Jan 132013
 
Every now and then, I spend a merry evening pulling half-forgotten manuscripts/preprints into this not-so-new website. So here is tonight’s potpourri:

 

Apr 202012
 
It’s silly season all over again: On the eve of this year’s ‘German Islam Conference’, Volker Kauder, head of  the Christian Democrats in parliament and one of Merkel’s key alleys,  declared that ‘Islam is not part of our tradition and identity in Germany and so does not belong in Germany.’ As an aside, he added that Muslims do belong to Germany and enjoy their full rights as citizens. Phew! His original statement is here, and here is a translation of Kauder’s remarks.

The ‘German Islam Conference’ is a series of consultations between representatives of the federal government, regional governments and local councils on the one hand, and members of various Muslim organisations on the other. It was initiated in 2006 by Wolfgang Schäubele, then responsible for Home Affairs. While the conference has been called anything from a paper tiger to a farce, it is a high-profile affair, a symbol of Germany coming to terms with the realities of migration from Turkey and the Maghreb after a mere 50 years.

The timing of Kauder’s remarks is no coincidence, obviously. One year ago, Schäubele’s successor Friedrich made a very similar statement just before the conference. Apparently, the right wing of the Christian Democrats feels the urge to ascertain its position. After all, the CD parties have become a remarkably broad church, what with a divorced woman leading the party, a pension and works minister who supports gender quotas and introduced a large scale program to support state-run nurseries and a (now disgraced) president whose single political program was the integration of Muslim migrants into the larger German society.

There is much to be said about Kauder’s remarks, and most has been said already over the last 48 hours. Like Friedrich a  year ago, Kauder claims that he did not want to offend anyone and was only talking about historical realities, but he is clever enough to realise that there is a difference between an academic debate and a political argument. Even as a historical statement, his claim is dubious at best as a sizable Muslim population has been around for decades, the Christian churches are in decline and notions of identity are contested. And by the way, religious freedom is a universal human right that is not limited to those Muslims who hold German passports (half the Muslims in Germany do not as a result of the still rather restrictive laws on citizenship).

The real blunder is party political, however. As a secular and occasionally radical  republican, I may happily support the  idea of separating human beings from their cultural-religious identities. But for Christian Democrats, this is denouncing their own political business model. Moreover, the Christian Democrats have fared fairly well with their broad church approach. While their support is a far cry from the 40+ per cent they could rely on  in the 1970s and 1980s, they have been the strongest political party at the national level for the last five years.

Instead of alienating them, it would seem much wiser to embrace the migrant communities, whose religious and family values chime with the CDU/CSU’s conservatism. On the other hand, upsetting two million voters (and two more million Muslims who might be naturalised eventually) does not sound like a bright idea to me.

Mar 122012
 
Colleagues/friends Matt Goodwin and Jocelyn Evans have created quite a stir with their report on the attitudes of BNP and UKIP supporters/voters. Obviously, UKIP is not happy at all about being lumped together with what remains of Nick Griffin’s party. Being introduced as a ‘polite alternative’ to the BNP (albeit with a rhetorical question mark) does not help, either. Today, Matt responds to their critics over at the Guardian’s ever more popular Comment is free section.

Whether UKIP likes it or not, this is fascinating stuff (for us aficionados). That their respondents predominantly young, male, undereducated and deeply worried about Muslims/immigrants hardly comes as a surprise. But there are some real innovations in this paper.

  • First, the N is huge (you need yougov or a very solid skull to interview ~2000 right-wingers). The sheer number of interviews makes it possible to differentiate between members, identifiers, supporters, and voters, something that is not normally possible.
  • Second, comparing BNP and UKIP supporters on the basis of a large sample makes a lot of substantive sense, whether UKIP likes it or not.
  • Third, Goodwin/Evans cleverly included items tapping into attitudes towards politically motivated violence in their survey. This allows them to connect existing research on voters with the sparse literature on militant activists.
What's the difference between BNP/UKIP voters? 1
Dec 022011
 

Who is afraid of whom?

The liberal German weekly Zeit has commissioned a YouGov poll which demonstrates that Germans are more afraid of right-wing terrorists than of Islamist terrorists. The question read “What is, in your opinion, the biggest terrorist threat in Germany?” On offer were right-wingers (41 per cent), Islamists (36.6 per cent), left-wingers (5.6 per cent), other groups (3.8 per cent), or (my favourite) “no threat” (13 per cent). This is a pretty daft question anyway. Given the news coverage of the Neo-Nazi gang that has killed at least ten people more or less under the eyes of the authorities, and given that the authorities have so far managed to stop would-be terrorists in their tracks, the result is hardly surprising.

Nonetheless, the difference of just under five percentage points made the headlines, because there is a subtext for Zeit readers: Germans are worried about right-wing terrorism (a few weeks ago many people would have denied that there are right-wing terrorists operating in Germany), which must be a good thing, and they are less concerned about Islamist terrorists, which is possibly a progressive thing. Or something along those lines.

But is the five-point difference real?

YouGov has interviewed 1043 members of its online access panel. If we assume (and this is a heroic assumption) that these respondents can be treated like a simple random sample, what are the confidence intervals?

Binomial Confidence Intervals

First, we could treat the two categories as if they were distributed as binomial and ask Stata for exact confidence intervals.

cii 1043 round(1043*.41)
cii 1043 round(1043*.366)

The confidence intervals overlap, so we’re lead to think that the proportions in the population are not necessarily different. But the two categories are not independent, because the “not right-wingers” answers include the “Islamists” answers and vice versa, so the multinomial is a better choice.

Multinomial Model

It is easy to re-create the univariate distribution of answers in Stata:

set obs 5
gen threat = _n
lab def threat 1 "right-wingers" 2 "islamists" 3 "left-wingers" 4 "other" 5 "no threat"
lab val threat threat

gen number = round(1043* 0.41) in 1
replace number = round(1043* 0.366) in 2
replace number = round(1043* 0.056) in 3
replace number = round(1043* 0.038) in 4
replace number = round(1043* 0.13) in 5
expand number

Next, run an empty multinomial logit model

mlogit threat,base(5)

The parameters of the model reproduce the observed distribution exactly and are therefore not very interesting, but the estimates of their standard errors are available for testing hypotheses:

test [right_wingers]_cons = [islamists]_cons

At the conventional level of 0.05, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that both proportions are equal in the population, i.e. we cannot tell if Germans are really more worried about one of the two groups.

Simulation

Just for the fun of it, we can carry out one additional test and ask a rather specific question: If both proportions are 0.388 in the population and the other three are identical to their values in the sample, what is the probability of observing a difference of at least 4.4 points in favour of right-wingers?

The idea is to sample repeatedly from a multinomial with known probabilities. This could be done more elegantly by defining a program and using Stata’s simulate command, but if your machine has enough memory, it is just as easy and possibly faster to use two loops to generate/analyse the required number of variables (one per simulation) and to fill them all in one go with three lines of mata code. Depending on the number of trials, you may have to adjust maxvars

local trials = 10000
foreach v of newlist s1-s`trials' {
qui gen `v' = .
}

mata:
probs =(.388,.388,.056,.038,.13)
st_view(X.,.,"s1-s`trials'",)
X[.,.] = rdiscrete(1043,`trials',probs)
end

local excess = 0

forvalues sample = 1/`trials' {
qui tab s`sample' if s`sample' == 1
local rw = r(N)
qui tab s`sample' if s`sample' == 2
local isl = r(N)
if (`rw' / 1043 * 100) - (`isl' / 1043 * 100) >=4.4 local excess = `excess' +1
}

display "Difference >=4.4 in `excess' of `trials' samples"

Seems the chance of a 4.4 point difference is between 5 and 6 per cent. This probability is somewhat smaller than the one from the multinomial model because the null hypothesis is more specific, but still not statistically significant. And the Zeit does not even have a proper random sample, so there is no scientific evidence for the claim that Germans are more afraid of right-wing extremists than of Islamists, what ever that would have been worth. Bummer.

Jan 202009
 
Does religion make you a better or worse human being? More specifically, does Christian religiosity reduce or increase the likelihood of a radical/extreme right vote in a West European context? This is the question Liz and I are trying to address in our latest paper on “Christian Religiosity and Voting for West European Radical Right Parties“.

There are a number of reasons why good Christians could be more likely to vote for the Right than agnostics: American research starting in the 1940s has linked high levels of church attendance and a closed belief systems to support for rightism. More over, contemporary Radical Right parties try to frame the issue of immigration in terms of a struggle between Christian/Western values and Islam.

On the other hand, many of the most radical parties (e.g. the Austrian FPÖ) have anti-clerical roots. Moreover, the Churches give support and shelter to refugees/immigrants in many countries, and some pro-immigrant movements are inspired by Christian values. Finally, religious voters are often firmly tied to Christian-Democratic parties and will therefore not be available for the Radical Right.

We develop a theoretical model that incorporates these mechanisms and use Structural Equation Modelling to test this model in eight countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Norway. As it turns out, religious people do not differ from their more agnostic compatriots in terms of their attitudes towards immigrants. They are, however, less likely to vote for the radical right because they often identify with Christian Democratic/Conservative parties. The final version of the paper will appear in West European Politics.

Technorati-Tags: extreme right, radical right, western europe, religion, religiosity, islam, structural equation modelling, attitudes, immigration, immigrants

Jul 292008
 
Weird, sad but apparently true: at Nottingham University, a PhD student who works on islamic terrorism and an administrator were arrested (though released without charges) because they were in possession of an al-Qaeda manual downloaded from the internet. The twist: the manual was part of an MA dissertation and had been re-submitted as part of a PhD application. Now this is clandestine. THE has the full story, and boing boing has lots of comments on it. All of the sudden, the whole point of urging students to provide proper references and go back to the sources seems rather moot.

Technorati-Tags: nottingham, university, terrorism, radicalism, islam, al-qaeda, plagiarism, uk, political, science, political science

Mar 212008
 
Last year, the “Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie and Sozialpsychologie” published an article on the level of support for the European Union’s core principles (democracy, gender equality, religious freedom, rule of law) in Turkey. In essence, the author claimed that the level of support for these principles in Turkey is low because a) the level of economic development is low while b) the number of Muslims is very high. Thanks to the very efficient PR office at the university of Cologne, these findings made their way into the mainstream media in Germany (including the English service of the Deutsche Welle) and Turkey and eventually even into the more shady parts of the blogosphere (that are normally the object rather than the consumer of sociological studies).

I felt, however, that the analysis suffered from a whole host of serious methodological and theoretical shortcomings, and that the claims of the original paper are untenable. Therefore, I wrote a comment on “Paßt die Türkei zur EU und die EU zu Europa” (in German, also as PDF). The Kölner Zeitschrift has recently accepted my article, and it will appear in the next issue. Replication data and stata scripts for my paper are available, too.

Technorati Tags: turkey, democracy, Islam, Muslims, multi-level analysis, european, union, values, survey, sociology, stata

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