Why Merkel’s Refusal to Help the Ailing FDP Will Come back to Haunt Her

It’s been a bit of a nailbiter yesterday, and every single pundit in the country must be rubbing their bloodshot eyes. So it’s obviously not a brilliant idea to blog about it just now. But there seems to be a largish elephant in the room (not related to sleep deprivation) that nobody seems to have noticed so far.

A Historical Result

lonesome politician
FDP: Going Nowheremicagoto / Foter / CC BY-NC

Without doubt, this is a very exciting result that warrants a lot of superlatives or near-superlatives. Merkel’s Christian Democrats have bounced back from their second-worst result since 1949 to heights they have not seen since the highly unusual 1990 (re-unification) election. At 41.5 per cent, they came awfully close to an outright majority, something they have not achieved since 1957 (although then they had a much bigger share of the vote ).

The Social Democrats, on the other hand, have hardly recovered from their devastating 2009 result. 25.7 per cent is still the second-worst result since the war. But the combined vote share of the two major parties – often described as ‘former major parties’ by pundits – has gone up for the first time since 2002.

Both the Greens (at some stage projected to garner 15 per cent) and the Left have lost more than 20 per cent of their support compared to their 2009 results, and for the first time since 1990, the number of parties in parliament has gone down. And that is of course because the FDP has gone from 14.6 per cent (their best result ever) to 4.8 per cent (their worst result ever) and is not represented in parliament for the first time since 1949.

To put this in perspective, let me remind you that during the 64 years, the FDP was not holding government positions only from 1956 to 1961, from 1966 to 1969, and from 1998 to 2009. In other words, they were in government for roughly 70 per cent of the time, usually holding key positions (Foreign Affairs, Economy, Justice) and punching far above their electoral weight. For most German Politics aficionados, it will take some time to get used to the idea of them not having a national presence. Moreover, their result, combined with the relatively strong showing of the AfD means that the number of wasted votes must be near its all time high, with proportionality going out of the window.

But there is something else.

The Coalition Could Have Had a Viable Majority in Parliament

In the past, the FDP has survived (and some times thrived) on a diet of tactical considerations. Their loyal supporters are few and far between, but often, supporters of the CDU would give them with their list votes to bring about a centre-right majority. Most of the time, the CDU would not openly encourage this behaviour but would also refrain from discouraging it. Sometimes, the two parties even came up with joint position papers for future governments, signalling that they were not exactly a pre-electoral alliance but very much part of the same camp.

But this year (following the FDP’s defeat in Bavaria only a week before the General election), the CDU sent out a clear, high-profile “everyone for themselves” message to their voters. I can see three reasons for that. First, recent electoral reforms designed to make the system more proportional mean that the CDU would not benefit from a by-product of tactical CDU/FDP voting, the so-called ‘surplus seats’. Second, the ‘loan vote’ strategy has recently backfired in Lower Saxony, leaving a weakened CDU on the opposition benches. Third, the CDU may well have anticipated a Grand Coalition after Bavaria, and in that case, bolstering the FDP would not have made sense.

But this was probably a self-fulfilling prophecy. Though it looked very close yesterday night, Merkel did not win an outright majority. Christian Democrats and FDP together, on the other hand, are stronger than the three left parties combined: 46.3 vs 42.7 per cent. That would have been enough for Merkel to continue the centre-right coalition (her preference), with the added benefit of having a much more docile, dependent partner.

Negotiating a coalition with the Social Democrats will be tough. The party is licking its wounds and is highly reluctant to enter such an arrangement after the 2009 disaster that followed their last co-operation with the Christian Democrats. A CDU/Green coalition, while arithmetically feasible, seems highly unlikely at the moment, so the SPD will try to extract a large premium from the Christian Democrats for going into government with them. In the end, coalition talks could fail, and Germany could go to the polls again.

Without doubt, this result is a great triumph for Merkel. But I think the CDU leadership may have outwitted themselves, and the stern, slightly grumpy expression Merkel wore as she left the celebrations seems to confirm it.

8 thoughts on “Why Merkel’s Refusal to Help the Ailing FDP Will Come back to Haunt Her”

  1. Well you certainly changed your mind quickly on the significance of the Bavarian election On September 20 you heartily downplayed it; three days later you cannot say enough about its importance. Substantial movement in that last week. Have you done a post-mortem on your model? After all on September 20 you were 95 percent certain the FDP would make it. And “a new mandate for the current government is still by far the most likely outcome.” The buzz in Berlin on the 20th was all about a GC.

    Reply
    • THE David P. Conradt? I feel honoured! Apart from that, I don’t think I’m contradicting myself here: On September 20, I say that the Bavarian result was not a bellwether, and in fact, it was quite different from the federal one. On September 23, I’m trying to argue (perhaps not very effectively) that the CDU leadership misread Bavaria for a bellwether and changed the message they sent to their voters accordingly, thereby depriving the FDP of 0.4 per cent of the vote that would have saved Merkel’s preferred coalition. That seem to be two different (and compatible) statements.

      As regards the model, this is a sore point. In my defence, I can say that the prediction for the coalition as a whole was not bad. Even the estimate for the FDP was not totally off at 5.something per cent. The real problem with the model was its ability to pick up a linear trend (the drift component), which was present in the weeks and months leading up to the election http://www.kai-arzheimer.com/16022604/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/wpid-minorparties-week-38.png but did not carry the party past the threshold in the end. I think (but this needs more attention) that relying on this trend made the confidence interval too narrow.

      Reply

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