seen as a plus by my students.
We also found the theoretical framework reasonably clear, appreciated the references to recent literature, found the hypotheses plausible and the definitions lucid. They were particularly happy with the tables that provided a bird’s-eye view of all the hypotheses and the related major findings.
What we did not like so much
As with Oesch and Rennwald, students argued that the there are important differences between new (green) and old (socialist, social-democratic, communist) left parties, particularly when it comes to immigration. Lumping these choices together could therefore blur the picture. As always, some parties are hard to classify. Conversely, “far right” is a very broad category that includes radicalised mainstream parties, the Radical Right and even openly extremist outfits.
Students pointed out that the Mediterranean countries where most of the refugees arrived (Greece, Italy, Malta) were not included in the sample. Spain and Portugal were also missing, although they were hit hard by the Euro crisis, too, and had also had high levels of immigration in the past. Moreover, Greece, Spain, and Portugal only returned to democracy in the 1970s, i.e. less than two decades before the CEE countries. And finally, students said that the number of hypotheses was a bit excessive. There you go.
Are you having a good pandemic? Mine is ok. My job is secure, my surroundings are pleasant, and I have so far avoided the plague. Spending a lot of time in the box room in front of my computer is not so different from my normal life. I do not really miss the commute, remote teaching is going better than expected, and online faculty meetings are shorter and more productive than the real thing. When they are not, there is always the second screen or a wonky (cough!) connection.
The spring 2021 (second pandemic) update of the Radical Right Bibliography
But while I’m in a better position than many others, my productivity has taken a hit. At the same time, the number of things that absolutely need doing is up. Which is why there was no winter update of the far right bibliography. Conversely, some of you have been very productive, which is why we are having a bumper spring update of the Eclectic, Erratic Bibliography on the Extreme Right (in (Western) Europe)™. You can download the latest version here in a format that most reference software can import.
If you are aware of any titles that should be in the bibliography, please send me the reference (and the PDF if you have it). And: yes, self-nomination is absolutely fine. And: no, there is not guarantee that I include a reference.
What is new in research on the radical right?
Since April 2020, I have added 78 new titles to the bibliography. This brings the total number of entries to 1032. Most of the new titles are fairly recent and where only published in the last couple of years or so.
Publication year
n
2020
45
2021
14
2019
10
2018
3
2017
1
2015
1
2014
1
2013
1
2009
1
2003
1
This is in line with a trend in previous editions. Last year, just under 20 per cent of the titles included in the bibliography had been published since 2017. This year, it is 25 per cent of titles that have been published since 2018. The median publication year is now 2013, and the modal publication year is 2018. Like the universe itself, the field is expanding at an accelerating rate.
Publications on the radical right over time
69 of the 78 new entries were published in (peer-reviewed) journals. This further contributes to the bibliography’s long-standing bias towards articles, which at least partly reflects the development of the field. In previous analyses, the European Journal of Political Research and West European Politics popped up as the most important journals for research on the Radical Right. In this recent crop, other journals with a European focus as well as more comparative journals dominate. Whether this is a trend or a fluke remains to be seen.
Journal
n
Comparative Political Studies
6
Electoral Studies
5
European Political Science Review
3
European Politics and Society
3
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
3
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties
3
Political Studies
3
Acta Politica
2
Comparative European Politics
2
Europe-Asia Studies
2
European Societies
2
Government and Opposition
2
International Journal of Public Opinion Research
2
Journal of European Integration
2
Party Politics
2
Politics and Governance
2
What are the new topics in radical right research?
Here is a quick visualisation of the words that dominate the titles and abstracts. Because stuff like “right-wing”, “radical” or “extreme” is more or less the selection criterion, I removed these terms. I should have applied some stemming (see “party/parties”, “voters/voting”) but did not, because stems look ugly, and common stemmers still treat “European”, “Europe”, and “EU” as three different things. Full lemmatisation might be a viable alternative by now, but I was too lazy to look into that.
Topics in research on the radical right
Even so, the focus on parties and voters is pretty obvious. “Immigration” and “Europe” are also hardly surprising. What I did not expect as the large number of items concerned with support, or the number of contributions dealing with Germany and the AfD. Also, “welfare” is quite prominent but did not feature at all last year (when I based the cloud on titles only).
To get a better idea what the different contributions are about, I calculated the (Euclidian) distances between texts based on their vocabulary and ran the result through a classical MDS. In the top right corner, there are outliers: Im 2021 writes about how different types of employment moderate the effect of welfare chauvinism, and Vadlamannati 2020 studies the moderating effect of welfare regimes on the link between refugees flows and radical right support. In other words, the political economy vibe is strong in this corner.
A map of the work on the radical right, based on vocabulary
But the true outliers are three collaborations between Lisanne Wichgers (in two cases), Laura Jacobs and Joost van Spanje, which appear all over the place. The first 2020 text is about frame use in politics and journalism in the Netherlands, the second one about the consequences of hate speech prosecution in Holland, whereas the Jacobs/van Spanje collaboration is also concerned with hate speech and electoral results but has a comparative outlook.
Once you (mentally) remove these outliers, some of the groupings in the big cluster also make some sense – see e.g. the relative proximity of Heinze 2020, Weisskircher 2020, and Rauchfleisch Kaiser 2020 who all deal with the far right in Germany. The rest is left as an exercise to the reader.
Gender of radical right researchers
Here is the ever popular cloud of authors’ first names. Unlike last year, I refrained from colour-coding them as either pink or navy blue, but it is pretty clear that Andres and Jonas have replaced Christian and David.
Given names of radical right researchers
Last year, the female share of unique authors was a meagre 28 per cent. This year, we’re up to (…. drum roll ….) 31 per cent. Better than nothing, but still not good. I have also re-run the analysis for the 1990-2021. The figure is weighted by publications in a given year and relies on an algorithmic classification of given names that overestimates the share of women in the database. Here is the updated graph. Progress is glacial, to say the least.
Share of female researchers over time (weighted by publications)
So, if you are female, please send me your work on right-wing radicalism. The men do it. All. The. Time.
Show us the latest titles in radical right research
These are all the new titles in their full glory. Click here to download/import the new titles into your reference management software.
Abts, Koen, Emmanuel Dalle Mulle, Stijn Kessel, and Elie Michel. “The Welfare Agenda of the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe: Combining Welfare Chauvinism, Producerism and Populism*.” Swiss Political Science Review online first (2021). doi:10.1111/spsr.12428 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Recent scholarship on the populist radical right tends to imprecisely describe the welfare agenda of this party family with reference to its key ideological characteristics of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. We propose an alternative analytical framework that considers the multidimensionality of welfare state positions and the {“}deservingness criteria{“} that underlie ideas about welfare entitlement. Applying this framework to a sample of four European populist radical right parties, we conclude that three interrelated frames inform their welfare agenda. These parties, we argue, advocate social closure not only on the basis of the deservingness criterion of identity (welfare chauvinism), but also on criteria of control, attitude, and reciprocity (welfare producerism) and on an antagonism between the people and the establishment (welfare populism). Understanding the welfare agenda of the populist radical right requires us to move beyond welfare chauvinism and to reconsider the concept of welfare producerism and its interaction with welfare chauvinism.
@Article{abts-mulle-kessel-michel-2021,
author = {Koen Abts and Emmanuel Dalle Mulle and Stijn Kessel and Elie Michel},
title = {The Welfare Agenda of the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe: Combining Welfare Chauvinism, Producerism and Populism*},
journal = {Swiss Political Science Review},
year = {2021},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {Recent scholarship on the populist radical right tends to imprecisely describe the welfare agenda of this party family with reference to its key ideological characteristics of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. We propose an alternative analytical framework that considers
the multidimensionality of welfare state positions and the {"}deservingness criteria{"} that underlie ideas about welfare entitlement. Applying this framework to a sample of four European populist radical right parties, we conclude that three interrelated frames inform their welfare
agenda. These parties, we argue, advocate social closure not only on the basis of the deservingness criterion of identity (welfare chauvinism), but also on criteria of control, attitude, and reciprocity (welfare producerism) and on an antagonism between the people and the
establishment (welfare populism). Understanding the welfare agenda of the populist radical right requires us to move beyond welfare chauvinism and to reconsider the concept of welfare producerism and its interaction with welfare chauvinism.},
doi = {10.1111/spsr.12428},
}
Allen, Trevor J. and Sara Wallace Goodman. “Individual- and party-level determinants of far-right support among women in Western Europe.” European Political Science Review 13.2 (2021): 135–150. doi:10.1017/S1755773920000405 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Support for Western Europe’s far-right is majority-male. However, given the sweeping success of the party family, literature on this ‘gender gap’ belies support given to the radical right by millions of women. We examine differences between men and women’s support for far-right parties, focusing on workplace experience, positions on economic and cultural issues, and features of far-right parties themselves. We find that the received scholarship on blue-collar support for far-right populists is a largely male phenomenon, and women in routine nonmanual (i.e. service, sales, and clerical) work are more likely than those in blue-collar work to support the far-right. Moreover, while men who support the far-right tend to be conservative on other moral issues, certain liberal positions predict far-right support among women, at both the voter and party level. Our analysis suggests that gender differences may obscure the socio-structural and attitudinal bases of support for far-right parties and have broader implications for comparative political behavior and gender and politics.
@Article{allen-goodman-2021,
author = {Trevor J. Allen and Sara Wallace Goodman},
title = {Individual- and party-level determinants of far-right support among women in Western Europe},
journal = {European Political Science Review},
year = {2021},
volume = {13},
number = {2},
pages = {135–150},
abstract = {Support for Western Europe’s far-right is majority-male. However, given the sweeping success of the party family, literature on this ‘gender gap’ belies support given to the radical right by millions of women. We examine differences between men and women’s support for
far-right parties, focusing on workplace experience, positions on economic and cultural issues, and features of far-right parties themselves. We find that the received scholarship on blue-collar support for far-right populists is a largely male phenomenon, and women in routine
nonmanual (i.e. service, sales, and clerical) work are more likely than those in blue-collar work to support the far-right. Moreover, while men who support the far-right tend to be conservative on other moral issues, certain liberal positions predict far-right support among women,
at both the voter and party level. Our analysis suggests that gender differences may obscure the socio-structural and attitudinal bases of support for far-right parties and have broader implications for comparative political behavior and gender and politics.},
doi = {10.1017/S1755773920000405},
}
The {“}rise of global populism{“} has become a primary metanarrative for the previous decade in advanced industrial democracies, but I argue that it is a deeply misleading one. Nativism-not populism-is the defining feature of both radical right parties in Western Europe and of radical right politicians like Donald Trump in the United States. The tide of {“}left-wing populism{“} in Europe receded quickly, as did its promise of returning power to the people through online voting and policy deliberation. The erosion of democracy in states like Hungary has not been the result of populism, but rather of the deliberate practice of competitive authoritarianism. Calling these disparate phenomena {“}populist{“} obscures their core features and mistakenly attaches normatively redeeming qualities to nativists and authoritarians.
@Article{art-2020,
author = {David Art},
title = {The Myth of Global Populism},
journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
year = {2020},
pages = {1--13},
abstract = {The {"}rise of global populism{"} has become a primary metanarrative for the previous decade in advanced industrial democracies, but I argue that it is a deeply misleading one. Nativism-not populism-is the defining feature of both radical right parties in Western Europe and of radical
right politicians like Donald Trump in the United States. The tide of {"}left-wing populism{"} in Europe receded quickly, as did its promise of returning power to the people through online voting and policy deliberation. The erosion of democracy in states like Hungary has not been the
result of populism, but rather of the deliberate practice of competitive authoritarianism. Calling these disparate phenomena {"}populist{"} obscures their core features and mistakenly attaches normatively redeeming qualities to nativists and authoritarians.},
doi = {10.1017/S1537592720003552},
}
Auers, Daunis and Andres Kasekamp. “Explaining the Electoral Failure of Extreme-Right Parties in Estonia and Latvia.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17.2 (2009): 241–254. doi:10.1080/14782800903108718 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Extreme-right political parties have achieved significant electoral success in Europe in recent years. This paper considers why this electoral success has not been replicated in contemporary Estonia and Latvia. The paper begins with a discussion of the necessary background conditions for the success of extreme-right movements, finding that they do largely exist in Estonia and Latvia. The paper then moves on to map the rising levels of extreme-right mobilisation among both titular and Russian-speaking parts of the population. We examine two hypotheses to explain the electoral failure of extreme-right parties: (1) The institutional hypothesis argues that the party and electoral laws check extreme-right party electoral success; (2) The competition hypothesis contends that political parties lack the membership and traditions that act as constraints on party behaviour. As a result, mainstream parties are free to adopt the radical rhetoric of extreme-right movements and parties.
@Article{auers-kasekamp-2009,
author = {Daunis Auers and Andres Kasekamp},
title = {Explaining the Electoral Failure of Extreme-Right Parties in Estonia and Latvia},
journal = {Journal of Contemporary European Studies},
year = {2009},
volume = {17},
number = {2},
pages = {241--254},
abstract = {Extreme-right political parties have achieved significant electoral success in Europe in recent years. This paper considers why this electoral success has not been replicated in contemporary Estonia and Latvia. The paper begins with a discussion of the necessary background
conditions for the success of extreme-right movements, finding that they do largely exist in Estonia and Latvia. The paper then moves on to map the rising levels of extreme-right mobilisation among both titular and Russian-speaking parts of the population. We examine two hypotheses
to explain the electoral failure of extreme-right parties: (1) The institutional hypothesis argues that the party and electoral laws check extreme-right party electoral success; (2) The competition hypothesis contends that political parties lack the membership and traditions that
act as constraints on party behaviour. As a result, mainstream parties are free to adopt the radical rhetoric of extreme-right movements and parties.},
doi = {10.1080/14782800903108718},
}
Auers, Daunis and Andres Kasekamp. “Comparing Radical-Right Populism in Estonia and Latvia.” Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse. Eds. Mral, Brigitte, Majid KhosraviNik, and Ruth Wodak. Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. 235–248. [BibTeX]
@InCollection{auers-kasekamp-2013,
author = {Daunis Auers and Andres Kasekamp},
title = {Comparing Radical-Right Populism in Estonia and Latvia},
booktitle = {Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse},
editor = {Brigitte Mral and Majid KhosraviNik and Ruth Wodak},
publisher = {Bloomsbury Academic},
year = {2013},
pages = {235--248},
}
Backlund, Anders and Ann-Cathrine Jungar. “Populist Radical Right Party-Voter Policy Representation in Western Europe.” Representation 55.4 (2019): 393–413. doi:10.1080/00344893.2019.1674911 [BibTeX][Abstract]
In this study we assess policy representation by populist radical right (PRR) parties in ten West European countries. Going beyond aggregate left-right or socio-cultural (GAL-TAN) dimensions of political conflict, we study representation on policy issues related to the PRR parties{“} core ideological features nativism, populism, and authoritarianism. Analysing data from party expert and voter surveys, we find that the PRR parties provide largely unique policy positions that are congruent with their voters{“} preferences in terms of their opposition to immigration and the European Union. By contrast, the parties are less representative in terms of their value conservative and authoritarian positions on gay rights and civil liberties. The findings have relevance for our understanding of party strategy, voter behaviour, and the dimensionality of political competition.
@Article{backlund-jungar-2019,
author = {Anders Backlund and Ann-Cathrine Jungar},
title = {Populist Radical Right Party-Voter Policy Representation in Western Europe},
journal = {Representation},
year = {2019},
volume = {55},
number = {4},
pages = {393--413},
abstract = {In this study we assess policy representation by populist radical right (PRR) parties in ten West European countries. Going beyond aggregate left-right or socio-cultural (GAL-TAN) dimensions of political conflict, we study representation on policy issues related to the PRR
parties{"} core ideological features nativism, populism, and authoritarianism. Analysing data from party expert and voter surveys, we find that the PRR parties provide largely unique policy positions that are congruent with their voters{"} preferences in terms of their opposition to
immigration and the European Union. By contrast, the parties are less representative in terms of their value conservative and authoritarian positions on gay rights and civil liberties. The findings have relevance for our understanding of party strategy, voter behaviour, and the
dimensionality of political competition.},
doi = {10.1080/00344893.2019.1674911},
}
Berning, Carl C. and Conrad Ziller. “Green Versus Radical Right As the New Political Divide? The European Parliament Election 2019 in Germany.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies online first (2020). doi:10.1111/jcms.13080 [BibTeX]
@Article{berning-ziller-2020,
author = {Carl C. Berning and Conrad Ziller},
title = {Green Versus Radical Right As the New Political Divide? The European Parliament Election 2019 in Germany},
journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
doi = {10.1111/jcms.13080},
}
Betz, Hans-Georg and Fabian Habersack. “Regional Nativism in East Germany. The Case of the AfD.” The People and the Nation. Populism and Ethno-Territorial Politics in Europe. Eds. Heinisch, Reinhard, Emanuele Massetti, and Oscar Mazzoleni. London: Routledge, 2019. 110–135. [BibTeX][Abstract]
This chapter argues that the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is a typical radical right-wing populist party, which promotes an emphatically nativist discourse and examines the particular features that distinguish the Eastern part of Germany from the rest of the country. It explores to what degree understanding Eastern Germany{“}s regional idiosyncrasies might help to explain the AfD{“}s disproportionate appeal there. Political success tends to invite rivalries, internal strife, power struggles, and programmatic trench warfare. This was also the case with the AfD following the European elections. Contemporary radical right-wing populism is a composite of two ideational elements: populism and nativism. The AfD{“}s growing appeal after 2015 was largely owed to the new leaders{“} ability to frame their discourse in a way that resonated with widespread and enduring undercurrents in German public opinion. The sociologist Robert Jansen defines populism as a political project that mobilizes ordinary people into contentious political action while {“}articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people{“}.
@InCollection{betz-habersack-2019,
author = {Hans-Georg Betz and Fabian Habersack},
title = {Regional Nativism in East Germany. The Case of the AfD},
booktitle = {The People and the Nation. Populism and Ethno-Territorial Politics in Europe},
publisher = {Routledge},
year = {2019},
editor = {Reinhard Heinisch and Emanuele Massetti and Oscar Mazzoleni},
pages = {110--135},
address = {London},
abstract = {This chapter argues that the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is a typical radical right-wing populist party, which promotes an emphatically nativist discourse and examines the particular features that distinguish the Eastern part of Germany from the rest of the country. It explores
to what degree understanding Eastern Germany{"}s regional idiosyncrasies might help to explain the AfD{"}s disproportionate appeal there. Political success tends to invite rivalries, internal strife, power struggles, and programmatic trench warfare. This was also the case with the AfD
following the European elections. Contemporary radical right-wing populism is a composite of two ideational elements: populism and nativism. The AfD{"}s growing appeal after 2015 was largely owed to the new leaders{"} ability to frame their discourse in a way that resonated with
widespread and enduring undercurrents in German public opinion. The sociologist Robert Jansen defines populism as a political project that mobilizes ordinary people into contentious political action while {"}articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary
people{"}.},
}
While public campaign financing is often thought of as a way to {“}level the playing field{“} of elections, I argue that such policies may have unintended second-order consequences. Namely, that increasing the degree to which public funding drives political campaigns disproportionately aids radical-right parties. This is a counter-intuitive result, as public financing of elections has recently become an important issue for those on the political left as a method to restore power to the majority. Rather, it seems to aid not only those on the right, but those on the political fringe. Through a cross-national analysis of 328 lower-house elections in 20 advanced democracies, I demonstrate that public financing serves to significantly increase vote-share of the radical-right.
@Article{bichay-2020,
author = {Nicolas Bichay},
title = {Public Campaign Financing and the Rise of Radical-Right Parties},
journal = {Electoral Studies},
year = {2020},
pages = {online first},
abstract = {While public campaign financing is often thought of as a way to {"}level the playing field{"} of elections, I argue that such policies may have unintended second-order consequences. Namely, that increasing the degree to which public funding drives political campaigns
disproportionately aids radical-right parties. This is a counter-intuitive result, as public financing of elections has recently become an important issue for those on the political left as a method to restore power to the majority. Rather, it seems to aid not only those on the
right, but those on the political fringe. Through a cross-national analysis of 328 lower-house elections in 20 advanced democracies, I demonstrate that public financing serves to significantly increase vote-share of the radical-right.},
doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102159},
}
Bornschier, Simon, Silja Häusermann, Delia Zollinger, and C. a’e. “How “Us” and “Them” Relates to Voting Behavior-Social Structure, Social Identities, and Electoral Choice.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2021). doi:10.1177/0010414021997504 [BibTeX][Abstract]
The last decades have seen the emergence of a divide pitting the new left against the far right in advanced democracies. We study how this universalism-particularism divide is crystallizing into a full-blown cleavage, complete with structural, political and identity elements. So far, little research exists on the identities that voters themselves perceive as relevant for drawing in- and out-group boundaries along this divide. Based on an original survey from Switzerland, a paradigmatic case of electoral realignment, we show that voters’ {“}objective{“} socio-demographic characteristics relate to distinctive, primarily culturally connoted identities. We then inquire into the degree to which these group identities have been politicized, that is, whether they divide new left and far right voters. Our results strongly suggest that the universalism-particularism {“}cleavage{“} not only bundles issues, but shapes how people think about who they are and where they stand in a group conflict that meshes economics and culture.
@Article{bornschier-haeusermann-zollinger-colombo-2021,
author = {Simon Bornschier and Silja H{\"a}usermann and Delia Zollinger and C{\a'e}line Colombo},
title = {How {"}Us{"} and {"}Them{"} Relates to Voting Behavior-Social Structure, Social Identities, and Electoral Choice},
journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
year = {2021},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {The last decades have seen the emergence of a divide pitting the new left against the far right in advanced democracies. We study how this universalism-particularism divide is crystallizing into a full-blown cleavage, complete with structural, political and identity elements. So
far, little research exists on the identities that voters themselves perceive as relevant for drawing in- and out-group boundaries along this divide. Based on an original survey from Switzerland, a paradigmatic case of electoral realignment, we show that voters' {"}objective{"}
socio-demographic characteristics relate to distinctive, primarily culturally connoted identities. We then inquire into the degree to which these group identities have been politicized, that is, whether they divide new left and far right voters. Our results strongly suggest that
the universalism-particularism {"}cleavage{"} not only bundles issues, but shapes how people think about who they are and where they stand in a group conflict that meshes economics and culture.},
doi = {10.1177/0010414021997504},
}
Brils, Tobias, Jasper Muis, and Teodora Gaidyt?. “Dissecting Electoral Support for the Far Right: A Comparison between Mature and Post-Communist European Democracies.” Government and Opposition (2020): online first. doi:10.1017/gov.2020.17 [BibTeX][Abstract]
This article investigates three explanations for electoral support for the far right – {“}cultural backlash{“}, {“}economic grievances{“} and {“}protest voting{“} – in a novel way. Our main contribution is that we contrast far-right voters with voters of centre-right parties, traditional left-wing parties and abstainers. Equally innovative is the comparison between mature and post-communist democracies. Using European Social Survey data (2014-16), we conclude that anti-immigration attitudes are most important in distinguishing far-right voters from all other groups. Yet, these differences are significantly smaller in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, far-right voters are not the so-called socioeconomic {“}losers of globalization{“}: this is only true when compared with centre-right voters. Concerning protest voting, distrust of supranational governance particularly enhances far-right voting. Overall, our study concludes that more fine-grained distinctions pay off and avoid misleading generalizations about {“}European far-right voters{“} often presented in public debates.
@Article{brils-muis-gaidyte-2020,
author = {Tobias Brils and Jasper Muis and Teodora Gaidyt?},
title = {Dissecting Electoral Support for the Far Right: A Comparison between Mature and Post-Communist European Democracies},
journal = {Government and Opposition},
year = {2020},
pages = {online first},
abstract = {This article investigates three explanations for electoral support for the far right - {"}cultural backlash{"}, {"}economic grievances{"} and {"}protest voting{"} - in a novel way. Our main contribution is that we contrast far-right voters with voters of centre-right parties, traditional
left-wing parties and abstainers. Equally innovative is the comparison between mature and post-communist democracies. Using European Social Survey data (2014-16), we conclude that anti-immigration attitudes are most important in distinguishing far-right voters from all other
groups. Yet, these differences are significantly smaller in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, far-right voters are not the so-called socioeconomic {"}losers of globalization{"}: this is only true when compared with centre-right voters. Concerning protest voting, distrust of supranational
governance particularly enhances far-right voting. Overall, our study concludes that more fine-grained distinctions pay off and avoid misleading generalizations about {"}European far-right voters{"} often presented in public debates.},
doi = {10.1017/gov.2020.17},
}
Carella, Leonardo and Robert Ford. “The Status Stratification of Radical Right Support: Reconsidering the Occupational Profile of Ukip”s Electorate.” Electoral Studies 67.online first (2020). doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102214 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Drawing on Weber{“}s conceptualisation of class and status as distinct principles of social order, this article argues that support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is better understood as a status-based phenomenon than a class-based one. Operationalising status as a function of social distance between occupational groups, we show that whilst class was a poor predictor of UKIP support in 2015, status scores were strongly and negatively correlated to the likelihood of supporting UKIP. The opposite is true for the Conservatives{“} and the Labour Party{“}s electorates, which were still much more strongly aligned on class lines. The effect of status on UKIP preference remains strong after controlling for educational qualifications, suggesting that the status scale taps into a deeper divide than simply an educational cleavage. Moreover, we find that status plays a similar role in predicting the likelihood of voting for right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in other Western European countries as well.
@Article{carella-ford-2020,
author = {Leonardo Carella and Robert Ford},
title = {The Status Stratification of Radical Right Support: Reconsidering the Occupational Profile of Ukip{"}s Electorate},
journal = {Electoral Studies},
year = {2020},
volume = {67},
number = {online first},
abstract = {Drawing on Weber{"}s conceptualisation of class and status as distinct principles of social order, this article argues that support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is better understood as a status-based phenomenon than a class-based one. Operationalising status as a
function of social distance between occupational groups, we show that whilst class was a poor predictor of UKIP support in 2015, status scores were strongly and negatively correlated to the likelihood of supporting UKIP. The opposite is true for the Conservatives{"} and the Labour
Party{"}s electorates, which were still much more strongly aligned on class lines. The effect of status on UKIP preference remains strong after controlling for educational qualifications, suggesting that the status scale taps into a deeper divide than simply an educational cleavage.
Moreover, we find that status plays a similar role in predicting the likelihood of voting for right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in other Western European countries as well.},
doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102214},
}
Castelli Gattinara, Pietro. “The Study of the Far Right and Its Three E”s: Why Scholarship Must Go Beyond Eurocentrism, Electoralism and Externalism.” French Politics 18.3 (2020): 314–333. doi:10.1057/s41253-020-00124-8 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Over the past decades, the far right has become one of the most studied phenomena in international political science, attracting more attention than all other party families combined. This article critically assesses the scholarly progress made so far and discusses what future research on the far right should focus on. It argues that although the number of studies has grown disproportionately, scholars have been slow in acknowledging that far-right politics have entered a new phase, where traditional aspects progressively lost momentum and new ones acquired central stage. To understand the transformations in the contemporary far right, scholars must address three shortcomings of international comparative research-Eurocentrism, Electoralism and Externalism. Today, we need to re-embed the study of the far right into the broader literature on party politics and political sociology, acknowledging the diversity that exists within the far right, its diffusion beyond (western) Europe and its mobilization outside the electoral arena.
@Article{castelli-2020,
author = {Pietro {Castelli Gattinara}},
title = {The Study of the Far Right and Its Three E{"}s: Why Scholarship Must Go Beyond Eurocentrism, Electoralism and Externalism},
journal = {French Politics},
year = {2020},
volume = {18},
number = {3},
pages = {314--333},
abstract = {Over the past decades, the far right has become one of the most studied phenomena in international political science, attracting more attention than all other party families combined. This article critically assesses the scholarly progress made so far and discusses what future
research on the far right should focus on. It argues that although the number of studies has grown disproportionately, scholars have been slow in acknowledging that far-right politics have entered a new phase, where traditional aspects progressively lost momentum and new ones
acquired central stage. To understand the transformations in the contemporary far right, scholars must address three shortcomings of international comparative research-Eurocentrism, Electoralism and Externalism. Today, we need to re-embed the study of the far right into the broader
literature on party politics and political sociology, acknowledging the diversity that exists within the far right, its diffusion beyond (western) Europe and its mobilization outside the electoral arena.},
doi = {10.1057/s41253-020-00124-8},
}
Chou, Winston, Rafaela Dancygier, Naoki Egami, and Amaney A. Jamal. “Competing for Loyalists? How Party Positioning Affects Populist Radical Right Voting.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2021). doi:10.1177/0010414021997166 [BibTeX][Abstract]
As populist radical right parties muster increasing support in many democracies, an important question is how mainstream parties can recapture their voters. Focusing on Germany, we present original panel evidence that voters supporting the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)-the country’s largest populist radical right party-resemble partisan loyalists with entrenched anti-establishment views, seemingly beyond recapture by mainstream parties. Yet this loyalty does not only reflect anti-establishment voting, but also gridlocked party-issue positioning. Despite descriptive evidence of strong party loyalty, experimental evidence reveals that many AfD voters change allegiances when mainstream parties accommodate their preferences. However, for most parties this repositioning is extremely costly. While mainstream parties can attract populist radical right voters via restrictive immigration policies, they alienate their own voters in doing so. Examining position shifts across issue dimensions, parties, and voter groups, our research demonstrates that, absent significant changes in issue preferences or salience, the status quo is an equilibrium.
@Article{chou-dancygier-egami-jamal-2021,
author = {Winston Chou and Rafaela Dancygier and Naoki Egami and Amaney A. Jamal},
title = {Competing for Loyalists? How Party Positioning Affects Populist Radical Right Voting},
journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
year = {2021},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {As populist radical right parties muster increasing support in many democracies, an important question is how mainstream parties can recapture their voters. Focusing on Germany, we present original panel evidence that voters supporting the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)-the
country's largest populist radical right party-resemble partisan loyalists with entrenched anti-establishment views, seemingly beyond recapture by mainstream parties. Yet this loyalty does not only reflect anti-establishment voting, but also gridlocked party-issue positioning.
Despite descriptive evidence of strong party loyalty, experimental evidence reveals that many AfD voters change allegiances when mainstream parties accommodate their preferences. However, for most parties this repositioning is extremely costly. While mainstream parties can attract
populist radical right voters via restrictive immigration policies, they alienate their own voters in doing so. Examining position shifts across issue dimensions, parties, and voter groups, our research demonstrates that, absent significant changes in issue preferences or salience,
the status quo is an equilibrium.},
doi = {10.1177/0010414021997166},
}
The literature has pointed to a change in radical right-wing parties{“} (RRWPs) position regarding the welfare state. Those parties have abandoned the neoliberal approach on distributive issues and have become defenders of social expenditure for deserving groups. Nevertheless, as RRWPs have joined with right-wing mainstream parties to form governments, their distributive policy position might cause conflict in a coalition. This study, therefore, addresses this puzzle by analysing the social policy outcomes of RRWPs{“} government participation. The conclusion is that those parties contribute to the welfare state retrenchment. However, policies are not affected evenly. Expenditure that targets groups regarded as undeserving by the radical right is retrenched the most.
@Article{chueri-2020,
author = {Juliana Chueri},
title = {Social Policy Outcomes of Government Participation By Radical Right Parties},
journal = {Party Politics},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {The literature has pointed to a change in radical right-wing parties{"} (RRWPs) position regarding the welfare state. Those parties have abandoned the neoliberal approach on distributive issues and have become defenders of social expenditure for deserving groups. Nevertheless, as
RRWPs have joined with right-wing mainstream parties to form governments, their distributive policy position might cause conflict in a coalition. This study, therefore, addresses this puzzle by analysing the social policy outcomes of RRWPs{"} government participation. The conclusion
is that those parties contribute to the welfare state retrenchment. However, policies are not affected evenly. Expenditure that targets groups regarded as undeserving by the radical right is retrenched the most.},
doi = {10.1177/1354068820923496},
}
a’e, Hilde Coff R.. “The Impact of Candidates’ Vocal Expression on Policy Agreement and Candidate Support: Differences Between Populist Radical Right and Other Voters.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 30.4 (2020): 422–445. doi:10.1080/17457289.2018.1544905 [BibTeX][Abstract]
This study assesses to what extent the vocal expression used by political candidates relates to voters’ likelihood of agreeing with a policy and of voting for the candidate introducing the policy. Experimental video data with hypothetical candidates presenting migration policies were collected among a representative sample of the Dutch population (N = 4,727). The candidates delivered the policies using either a hard vocal expression (indicating a more aggressive, austere and dominant style) or a soft vocal expression (indicating a friendlier and more amicable style). The analysis reveals that using a hard (versus soft) vocal expression negatively affects the likelihood of supporting a candidate and agreeing with the policy, an effect which is significantly stronger among citizens who do not support the populist radical right Freedom Party (PVV) than among those who do support the PVV. This negative effect of a hard (versus soft) expression among those not supporting the PVV is significantly stronger when the presented policy on the integration of immigrants is moderate rather than restrictive.
@Article{coffe-2020,
author = {Hilde R. Coff{\a'e}},
title = {The Impact of Candidates’ Vocal Expression on Policy Agreement and Candidate Support: Differences Between Populist Radical Right and Other Voters},
journal = {Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties},
year = {2020},
volume = {30},
number = {4},
pages = {422--445},
abstract = {This study assesses to what extent the vocal expression used by political candidates relates to voters’ likelihood of agreeing with a policy and of voting for the candidate introducing the policy. Experimental video data with hypothetical candidates presenting migration policies
were collected among a representative sample of the Dutch population (N = 4,727). The candidates delivered the policies using either a hard vocal expression (indicating a more aggressive, austere and dominant style) or a soft vocal expression (indicating a friendlier and more
amicable style). The analysis reveals that using a hard (versus soft) vocal expression negatively affects the likelihood of supporting a candidate and agreeing with the policy, an effect which is significantly stronger among citizens who do not support the populist radical right
Freedom Party (PVV) than among those who do support the PVV. This negative effect of a hard (versus soft) expression among those not supporting the PVV is significantly stronger when the presented policy on the integration of immigrants is moderate rather than restrictive.},
doi = {10.1080/17457289.2018.1544905},
}
Cohen, Denis. “Between Strategy and Protest. How Policy Demand, Political Dissatisfaction and Strategic Incentives Matter for Far-right Voting.” Political Science Research and Methods 8.4 (2020): 662–676. doi:10.1017/psrm.2019.21 [BibTeX][Abstract]
What attracts voters to far-right parties? Emphasizing the repercussions of far-right parties{“} past achievements on the mobilization of voters{“} electoral demand, this paper develops an argument of context-dependent strategic far-right voting. Far-right parties seek to mobilize on a combination of demand for nativist policies and anti-establishment protest sentiment. Their capacity of doing so, however, critically depends on the strategic incentives they supply. My findings from a comparative analysis based on six waves of the European Election Study show that far-right parties{“} past attainment of legislative strength boosts the credibility of their policy appeal and broadens the scope of their protest appeal whereas their participation in government jeopardizes their capacity to mobilize on popular discontent.
@Article{cohen-2020,
author = {Denis Cohen},
title = {Between Strategy and Protest. How Policy Demand, Political Dissatisfaction and Strategic Incentives Matter for Far-right Voting},
journal = {Political Science Research and Methods},
year = {2020},
volume = {8},
number = {4},
pages = {662–676},
abstract = {What attracts voters to far-right parties? Emphasizing the repercussions of far-right parties{"} past achievements on the mobilization of voters{"} electoral demand, this paper develops an argument of context-dependent strategic far-right voting. Far-right parties seek to mobilize on
a combination of demand for nativist policies and anti-establishment protest sentiment. Their capacity of doing so, however, critically depends on the strategic incentives they supply. My findings from a comparative analysis based on six waves of the European Election Study show
that far-right parties{"} past attainment of legislative strength boosts the credibility of their policy appeal and broadens the scope of their protest appeal whereas their participation in government jeopardizes their capacity to mobilize on popular discontent.},
doi = {10.1017/psrm.2019.21},
}
Dennison, James and Matthew Goodwin. “Immigration, Issue Ownership and the Rise of UKIP.” Parliamentary Affairs 68.Supplement 1 (2015): 168–187. doi:10.1093/pa/gsv034 [BibTeX]
@Article{dennison-goodwin-2015,
author = {James Dennison and Matthew Goodwin},
title = {Immigration, Issue Ownership and the Rise of UKIP},
journal = {Parliamentary Affairs},
year = {2015},
volume = {68},
number = {Supplement 1},
pages = {168--187},
doi = {10.1093/pa/gsv034},
}
Down, Ian and Kyung Joon Han. “Far Right Parties and “Europe”. Societal Polarization and the Limits of EU Issue Contestation.” Journal of European Integration online first (2020): 1–17. doi:10.1080/07036337.2020.1728263 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Europe has experienced both marked growth in public support for far right parties and growth in public Euro-skepticism. While far right parties have become associated with particularly strident negative orientations towards the European Union (EU), there is considerable variation in the extent of their antipathy, and, in the extent to which they emphasize the EU. Here we examine the conditions under which far right parties can successfully leverage the EU issue to win votes. Specifically, we argue that the extent of societal polarization on the EU constitutes an important intermediating condition. Our findings indicate that individuals are more likely to vote far right when these parties contest the EU, but only if they do so in a context of societal polarization on the issue.
@Article{down-han-2020,
author = {Ian Down and Kyung Joon Han},
title = {Far Right Parties and {"}Europe{"}. Societal Polarization and the Limits of EU Issue Contestation},
journal = {Journal of European Integration},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
pages = {1--17},
abstract = {Europe has experienced both marked growth in public support for far right parties and growth in public Euro-skepticism. While far right parties have become associated with particularly strident negative orientations towards the European Union (EU), there is considerable variation
in the extent of their antipathy, and, in the extent to which they emphasize the EU. Here we examine the conditions under which far right parties can successfully leverage the EU issue to win votes. Specifically, we argue that the extent of societal polarization on the EU
constitutes an important intermediating condition. Our findings indicate that individuals are more likely to vote far right when these parties contest the EU, but only if they do so in a context of societal polarization on the issue.},
doi = {10.1080/07036337.2020.1728263},
}
Evans, Jocelyn and Gilles Ivaldi. “Contextual Effects of Immigrant Presence on Populist Radical Right Support: Testing the Halo Effect.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2020). doi:10.1177/0010414020957677 [BibTeX][Abstract]
This paper examines the relationship between immigration and populist radical right (PRR) support, based on an analysis of the contextual effects of immigrant presence on Front National vote in France in 2017. Using a unique set of survey data geolocalising respondents at the subcommunal level, it finds evidence for the existence of a curvilinear {“}halo effect,{“} with substantial increases in the probability of PRR vote in areas surrounding communities with significantly higher-than-average immigrant populations, and independent of other socio-economic context, as well as individual socio-demographic characteristics. Most importantly, a path analysis confirms the presence of individual attitudinal mediators of this halo effect on PRR vote, thus testing the foundation of the halo, namely that the contextual effects of immigrant presence act on attitudes which drive PRR support. These findings provide a significant step forward in understanding the mechanisms linking subjective experience of immigration with voting for the populist radical right.
@Article{evans-ivaldi-2020,
author = {Jocelyn Evans and Gilles Ivaldi},
title = {Contextual Effects of Immigrant Presence on Populist Radical Right Support: Testing the Halo Effect},
journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {This paper examines the relationship between immigration and populist radical right (PRR) support, based on an analysis of the contextual effects of immigrant presence on Front National vote in France in 2017. Using a unique set of survey data geolocalising respondents at the
subcommunal level, it finds evidence for the existence of a curvilinear {"}halo effect,{"} with substantial increases in the probability of PRR vote in areas surrounding communities with significantly higher-than-average immigrant populations, and independent of other socio-economic
context, as well as individual socio-demographic characteristics. Most importantly, a path analysis confirms the presence of individual attitudinal mediators of this halo effect on PRR vote, thus testing the foundation of the halo, namely that the contextual effects of immigrant
presence act on attitudes which drive PRR support. These findings provide a significant step forward in understanding the mechanisms linking subjective experience of immigration with voting for the populist radical right.},
doi = {10.1177/0010414020957677},
}
In recent years, electoral support for the far-right has increased dramatically across the world. This phenomenon is especially acute in some new democracies; however, little attention has been devoted to the effects of the legacies of past authoritarian ideologies. We argue that the ideology of the past regime affects far-right support because voters that were politically socialized under authoritarianism will be biased against its ideological brand. To test this argument, we conduct an individual-level analysis across 20 countries between 1996 and 2018 using a difference-in-difference estimation and a country-level analysis using data from 39 democracies between 1980 and 2018. We demonstrate that voters socialized under right-wing dictatorships are less likely to support far-right parties compared to citizens that were socialized under different circumstances. Moreover, support for far-right parties is significantly lower in countries that transitioned from right-wing autocracies. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the far-right movement literature.
@Article{frantzeskakis-sato-2020,
author = {Nikolaos Frantzeskakis and Yuko Sato},
title = {Echoes of a Fading Past: Authoritarian Legacies and Far-right Voting},
journal = {Electoral Studies},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {In recent years, electoral support for the far-right has increased dramatically across the world. This phenomenon is especially acute in some new democracies; however, little attention has been devoted to the effects of the legacies of past authoritarian ideologies. We argue that
the ideology of the past regime affects far-right support because voters that were politically socialized under authoritarianism will be biased against its ideological brand. To test this argument, we conduct an individual-level analysis across 20 countries between 1996 and 2018
using a difference-in-difference estimation and a country-level analysis using data from 39 democracies between 1980 and 2018. We demonstrate that voters socialized under right-wing dictatorships are less likely to support far-right parties compared to citizens that were socialized
under different circumstances. Moreover, support for far-right parties is significantly lower in countries that transitioned from right-wing autocracies. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the far-right movement literature.},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102163},
}
Froio, Caterina, Pietro Castelli Gattinara, Giorgia Bulli, and Matteo Albanese. CasaPound Italia. Contemporary Extreme-Right Politics. London: Routledge, 2020. [BibTeX]
@Book{froio-gattinara-bulli-albanese-2020,
author = {Caterina Froio and Pietro Castelli Gattinara and Giorgia Bulli and Matteo Albanese},
title = {CasaPound Italia. Contemporary Extreme-Right Politics},
publisher = {Routledge},
year = {2020},
address = {London},
}
Contestation over European integration has been widely studied in the rhetoric of parties, leaders, and movements on the far right in a variety of media. Focusing on Twitter use by far right actors in Western Europe, we apply corpus-aided discourse analysis to explore how imaginative geographies are used to politicize Europe among their digital publics. We find that the idea of a crisis of cultural identity pervades imaginaries of Europe amongst far right digital publics. While Europe is presented as facing a crisis of cultural identity, we find that the far right articulates an aspirational imaginary of Europe, the {“}Europe des Nations{“} that rejects liberal-democratic pluralism in the EU and the {“}establishment{“}. We find that the contestation of Europe in far right digital publics relies on a crisis of cultural identity, representing a translation of Nouvelle Droite imaginaries of Europe into the social media space.
@Article{ganesh-froio-2020,
author = {Bharath Ganesh and Caterina Froio},
title = {A Europe Des Nations},
journal = {Journal of European Integration},
year = {2020},
volume = {42},
number = {5},
pages = {715--732},
abstract = {Contestation over European integration has been widely studied in the rhetoric of parties, leaders, and movements on the far right in a variety of media. Focusing on Twitter use by far right actors in Western Europe, we apply corpus-aided discourse analysis to explore how
imaginative geographies are used to politicize Europe among their digital publics. We find that the idea of a crisis of cultural identity pervades imaginaries of Europe amongst far right digital publics. While Europe is presented as facing a crisis of cultural identity, we find
that the far right articulates an aspirational imaginary of Europe, the {"}Europe des Nations{"} that rejects liberal-democratic pluralism in the EU and the {"}establishment{"}. We find that the contestation of Europe in far right digital publics relies on a crisis of cultural identity,
representing a translation of Nouvelle Droite imaginaries of Europe into the social media space.},
doi = {10.1080/07036337.2020.1792462},
}
Giebler, Heiko, Magdalena Hirsch, Benjamin Schürmann, and Susanne Veit. “Discontent With What? Linking Self-Centered and Society-Centered Discontent to Populist Party Support.” Political Studies online first (2020). doi:10.1177/0032321720932115 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Previous studies aimed at explaining populist support emphasize the crucial role of populist attitudes and ideology among the general population. With respect to the role of discontent and grievances as drivers of populist support—often at the heart of theoretical work on populism—however, empirical results are rather mixed. We argue that the apparent contradictions are partly due to insufficient conceptualization of discontent. We distinguish between societal-centered discontent, which is more based on a general, negative subjective assessment of society, and self-centered discontent that expresses a negative assessment of one’s personal situation. In line with our expectations, regression results for Germany confirm that society-centered discontent, but not self-centered discontent, is important for populist party support. Moreover, we find that society-centered discontent also moderates the relation between populist attitudes and populist support. We conclude that beyond ideologies, populism capitalizes on the cultivation of collective—but not individual—discontent.
@Article{giebler-hirsch-schuermann-veit-2020,
author = {Heiko Giebler and Magdalena Hirsch and Benjamin Sch{\"u}rmann and Susanne Veit},
title = {Discontent With What? Linking Self-Centered and Society-Centered Discontent to Populist Party Support},
journal = {Political Studies},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {Previous studies aimed at explaining populist support emphasize the crucial role of populist attitudes and ideology among the general population. With respect to the role of discontent and grievances as drivers of populist support—often at the heart of theoretical work on
populism—however, empirical results are rather mixed. We argue that the apparent contradictions are partly due to insufficient conceptualization of discontent. We distinguish between societal-centered discontent, which is more based on a general, negative subjective assessment of
society, and self-centered discontent that expresses a negative assessment of one’s personal situation. In line with our expectations, regression results for Germany confirm that society-centered discontent, but not self-centered discontent, is important for populist party
support. Moreover, we find that society-centered discontent also moderates the relation between populist attitudes and populist support. We conclude that beyond ideologies, populism capitalizes on the cultivation of collective—but not individual—discontent.},
doi = {10.1177/0032321720932115},
}
Gwiazda, Anna. “Right-wing populism and feminist politics: The case of Law and Justice in Poland.” International Political Science Review online first (2020). doi:10.1177/0192512120948917 [BibTeX][Abstract]
This article disentangles the complexity of right-wing populism and feminist politics using an original framework based on inputs (representative claims) and outputs (policies) to examine a Polish case. In 2015, the right-wing populist Law and Justice party (PiS) formed a single-party majority government led by a female prime minister after winning the elections. PiS is ideologically conservative, promotes traditional and national values and is supported by the Catholic Church. Additionally, it is hostile towards what it calls ‘gender-ideology’ and is reluctant to implement feminist policies. This article also reveals that PiS represents conservative women’s interests and advocates an aspect of conservative feminism, therefore possessing a duality in its claims and policies. Overall, this article draws inferences about the nexus between social conservatism, populism and feminism, and thus seeks to contribute to the scholarly literature by examining a timely issue against the backdrop of rising populism, illiberalism and anti-gender campaigns.
@Article{gwiazda-2020,
author = {Anna Gwiazda},
title = {Right-wing populism and feminist politics: The case of Law and Justice in Poland},
journal = {International Political Science Review},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {This article disentangles the complexity of right-wing populism and feminist politics using an original framework based on inputs (representative claims) and outputs (policies) to examine a Polish case. In 2015, the right-wing populist Law and Justice party (PiS) formed a
single-party majority government led by a female prime minister after winning the elections. PiS is ideologically conservative, promotes traditional and national values and is supported by the Catholic Church. Additionally, it is hostile towards what it calls ‘gender-ideology’
and is reluctant to implement feminist policies. This article also reveals that PiS represents conservative women’s interests and advocates an aspect of conservative feminism, therefore possessing a duality in its claims and policies. Overall, this article draws inferences about
the nexus between social conservatism, populism and feminism, and thus seeks to contribute to the scholarly literature by examining a timely issue against the backdrop of rising populism, illiberalism and anti-gender campaigns.},
doi = {10.1177/0192512120948917},
}
Halikiopoulou, Daphne and Tim Vlandas. “When Economic and Cultural Interests Align: the Anti-Immigration Voter Coalitions Driving Far Right Party Success in Europe.” European Political Science Review 12.4 (2020): 427–448. doi:10.1017/s175577392000020x [BibTeX][Abstract]
This article contests the view that the strong positive correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and far right party success necessarily constitutes evidence in support of the cultural grievance thesis. We argue that the success of far right parties depends on their ability to mobilize a coalition of interests between their core supporters, that is voters with cultural grievances over immigration and the often larger group of voters with economic grievances over immigration. Using individual level data from eight rounds of the European Social Survey, our empirical analysis shows that while cultural concerns over immigration are a stronger predictor of far right party support, those who are concerned with the impact of immigration on the economy are important to the far right in numerical terms. Taken together, our findings suggest that economic grievances over immigration remain pivotal within the context of the transnational cleavage.
@Article{halikiopoulou-vlandas-2020,
author = {Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas},
title = {When Economic and Cultural Interests Align: the Anti-Immigration Voter Coalitions Driving Far Right Party Success in Europe},
journal = {European Political Science Review},
year = {2020},
volume = {12},
number = {4},
pages = {427--448},
abstract = {This article contests the view that the strong positive correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and far right party success necessarily constitutes evidence in support of the cultural grievance thesis. We argue that the success of far right parties depends on their ability
to mobilize a coalition of interests between their core supporters, that is voters with cultural grievances over immigration and the often larger group of voters with economic grievances over immigration. Using individual level data from eight rounds of the European Social Survey,
our empirical analysis shows that while cultural concerns over immigration are a stronger predictor of far right party support, those who are concerned with the impact of immigration on the economy are important to the far right in numerical terms. Taken together, our findings
suggest that economic grievances over immigration remain pivotal within the context of the transnational cleavage.},
doi = {10.1017/s175577392000020x},
}
Harteveld, Eelco, Wouter van der Brug, Sarah de Lange, and Tom van der Meer. “Multiple Roots of the Populist Radical Right: Support for the Dutch PVV in Cities and the Countryside.” European Journal of Political Research online first (2021). doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12452 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Populist radical right parties are considerably more popular in some areas (neighbourhoods, municipalities, regions) than others. They thrive in some cities, in some smaller towns and in some rural areas, but they are unsuccessful in other cities, small towns and rural areas. We seek to explain this regional variation by modelling at the individual level how citizens respond to local conditions. We argue that patterns of populist radical right support can be explained by anxiety in the face of social change. However, how social change manifests itself is different in rural and urban areas, so that variations in populist radical right support are rooted in different kinds of conditions. To analyse the effects of these conditions we use unique geo-referenced survey data from the Netherlands collected among a nationwide sample of 8,000 Dutch respondents. Our analyses demonstrate that the presence of immigrants (and increases therein) can explain why populist radical right parties are more popular in some urban areas than in others, but that it cannot explain variation across rural areas. In these areas, regional marginalization is an important predictor of support for populist radical right parties. Hence, to understand the support for the populist radical right, the heterogeneity of its electorate should be recognized
@Article{harteveld-brug-lange-meer-2021,
author = {Eelco Harteveld and Wouter {van der Brug} and Sarah {de Lange} and Tom {van der Meer}},
title = {Multiple Roots of the Populist Radical Right: Support for the Dutch PVV in Cities and the Countryside},
journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
year = {2021},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {Populist radical right parties are considerably more popular in some areas (neighbourhoods, municipalities, regions) than others. They thrive in some cities, in some smaller towns and in some rural areas, but they are unsuccessful in other cities, small towns and rural areas. We
seek to explain this regional variation by modelling at the individual level how citizens respond to local conditions. We argue that patterns of populist radical right support can be explained by anxiety in the face of social change. However, how social change manifests itself is
different in rural and urban areas, so that variations in populist radical right support are rooted in different kinds of conditions. To analyse the effects of these conditions we use unique geo-referenced survey data from the Netherlands collected among a nationwide sample of
8,000 Dutch respondents. Our analyses demonstrate that the presence of immigrants (and increases therein) can explain why populist radical right parties are more popular in some urban areas than in others, but that it cannot explain variation across rural areas. In these areas,
regional marginalization is an important predictor of support for populist radical right parties. Hence, to understand the support for the populist radical right, the heterogeneity of its electorate should be recognized},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12452},
}
Harteveld, Eelco, Andrej Kokkonen, Jonas Linde, and Stefan Dahlberg. “A Tough Trade-off? The Asymmetrical Impact of Populist Radical Right Inclusion on Satisfaction With Democracy and Government.” European Political Science Review 13.1 (2021): 113–133. doi:10.1017/S1755773920000387 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Populist radical right (PRR) parties are increasingly included in coalition governments across Western Europe. How does such inclusion affect satisfaction with democracy (SWD) in these societies? While some citizens will feel democracy has grown more responsive, others will abhor the inclusion of such controversial parties. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002–2018) and panel data from the Netherlands, we investigate how nativists{“} and non-nativists{“} SWD depends on mainstream parties{“} strategies towards PRR parties. We show that the effect is asymmetrical: at moments of inclusion nativists become substantially more satisfied with democracy, while such satisfaction among non-nativists decreases less or not at all. This pattern, which we attribute to Easton{“}s {“}reservoir of goodwill{“}, that is, a buffer of political support generated by a track-record of good performance and responsiveness, can account for the seemingly contradictory increase in SWD in many Western European countries in times of populism.
@Article{harteveld-kokkonen-linde-dahlberg-2021,
author = {Eelco Harteveld and Andrej Kokkonen and Jonas Linde and Stefan Dahlberg},
title = {A Tough Trade-off? The Asymmetrical Impact of Populist Radical Right Inclusion on Satisfaction With Democracy and Government},
journal = {European Political Science Review},
year = {2021},
volume = {13},
number = {1},
pages = {113–133},
abstract = {Populist radical right (PRR) parties are increasingly included in coalition governments across Western Europe. How does such inclusion affect satisfaction with democracy (SWD) in these societies? While some citizens will feel democracy has grown more responsive, others will abhor
the inclusion of such controversial parties. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002–2018) and panel data from the Netherlands, we investigate how nativists{"} and non-nativists{"} SWD depends on mainstream parties{"} strategies towards PRR parties. We show that the effect is
asymmetrical: at moments of inclusion nativists become substantially more satisfied with democracy, while such satisfaction among non-nativists decreases less or not at all. This pattern, which we attribute to Easton{"}s {"}reservoir of goodwill{"}, that is, a buffer of political support
generated by a track-record of good performance and responsiveness, can account for the seemingly contradictory increase in SWD in many Western European countries in times of populism.},
doi = {10.1017/S1755773920000387},
}
Heinisch, Reinhard and Carsten Wegscheider. “Disentangling How Populism and Radical Host Ideologies Shape Citizens’ Conceptions of Democratic Decision-Making.” Politics and Governance 8.3 (2020): 32–44. doi:10.17645/pag.v8i3.2915 [BibTeX][Abstract]
In this article, we aim to disentangle the extent to which citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making are shaped by populist attitudes or rather by radical left and right host ideologies. Following recent work by Landwehr and Steiner (2017), we distinguish four modes of decision-making embedded in different conceptions of democracy: trusteeship democracy, anti-pluralism, deliberative proceduralism, and majoritarianism. Drawing on data from Austria and Germany, we show that populism and radical host ideologies tap into different dimensions of democracy. While populism is primarily directed against representative forms of democratic decision-making, preferences for deliberative procedures and majority decisions appear entirely shaped by radical left and right host ideologies. Populism thus views decision-making based on the general will of the people as the only legitimate democratic procedure, whereas radical left and right host ideologies aim at involving the relevant group(s) of citizens. Further analyses of the interactions between populist attitudes and radical host ideologies confirm that the effects of populism remain robust and thus independent of the specific manifestations of radical host ideologies. These findings help to disentangle the causes of democratic discontent and to develop possible responses through democratic reforms that specifically and separately aim to mitigate populism and radical host ideologies.
@Article{heinisch-wegscheider-2020,
author = {Reinhard Heinisch and Carsten Wegscheider},
title = {Disentangling How Populism and Radical Host Ideologies Shape Citizens’ Conceptions of Democratic Decision-Making},
journal = {Politics and Governance},
year = {2020},
volume = {8},
number = {3},
pages = {32--44},
abstract = {In this article, we aim to disentangle the extent to which citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making are shaped by populist attitudes or rather by radical left and right host ideologies. Following recent work by Landwehr and Steiner (2017), we distinguish four modes of
decision-making embedded in different conceptions of democracy: trusteeship democracy, anti-pluralism, deliberative proceduralism, and majoritarianism. Drawing on data from Austria and Germany, we show that populism and radical host ideologies tap into different dimensions of
democracy. While populism is primarily directed against representative forms of democratic decision-making, preferences for deliberative procedures and majority decisions appear entirely shaped by radical left and right host ideologies. Populism thus views decision-making based on
the general will of the people as the only legitimate democratic procedure, whereas radical left and right host ideologies aim at involving the relevant group(s) of citizens. Further analyses of the interactions between populist attitudes and radical host ideologies confirm that
the effects of populism remain robust and thus independent of the specific manifestations of radical host ideologies. These findings help to disentangle the causes of democratic discontent and to develop possible responses through democratic reforms that specifically and separately
aim to mitigate populism and radical host ideologies.},
doi = {10.17645/pag.v8i3.2915},
}
Heinze, Anna-Sophie. Strategien gegen Rechtspopulismus? Der Umgang mit der AfD in Landesparlamenten.. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020. [BibTeX]
@Book{heinze-2020b,
author = {Anna-Sophie Heinze},
title = {Strategien gegen Rechtspopulismus? Der Umgang mit der AfD in Landesparlamenten.},
publisher = {Nomos},
year = {2020},
address = {Baden-Baden},
}
Heinze, Anna-Sophie. “Zum schwierigen Umgang mit der AfD in den Parlamenten: Arbeitsweise, Reaktionen, Effekte.” Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft online first (2020). doi:10.1007/s41358-020-00245-0 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Der 2013 gegründeten {“}Alternative für Deutschland{“} (AfD) gelang es – anders als früheren Rechtsaußenparteien wie der NPD, DVU oder den Republikanern – in rasanter Geschwindigkeit in alle Landesparlamente, den Bundestag und das Europäische Parlament einzuziehen. Wenngleich die etablierten Parteien bereits viele Erfahrungen mit der AfD in den Parlamenten sammeln konnten, ist die Frage des {“}richtigen{“} Umgangs mit ihr bis heute Gegenstand heftiger Debatten. Vom parlamentarischen Verhalten der anderen Parteien hängt auch ab, welchen Einfluss die AfD dort direkt und indirekt ausüben kann.
@Article{heinze-2020,
author = {Anna-Sophie Heinze},
title = {Zum schwierigen Umgang mit der AfD in den Parlamenten: Arbeitsweise, Reaktionen, Effekte},
journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Politikwissenschaft},
year = {2020},
number = {online first},
abstract = {Der 2013 gegründeten {"}Alternative für Deutschland{"} (AfD) gelang es - anders als früheren Rechtsaußenparteien wie der NPD, DVU oder den Republikanern - in rasanter Geschwindigkeit in alle Landesparlamente, den Bundestag und das Europäische Parlament einzuziehen. Wenngleich die
etablierten Parteien bereits viele Erfahrungen mit der AfD in den Parlamenten sammeln konnten, ist die Frage des {"}richtigen{"} Umgangs mit ihr bis heute Gegenstand heftiger Debatten. Vom parlamentarischen Verhalten der anderen Parteien hängt auch ab, welchen Einfluss die AfD dort
direkt und indirekt ausüben kann.},
doi = {10.1007/s41358-020-00245-0},
}
Im, Zhen Jie. “Welfare Chauvinism in Times of Labour Market Segmentation: How Different Employment Contracts Moderate the Impact of Welfare Chauvinism on Support for Radical Right Parties.” Comparative European Politics 19.1 (2021): 94–116. doi:10.1057/s41295-020-00224-3 [BibTeX][Abstract]
I examine how different employment contracts moderate the impact of welfare chauvinist preferences on radical right support. Welfare chauvinism has become a cornerstone of radical right’s nativist electoral programme. Yet, there are mixed findings on how welfare chauvinist preferences affect radical right support. While some studies find a positive association, others find little correlation. One reason for such ambiguity is: voters who support welfare chauvinism may prioritise other competing issue preferences. They may thus vote for other parties, even if such parties do not offer welfare chauvinist programmes. From this perspective, the crucial question is: under what conditions do voters who support welfare chauvinism prefer the radical right? Among other reasons, I argue that they may do so when they experience economic risk from insecure employment contracts. Differences in employment protection legislation strictness for different employment contracts yield differences in employment security for these different contracts. Using cross-national data from the European Social Survey (Rounds 1 and 7), I find that employed workers, who support welfare chauvinism and have temporary contracts, vote most for radical right parties. I regard this finding as evidence that voters supporting welfare chauvinism prefer radical right parties under conditions of employment insecurity.
@Article{im-2021,
author = {Zhen Jie Im},
title = {Welfare Chauvinism in Times of Labour Market Segmentation: How Different Employment Contracts Moderate the Impact of Welfare Chauvinism on Support for Radical Right Parties},
journal = {Comparative European Politics},
year = {2021},
volume = {19},
number = {1},
pages = {94--116},
abstract = {I examine how different employment contracts moderate the impact of welfare chauvinist preferences on radical right support. Welfare chauvinism has become a cornerstone of radical right’s nativist electoral programme. Yet, there are mixed findings on how welfare chauvinist
preferences affect radical right support. While some studies find a positive association, others find little correlation. One reason for such ambiguity is: voters who support welfare chauvinism may prioritise other competing issue preferences. They may thus vote for other parties,
even if such parties do not offer welfare chauvinist programmes. From this perspective, the crucial question is: under what conditions do voters who support welfare chauvinism prefer the radical right? Among other reasons, I argue that they may do so when they experience economic
risk from insecure employment contracts. Differences in employment protection legislation strictness for different employment contracts yield differences in employment security for these different contracts. Using cross-national data from the European Social Survey (Rounds 1 and
7), I find that employed workers, who support welfare chauvinism and have temporary contracts, vote most for radical right parties. I regard this finding as evidence that voters supporting welfare chauvinism prefer radical right parties under conditions of employment insecurity.},
doi = {10.1057/s41295-020-00224-3},
}
Ivaldi, Gilles and Oscar Mazzoleni. “Economic Populism and Sovereigntism: the Economic Supply of European Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties.” European Politics and Society 21.2 (2019): 202–218. doi:10.1080/23745118.2019.1632583 [BibTeX][Abstract]
While economic issues are increasingly salient in political mobilization by European radical right-wing populist parties, we are still in need of a definition of these parties{“} economic positions. This paper argues that the economic supply of radical right populist parties is best characterized by a mix of economic populism and sovereigntism, which forms the basis of a common mobilization frame. Economic populism refers to defence of the economic prosperity of the {“}heartland{“} against the elite and immigrants. Economic sovereigntism is seen, on the other hand, as a means of restoring the people{“}s well-being and the nation{“}s prosperity. To illustrate this argument, we conduct a qualitative analysis of five established European populist radical right parties. We demonstrate that, despite different socioeconomic stances, all parties under scrutiny share a common economic populist sovereigntist frame which claims to defend the self-identified economic interests and well-being of the people. We discuss the implications of our research for the broader understanding of populist mobilization.
@Article{ivaldi-mazzoleni-2019,
author = {Gilles Ivaldi and Oscar Mazzoleni},
title = {Economic Populism and Sovereigntism: the Economic Supply of European Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties},
journal = {European Politics and Society},
year = {2019},
volume = {21},
number = {2},
pages = {202--218},
abstract = {While economic issues are increasingly salient in political mobilization by European radical right-wing populist parties, we are still in need of a definition of these parties{"} economic positions. This paper argues that the economic supply of radical right populist parties is best
characterized by a mix of economic populism and sovereigntism, which forms the basis of a common mobilization frame. Economic populism refers to defence of the economic prosperity of the {"}heartland{"} against the elite and immigrants. Economic sovereigntism is seen, on the other
hand, as a means of restoring the people{"}s well-being and the nation{"}s prosperity. To illustrate this argument, we conduct a qualitative analysis of five established European populist radical right parties. We demonstrate that, despite different socioeconomic stances, all parties
under scrutiny share a common economic populist sovereigntist frame which claims to defend the self-identified economic interests and well-being of the people. We discuss the implications of our research for the broader understanding of populist mobilization.},
doi = {10.1080/23745118.2019.1632583},
}
Jacobs, Laura and Joost van Spanje. “Prosecuted, Yet Popular? Hate Speech Prosecution of Anti-Immigration Politicians in the News and Electoral Support.” Comparative European Politics online first (2020). doi:10.1057/s41295-020-00215-4 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Prosecuting anti-immigration party leaders for hate speech is theorized to yield electoral ramifications. We assess to what extent these trials are mediatized and whether news visibility of hate speech prosecution affects levels of anti-immigration party support. We compare four Western European countries (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) for which aggregate-level media and public opinion data are combined. We find that hate speech trials were highly mediatized, and dominated the headlines for protracted periods. This short-term news attention drives general news visibility for anti-immigration party actors. Thus, news about hate speech prosecution of anti-immigration politicians creates a reinforcing spiral of attention by increasing the general newsworthiness of a political actor. The findings seem to point to the cautious conclusion that hate speech prosecution is either directly or indirectly related to increased electoral support. While in France and Germany, general news visibility of anti-immigration party actors is associated with higher levels of electoral support, in the Netherlands and Belgium, news about hate speech prosecution has a weak and direct positive relationship with anti-immigration party support. This finding yields implications for political communication strategies of parties by suggesting that hate speech prosecution does not undermine the electoral performance of anti-immigration parties. In fact, initiating legal actions yields unintended effects by granting these parties a media platform.
@Article{jacobs-spanje-2020,
author = {Laura Jacobs and Joost {van Spanje}},
title = {Prosecuted, Yet Popular? Hate Speech Prosecution of Anti-Immigration Politicians in the News and Electoral Support},
journal = {Comparative European Politics},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {Prosecuting anti-immigration party leaders for hate speech is theorized to yield electoral ramifications. We assess to what extent these trials are mediatized and whether news visibility of hate speech prosecution affects levels of anti-immigration party support. We compare four
Western European countries (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) for which aggregate-level media and public opinion data are combined. We find that hate speech trials were highly mediatized, and dominated the headlines for protracted periods. This short-term news attention
drives general news visibility for anti-immigration party actors. Thus, news about hate speech prosecution of anti-immigration politicians creates a reinforcing spiral of attention by increasing the general newsworthiness of a political actor. The findings seem to point to the
cautious conclusion that hate speech prosecution is either directly or indirectly related to increased electoral support. While in France and Germany, general news visibility of anti-immigration party actors is associated with higher levels of electoral support, in the Netherlands
and Belgium, news about hate speech prosecution has a weak and direct positive relationship with anti-immigration party support. This finding yields implications for political communication strategies of parties by suggesting that hate speech prosecution does not undermine the
electoral performance of anti-immigration parties. In fact, initiating legal actions yields unintended effects by granting these parties a media platform.},
doi = {10.1057/s41295-020-00215-4},
}
Jacobs, Laura and Joost van Spanje. “Not All Terror Is Alike: How Right-Wing Extremist and Islamist Terror Threat Affect Anti-immigration Party Support.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research online first (2021). doi:10.1093/ijpor/edaa037 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Terror threat has been theorized to affect political attitudes. Most prior studies have focused exclusively on Islamist terror threat, while effects of right-wing extremist terrorism on voting behavior have been understudied. We argue that effects on the propensity to vote (PTV) for an anti-immigration party (AIP) depend on the type of threat and is moderated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and internal motivation to control prejudice (IMCP). Using a cross-country experiment in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (N = 1,187), we find that Islamist terror threat increases PTV for AIPs amongst voters high in RWA; similarly, right-wing extremist terror threat reduces PTV for AIPs amongst participants high in RWA. IMCP did not moderate the relationship between terror threat and PTV for an AIP.
@Article{jacobs-spanje-2021,
author = {Laura Jacobs and Joost {van Spanje}},
title = {Not All Terror Is Alike: How Right-Wing Extremist and Islamist Terror Threat Affect Anti-immigration Party Support},
journal = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research},
year = {2021},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {Terror threat has been theorized to affect political attitudes. Most prior studies have focused exclusively on Islamist terror threat, while effects of right-wing extremist terrorism on voting behavior have been understudied. We argue that effects on the propensity to vote (PTV)
for an anti-immigration party (AIP) depend on the type of threat and is moderated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and internal motivation to control prejudice (IMCP). Using a cross-country experiment in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (N = 1,187), we find that
Islamist terror threat increases PTV for AIPs amongst voters high in RWA; similarly, right-wing extremist terror threat reduces PTV for AIPs amongst participants high in RWA. IMCP did not moderate the relationship between terror threat and PTV for an AIP.},
doi = {10.1093/ijpor/edaa037},
}
Kasekamp examines extreme-right political parties (ERPs) in Estonia since the restoration of independence in 1991. While nationalist sentiments have been widespread and political discourse has been dominated by the centre right, ERPs have not been successful. It is possible to identify two distinct generations of ERPs in Estonia with two different programmatic emphases: the first of 1992–8 could be labelled ‘anti-Soviet’; the second generation beginning in 1999 focuses on opposition to the European Union (EU) and as such has more in common with the ERPs in Western Europe than the first generation. Following Roger Eatwell’s model for the political breakthrough of ERPs, Kasekamp concludes that conducive conditions do not exist at present for such a breakthrough in Estonia, although opposition to the EU offers notable potential for future mobilization.
@Article{kasekamp-2003,
author = {Andres Kasekamp},
title = {Extreme-right parties in contemporary Estonia},
journal = {Patterns of Prejudice},
year = {2003},
volume = {37},
number = {4},
pages = {401--414},
abstract = {Kasekamp examines extreme-right political parties (ERPs) in Estonia since the restoration of independence in 1991. While nationalist sentiments have been widespread and political discourse has been dominated by the centre right, ERPs have not been successful. It is possible to
identify two distinct generations of ERPs in Estonia with two different programmatic emphases: the first of 1992–8 could be labelled ‘anti-Soviet’; the second generation beginning in 1999 focuses on opposition to the European Union (EU) and as such has more in common with the
ERPs in Western Europe than the first generation. Following Roger Eatwell’s model for the political breakthrough of ERPs, Kasekamp concludes that conducive conditions do not exist at present for such a breakthrough in Estonia, although opposition to the EU offers notable
potential for future mobilization.},
doi = {10.1080/0031322032000144483},
}
Kasekamp, Andres, Mari-Liis Madisson, and Louis Wierenga. “Discursive Opportunities for the Estonian Populist Radical Right in a Digital Society.” Problems of Post-Communism 66.1 (2019): 47–58. doi:10.1080/10758216.2018.1445973 [BibTeX][Abstract]
This article analyzes the discursive opportunities, narratives, and dominant themes used by the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE), a new populist radical right party, to achieve increasing visibility. Applying thematic analysis of EKRE’s social media content, we identify four main groups of issues that have formed the mainstay of EKRE’s political communication and framed the narrative that social media channels have disseminated: an anti-Russian stance, Euroskepticism, promotion of family values, and an anti-refugee discourse. We conclude that EKRE has successfully capitalized on specific conditions in the public sphere to increase its popularity.
@Article{kasekamp-madisson-wierenga-2019,
author = {Andres Kasekamp and Mari-Liis Madisson and Louis Wierenga},
title = {Discursive Opportunities for the Estonian Populist Radical Right in a Digital Society},
journal = {Problems of Post-Communism},
year = {2019},
volume = {66},
number = {1},
pages = {47--58},
abstract = {This article analyzes the discursive opportunities, narratives, and dominant themes used by the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE), a new populist radical right party, to achieve increasing visibility. Applying thematic analysis of EKRE’s social media content, we
identify four main groups of issues that have formed the mainstay of EKRE’s political communication and framed the narrative that social media channels have disseminated: an anti-Russian stance, Euroskepticism, promotion of family values, and an anti-refugee discourse. We
conclude that EKRE has successfully capitalized on specific conditions in the public sphere to increase its popularity.},
doi = {10.1080/10758216.2018.1445973},
}
Koning, Edward Anthony. “Breaking Through: How Anti-immigrant Parties Establish Themselves and the Implications for Their Study.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties online first (2020). doi:10.1080/17457289.2020.1785478 [BibTeX][Abstract]
While the sizeable literature on anti-immigrant parties commonly invokes the term {“}breakthrough{“} in discussing their electoral fortunes, no existing study has subjected this concept to conceptual or empirical scrutiny. Based on an investigation of 54 anti-immigrant parties in seventeen Western European countries, this paper concludes that these parties indeed tend to establish themselves with rare breakthrough elections rather than by incremental growth, and to stay around once they achieve such success. Moreover, these breakthroughs are more likely when these parties have direct or indirect ties to the party system. On the one hand, these findings confirm an often invoked but so far untested suspicion about the way these parties establish themselves. On the other hand, they have important implications for their future study. They suggest that some elections are more important than others for understanding the success of anti-immigrant parties, and that it is potentially misleading to explain the failure of anti-immigrant politicians in some places as the necessary consequence of country-specific characteristics. Not only can one unpredictable election change everything, the failure of anti-immigrant politicians in the past might also pave the way for like-minded politicians in the future.
@Article{koning-2020,
author = {Edward Anthony Koning},
title = {Breaking Through: How Anti-immigrant Parties Establish Themselves and the Implications for Their Study},
journal = {Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {While the sizeable literature on anti-immigrant parties commonly invokes the term {"}breakthrough{"} in discussing their electoral fortunes, no existing study has subjected this concept to conceptual or empirical scrutiny. Based on an investigation of 54 anti-immigrant parties in
seventeen Western European countries, this paper concludes that these parties indeed tend to establish themselves with rare breakthrough elections rather than by incremental growth, and to stay around once they achieve such success. Moreover, these breakthroughs are more likely
when these parties have direct or indirect ties to the party system. On the one hand, these findings confirm an often invoked but so far untested suspicion about the way these parties establish themselves. On the other hand, they have important implications for their future study.
They suggest that some elections are more important than others for understanding the success of anti-immigrant parties, and that it is potentially misleading to explain the failure of anti-immigrant politicians in some places as the necessary consequence of country-specific
characteristics. Not only can one unpredictable election change everything, the failure of anti-immigrant politicians in the past might also pave the way for like-minded politicians in the future.},
doi = {10.1080/17457289.2020.1785478},
}
Kriesi, Hanspeter and Julia Schulte-Cloos. “Support for Radical Parties in Western Europe: Structural Conflicts and Political Dynamics.” Electoral Studies 65 (2020): online first. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102138 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Why is the populist radical left and right on the rise across western Europe? Integrating theories on changing socio-political conflict with arguments about crises of political representation, we contend that electoral support for radical right and radical left parties is rooted in two distinct sets of socio-structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is in both cases conditioned by the individual political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. Relying on the European Social Survey (ESS) covering the period from 2002 to 2016 and Parlgov data, we show that the lack of responsiveness of mainstream parties to the changing social conflict structure provides critical opportunities for new challengers from both the radical left and the radical right, while voters’ political discontent only works to heighten their success when these parties are in opposition. Our article contributes not only by offering an integrative account of the electoral appeal of the radical right and radical left parties. In emphasising the largely similar nature of short-term, political factors that condition the translation of the different sets of long-term, structural determinants into opting for these parties, critically, this article also contributes to understanding the electoral success of radical challengers across western Europe.
@Article{kriesi-schulte-cloos-2020,
author = {Hanspeter Kriesi and Julia Schulte-Cloos},
title = {Support for Radical Parties in Western Europe: Structural Conflicts and Political Dynamics},
journal = {Electoral Studies},
year = {2020},
volume = {65},
pages = {online first},
abstract = {Why is the populist radical left and right on the rise across western Europe? Integrating theories on changing socio-political conflict with arguments about crises of political representation, we contend that electoral support for radical right and radical left parties is rooted
in two distinct sets of socio-structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is in both cases conditioned by the individual political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. Relying on the European Social Survey (ESS) covering the period from
2002 to 2016 and Parlgov data, we show that the lack of responsiveness of mainstream parties to the changing social conflict structure provides critical opportunities for new challengers from both the radical left and the radical right, while voters’ political discontent only
works to heighten their success when these parties are in opposition. Our article contributes not only by offering an integrative account of the electoral appeal of the radical right and radical left parties. In emphasising the largely similar nature of short-term, political
factors that condition the translation of the different sets of long-term, structural determinants into opting for these parties, critically, this article also contributes to understanding the electoral success of radical challengers across western Europe.},
doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102138},
}
Kurer, Thomas. “The Declining Middle: Occupational Change, Social Status, and the Populist Right.” Comparative Political Studies 53.10-11 (2020): 1798–1835. doi:10.1177/0010414020912283 [BibTeX][Abstract]
This article investigates the political consequences of occupational change in times of rapid technological advancement and sheds light on the economic and cultural roots of right-wing populism. A growing body of research shows that the disadvantages of a transforming employment structure are strongly concentrated among semiskilled routine workers in the lower middle class. I argue that individual employment trajectories and relative shifts in the social hierarchy are key to better understand recent political disruptions. A perception of relative economic decline among politically powerful groups—not their impoverishment—drives support for conservative and, especially, right-wing populist parties. Individual-level panel data from three postindustrial democracies and original survey data demonstrate this relationship. A possible interpretation of the findings is that traditional welfare policy might be an ineffective remedy against the ascent of right-wing populism.
@Article{kurer-2020,
author = {Thomas Kurer},
title = {The Declining Middle: Occupational Change, Social Status, and the Populist Right},
journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
year = {2020},
volume = {53},
number = {10-11},
pages = {1798--1835},
abstract = {This article investigates the political consequences of occupational change in times of rapid technological advancement and sheds light on the economic and cultural roots of right-wing populism. A growing body of research shows that the disadvantages of a transforming employment
structure are strongly concentrated among semiskilled routine workers in the lower middle class. I argue that individual employment trajectories and relative shifts in the social hierarchy are key to better understand recent political disruptions. A perception of relative economic
decline among politically powerful groups—not their impoverishment—drives support for conservative and, especially, right-wing populist parties. Individual-level panel data from three postindustrial democracies and original survey data demonstrate this relationship. A possible
interpretation of the findings is that traditional welfare policy might be an ineffective remedy against the ascent of right-wing populism.},
doi = {10.1177/0010414020912283},
}
Leininger, Arndt and Maurits J. Meijers. “Do Populist Parties Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence From Over 40 Years of Electoral History in 31 European Democracies.” Political Studies online first (2020). doi:10.1177/0032321720923257 [BibTeX][Abstract]
While some consider populist parties to be a threat to liberal democracy, others have argued that populist parties may positively affect the quality of democracy by increasing political participation of citizens. This supposition, however, has hitherto not been subjected to rigorous empirical tests. The voter turnout literature, moreover, has primarily focused on stable institutional and party system characteristics – ignoring more dynamic determinants of voter turnout related to party competition. To fill this double gap in the literature, we examine the effect of populist parties, both left and right, on aggregate-level turnout in Western and Eastern European parliamentary elections. Based on a dataset on 315 elections in 31 European democracies since 1970s, we find that turnout is higher when populist parties are represented in parliament prior to an election in Eastern Europe, but not in Western Europe. These findings further our understanding of the relationship between populism, political participation and democracy.
@Article{leininger-meijers-2020,
author = {Arndt Leininger and Maurits J. Meijers},
title = {Do Populist Parties Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence From Over 40 Years of Electoral History in 31 European Democracies},
journal = {Political Studies},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {While some consider populist parties to be a threat to liberal democracy, others have argued that populist parties may positively affect the quality of democracy by increasing political participation of citizens. This supposition, however, has hitherto not been subjected to
rigorous empirical tests. The voter turnout literature, moreover, has primarily focused on stable institutional and party system characteristics – ignoring more dynamic determinants of voter turnout related to party competition. To fill this double gap in the literature, we
examine the effect of populist parties, both left and right, on aggregate-level turnout in Western and Eastern European parliamentary elections. Based on a dataset on 315 elections in 31 European democracies since 1970s, we find that turnout is higher when populist parties are
represented in parliament prior to an election in Eastern Europe, but not in Western Europe. These findings further our understanding of the relationship between populism, political participation and democracy.},
doi = {10.1177/0032321720923257},
}
Lorimer, Marta. “What Do They Talk About When They Talk About Europe? Euro-Ambivalence in Far Right Ideology.” Ethnic and Racial Studies (2020): online first. doi:10.1080/01419870.2020.1807035 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Euroscepticism is frequently presented as a key ideological feature of far right parties, however, this definition masks important variations between them. This paper argues that far right positions on Europe are characterized by long-standing ambivalence rather than straightforward opposition. While far right parties frequently oppose the EU, ideological flexibility, the malleability of European integration and the protean nature of Europe also lead them to display support towards certain aspects of it and towards Europe as a civilization. The argument is illustrated through a qualitative analysis of the party literature of the Movimento Sociale Italiano and the Front National. The analysis shows that these parties conceived of Europe as an identity, a space of liberty, an endangered heritage and a construction where national interests must be defended. In each theme, they offered ambivalent readings of Europe, oscillating between opposition and support depending on how Europe and the EU were defined.
@Article{lorimer-2020b,
author = {Marta Lorimer},
title = {What Do They Talk About When They Talk About Europe? Euro-Ambivalence in Far Right Ideology},
journal = {Ethnic and Racial Studies},
year = {2020},
pages = {online first},
abstract = {Euroscepticism is frequently presented as a key ideological feature of far right parties, however, this definition masks important variations between them. This paper argues that far right positions on Europe are characterized by long-standing ambivalence rather than
straightforward opposition. While far right parties frequently oppose the EU, ideological flexibility, the malleability of European integration and the protean nature of Europe also lead them to display support towards certain aspects of it and towards Europe as a civilization. The
argument is illustrated through a qualitative analysis of the party literature of the Movimento Sociale Italiano and the Front National. The analysis shows that these parties conceived of Europe as an identity, a space of liberty, an endangered heritage and a construction where
national interests must be defended. In each theme, they offered ambivalent readings of Europe, oscillating between opposition and support depending on how Europe and the EU were defined.},
doi = {10.1080/01419870.2020.1807035},
}
Ever since they first entered the European Parliament in 1979, the EU has proven to be a strong legitimising tool for far right parties, providing them with funding, visibility and a higher degree of credibility and respectability. While recent literature has explored some of these dynamics, the role of the far right{“}s ideological positioning on Europe as a source of public legitimacy has been neglected. This paper argues that as a relatively new and contentious political issue, Europe can function as a powerful ideological resource for far right parties by allowing them to convey a more acceptable political message. This argument is illustrated through a case study of two key aspects of the Rassemblement National{“}s ideological approach to the European Union: the party{“}s claim to be pro-European but anti-EU and its opposition to EU integration on grounds of sovereignty.
@Article{lorimer-2020,
author = {Marta Lorimer},
title = {Europe as Ideological Resource: The Case of the Rassemblement National},
journal = {Journal of European Public Policy},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
pages = {1--18},
abstract = {Ever since they first entered the European Parliament in 1979, the EU has proven to be a strong legitimising tool for far right parties, providing them with funding, visibility and a higher degree of credibility and respectability. While recent literature has explored some of
these dynamics, the role of the far right{"}s ideological positioning on Europe as a source of public legitimacy has been neglected. This paper argues that as a relatively new and contentious political issue, Europe can function as a powerful ideological resource for far right
parties by allowing them to convey a more acceptable political message. This argument is illustrated through a case study of two key aspects of the Rassemblement National{"}s ideological approach to the European Union: the party{"}s claim to be pro-European but anti-EU and its
opposition to EU integration on grounds of sovereignty.},
doi = {10.1080/13501763.2020.1754885},
}
Magni, Gabriele. “Economic Inequality, Immigrants and Selective Solidarity: From Perceived Lack of Opportunity to In-group Favoritism.” British Journal of Political Science (2020): online first. doi:10.1017/S0007123420000046 [BibTeX][Abstract]
How does economic inequality affect support for redistribution to native citizens and immigrants? While prior studies have examined the separate effects of inequality and immigration on redistribution preferences, the interaction between inequality and communal identity has been largely overlooked. This article explains that inequality triggers selective solidarity. Individuals exposed to inequality become more supportive of redistribution – but only if the redistribution benefits native-born citizens. Inequality therefore reinforces the already popular opinion that native citizens deserve welfare priority and widens the gap between support for natives and support for immigrants. This study first provides cross-national evidence with survey data linked to contextual socio-economic indicators from advanced industrialized countries. To evaluate causally identified effects, it then presents the results of a survey experiment administered to a nationally representative sample of Italian citizens. The findings imply that economic inequality can increase support for populist radical right parties that advocate discrimination in access to welfare services based on native citizenship.
@Article{magni-2020,
author = {Gabriele Magni},
title = {Economic Inequality, Immigrants and Selective Solidarity: From Perceived Lack of Opportunity to In-group Favoritism},
journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
year = {2020},
pages = {online first},
abstract = {How does economic inequality affect support for redistribution to native citizens and immigrants? While prior studies have examined the separate effects of inequality and immigration on redistribution preferences, the interaction between inequality and communal identity has been
largely overlooked. This article explains that inequality triggers selective solidarity. Individuals exposed to inequality become more supportive of redistribution - but only if the redistribution benefits native-born citizens. Inequality therefore reinforces the already popular
opinion that native citizens deserve welfare priority and widens the gap between support for natives and support for immigrants. This study first provides cross-national evidence with survey data linked to contextual socio-economic indicators from advanced industrialized countries.
To evaluate causally identified effects, it then presents the results of a survey experiment administered to a nationally representative sample of Italian citizens. The findings imply that economic inequality can increase support for populist radical right parties that advocate
discrimination in access to welfare services based on native citizenship.},
doi = {10.1017/S0007123420000046},
}
Mauk, Marlene. “Rebuilding Trust in Broken Systems? Populist Party Success and Citizens” Trust in Democratic Institutions.” Politics and Governance 8.3 (2020): 45–58. doi:10.17645/pag.v8i3.2896 [BibTeX][Abstract]
What effect does the recent rise of populist parties harnessing an anti-system rhetoric have on political trust? Will citizens become disenchanted with and lose trust in the political system, or could populist party success even stimulate a growth of political trust? Arguing that populist parties may well be conceived as a corrective force giving voice to and addressing citizen concerns about the established political system, this contribution hypothesizes that populist party success will increase political trust among the general public, especially in countries lacking democratic quality, with weak corruption control, and meagre government performance. Empirically, it combines ParlGov data with survey data from the European Social Survey (2002–2016) as well as aggregate data from the Varieties-of-Democracy project and the World Development Indicators to investigate how political trust has changed in relation to the growing success of populist parties and how democratic quality, corruption control, and government performance have moderated this relationship in 23 European democracies. Its main findings indicate that, at least in the short run, political trust increases rather than decreases following populist party success and that this increase in trust is most pronounced in political systems that lack democratic quality, struggle with corruption, and deliver only meager government performance
@Article{mauk-2020,
author = {Marlene Mauk},
title = {Rebuilding Trust in Broken Systems? Populist Party Success and Citizens{"} Trust in Democratic Institutions},
journal = {Politics and Governance},
year = {2020},
volume = {8},
number = {3},
pages = {45--58},
abstract = {What effect does the recent rise of populist parties harnessing an anti-system rhetoric have on political trust? Will citizens become disenchanted with and lose trust in the political system, or could populist party success even stimulate a growth of political trust? Arguing that
populist parties may well be conceived as a corrective force giving voice to and addressing citizen concerns about the established political system, this contribution hypothesizes that populist party success will increase political trust among the general public, especially in
countries lacking democratic quality, with weak corruption control, and meagre government performance. Empirically, it combines ParlGov data with survey data from the European Social Survey (2002–2016) as well as aggregate data from the Varieties-of-Democracy project and the
World Development Indicators to investigate how political trust has changed in relation to the growing success of populist parties and how democratic quality, corruption control, and government performance have moderated this relationship in 23 European democracies. Its main
findings indicate that, at least in the short run, political trust increases rather than decreases following populist party success and that this increase in trust is most pronounced in political systems that lack democratic quality, struggle with corruption, and deliver only
meager government performance},
doi = {10.17645/pag.v8i3.2896},
}
Mazzoleni, Oscar and Gilles Ivaldi. “Economic Populist Sovereignism and Electoral Support for Radical Right-Wing Populism.” Political Studies nil.nil (2020): 3232172095856. doi:10.1177/0032321720958567 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Sovereignism is at the crux of the current wave of radical right-wing populism. Populist parties advocate {“}taking back control{“} and generally do so in the name of the {“}people{“}, pledging to restore economic well-being. This article argues that populism and sovereignism are inherently connected in radical right-wing populism politics through a set of values that emphasize popular and national sovereignty. To test the empirical validity of our proposition, we focus on two established European radical right-wing populist parties, namely the Rassemblement National in France and the Swiss People{“}s Party and use data from an original survey. We find that while Rassemblement National and Swiss People{“}s Party voters diverge in general economic orientations, they share similar economic populist sovereignist values that significantly shape electoral support for those parties. These findings suggest that economic populist sovereignism may represent an important driver of support for the radical right-wing populism, alongside other correlates of radical right- wing populism voting, such as perceived immigration threat.
@Article{mazzoleni-ivaldi-2020,
author = {Oscar Mazzoleni and Gilles Ivaldi},
title = {Economic Populist Sovereignism and Electoral Support for Radical Right-Wing Populism},
journal = {Political Studies},
year = {2020},
volume = {nil},
number = {nil},
pages = {003232172095856},
abstract = {Sovereignism is at the crux of the current wave of radical right-wing populism. Populist parties advocate {"}taking back control{"} and generally do so in the name of the {"}people{"}, pledging to restore economic well-being. This article argues that populism and sovereignism are
inherently connected in radical right-wing populism politics through a set of values that emphasize popular and national sovereignty. To test the empirical validity of our proposition, we focus on two established European radical right-wing populist parties, namely the
Rassemblement National in France and the Swiss People{"}s Party and use data from an original survey. We find that while Rassemblement National and Swiss People{"}s Party voters diverge in general economic orientations, they share similar economic populist sovereignist values that
significantly shape electoral support for those parties. These findings suggest that economic populist sovereignism may represent an important driver of support for the radical right-wing populism, alongside other correlates of radical right- wing populism voting, such as perceived
immigration threat.},
doi = {10.1177/0032321720958567},
}
Mendes, Mariana S. and James Dennison. “Explaining the emergence of the radical right in Spain and Portugal: salience, stigma and supply.” West European Politics 44.4 (2021): 752–775. doi:10.1080/01402382.2020.1777504 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Spain and Portugal have long been considered exceptions when it comes to the electoral success of radical right-wing parties in Europe. This scenario changed for both countries in 2019, with the extraordinary rise of Vox in Spain and the comparatively more modest election of one representative of Chega in Portugal. Their emergence – and the stark difference in the extents of their success – provides researchers with an ideal ‘edge-case’ and can be explained via a theoretical model that builds on and fuses previous explanatory models for radical right success. The Iberian cases demonstrate that radical right parties succeed when they (i) avoid the stigma of extremism, (ii) benefit from a gap in political supply on the right and (iii) cater to an unsatiated demand of voters on a salient sociocultural issue. While both countries had long been home to marginal far-right political forces, the stigma of extremism prevented them from being considered credible political alternatives. The appearance of new parties that emerged as a result of splits from the mainstream centre-right, in both cases reflecting a beleaguered political supply, gave the radical right an opportunity to avoid stigma, as we demonstrate through a news content analysis. However, whereas in Spain Vox could profit from both the Catalan independence challenge and the uptick in salience of immigration, which had previously been anomalously low in Iberia, Chega has not (yet) benefited from a similarly ripe political opportunity structure in Portugal.
@Article{mendes-dennison-2021,
author = {Mariana S. Mendes and James Dennison},
title = {Explaining the emergence of the radical right in Spain and Portugal: salience, stigma and supply},
journal = {West European Politics},
year = {2021},
volume = {44},
number = {4},
pages = {752--775},
abstract = {Spain and Portugal have long been considered exceptions when it comes to the electoral success of radical right-wing parties in Europe. This scenario changed for both countries in 2019, with the extraordinary rise of Vox in Spain and the comparatively more modest election of one
representative of Chega in Portugal. Their emergence – and the stark difference in the extents of their success – provides researchers with an ideal ‘edge-case’ and can be explained via a theoretical model that builds on and fuses previous explanatory models for radical
right success. The Iberian cases demonstrate that radical right parties succeed when they (i) avoid the stigma of extremism, (ii) benefit from a gap in political supply on the right and (iii) cater to an unsatiated demand of voters on a salient sociocultural issue. While both
countries had long been home to marginal far-right political forces, the stigma of extremism prevented them from being considered credible political alternatives. The appearance of new parties that emerged as a result of splits from the mainstream centre-right, in both cases
reflecting a beleaguered political supply, gave the radical right an opportunity to avoid stigma, as we demonstrate through a news content analysis. However, whereas in Spain Vox could profit from both the Catalan independence challenge and the uptick in salience of immigration,
which had previously been anomalously low in Iberia, Chega has not (yet) benefited from a similarly ripe political opportunity structure in Portugal.},
doi = {10.1080/01402382.2020.1777504},
}
Populist nationalist movements have primarily been understood through their nationalist frames, even as the media and scholars alike frequently refer to {“}global{“} trends related to populism. But there are in fact global dimensions to populist nationalism that deserve more conceptual and analytical attention. Three ways in which populist nationalism intersects with the global include cross-national imitation of populist tactics; the use of populist rhetorical strategies that move from the framing of local interests against national policies to framings of national interests against the global; and the potential for transnational populist nationalist movements to emerge.
@Article{miller-idriss-2019,
author = {Cynthia Miller-Idriss},
title = {The Global Dimensions of Populist Nationalism},
journal = {The International Spectator},
year = {2019},
volume = {54},
number = {2},
pages = {17--34},
abstract = {Populist nationalist movements have primarily been understood through their nationalist frames, even as the media and scholars alike frequently refer to {"}global{"} trends related to populism. But there are in fact global dimensions to populist nationalism that deserve more
conceptual and analytical attention. Three ways in which populist nationalism intersects with the global include cross-national imitation of populist tactics; the use of populist rhetorical strategies that move from the framing of local interests against national policies to
framings of national interests against the global; and the potential for transnational populist nationalist movements to emerge.},
doi = {10.1080/03932729.2019.1592870},
}
Pesthy, Maria, Matthias Mader, and Harald Schoen. “Why Is the AfD so Successful in Eastern Germany? An Analysis of the Ideational Foundations of the AfD Vote in the 2017 Federal Election.” Politische Vierteljahresschrift online first (2020). [BibTeX][Abstract]
The Alternative for Germany party (AfD) has been more successful electorally in eastern than in western Germany. In this paper, we look at nativism coupled with populist attitudes as possible contributors to the 2017 federal electoral outcome. We compare two alternative mechanisms for the varying election results, the first being whether individuals living in eastern Germany are, on average, more nativist and populist inclined; the second, whether nativism and populism are more salient when these voters go to the polls. The results show that there indeed exists a slightly higher level of nativist and populist sentiment among the east German citizens than among the west Germans. This difference concerns older east Germans in particular, who were politically socialised during the German separation. Furthermore, elements of nativist and populist ideas explain electoral support for the AfD in both parts of the country, but nativism appears to be more relevant in the east. Overall, the analysis of the short-term campaign panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Study suggests that the inspected ideational foundations contribute to the east-west gap in AfD support without accounting for it completely.
@Article{pesthy-mader-schoen-2020,
author = {Maria Pesthy and Matthias Mader and Harald Schoen},
title = {Why Is the AfD so Successful in Eastern Germany? An Analysis of the Ideational Foundations of the AfD Vote in the 2017 Federal Election},
journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {The Alternative for Germany party (AfD) has been more successful electorally in eastern than in western Germany. In this paper, we look at nativism coupled with populist attitudes as possible contributors to the 2017 federal electoral outcome. We compare two alternative mechanisms
for the varying election results, the first being whether individuals living in eastern Germany are, on average, more nativist and populist inclined; the second, whether nativism and populism are more salient when these voters go to the polls. The results show that there indeed
exists a slightly higher level of nativist and populist sentiment among the east German citizens than among the west Germans. This difference concerns older east Germans in particular, who were politically socialised during the German separation. Furthermore, elements of nativist
and populist ideas explain electoral support for the AfD in both parts of the country, but nativism appears to be more relevant in the east. Overall, the analysis of the short-term campaign panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Study suggests that the inspected
ideational foundations contribute to the east-west gap in AfD support without accounting for it completely.},
}
Pytlas, Bartek. “Hijacking Europe: Counter‐european Strategies and Radical Right Mainstreaming During the Humanitarian Crisis Debate 2015-16*.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies online first (2020): jcms.13092. doi:10.1111/jcms.13092 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Radical right European contestation is analyzed mainly as claims denouncing European integration. Less focus is put on narratives suggesting how a supposed {“}truly European{“} political process should be and work. This paper explores how radical right actors use such counter‐European claims within their competition strategies. Computer‐assisted qualitative analysis of communication by Front National, Alternative for Germany and Fidesz during the humanitarian crisis debate 2015-16 demonstrates that radical right counter‐Europeanism constitutes a nuanced tactical resource deployed to normalize nativist supply in the name of Europe. Unlike Eurorejectionist FN, Fidesz and AfD redefined Europe in nativist terms, attempting to draw legitimacy from association with European identity and cooperation. Concurrently, both actors justified Euronativism not only as antithetical to current EU values and political principles, but mainly as their more fundamental practice juxtaposed against {“}not (truly) European elites{“}, effectively {“}hijacking{“} Europe from within. The findings deepen our understanding of radical right Europe‐contesting competition strategies.
@Article{pytlas-2020,
author = {Bartek Pytlas},
title = {Hijacking Europe: Counter‐european Strategies and Radical Right Mainstreaming During the Humanitarian Crisis Debate 2015-16*},
journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
pages = {jcms.13092},
abstract = {Radical right European contestation is analyzed mainly as claims denouncing European integration. Less focus is put on narratives suggesting how a supposed {"}truly European{"} political process should be and work. This paper explores how radical right actors use such
counter‐European claims within their competition strategies. Computer‐assisted qualitative analysis of communication by Front National, Alternative for Germany and Fidesz during the humanitarian crisis debate 2015-16 demonstrates that radical right counter‐Europeanism
constitutes a nuanced tactical resource deployed to normalize nativist supply in the name of Europe. Unlike Eurorejectionist FN, Fidesz and AfD redefined Europe in nativist terms, attempting to draw legitimacy from association with European identity and cooperation. Concurrently,
both actors justified Euronativism not only as antithetical to current EU values and political principles, but mainly as their more fundamental practice juxtaposed against {"}not (truly) European elites{"}, effectively {"}hijacking{"} Europe from within. The findings deepen our
understanding of radical right Europe‐contesting competition strategies.},
doi = {10.1111/jcms.13092},
}
Pytlas, Bartek. “Hijacking Europe: Counter-European Strategies and Radical Right Mainstreaming during the Humanitarian Crisis Debate 2015-16*.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 59.2 (2021): 335–353. [BibTeX][Abstract]
Radical right European contestation is analyzed mainly as claims denouncing European integration. Less focus is put on narratives suggesting how a supposed {“}truly European{“} political process should be and work. This paper explores how radical right actors use such counter-European claims within their competition strategies. Computer-assisted qualitative analysis of communication by Front National, Alternative for Germany and Fidesz during the humanitarian crisis debate 2015-16 demonstrates that radical right counter-Europeanism constitutes a nuanced tactical resource deployed to normalize nativist supply in the name of Europe. Unlike Eurorejectionist FN, Fidesz and AfD redefined Europe in nativist terms, attempting to draw legitimacy from association with European identity and cooperation. Concurrently, both actors justified Euronativism not only as antithetical to current EU values and political principles, but mainly as their more fundamental practice juxtaposed against {“}not (truly) European elites{“}, effectively {“}hijacking{“} Europe from within. The findings deepen our understanding of radical right Europe-contesting competition strategies.
@Article{pytlas-2021,
author = {Bartek Pytlas},
title = {Hijacking Europe: Counter-European Strategies and Radical Right Mainstreaming during the Humanitarian Crisis Debate 2015-16*},
journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},
year = {2021},
volume = {59},
number = {2},
pages = {335--353},
abstract = {Radical right European contestation is analyzed mainly as claims denouncing European integration. Less focus is put on narratives suggesting how a supposed {"}truly European{"} political process should be and work. This paper explores how radical right actors use such counter-European
claims within their competition strategies. Computer-assisted qualitative analysis of communication by Front National, Alternative for Germany and Fidesz during the humanitarian crisis debate 2015-16 demonstrates that radical right counter-Europeanism constitutes a nuanced tactical
resource deployed to normalize nativist supply in the name of Europe. Unlike Eurorejectionist FN, Fidesz and AfD redefined Europe in nativist terms, attempting to draw legitimacy from association with European identity and cooperation. Concurrently, both actors justified
Euronativism not only as antithetical to current EU values and political principles, but mainly as their more fundamental practice juxtaposed against {"}not (truly) European elites{"}, effectively {"}hijacking{"} Europe from within. The findings deepen our understanding of radical right
Europe-contesting competition strategies.},
}
Rauchfleisch, Adrian and Jonas Kaiser. “The German Far-right on YouTube: An Analysis of User Overlap and User Comments.” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 64.3 (2020): 373–396. doi:10.1080/08838151.2020.1799690 [BibTeX][Abstract]
This study focuses on the formation of far-right online communities on YouTube and whether the rise of three new actors (Pegida, Identitarian movement, AfD) can also be observed with user behavior on YouTube. We map the network of far-right, conspiracy and alternative media channels in the German-language YouTube sphere, how this network evolves over time and identify the topics that users discuss. Our analysis shows that the overall common denominator within the German far-right YouTube sphere is the refugee crisis and the problems associated with it. Furthermore, we show that the community is getting denser and more centralized over time.
@Article{rauchfleisch-kaiser-2020,
author = {Adrian Rauchfleisch and Jonas Kaiser},
title = {The German Far-right on YouTube: An Analysis of User Overlap and User Comments},
journal = {Journal of Broadcasting \& Electronic Media},
year = {2020},
volume = {64},
number = {3},
pages = {373--396},
abstract = {This study focuses on the formation of far-right online communities on YouTube and whether the rise of three new actors (Pegida, Identitarian movement, AfD) can also be observed with user behavior on YouTube. We map the network of far-right, conspiracy and alternative media
channels in the German-language YouTube sphere, how this network evolves over time and identify the topics that users discuss. Our analysis shows that the overall common denominator within the German far-right YouTube sphere is the refugee crisis and the problems associated with
it. Furthermore, we show that the community is getting denser and more centralized over time.},
doi = {10.1080/08838151.2020.1799690},
}
Reinl, Ann-Kathrin and Constantin Schäfer. “How the 2017 Federal Election in Germany Affected Satisfaction with Democracy among AfD Voters.” German Politics online first (2020). doi:10.1080/09644008.2020.1741550 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Dissatisfaction with democracy is among the central determinants of voting for a populist radical right party, such as the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). At the same time, elections have been shown to increase political satisfaction, especially when voters see themselves as winners of the election. In this article, we ask, first, whether voters of the AfD have partly been reconciled with democracy during the 2017 federal election in Germany in which the party entered the Bundestag for the first time since its foundation. Second, we investigate which individual level factors conditioned the change in democratic satisfaction among AfD voters. Our empirical analysis, which is based on panel survey data from the 2017 Germany Longitudinal Election Studies (GLES), shows that AfD voters experienced a stronger increase in support for the political regime than any other voter group. Moreover, policy congruence with the AfD on socioeconomic issues as well as identifying with a party other than the AfD enhanced this boost in satisfaction with democracy. Our findings point to the importance of political representation and opportunities for protest-based voting behaviour regarding public support and the legitimacy of democratic political systems.
@Article{reinl-schaefer-2020,
author = {Ann-Kathrin Reinl and Constantin Sch{\"a}fer},
title = {How the 2017 Federal Election in Germany Affected Satisfaction with Democracy among AfD Voters},
journal = {German Politics},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {Dissatisfaction with democracy is among the central determinants of voting for a populist radical right party, such as the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). At the same time, elections have been shown to increase political satisfaction, especially when voters see
themselves as winners of the election. In this article, we ask, first, whether voters of the AfD have partly been reconciled with democracy during the 2017 federal election in Germany in which the party entered the Bundestag for the first time since its foundation. Second, we
investigate which individual level factors conditioned the change in democratic satisfaction among AfD voters. Our empirical analysis, which is based on panel survey data from the 2017 Germany Longitudinal Election Studies (GLES), shows that AfD voters experienced a stronger
increase in support for the political regime than any other voter group. Moreover, policy congruence with the AfD on socioeconomic issues as well as identifying with a party other than the AfD enhanced this boost in satisfaction with democracy. Our findings point to the importance
of political representation and opportunities for protest-based voting behaviour regarding public support and the legitimacy of democratic political systems.},
doi = {10.1080/09644008.2020.1741550},
}
Arzheimer, Kai. “The Electoral Breakthrough of the AfD and the East-West Divide In German Politics.” From the Streets to Parliament? The Fourth Wave of Far-Right Politics in Germany. London: Routledge, 2021. . [BibTeX][Abstract]
The radical right became a relevant party family in most west European polities in the 1990s and early 2000s, but Germany was a negative outlier up until very recently. Right-wing mobilisation success remained confinded to the local and regional level, as previous far-right parties never managed to escape from the shadow of “Grandpa’s Fascism”. This only changed with the rise, electoral breakthrough, and transformation of “Alternative for Germany” (AfD), which quickly became the dominant far-right actor. Germany’s “new” eastern states were crucial for the AfD’s ascendancy. In the east, the AfD began to experiment with nativist messages as early as 2014. Their electoral breakthroughs in the state elections of this year helped sustain the party through the wilderness year of 2015 and provided personel, ressources, and a template for the AfD’s transformation. Since its inception, support for the AfD in the east has been at least twice as high as in the west. This can be fully explained by substantively higher levels of nativist attitudes in the eastern population. As all alleged causes of this nativism are structural, the eastern states seem set to remain a stronghold for the far right in the medium- to long-term.
@InCollection{arzheimer-2021,
author = {Kai Arzheimer},
title = {The Electoral Breakthrough of the AfD and the East-West Divide In German Politics},
booktitle = {From the Streets to Parliament? The Fourth Wave of Far-Right Politics in Germany},
publisher = {Routledge},
year = {2021},
address = {London},
abstract = {The radical right became a relevant party family in most west European polities in the 1990s and early 2000s, but Germany was a negative outlier up until very recently. Right-wing mobilisation success remained confinded to the local and regional level, as previous far-right
parties never managed to escape from the shadow of “Grandpa’s Fascism”. This only changed with the rise, electoral breakthrough, and transformation of “Alternative for Germany” (AfD), which quickly became the dominant far-right actor. Germany’s “new” eastern states
were crucial for the AfD’s ascendancy. In the east, the AfD began to experiment with nativist messages as early as 2014. Their electoral breakthroughs in the state elections of this year helped sustain the party through the wilderness year of 2015 and provided personel,
ressources, and a template for the AfD’s transformation. Since its inception, support for the AfD in the east has been at least twice as high as in the west. This can be fully explained by substantively higher levels of nativist attitudes in the eastern population. As all alleged
causes of this nativism are structural, the eastern states seem set to remain a stronghold for the far right in the medium- to long-term.},
}
Roumanias, Costas, Spyros Skouras, and Nicos Christodoulakis. “Crisis and extremism. How does an extreme far right emerge in a modern democracy? Evidence from Greece’s Golden Dawn.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties online first (2020). doi:10.1080/17457289.2020.1778007 [BibTeX][Abstract]
We trace the rise of Golden Dawn, one of the most extreme and violent European far-right parties, from the fringe to a prominent position in Greek politics. We use regression analysis to show that its rise is associated with changes in voting behavior caused by the deep socioeconomic crisis the country went through after 2008. We show that the demand factors affecting the GD vote were triggered by structural changes in the supply side and the implosion of the two-party system that followed the signing of the bail-out agreement (Memorandum) with the country’s creditors. Our results have implications about the political manifestation of socioeconomic grievances and their effect on the far-right vote: whereas socioeconomic grievances usually contribute towards a latent dissatisfaction by the electorate, this might need a sudden supply-side trigger in order to manifest itself, giving little warning signs in advance.
@Article{roumanias-skouras-christodoulakis-2020,
author = {Costas Roumanias and Spyros Skouras and Nicos Christodoulakis},
title = {Crisis and extremism. How does an extreme far right emerge in a modern democracy? Evidence from Greece’s Golden Dawn},
journal = {Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {We trace the rise of Golden Dawn, one of the most extreme and violent European far-right parties, from the fringe to a prominent position in Greek politics. We use regression analysis to show that its rise is associated with changes in voting behavior caused by the deep
socioeconomic crisis the country went through after 2008. We show that the demand factors affecting the GD vote were triggered by structural changes in the supply side and the implosion of the two-party system that followed the signing of the bail-out agreement (Memorandum) with
the country’s creditors. Our results have implications about the political manifestation of socioeconomic grievances and their effect on the far-right vote: whereas socioeconomic grievances usually contribute towards a latent dissatisfaction by the electorate, this might need a
sudden supply-side trigger in order to manifest itself, giving little warning signs in advance.},
doi = {10.1080/17457289.2020.1778007},
}
@Book{rydgren-2018b,
editor = {Jens Rydgren},
title = {The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2018},
doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.001.0001},
}
Rydgren, Jens and Maria Tyrberg. “Contextual Explanations of Radical Right-Wing Party Support in Sweden: A Multilevel Analysis.” European Societies online first (2020): 1–26. doi:10.1080/14616696.2020.1793213 [BibTeX][Abstract]
With the aim of studying the role of contextual factors for explaining within-country variation in the vote share of the radical right-wing party, the Sweden Democrats, in the 2014 Swedish election, we specify and test hypotheses pertaining to social marginality, ethnic threat, the contact hypothesis, and the halo effect. We study the variation in the electoral share of the Sweden Democrats at two different levels simultaneously by performing multilevel analyses to account for the ways in which voting districts are clustered within municipalities. The main finding from our analyses is the support for the ethnic threat hypothesis, where the vote share of the Sweden Democrats is significantly higher in those areas that have seen an increase in the foreign-born population, and to some extent also in ethnically diverse areas, contradicting previous research on ethnic minority presence in fine-grained contexts. The expectation that the vote share for the Sweden Democrats should be higher in socioeconomic marginalized districts is partly supported, but we find no evidence of a halo effect, where ethnically homogeneous areas that are geographically close to heterogeneous districts were expected to have a higher vote share for the Sweden Democrats.
@Article{rydgren-tyrberg-2020,
author = {Jens Rydgren and Maria Tyrberg},
title = {Contextual Explanations of Radical Right-Wing Party Support in Sweden: A Multilevel Analysis},
journal = {European Societies},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
pages = {1--26},
abstract = {With the aim of studying the role of contextual factors for explaining within-country variation in the vote share of the radical right-wing party, the Sweden Democrats, in the 2014 Swedish election, we specify and test hypotheses pertaining to social marginality, ethnic threat,
the contact hypothesis, and the halo effect. We study the variation in the electoral share of the Sweden Democrats at two different levels simultaneously by performing multilevel analyses to account for the ways in which voting districts are clustered within municipalities. The
main finding from our analyses is the support for the ethnic threat hypothesis, where the vote share of the Sweden Democrats is significantly higher in those areas that have seen an increase in the foreign-born population, and to some extent also in ethnically diverse areas,
contradicting previous research on ethnic minority presence in fine-grained contexts. The expectation that the vote share for the Sweden Democrats should be higher in socioeconomic marginalized districts is partly supported, but we find no evidence of a halo effect, where
ethnically homogeneous areas that are geographically close to heterogeneous districts were expected to have a higher vote share for the Sweden Democrats.},
doi = {10.1080/14616696.2020.1793213},
}
Santana, Andrës and Josë Rama. “Electoral Support for Left Wing Populist Parties in Europe: Addressing the Globalization Cleavage.” European Politics and Society 19.5 (2018): 558–576. doi:10.1080/23745118.2018.1482848 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Drawing on the European Electoral Study (EES) for the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, we analyse the electoral competition between left wing populist parties and their non-populist counterparts in the nine European countries where this type of competition has occurred. By using the EES, we hold constant the electoral level and the electoral system, the timing of the elections and the question wording. To our knowledge, this is one of the broadest comparative analyses of European left-wing populist parties so far. The focus on the competition between leftist parties draws attention to the key question of the vulnerabilities of the non-populist left vis à vis their populist competitors. We test a battery of bivariate clustered logistic models and find that the losers of globalization theories help account for left wing populist parties{“} support. However, the sociodemographic profile of these supporters does not fit the mainstream view on who these losers are. Moreover, we obtain strong support for the globalization cleavage theories: citizens who hold critical attitudes towards the EU and who perceive immigration as a threat to their {“}way of life{“} are more prone to support left wing populist parties than non-populist left parties. These findings apply both to the entire sample of countries and to each one of them individually.
@Article{santana-rama-2018,
author = {Andr{\"e}s Santana and Jos{\"e} Rama},
title = {Electoral Support for Left Wing Populist Parties in Europe: Addressing the Globalization Cleavage},
journal = {European Politics and Society},
year = {2018},
volume = {19},
number = {5},
pages = {558--576},
abstract = {Drawing on the European Electoral Study (EES) for the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, we analyse the electoral competition between left wing populist parties and their non-populist counterparts in the nine European countries where this type of competition has occurred. By
using the EES, we hold constant the electoral level and the electoral system, the timing of the elections and the question wording. To our knowledge, this is one of the broadest comparative analyses of European left-wing populist parties so far. The focus on the competition between
leftist parties draws attention to the key question of the vulnerabilities of the non-populist left vis à vis their populist competitors. We test a battery of bivariate clustered logistic models and find that the losers of globalization theories help account for left wing populist
parties{"} support. However, the sociodemographic profile of these supporters does not fit the mainstream view on who these losers are. Moreover, we obtain strong support for the globalization cleavage theories: citizens who hold critical attitudes towards the EU and who perceive
immigration as a threat to their {"}way of life{"} are more prone to support left wing populist parties than non-populist left parties. These findings apply both to the entire sample of countries and to each one of them individually.},
doi = {10.1080/23745118.2018.1482848},
}
Schaub, Max, Johanna Gereke, and Delia Baldassarri. “Strangers in Hostile Lands: Exposure To Refugees and Right-Wing Support in Germany”s Eastern Regions.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2020). doi:10.1177/0010414020957675 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Does local exposure to refugees increase right-wing support? This paper studies a case uniquely suited to address this question: the allocation of refugees to the rural hinterlands of eastern Germany during the European refugee crisis. Similar to non-urban regions elsewhere, the area has had minimal previous exposure to foreigners, but distinctively leans towards the political right. Our data comprise electoral outcomes, and individual-level survey and behavioral measures. A policy allocating refugees following strict administrative rules and a matching procedure allow for causal identification. Our measurements confirm the presence of widespread anti-immigrant sentiments. However, these are unaffected by the presence of refugees in respondents{“} hometowns: on average, we record null effects for all outcomes, which we interpret as supporting a sociotropic perspective on immigration attitudes. Masked by these overall null findings, we observe convergence: local exposure to refugees appears to have pulled both right- and left-leaning individuals more towards the center.
@Article{schaub-gereke-baldassarri-2020,
author = {Max Schaub and Johanna Gereke and Delia Baldassarri},
title = {Strangers in Hostile Lands: Exposure To Refugees and Right-Wing Support in Germany{"}s Eastern Regions},
journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {Does local exposure to refugees increase right-wing support? This paper studies a case uniquely suited to address this question: the allocation of refugees to the rural hinterlands of eastern Germany during the European refugee crisis. Similar to non-urban regions elsewhere, the
area has had minimal previous exposure to foreigners, but distinctively leans towards the political right. Our data comprise electoral outcomes, and individual-level survey and behavioral measures. A policy allocating refugees following strict administrative rules and a matching
procedure allow for causal identification. Our measurements confirm the presence of widespread anti-immigrant sentiments. However, these are unaffected by the presence of refugees in respondents{"} hometowns: on average, we record null effects for all outcomes, which we interpret as
supporting a sociotropic perspective on immigration attitudes. Masked by these overall null findings, we observe convergence: local exposure to refugees appears to have pulled both right- and left-leaning individuals more towards the center.},
doi = {10.1177/0010414020957675},
}
van Spanje, Joost. Controlling the Electoral Marketplace: How Established Parties Ward Off Competition. Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. [BibTeX]
@Book{spanje-2019,
author = {Joost {van Spanje}},
title = {Controlling the Electoral Marketplace: How Established Parties Ward Off Competition},
publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
year = {2019},
}
van Spanje, Joost and Rachid Azrout. “The Plight of the Discredited: Electoral Effects of Stigmatizing And Prosecuting an Anti-Immigration Politician.” Acta Politica online first (2021). doi:10.1057/s41269-021-00197-5 [BibTeX][Abstract]
The emergence of anti-immigration parties in mature democracies has triggered various reactions. These reactions, including stigmatization of these parties and prosecution of their members for hate speech, may have unintended consequences. What are the effects of these responses on the electoral support for these parties? Using an experimental approach, we confront a sample representative of the Dutch electorate with one of six versions of a manipulated news video about a new anti-immigration party. We find that stigmatization of the party reduces the propensity to vote for that party, and even more so if it is mentioned that a prominent member is prosecuted for hate speech than if not. Either way, the effect is moderated by anti-immigrant attitude and mediated by the partyâ??s perceived legitimacy.
@Article{spanje-azrout-2021,
author = {Joost {van Spanje} and Rachid Azrout},
title = {The Plight of the Discredited: Electoral Effects of Stigmatizing And Prosecuting an Anti-Immigration Politician},
journal = {Acta Politica},
year = {2021},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {The emergence of anti-immigration parties in mature democracies has triggered various reactions. These reactions, including stigmatization of these parties and prosecution of their members for hate speech, may have unintended consequences. What are the effects of these responses
on the electoral support for these parties? Using an experimental approach, we confront a sample representative of the Dutch electorate with one of six versions of a manipulated news video about a new anti-immigration party. We find that stigmatization of the party reduces the
propensity to vote for that party, and even more so if it is mentioned that a prominent member is prosecuted for hate speech than if not. Either way, the effect is moderated by anti-immigrant attitude and mediated by the party{\^a}??s perceived legitimacy.},
doi = {10.1057/s41269-021-00197-5},
}
Stefanovic, Djordje and Geoffrey Evans. “Multiple Winning Formulae? Far Right Voters and Parties in Eastern Europe.” Europe-Asia Studies 71.9 (2019): 1443–1473. doi:10.1080/09668136.2019.1653447 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Can theories explaining far right voting in Western Europe be extended to post-communist Eastern Europe? We address this question with a comparative demand-side analysis of far right parties and their voters in four post-communist countries: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia. Our findings indicate the emergence of two distinct types of far right party. While the Latvian and Lithuanian far right resemble the new radical right (NRR) model, the Bulgarian far right comes closer to the welfare chauvinist ideal type. The far right mobilised anti-Semitic voters in Latvia, Slovakia and Bulgaria. In all four cases, the far right was especially successful in capturing the votes of ethnic majority members who are the most opposed to their country{“}s formerly dominant ethnic group.
@Article{stefanovic-evans-2019,
author = {Djordje Stefanovic and Geoffrey Evans},
title = {Multiple Winning Formulae? Far Right Voters and Parties in Eastern Europe},
journal = {Europe-Asia Studies},
year = {2019},
volume = {71},
number = {9},
pages = {1443--1473},
abstract = {Can theories explaining far right voting in Western Europe be extended to post-communist Eastern Europe? We address this question with a comparative demand-side analysis of far right parties and their voters in four post-communist countries: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Slovakia. Our findings indicate the emergence of two distinct types of far right party. While the Latvian and Lithuanian far right resemble the new radical right (NRR) model, the Bulgarian far right comes closer to the welfare chauvinist ideal type. The far right mobilised
anti-Semitic voters in Latvia, Slovakia and Bulgaria. In all four cases, the far right was especially successful in capturing the votes of ethnic majority members who are the most opposed to their country{"}s formerly dominant ethnic group.},
doi = {10.1080/09668136.2019.1653447},
}
Steiner, Nils D. and Sven Hillen. “Vote choices of left-authoritarians: Misperceived congruence and issue salience.” Electoral Studies 70 (2021): online first. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102280 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Often lacking parties with a corresponding profile, citizens with economically left and culturally authoritarian, or nationalist, policy orientations face a trade-off between congruence on economic and on cultural issues. How such left-authoritarian voters resolve this trade-off depends on which issues are more salient to them, previous research argues. We extend this line of research by considering the role of (mis-)perceived party positions. Using a survey in the context of the 2017 German election, we show how perceived congruence and issue importance interactively shape the left-authoritarian vote. Our findings indicate that many left-authoritarians vote for a party simply because they misperceive it to hold a congruent left-authoritarian position. In this case, issue importance matters little. Yet when voters are aware that parties match their position on only one dimension, vote choices are shaped by whether they care most about the economy or immigration. We discuss several implications.
@Article{steiner-hillen-2021,
author = {Nils D. Steiner and Sven Hillen},
title = {Vote choices of left-authoritarians: Misperceived congruence and issue salience},
journal = {Electoral Studies},
year = {2021},
volume = {70},
pages = {online first},
abstract = {Often lacking parties with a corresponding profile, citizens with economically left and culturally authoritarian, or nationalist, policy orientations face a trade-off between congruence on economic and on cultural issues. How such left-authoritarian voters resolve this trade-off
depends on which issues are more salient to them, previous research argues. We extend this line of research by considering the role of (mis-)perceived party positions. Using a survey in the context of the 2017 German election, we show how perceived congruence and issue importance
interactively shape the left-authoritarian vote. Our findings indicate that many left-authoritarians vote for a party simply because they misperceive it to hold a congruent left-authoritarian position. In this case, issue importance matters little. Yet when voters are aware that
parties match their position on only one dimension, vote choices are shaped by whether they care most about the economy or immigration. We discuss several implications.},
doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102280},
}
Stockemer, Daniel. The Front National in France: Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen. Springer, 2017. [BibTeX]
@Book{stockemer-2017b,
author = {Daniel Stockemer},
title = {The Front National in France: Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2017},
}
This article focuses on the prevalence of anti-immigration attitudes among the far-right electorate. Drawing on the distinction between the predictive power of immigration concerns, and the question of how widespread these concerns are among the far-right voter pool, we proceed in two steps. First, we assess the extent to which anti-immigration attitudes are a necessary condition for voting far-right; and second, we examine whether far-right voters with different levels of anti-immigration attitudes exhibit similar individual and attitudinal characteristics. Using data from the 8th wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) we find that, surprisingly, anti-immigration attitudes are not a necessary condition for voting for the far-right as approximately one third of far-right voters have no concerns over immigration. We further show that far-right voters with different levels of immigration concerns have different profiles when it comes to other predictors of the far right-vote including ideological affinity, attachment to the EU and government satisfaction. Our contribution is significant as we suggest that there are different routes to voting for the far right by groups with different grievances, including non- immigration related.
@Article{stockemer-halikiopoulou-vlandas-2020,
author = {Daniel Stockemer and Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas},
title = {Birds of a feather},
journal = {Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
pages = {1--28},
abstract = {This article focuses on the prevalence of anti-immigration attitudes among the far-right electorate. Drawing on the distinction between the predictive power of immigration concerns, and the question of how widespread these concerns are among the far-right voter pool, we proceed in
two steps. First, we assess the extent to which anti-immigration attitudes are a necessary condition for voting far-right; and second, we examine whether far-right voters with different levels of anti-immigration attitudes exhibit similar individual and attitudinal characteristics.
Using data from the 8th wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) we find that, surprisingly, anti-immigration attitudes are not a necessary condition for voting for the far-right as approximately one third of far-right voters have no concerns over immigration. We further show that
far-right voters with different levels of immigration concerns have different profiles when it comes to other predictors of the far right-vote including ideological affinity, attachment to the EU and government satisfaction. Our contribution is significant as we suggest that there
are different routes to voting for the far right by groups with different grievances, including non- immigration related.},
doi = {10.1080/1369183X.2020.1770063},
}
a’n, Natasza Styczy. “Refugees Not Welcome. The Populist Radical Right in Poland and the Migration Crisis.” Visions and Revisions of Europe. Eds. Czerska-Shaw, Karolina, Marcin Galent, and Bożena Gierat-Biero. Studies in Euroculture. Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2018. 75–90. [BibTeX]
@InCollection{styczynska-2018,
author = {Natasza Styczy{\a'n}ska},
title = {Refugees Not Welcome. The Populist Radical Right in Poland and the Migration Crisis},
booktitle = {Visions and Revisions of Europe},
publisher = {Universitätsverlag Göttingen},
year = {2018},
editor = {Karolina Czerska-Shaw and Marcin Galent and Bo{\.z}ena Gierat-Biero},
number = {4},
series = {Studies in Euroculture},
pages = {75--90},
address = {Göttingen},
}
Tipaldou, Sofia and Katrin Uba. “The Russian Radical Right Movement and Immigration Policy: Do They Just Make Noise Or Have an Impact As Well?.” Europe-Asia Studies 66.7 (2014): 1080–1101. doi:10.1080/09668136.2014.927647 [BibTeX][Abstract]
This article examines how, if at all, the mobilisation of the Russian Movement Against Illegal Immigration has had an impact on changes in Russian policies. Little is known about the outcomes of radical right movements in general or the Russian radical right in particular. The Movement Against Illegal Immigration has arguably played a role in shaping negative public attitudes towards immigration. On the other hand, the Russian government has not adopted any clear nationalistic anti-immigration policy frame. We show that disruptive events of Movement Against Illegal Immigration{“}s mobilisation have caused reactions in terms of the elite discourse on immigration and restrictive immigration legislation.
@Article{tipaldou-uba-2014,
author = {Sofia Tipaldou and Katrin Uba},
title = {The Russian Radical Right Movement and Immigration Policy: Do They Just Make Noise Or Have an Impact As Well?},
journal = {Europe-Asia Studies},
year = {2014},
volume = {66},
number = {7},
pages = {1080--1101},
abstract = {This article examines how, if at all, the mobilisation of the Russian Movement Against Illegal Immigration has had an impact on changes in Russian policies. Little is known about the outcomes of radical right movements in general or the Russian radical right in particular. The
Movement Against Illegal Immigration has arguably played a role in shaping negative public attitudes towards immigration. On the other hand, the Russian government has not adopted any clear nationalistic anti-immigration policy frame. We show that disruptive events of Movement
Against Illegal Immigration{"}s mobilisation have caused reactions in terms of the elite discourse on immigration and restrictive immigration legislation.},
doi = {10.1080/09668136.2014.927647},
}
Tipaldou, Sofia and Katrin Uba. “Movement Adaptability in Dissimilar Settings: the Far Right in Greece and Russia.” European Societies 21.4 (2019): 563–582. doi:10.1080/14616696.2018.1494294 [BibTeX][Abstract]
This article discusses how two similar far right movements in different political systems – Golden Dawn (GD) in democratic Greece and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) in authoritarian Russia – adapted their strategies and claims to better fit existing political contexts and how this affected the institutionalization of these movements. GD, a neo-Nazi movement formed in the 1980s, entered mainstream politics during the deep financial crisis of 2010, and since 2012 has consolidated its position as the third major opposition party. DPNI was founded in 2002; it had close connections with governing politicians and mobilized large xenophobic protests until it was banned in 2011. It then entered into a coalition with other far right groups under the banner of Russkie, cooperated with the liberals in the massive anti-fraud protests during 2011-2013, and tried to register as the Party of Nationalists, but failed and has now disbanded. While GD de-radicalized its anti-immigration claims to fit with the dominant discourse and exploited the financial crisis for its grass-root mobilization, DPNI changed its strategies and collaborated with its ideological opponents only after it had become very popular and faced with severe state repression. Our comparative analysis shows that far right movements adapt to their diverse environments in a manner similar to that of other anti-establishment movements regardless of context – whether within a democratic or non-democratic regime.
@Article{tipaldou-uba-2019,
author = {Sofia Tipaldou and Katrin Uba},
title = {Movement Adaptability in Dissimilar Settings: the Far Right in Greece and Russia},
journal = {European Societies},
year = {2019},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {563--582},
abstract = {This article discusses how two similar far right movements in different political systems - Golden Dawn (GD) in democratic Greece and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) in authoritarian Russia - adapted their strategies and claims to better fit existing political
contexts and how this affected the institutionalization of these movements. GD, a neo-Nazi movement formed in the 1980s, entered mainstream politics during the deep financial crisis of 2010, and since 2012 has consolidated its position as the third major opposition party. DPNI was
founded in 2002; it had close connections with governing politicians and mobilized large xenophobic protests until it was banned in 2011. It then entered into a coalition with other far right groups under the banner of Russkie, cooperated with the liberals in the massive anti-fraud
protests during 2011-2013, and tried to register as the Party of Nationalists, but failed and has now disbanded. While GD de-radicalized its anti-immigration claims to fit with the dominant discourse and exploited the financial crisis for its grass-root mobilization, DPNI changed
its strategies and collaborated with its ideological opponents only after it had become very popular and faced with severe state repression. Our comparative analysis shows that far right movements adapt to their diverse environments in a manner similar to that of other
anti-establishment movements regardless of context - whether within a democratic or non-democratic regime.},
doi = {10.1080/14616696.2018.1494294},
}
Using the 8th Round of the European Social Survey, we analyse the electoral competition between left-wing (LWPPs) and right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) in the six European countries where this type of competition has occurred (France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania and The Netherlands). By focusing on the competition between populist parties in the same sample of countries we can resolve what tells apart a LWPP voter from a RWPP voter. Thus, we study the factors that explain their different voting behaviour and confine our attention to the four main factors that affect populist competition: anti-elite attitudes, material deprivation, euro-scepticism and anti-immigration attitudes. Our results show that LWPPs and RWPPs voters are similar in their attitudes towards immigration and the European Union (EU) but differ in their attitudes towards elites and material deprivation.
@Article{rama-santana-2020,
author = {Jos{\a'e} Rama and Andr{\a'e}s Santana},
title = {In the Name of the People: Left Populists Versus Right Populists},
journal = {European Politics and Society},
year = {2020},
volume = {21},
number = {1},
pages = {17--35},
abstract = {Using the 8th Round of the European Social Survey, we analyse the electoral competition between left-wing (LWPPs) and right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) in the six European countries where this type of competition has occurred (France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania and The
Netherlands). By focusing on the competition between populist parties in the same sample of countries we can resolve what tells apart a LWPP voter from a RWPP voter. Thus, we study the factors that explain their different voting behaviour and confine our attention to the four main
factors that affect populist competition: anti-elite attitudes, material deprivation, euro-scepticism and anti-immigration attitudes. Our results show that LWPPs and RWPPs voters are similar in their attitudes towards immigration and the European Union (EU) but differ in their
attitudes towards elites and material deprivation.},
doi = {10.1080/23745118.2019.1596583},
}
Turnbull-Dugarte, Stuart J., Jos a’e, and Andr a’e. “The Baskerville”s Dog Suddenly Started Barking: Voting for Vox in the 2019 Spanish General Elections.” Political Research Exchange 2.1 (2020). doi:10.1080/2474736X.2020.1781543 [BibTeX][Abstract]
The electoral success of the new populist radical right-wing party, VOX, which achieved an unprecedent electoral result in the Spanish general elections of April 2019, brought an end to Spain{“}s exceptional status as a country free of the radical right. This article asks: who votes for VOX? Empirically, we present the first assessment of electoral support for VOX at the national level. Relying on national post-electoral survey data, our results show that the electoral profile of VOX{“}s supporters differs from that of populist radical right-wing parties from the rest of Europe. Support for VOX, much like the voters of their European contemporaries, tends to be markedly higher amongst males; economic status, however, has the reverse effect than that observed elsewhere on the continent, with individuals on the higher end of the income distribution more likely to have voted for VOX in the April 2019 general elections. Importantly, we establish that national identity plays a large role in explaining support for the new radical right-wing challenger and that the effect of identity is conditioned by negative evaluations of the political situation in Spain.
@Article{turnbull-dugarte-rama-santana-2020,
author = {Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte and Jos{\a'e} Rama and Andr{\a'e}s Santana},
title = {The Baskerville{"}s Dog Suddenly Started Barking: Voting for Vox in the 2019 Spanish General Elections},
journal = {Political Research Exchange},
year = {2020},
volume = {2},
number = {1},
abstract = {The electoral success of the new populist radical right-wing party, VOX, which achieved an unprecedent electoral result in the Spanish general elections of April 2019, brought an end to Spain{"}s exceptional status as a country free of the radical right. This article asks: who votes
for VOX? Empirically, we present the first assessment of electoral support for VOX at the national level. Relying on national post-electoral survey data, our results show that the electoral profile of VOX{"}s supporters differs from that of populist radical right-wing parties from
the rest of Europe. Support for VOX, much like the voters of their European contemporaries, tends to be markedly higher amongst males; economic status, however, has the reverse effect than that observed elsewhere on the continent, with individuals on the higher end of the income
distribution more likely to have voted for VOX in the April 2019 general elections. Importantly, we establish that national identity plays a large role in explaining support for the new radical right-wing challenger and that the effect of identity is conditioned by negative
evaluations of the political situation in Spain.},
doi = {10.1080/2474736X.2020.1781543},
}
Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya. “Welfare Chauvinism? Refugee Flows and Electoral Support for Populist-Right Parties in Industrial Democracies.” Social Science Quarterly 101.4 (2020): 1600–1626. doi:10.1111/ssqu.12838 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Objectives The objective of this article is to examine whether refugee flows are associated with an increase in electoral support for populist-right parties. The empirical evidence on this so far remains mixed. This article argues that refugee inflows alone are an inaccurate predictor of the success of populist-right parties. Rather, refugee inflows can lead to a rise in electoral support for populist-right parties where traditional welfare states are expansive-the so-called welfare chauvinism argument, wherein natives already dependent on high levels of social welfare are likely to see refugees as interlopers who free-ride on welfare and thereby threaten the welfare of locals. Methods This article deploys Tobit and OLS fixed effect estimators in panel data covering 27 OECD countries during the period 1990-2014 (25 years). Results There is no evidence to suggest that refugee inflows per se increase electoral support for populist-right parties. However, a positive effect of refugee inflows on electoral support for populist-right parties is conditional upon a higher degree of social welfare spending, which supports the propositions of {“}welfare chauvinism.{“} Moreover, support for populist-right parties increases when the degree of labor market regulation and welfare spending is high. These results are robust to alternative data, sample, and estimation techniques. Conclusion The results suggest that societies with higher levels of social protection through high taxes might fuel {“}welfare chauvinism,{“} in which the segments of native population fear significant welfare losses from inflow of refugees.
@Article{vadlamannati-2020,
author = {Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati},
title = {Welfare Chauvinism? Refugee Flows and Electoral Support for Populist-Right Parties in Industrial Democracies},
journal = {Social Science Quarterly},
year = {2020},
volume = {101},
number = {4},
pages = {1600--1626},
abstract = {Objectives The objective of this article is to examine whether refugee flows are associated with an increase in electoral support for populist-right parties. The empirical evidence on this so far remains mixed. This article argues that refugee inflows alone are an inaccurate
predictor of the success of populist-right parties. Rather, refugee inflows can lead to a rise in electoral support for populist-right parties where traditional welfare states are expansive-the so-called welfare chauvinism argument, wherein natives already dependent on high levels
of social welfare are likely to see refugees as interlopers who free-ride on welfare and thereby threaten the welfare of locals. Methods This article deploys Tobit and OLS fixed effect estimators in panel data covering 27 OECD countries during the period 1990-2014 (25 years).
Results There is no evidence to suggest that refugee inflows per se increase electoral support for populist-right parties. However, a positive effect of refugee inflows on electoral support for populist-right parties is conditional upon a higher degree of social welfare spending,
which supports the propositions of {"}welfare chauvinism.{"} Moreover, support for populist-right parties increases when the degree of labor market regulation and welfare spending is high. These results are robust to alternative data, sample, and estimation techniques. Conclusion The
results suggest that societies with higher levels of social protection through high taxes might fuel {"}welfare chauvinism,{"} in which the segments of native population fear significant welfare losses from inflow of refugees.},
doi = {10.1111/ssqu.12838},
}
Valentim, Vicente. “Parliamentary Representation and the Normalization of Radical Right Support.” Comparative Political Studies online first (2021). doi:10.1177/0010414021997159 [BibTeX][Abstract]
How do stigmatized political preferences become normalized? I argue that the parliamentary representation of the radical right normalizes radical right support. Radical right politicians breach established social norms. Hence their supporters have an incentive to conceal that support. When the radical right enters parliament, however, its voters are likely to perceive that their views have been legitimized, becoming more likely to display their private preferences. I use three studies to test this argument. Study 1 employs a regression discontinuity comparing the underreport of voting for radical right parties (RRPs) above and below thresholds of parliamentary representation. Study 2 compares how much individuals report liking RRPs in post-electoral surveys depending on interview mode. Study 3 employs a difference-in-differences that looks into the underreport of UKIP vote before and after entering parliament. The results support the argument and highlight the role of political institutions in defining the acceptability of behaviors in society.
@Article{valentim-2021,
author = {Vicente Valentim},
title = {Parliamentary Representation and the Normalization of Radical Right Support},
journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
year = {2021},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {How do stigmatized political preferences become normalized? I argue that the parliamentary representation of the radical right normalizes radical right support. Radical right politicians breach established social norms. Hence their supporters have an incentive to conceal that
support. When the radical right enters parliament, however, its voters are likely to perceive that their views have been legitimized, becoming more likely to display their private preferences. I use three studies to test this argument. Study 1 employs a regression discontinuity
comparing the underreport of voting for radical right parties (RRPs) above and below thresholds of parliamentary representation. Study 2 compares how much individuals report liking RRPs in post-electoral surveys depending on interview mode. Study 3 employs a
difference-in-differences that looks into the underreport of UKIP vote before and after entering parliament. The results support the argument and highlight the role of political institutions in defining the acceptability of behaviors in society.},
doi = {10.1177/0010414021997159},
}
a`e, Man. “The Strength of Far-Right AfD in Eastern Germany: The East-West Divide and the Multiple Causes behind Populism.” The Political Quarterly (2020): online first. doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12859 [BibTeX][Abstract]
This article sheds light on one of the key developments in recent German politics and relates it to the broader debate on the electoral success of the far right. The rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) is also a story about Germany’s internal political divide three decades after reunification, as the party has roughly twice as much support in the east than in the west. The article analyses the country’s east-west divide, strongly visible in widespread sentiments of societal marginalisation among eastern Germans. The key socio-structural differences between the east and the west relate to matters of economics, migration, and representation-and provide a setting suitable to AfD strength in the east. In explaining the party’s electoral success in eastern Germany, the article echoes recent scholarship which rejects narrow explanations for the strength of {“}populism{“}, and instead highlights its multiple causes.
@Article{weisskircher-2020,
author = {Man{\a`e}s Weisskircher},
title = {The Strength of Far-Right AfD in Eastern Germany: The East-West Divide and the Multiple Causes behind Populism},
journal = {The Political Quarterly},
year = {2020},
pages = {online first},
abstract = {This article sheds light on one of the key developments in recent German politics and relates it to the broader debate on the electoral success of the far right. The rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) is also a story about Germany's internal
political divide three decades after reunification, as the party has roughly twice as much support in the east than in the west. The article analyses the country's east-west divide, strongly visible in widespread sentiments of societal marginalisation among eastern Germans. The key
socio-structural differences between the east and the west relate to matters of economics, migration, and representation-and provide a setting suitable to AfD strength in the east. In explaining the party's electoral success in eastern Germany, the article echoes recent scholarship
which rejects narrow explanations for the strength of {"}populism{"}, and instead highlights its multiple causes.},
doi = {10.1111/1467-923X.12859},
}
Wichgers, Lisanne, Laura Jacobs, and Joost van Spanje. “The Battle of Frame Building: The Reciprocal Relationship between Journalists and Frame Sponsors.” The International Journal of Press/Politics online first (2020). doi:10.1177/1940161220942760 [BibTeX][Abstract]
The idea that journalists make use of framing is widespread. However, systematic studies of the role of frame sponsors-that is, nonmedia actors who advocate a certain frame package-in influencing the patterns in frame package use by journalists are limited. Which characteristics make frame sponsors successful in frame building, and why? In this study, we propose a new way of understanding the relationship between journalists and frame sponsors, by studying to what extent high authority and having a strong stake in an issue are important predictors of frame coverage, and whether a bidirectional relationship between frame sponsors and journalists can be discerned in frame building. We examine the two court cases against Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), for alleged hate speech (2009-2020). Based on a content analysis of media input, such as statements, social media posts, and press releases (N = 220) of relevant frame sponsors as well as news stories about the court cases (N = 691), we demonstrate that there is a reciprocal relationship between frame sponsors and journalists in frame building. Frame sponsors influence journalists in the use of frame packages, but framing in news reports also stimulates frame sponsors to communicate similar frame packages in the future. Actors with high levels of authority and a strong stake in the issue are more successful in getting their preferred frame packages across. By acknowledging the bidirectional relationship and expanding knowledge on who benefits most from this relationship, this study advances literature on frame building.
@Article{wichgers-jacobs-spanje-2020,
author = {Lisanne Wichgers and Laura Jacobs and Joost {van Spanje}},
title = {The Battle of Frame Building: The Reciprocal Relationship between Journalists and Frame Sponsors},
journal = {The International Journal of Press/Politics},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {The idea that journalists make use of framing is widespread. However, systematic studies of the role of frame sponsors-that is, nonmedia actors who advocate a certain frame package-in influencing the patterns in frame package use by journalists are limited. Which characteristics
make frame sponsors successful in frame building, and why? In this study, we propose a new way of understanding the relationship between journalists and frame sponsors, by studying to what extent high authority and having a strong stake in an issue are important predictors of frame
coverage, and whether a bidirectional relationship between frame sponsors and journalists can be discerned in frame building. We examine the two court cases against Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), for alleged hate speech (2009-2020). Based on a content
analysis of media input, such as statements, social media posts, and press releases (N = 220) of relevant frame sponsors as well as news stories about the court cases (N = 691), we demonstrate that there is a reciprocal relationship between frame sponsors and journalists in frame
building. Frame sponsors influence journalists in the use of frame packages, but framing in news reports also stimulates frame sponsors to communicate similar frame packages in the future. Actors with high levels of authority and a strong stake in the issue are more successful in
getting their preferred frame packages across. By acknowledging the bidirectional relationship and expanding knowledge on who benefits most from this relationship, this study advances literature on frame building.},
doi = {10.1177/1940161220942760},
}
Wichgers, Lisanne, Laura Jacobs, and Joost van Spanje. “Trial and Error: Hate Speech Prosecution and Its (unintended) Effects on Democratic Support.” Acta Politica online first (2020). doi:10.1057/s41269-020-00177-1 [BibTeX][Abstract]
Due to its controversial nature, hate speech prosecution of anti-immigration politicians is likely to affect citizens{“} democratic support. Using a web experiment in which participants are exposed to a manipulated television news story about hate speech prosecution, we test these potential effects in the Dutch context. We demonstrate that effects on democratic support are driven by (dis)agreement with ideas expressed by the prosecuted politician in his alleged hate speech rather than by identification with his party. While a decision to not prosecute a politician does not seem to affect democratic support, a decision to prosecute a politician for hate speech decreases democratic support among citizens with anti-immigration attitudes, and increases democratic support among citizens with pro-immigration attitudes. Decisions to prosecute politicians for hate speech thus have important effects not just on supporters of the politician{“}s party, but also on other groups in society.
@Article{wichgers-jacobs-spanje-2020b,
author = {Lisanne Wichgers and Laura Jacobs and Joost {van Spanje}},
title = {Trial and Error: Hate Speech Prosecution and Its (unintended) Effects on Democratic Support},
journal = {Acta Politica},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {Due to its controversial nature, hate speech prosecution of anti-immigration politicians is likely to affect citizens{"} democratic support. Using a web experiment in which participants are exposed to a manipulated television news story about hate speech prosecution, we test these
potential effects in the Dutch context. We demonstrate that effects on democratic support are driven by (dis)agreement with ideas expressed by the prosecuted politician in his alleged hate speech rather than by identification with his party. While a decision to not prosecute a
politician does not seem to affect democratic support, a decision to prosecute a politician for hate speech decreases democratic support among citizens with anti-immigration attitudes, and increases democratic support among citizens with pro-immigration attitudes. Decisions to
prosecute politicians for hate speech thus have important effects not just on supporters of the politician{"}s party, but also on other groups in society.},
doi = {10.1057/s41269-020-00177-1},
}
Wurthmann, Constantin L., Stefan Marschall, Vasiliki Triga, and Vasilis Manavopoulos. “Many Losers – One Winner? an Examination of Vote Switching To the Afd in the 2017 German Federal Election Using Vaa Data.” Party Politics online first (2020). doi:10.1177/1354068820914959 [BibTeX][Abstract]
The German federal election of 2017 saw significant losses for the two German mainstream parties (Volksparteien) and governing coalition partners, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). The major beneficiary was the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a right-populist party, which almost tripled its amount of votes received from the 2013 federal election. Making use of data from a Voting Advice Application, this article seeks to explore the AfD{“}s extraordinary electoral success with particular attention to the party{“}s capacity to attract voters from the two mainstream and traditionally powerful parties. Drawing on the literature on radical right-wing parties in Europe and tracking the route of AfD from a single-issue Eurosceptic party to a radical party with broader programmatic appeal, this work tests hypotheses regarding demographic, political and attitudinal determinants of voting for AfD, in general, and switching one{“}s vote to AfD from CDU/CSU or SPD more specifically. In line with previous literature, individual-level analyses show that voting for the AfD seems to be more tangentially related to demographic variables, such as sex, age and education and more strongly connected to political concerns, e.g. {“}conservative{“} self-placement and attitudes toward specific policies, immigration and Euroscepticism in particular.
@Article{wurthmann-marschall-triga-manavopoulos-2020,
author = {L. Constantin Wurthmann and Stefan Marschall and Vasiliki Triga and Vasilis Manavopoulos},
title = {Many Losers - One Winner? an Examination of Vote Switching To the Afd in the 2017 German Federal Election Using Vaa Data},
journal = {Party Politics},
year = {2020},
volume = {online first},
abstract = {The German federal election of 2017 saw significant losses for the two German mainstream parties (Volksparteien) and governing coalition partners, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). The major beneficiary was the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a
right-populist party, which almost tripled its amount of votes received from the 2013 federal election. Making use of data from a Voting Advice Application, this article seeks to explore the AfD{"}s extraordinary electoral success with particular attention to the party{"}s capacity to
attract voters from the two mainstream and traditionally powerful parties. Drawing on the literature on radical right-wing parties in Europe and tracking the route of AfD from a single-issue Eurosceptic party to a radical party with broader programmatic appeal, this work tests
hypotheses regarding demographic, political and attitudinal determinants of voting for AfD, in general, and switching one{"}s vote to AfD from CDU/CSU or SPD more specifically. In line with previous literature, individual-level analyses show that voting for the AfD seems to be more
tangentially related to demographic variables, such as sex, age and education and more strongly connected to political concerns, e.g. {"}conservative{"} self-placement and attitudes toward specific policies, immigration and Euroscepticism in particular.},
doi = {10.1177/1354068820914959},
}
a’o, Piotr Zag, Jose Rama, and Guillermo Cordero. “Young and Temporary: Youth Employment Insecurity and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe.” Government and Opposition (2019): 1–22. doi:10.1017/gov.2019.28 [BibTeX][Abstract]
The recent success of right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in Europe has given rise to different explanations. Economic factors have proven to be significant mainly at the aggregate level. As for the individual level, it has been argued that the so-called {“}losers of globalization{“} – the less educated and less skilled, profiles with higher job insecurity – are more likely to support RPPs. Nevertheless, RPPs perform strikingly well in countries less affected by the Great Recession, gathering high levels of support among profiles not considered the losers of globalization. Moreover, the effect of age on support for RPPs is not clear, as, on the one hand, the young are better educated and skilled, but, on the other, they suffered the effects of the economic crisis more. To address this puzzle, we focus on the impact of unemployment and employment insecurity among the youth on voting for RPPs in 17 European countries. We find that youth support for RPPs can be explained by the precariousness of the youth labour market.
@Article{zagorski-rama-cordero-2019,
author = {Piotr Zag{\a'o}rski and Jose Rama and Guillermo Cordero},
title = {Young and Temporary: Youth Employment Insecurity and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe},
journal = {Government and Opposition},
year = {2019},
pages = {1--22},
abstract = {The recent success of right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in Europe has given rise to different explanations. Economic factors have proven to be significant mainly at the aggregate level. As for the individual level, it has been argued that the so-called {"}losers of globalization{"} -
the less educated and less skilled, profiles with higher job insecurity - are more likely to support RPPs. Nevertheless, RPPs perform strikingly well in countries less affected by the Great Recession, gathering high levels of support among profiles not considered the losers of
globalization. Moreover, the effect of age on support for RPPs is not clear, as, on the one hand, the young are better educated and skilled, but, on the other, they suffered the effects of the economic crisis more. To address this puzzle, we focus on the impact of unemployment and
employment insecurity among the youth on voting for RPPs in 17 European countries. We find that youth support for RPPs can be explained by the precariousness of the youth labour market.},
doi = {10.1017/gov.2019.28},
}
The reading class exercise goes on. Inevitably, the class on the consequences of the Radical Right’s rise kicks off with some recent work on the underlying causes.
What is the link between social class and radical right voting in Western Europe?
The idea that the radical right forms a new party family, whose rise is the result of changes in the class structure of European societies has been around for a while. Kitschelt, Betz, and Kriesi were amongst the earliest proponents, and Kitschelt/Rehm (2014) develop some interesting ideas about the mechanisms behind these alignments. Oesch and Rennwald have been working in this field for a long time, too.
This article, which was published in EJPR three years ago, is almost an instant classic. Having said that, I have previously found the article a bit busy (by now, I’m conditioned to only digest bite-sized pieces that do one single thing in 6,000 words or less). And, my personal bug-bear, the text uses “poles” and “party families” as exchangeable, but on closer inspection, their poles encompass several party families.
Oesch, D., & Rennwald, L. (2018). Electoral competition in Europe’s new tripolar political space: class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right. European Journal of Political Research, 57(), 783–807. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12259
What we liked
Students said that the statistical analyses were quite focused and presented in an accessible way, i.e. with tables and graphs that convey the meaning of what is being done. They pointed out that the paradox of service and production workers that vote against their own economic interests really comes to the fore in these analyses. So does the lack of left-wing authoritarian parties in most contemporary European societies. One student made the connection with the gender gap in radical right voting: if the distribution of jobs in European societies is heavily gendered (compare e.g. education and medicine/nursing on the one hand and production/construction on the other) and if the logic of workplace relations has an impact on one’s politics, it makes perfect sense that the radical right disproportionately attracts male voters.
Students agreed that “poles” are not really party families. More specifically, they argued that one should differentiate between Old Left/New Left parties. Taking on board some ideas from my other MA course, they argued that contextual/institutional factors (e.g. type of welfare state) should be taken into account. They wondered about what goes into the “cultural” dimension of party competition (don’t we all) and were a bit baffled by some of the comparisons in the last part of the text, which read like comparisons over time but are actually comparisons between groups of countries.
Dennison, J. (2020). How issue salience explains the rise of the populist right in western europe. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 32(3), 397–420. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edz022
The author argues that various explanations for radical right support are all linked to the salience of their issues (first and foremost immigration).
What we liked
The students (and I) thought this was an interesting new approach to an already crowded (but still interesting) field. Students found the text accessible and well-structured, liked the models (particularly the presentation of the fixed effects approach, which was new to most of them) and the literature review. They also said the benefited from the carefully written introduction and the extensive conclusions.
What we did not like so much
There was not much we did not like, but some minor points were raised. The figures were less than perfectly readable. The argument for aggregating individual data was not immediately obvious (but became clear once we discussed the alternatives). Students would have liked some explanations re the random effects specification and asked for replication data.
Whiteley, P., Larsen, E., Goodwin, M., & Clarke, H. (2019). Party activism in the populist radical right: the case of the uk independence party. Party Politics, online first. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068819880142
Big guns, and Paul Whiteley was the friendliest next-door (office) neighbour I could wish for in a previous life. Apart from that, the research question is intriguing: are/were members of UKIP motivated by the same factors as members of more “normal” parties? Or are/were UKIP members different, because their party was a (self-styled) outsider? The text is also a convenient introduction to the subfield of party member studies/surveys, something my students were not really aware of.
What we liked
The data set is amazing: thousands of UKIP members, many of them without doubts graduates from the school of hard knocks, were willing to talk to, you know, boffins. Students really liked that. They also appreciated the choice and framing of the research question, and that the authors tried to address the issue of relative deprivation (though the students pointed out that they were talking about a macro concept while using micro data).
What we did not like so much
Having said that, students were quite critical. They kicked off by pointing out that the general incentives model is not so totally different from but rather a special case of the Civic Voluntarism model. So a bit of a straw man/false dichotomy to start with?
The text is rather short (less than 8,000 words including the tables but excluding the references). Cynics might think that students would like that, too, but some of them actually complained that they wanted more information on the wording of the items and the construction of the variables, something that they could not even find in the online appendix (yes, they are perverted like that). More generally, they felt that one or two extra pages would have been required for the presentation of the findings and a fuller discussion of their implications.
They also said that additional factors such as religiosity and Islamophobia should have been included in the model and were concerned that UKIP and the UK were not necessarily very representative of the Radical Right and Western Europe. All good points.
And I’m really proud that they spotted one major issue: Whiteley et al. find that the same general incentives that work for other parties also explain variation in participation levels within the UKIP membership. But a more interesting question is perhaps whether they also explain the decision to join a party, and more specifically UKIP. Which reminds me of another piece that I could have selected for this course:
Poletti, M., Webb, P., & Bale, T. (2019). Why do only some people who support parties actually join them? evidence from britain. West European Politics, 42(1), 156–172. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1479921
do exactly this: by comparing party members and non-members, they show that general incentives can explain the crucial step of joining. Then again, they have a much smaller sample of UKIP members.
All that ends well…
In the end, students said they had learned a lot from the text, even if they disagreed with some of the authors’ choices. What more can you ask for?
