Mar 202020
 

Update #3 March 25:

Looks like we are indeed getting an option 1+2 outcome: Höcke & Kalbitz say they cannot shred the membership list b/c there is none, but tell members to refrain from political activity under the “wing” brand. Obviously, they will otherwise remain very active within the party.

Update #2 March 21:

The wing (who exactly?) has chosen option number 1 (see below), probably in a really, really ghastly WhatsApp group chat. The message they sent out on twitter is telling: while the wing is no more, their beliefs and values are unchanged, and they remain a “part of this great party project”. In other words, the wing shall henceforth be known as “AfD”.

The wing's final post on twitter

The wing disbands. Problem solved. Simples.

Update #1 March 21:

The meeting of the wing has been postponed because of the Covid19 crisis. Apparently, it’s not fake news when your own life is on the line. The national leadership said that the April 30 deadline applies, regardless.

On March 12 2020, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (aka the spooks) stated that the AfD’s “Flügel (“wing”) faction is right-wing extremist and will be put under surveillance. This also applies to the faction’s most prominent members, its head honchos Höcke & Kalbitz. This has far-reaching consequences. Surveillance up to the use of informers aside, the official “extremist” label will make the party less attractive/acceptable for some of its voters. Members of the “wing” who are public servants may well lose their jobs and their pensions. Most importantly perhaps, the move against the “wing” suggests that the party as a whole might come under observation next.The wing emerged almost exactly five years ago as an informal group of rebels who signed a declaration against the (relatively moderate) course of the party’s then-leader Bernd Lucke. Within days, the manifesto attracted hundreds of signatories. The formation of the Flügel presaged the 2015 split and subsequent radicalisation of the party (read everything about this trajectory in my recent paper on this topic (ungated)). Over the following years, the group has held annual meetings in a spot where right-wing extremist have gathered since the days of the empire. These were often attended by prominent members of the national leadership. Over time, the wing has replaced another faction (the “Patriotic Platform”), and its influence has grown, especially in the eastern states. However, it was never recognised by the party as an official group and never sought an official status. What the wing really wanted to be was an influential network of like-minded ultra-radicals, with ties to openly extremist elements outside the party proper.

Bernd Höcke

Bernd Höcke. Based on work by Sandro Halank, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0Treating the wing as an organisation that represents the party’s extremism problem and could be removed in principle is therefore slightly misleading. But this is exactly what the party, the media, and the authorities are doing at the moment. Today, the party’s national executive has called upon the wing to dissolve by the end of April. It is the latest in a string of appeals for moderation, and considerably more low-key than the previous (failed) attempts to expel Höcke from the party.Today’s meeting was prompted by two stories that were all over the media before COVID-19 drowned out everything else. First, it emerged that Kalbitz and his family had been members of the HDJ for several years, something that he had always denied, although it was already known that the he had attended one of their meetings. The HDJ was a right-wing organisation (now disbanded) whose stated aim was to indoctrinate children with Nazi ideology. Only a couple of days later, a video of a wing meeting was leaked. In the video Höcke made an awkward pun about sending his enemies within the party to a concentration camp.Höcke and Kalbitz are the leaders of the AfD in their respective states. Most MPs for the AfD in these state’s belong to the wing. Think about that for a minute.COVID or not, the wing will have a meeting of its own on this weekend. I can see three ways in which this could go.

  1. The wing complies and dissolves. That could be acceptable for them. The exec did not vote to kick out Höcke, Kalbitz, or anyone else. This would be a win-win: the network networks on (perhaps under a different name), the AfD can claim that they stopped extremism in its tracks.
  2. The wing tells everyone that you cannot formally disband informal structures. They don’t have a membership list, because they are not a proper organisation – just a long list of names under the original resolution and chaps sending emails to other chaps. Nothing to be done about. The standoff continues in a cold-war like scenario.
  3. Full-on conflict. The party splits: easterners trying to kick out the westerners and vice versa, perhaps even splits within state chapters. This would probably be the end of the AfD as we know it. Germany being Germany, it would probably also result in lengthy battles in court over who may use the old name.

In my view, 3) is the wing’s first inclination, but also the least rational solution. The wing is strong (allegedly it has some 5,000 members) but hardly strong enough to go it alone. It is also unnecessary: while there are people left in the party who call themselves moderates, the party as a whole has become very radical over the last five years. Disagreement with the wing is mostly over style (many dislike the Höcke cult), over keeping up appearances, and over dealing strategically with the legal pressure the party is under. In many ways, the wing is seen as a naughty child that needlessly provokes the authorities. Then again, this brand of naughtiness is a vote getter in the east and strongly motivates some members. So 1), or a mixture of 1) and 2) looks like the most likely outcome to me. I shall keep you posted.

Dec 202019
 
The 10 most popular posts on this blog in 2019 1

Yet another end-of-year post

It’s that time of the year again. No, I’m not talking about mindless consumerism, pointless over-indulgence and the Great Starbucks War on Christmas. What I’m talking about is my yearly reflection on why I still solo blog in <insert year>, and which posts were the least unpopular. To which the answer is not so easy. With today’s infrastructure, server logs have become meaningless. Google analytics is an Orwellian nightmare for both my few readers and me. Which leaves the humble wordpress tracking code: yet another data protection scare, but less high-profile. And so, without further ado, here comes this blog’s top ten for 2019.

The contenders

#10 Conceptual confusion is kinda ok

This post, written a year ago, demonstrates how research on the Extreme Right became research on the Radical Right without missing a beat. I know, it’s a bit meta.

#9 Regional support for the “Alternative for Germany” varies wildly

A short post with maps that summarises some of my recent work on the geography of the radical right vote in Germany.

#8 Conference Posters with beamerposter

Do you need a conference poster, fast? Do you love \LaTeX? This post may be old (it is from 2011), but people still find it useful.

#7 A new putsch in the AfD

Almost a year ago, a third reasonably prominent politician (though not a former leader) left the AfD to set up their own shop. As we now no, he failed, utterly, but it’s still a cautionary tale.

#6 AfD leader Gauland speaks at the New Right “winter school”

The leader of the biggest opposition party in the Bundestag gave the keynote at an institution that aims to educate the future extreme right elite. That is quite something. And because all this list is super self-indulgent anyway, I’m also reposting the video I made about it

Alexander Gauland, co-leader of the AfD, headlines a far-right "winter school"
Watch this video on YouTube.

#5 How the tidyverse changed my view of R

A short-ish post about R with the tidyverse is slightly and pleasantly different from grandpa’s R (i.e. the R of my PhD days). I guess people liked the post because of the memes.

#4 The March 2019 update of the Extreme Right Bibliography

I maintain this slightly obsessive bibliography on the Far/Radical/Extreme Right and their voters. The March 2019 update was a big one, which attracted some attention from fellow nerds.

#3 nlcom and the delta method

This post from 2013 is an evergreen, because Stata’s implementation of the delta method (still) rocks.

#2 The regional elections in eastern Germany

Everyone with the slightest interest in German politics was watching the 2019 state elections in the east. Here is/was my five-minute analysis of what was going down.

#1 The state election in Thuringia

This eastern state election made quite a splash, what with the collapse of the SPD, the rise of the AfD, and the underwhelming result for the Greens. Given the size and importance of Thuringia for the great scheme of things, the post attracted disproportionate interest. I blame twitter.

Coda

I find it hard to believe, but I’ve written almost 80 posts this year, which is well above my yearly average. Most of them are just short throw away things (“Look, I was misquoted by some university radio station in Bosnia!”). Others are more substantial, and some reach a rise up to a length, sophistication, and dullness that I should reserve for my best proper academic writing. I have no idea why I’m still doing this, but while I’m still doing this, people might as well read it, so share a post or two, will you?

Dec 152019
 

A coalition to keep out the AfD

Back in the distant past of 2016, the rise of the AfD in Germany’s eastern states and the fragmentation of the party system began to force the formation of awkward coalitions. In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD captured about a quarter of the vote and so brought together a ‘Kenya Coalition’ (CDU / SPD / Greens). As menages a trois go, it was not a happy arrangement, but somehow the coalition rumbled on. But the AfD remained a problem. Like in other eastern states, some in the CDU (mostly second and third tier politicians) would be much happier in a coalition with the radical right than with two left-ish parties. Many others and the federal CDU quite rightfully think that this would be political suicide. And so there was was the occasional wink-and-nod, and a lot of kerfuffle and shenanigans, but not much else.

A neo-Nazi in the local CDU

While we were all obsessing about the UK General election, a scandal broke in the eastern periphery. Robert Möritz, a young and relatively recent member of the CDU turned out to be a member of ‘Uniter’, an association of former soldiers, and special forces and police officers that has been linked to the right-wing extremist ‘prepper’ scene. On closer inspection, it also emerged that Möritz was a steward at a neo-Nazi march, is a fan of neo-Nazi bands and sports a massive ‘black sun’ tattoo (a combination of swastikas, infamously linked to the SS) (if you read German or know how to run Google translate, here are all the gory details) 👇

All of this undisputed. Möritz apparently removed some posts from his accounts, claimed youthful innocence and said he had moved on. His local association said they were happy with that.

Could a fourth-tier politician be the end of the coalition in Saxony-Anhalt?

A neo-Nazi scandal could bring down the 'Kenya Coalition' in Saxony-Anhalt 3

Not all news are good news

As far as I can tell, Möritz is a member of some advisory assembly at the very local level. It strikes me as unlikely that he has any juice within the CDU, or that anyone would think he was worth wasting political capital on. On the other hand, the potential political fallout is massive. The normal reaction would have been to investigate the matter, with a view to chugging the guy out (legally complicated but doable).But when the story broke, the state-level CDU leadership did not pull the plug. They were happy with the way the local guys had dealt with it, period. Incredulous silence all around, then the Greens piped up and asked, quite literally, ‘How many MORE swastikas do you have in your ranks’. Excellent question. To which the state leadership responded by … 🥁 … demanding an apology and threatening to end the coalition.Cue emergency delivery of mil-grade tranquillisers to CDU HQ back in Berlin and head-scratching all around. What is this all about? Internal CDU power struggle? Testing the waters? The state CDU forcing early elections or a year of minority government to warm up for the campaign? I have no idea. But this is how we in Germany spend the weekend after the day after the night before.

Nov 292019
 
A vast majority of Germans sees the AfD as a right-wing extremist party

For the radical right in Europe, Alternative for Germany is an increasingly unusual case

In a recent paper published in JCMS, I argue that unlike other German far-right parties, the “Alternative for Germany party” (AfD) managed to avoid being associated with Nazism. The strong presence of establishment figures that previously were (or could have been) members of centre-right parties acted as what Elisabeth Ivarsflaten has once called a “reputational shield“. Without such a shield, a party will be branded “fringe” or extremist, and many voters will be reluctant to support it. Also, such parties will find it difficult to recruit competent and presentable would-be politicians – an argument that David Art makes and illustrates in his fabulous study of radical right party activists.

A vast majority of Germans sees the AfD as a right-wing extremist party 4

In the JCMS paper, I also look at the trajectory of the Alternative for Germany. The AfD started out as a socially conservative/market radical “professors’ party”, then, within just two years, developed into a (mostly) bog-standard Western European radical right party. What sets the “Alternative” apart from similar parties in Western Europe, however, is its desperate flirt with traditional German right-wing extremism.

Back to the future?

The Front National (now the Rassemblement) recently expelled its founder and long-time leader Jean-Marie Le Pen because the old man would not stop talking about the Holocaust. The Sweden Democrats gave up the uniforms, then had a real purge of the old guard. Other parties like the PVV never had any connection to the old inter-war Extreme Right. And this looked like the way forward for the last couple of decades or so.

In the AfD, regional leader Björn Höcke can publicly trot out racist tropesattack the culture of remembrance and use rhetoric and ideas straight from the 1930s playbook without getting as much as a slap on the wrist. Regional leader Andreas Kalbitz was a member of various right-wing extremist groups and the former “Republican” party. Kalbitz also attended a Greek Neo-Nazi rally in Athens and a festival for Fascists and Neo-Nazis in Belgium. Not a problem. National leader Alexander Gauland, who infamously called the rule of the Nazis “a spot of bird shit” in an otherwise glorious history, thinks that Höcke is “right in the middle” of the party, and that Kalbitz is a “good man”.

 

80 per cent of Germans are suspicious of the AfD

In the JCMS paper, I suggest that this trajectory, which is fueled by electoral successes in the East and intra-party outbidding for the most outrageous positions, could not just bring legal problems (the offices for the protection of the constitution seem to be set to heighten their scrutiny of the AfD) but also undermine its electoral appeal in the medium term. Lo and behold: in a (very rare) instance of not being completely out of touch with reality, I may have gauged the public mood just right. Today’s Politbarometer poll asked citizens how far right-wing extremist ideas have spread within the AfD. A cool 41 per cent said “far”, and further 39 per cent said “very far”. For comparison, 15 per cent thought these ideas have spread “not very far”, and just two (two!) per cent said that right-wing extremism within the party did not exist. In other words: 80 per cent see Alternative for Germany as a right-wing extremist party.

80 per cent believe right-wing extremists are have spread far or very far within the Alternative for Germany

This dovetails neatly with slightly older polls which show that notwithstanding its national electoral support of 10 to 15 per cent, the AfD is by far the least popular party in Germany. About 80 per cent of voters would never consider voting for them. So far, the main result of the AfD’s ongoing radicalisation is not a collapse of its support, but rather a segmentation of the German party system. If you want to see the future of Germany, look to Flanders (minus the excellent fatty food, the quirky beers, and, well minus Belgium).

Nov 182019
 

Happy to report that I made it to no. 53 on this totally scientific and utterly unbiased list of “Top 100 Political Science Blogs“. Presumably, because there are so few of us left. But anyways, if you are still reading blogs, take a look: there are a lot of interesting items on this list.

 

Nov 052019
 

When former leader Frauke Petry left the AfD after the 2017 federal election, she kept her seats in the Bundestag and in Saxony’s regional parliament. These seats were meant to form the base for a new movement/party she quickly set up with friends and family.

The Blue Party is over

Image source: Wikipedia

The “Blue Party” was supposed to become a sort of respectable radical right party: a potential coalition partner for the Christian Democrats and an alternative to the Alternative for Germany that was veering to the right. To put it in github terms: like her predecessor Lucke, whom she had de facto ousted, Petry tried to fork a previous iteration of the original AfD project.

And like Lucke (and Poggenburg), she failed. In the EP 2019 election (where they might have stood a chance because there was no electoral threshold) they could not run because they failed to collect the required number of supporting signatures. In the Saxony (Petry’s home state), they won 0.4 per cent of the vote in the September election. Ten days ago, they won 0.1 per cent in the Thuringia election.

This weekend, the Blues have pulled the plug: they will shut down the party before the end of the year. Petry will continue to sit as an independent until 2021 and plans to end her political career there and then.

The bigger story here is of course that for the first time since the 1960s, the German radical/extreme right is electorally united. The NPD (which had gobbled up the DVU) is in tatters. The AfD breakaways are toast. Everything else are just sects. That is one scary perspective.

Oct 272019
 
5 quick hits on the state election in Thuringia 5

LEFT30.4%
AfD23.5%
CDU22.1%
SPD8.1%
GREENS5.1%
FDP5.1%

Source: FGW projection, 8:10pm

Why waste my life writing lengthy books that no-one is going to read? Why go through the pain of peer review? Why, in fact, wait for the actual election results to come in? So here is my list on hot takes on the Thuringia state election.

  1. Everyone is talking about the AfD, but the real story of this election is the Left. Bodo Ramelow was the first member of the Left to become Minister President of a federal state. His red-red-green coalition was defeated, but only because his partners lost electoral support. The Left’s vote share actually increased a bit so that for the first time since 1990, the Left has become the strongest party in a Land election. Ramelow himself is even more popular than his party and may be able to continue, either as a caretaker/minority Minister President or at the helm of some new (and very complicated) coalition.
  2. Single-digit SPD results are almost normal now. The SPD has always struggled in Thuringia. Now, the SPD has once more dipped into single-digit territory (after Bavaria and Saxony). A few years ago, that would have been unthinkable. Now, it’s not really a huge surprise.
  3. Germany is not yet the Netherlands, but we are getting there. Journalists and pundits still talk about the “Volksparteien” – the CDU/CSU-SPD duopoly – as if this were the normal state of affairs in Germany. But it seems unlikely that were are going back to a two-dominant-and-some-minor-parties arrangement any time soon. If the FDP makes it past the electoral threshold, there will be six parties in the new state parliament. Just like in the Bundestag, the Bavarian state parliament, and the Landtag in Brandenburg, to name a few. For the time being, fragmentation and volatility are the new normal.
  4. The Green Wave has not reached Thuringia. Nationwide, the Greens are still the second party and poll between 20 and 25 per cent. They have made some inroads in the eastern states, where they have struggled for most of the last three decades. Opinion polls looked moderately good for them, but in reality, they came dangerously close to the threshold. In fact, it is still not clear whether they will make into parliament. This does not mean that the wave has ended today. Thuringia is a small state that is in no way representative and was always a difficult arena for them (think lots of wood and history, few universities/cities).
  5. The most extreme flavour of the AfD remains popular in the (south-)east. It’s not a secret that the AfD is much stronger in the eastern states than they are in the west. Currently, a result in the 20s seems to be normal in the southern part of the former GDR, with some pockets were they go even beyond 30 per cent. The result in Thuringia is well within that range. The interesting point is that the AfD in Thuringia is led by a man who pushes the envelope of being a right-wing populist, a man whose rhetoric, policies and associates are more in line with traditional German right-wing extremism. Höcke has voiced support for rank-and-file members of the NPD when the AfD was still a polite bunch of Eurosceptics. He has spread racist tropes about Africans, has marched with Neo-Nazis and campaigned for a U-turn in Germany’s approach to its traumatic past. He infamously called the Holocaust memorial in Berlin a “monument of shame in the heart of our capital”. And yet, only days after a Christchurch-style attack on a synagogue, Höcke’s AfD won about a quarter of the vote. Some may have cast their vote in spite of him (he was not exactly popular in pre-election surveys), but at least fraction must have known what they were doing. Which is a very scary notion.

Sep 212019
 

The ‘Institut für Staatspolitik’ is a well-known far-right ‘think tank’. Their self-stated meta-political mission is to educate the future nationalist. The long-term objective is to achieve a stealthy transformation of German society. They have been around for a while, and there are books and chapters about them, written by people who study right-wing extremism for a living.

Their head honcho is one Götz Kubitschek, a prominent right-wing publisher who is well connected within the more intellectual sector of the larger right-wing extremist movement. He is an associate of Björn Höcke, who in turn leads the right-most faction within the AfD.

Another AfD leader speaks at a far-right

Höcke says that he comes to the Institute to dose up on ‘intellectual sustenance’ (yes, that’s how he rolls). It was at the Institute that Höcke gave a speech in which he claimed that Africans were, quite literally, ‘a different breed’ – one of many statements that, amazingly, did not end his political career.

Alice Weidel is the co-leader of the AfD group in the Bundestag. Weidel used to be one of those legendary ‘economic liberals’. Most of whom left the party in 2015. In this role, she wanted Höcke expelled from the AfD for his outrageous statements as late as 2017.

Now Weidel followed the example of her co-leader Gauland by speaking at the Institute‘s ‘academy’ for future leaders. Rumour has it that Kubitschek brokered an agreement between Höcke and Weidel. In a video that is making the rounds she tells Kubitschek that ‘it feels great’ to be there. Once more, move on: nothing to see here.

Sep 012019
 
Regional support (district level) for the AfD in the EP 2019 election

Today’s elections in Brandenburg & Saxony are sending a new set of shock waves through German politics. Here are some quick thoughts.

  1. The AfD polled about 28 per cent in Saxony, their best result yet. Saxony is truly the AfD’s heartland.
  2. The AfD did also well in Brandenburg. In both states, they are led and dominated by members of the “Flügel”, the most radical faction within an increasingly radical party. When the eastern states voted five years ago, it was not even clear that they were radical populists. Now, the links to right-wing extremist organisations and policies are becoming clearer and clearer
  3. Recall-question based models of voter flows are the work of the devil. But the estimates published by the big pollsters suggest that like in 2016, the AfD managed to mobilise a very large number of former no-voters ans hence benefitted from the massive increase in turnout. So that’s democracy at work, I guess.
  4. Even in their heartland, the AfD topped out below 30 per cent. I have zero hard evidence / strong theory for that, empirically, that seems to be about the maximum that these parties can achieve in Western Europe.
  5. Accordingly, they should not get more than a quarter of the total attention. So here is the other, totally underreported story of this election: for the Greens, the German East used to be a wasteland. But now they are in double digit territory and might well end up in government in both states.
  6. The SPD, on the other hand, made it barely beyond the threshold in Saxony. For once, I’m lost for words.
  7. The Left, formerly the eastern party, has also lost big in both states. And yet, if one counts the left parties as a bloc, there seems to be a left majority in Brandenburg that may form a coalition.
  8. In terms of electoral behaviour, the overall story is one of fragmentation and volatility. And for once, the East is the avant-garde: this is where Germany as a whole is headed.
  9. And yet in both states, the parties that have dominated them for the last three decades, the SPD in Brandenburg and the CDU in Saxony, came out top. Their support is much reduced and this might be their respective last hurrah, but still.