Protest, Neo-Liberalism or Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: What Motivates the Voters of the Extreme Right in Western Europe?

 
Protest, Neo-Liberalism or Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: What Motivates the Voters of the Extreme Right in Western Europe?

Over the last three decades, the parties of the “Extreme”, “Radical” or “Populist” Right have become a political staple in Western Europe. However, comparative evidence on the motives of their voters is relatively scarce. This article assesses the empirical effects of the most prominent alleged motivational factors “pure” (i.e. performance related) protest, anti-immigrant sentiment, and neo-liberal economic preferences – on the extreme right vote while controlling for a whole host of background variables. While protest and neo-liberalism have no statistically significant impact whatsoever, immigrant sentiment plays a crucial role in all countries but Italy. Its effect is moderated, however, by general ideological preferences and party identification. Consequentially, comparative electoral research should focus on the circumstances under which immigration is politicised.

Working Class Parties 2.0? Competition between Centre Left and Extreme Right Parties

 
Working Class Parties 2.0? Competition between Centre Left and Extreme Right Parties

The propensity of workers to vote for the Extreme Right has risen significantly. This “proletarisation” is the result of the interplay between a long-term dealignment process and increasing worries amongst the European working classes about the immigration of cheap labour. As a result, Western European Centre Left parties may find themselves squeezed between the New Right on the one hand and the New Left on the other. There is no obvious strategy for dealing with this dilemma. Staying put will not win working class defectors back. Toughening up immigration policies is unpalatable for many party members, does not seem to make Social Democrats more attractive for working class voters, and might eventually alienate other social groups

How (not) to Operationalise Subnational Political Opportunity Structures

 
How (not) to Operationalise Subnational Political Opportunity Structures

Kestilä and Söderlund (2007) examine the impact of subnational political opportunity structures on the success of the radical right and argue that such an approach can control for a wider range of factors and provide more reliable results than cross-national analyses. The present article disputes this claim on theoretical, conceptual and methodological grounds and demonstrates that their empirical findings are spurious.

Electoral Sociology: Who Votes for the Extreme Right and why – and when?

 

Over the last 15 years or so, analyses of the Extreme Right’s electorate(s) have become a minor industry within the larger context of (comparative) Political Sociology. By necessity, this chapter aims at summarising the main findings from this research program, but cannot strive for a comprehensive presentation of all that has been achieved during these…

Wahlen und Rechtsextremismus

 
Wahlen und Rechtsextremismus

This chapter provides a summary of what is known about electoral support for the Extreme Right in Germany in the postwar era [in German].
Dieses Kapitel gibt einen Überblick über das Wahlverhalten zugunsten der Extremen Rechten in Deutschland seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg

Liberalismus, Rechtsradikalismus und Rechtspopulismus in Deutschland und Österreich

 
Liberalismus, Rechtsradikalismus und Rechtspopulismus in Deutschland und Österreich

This is a comparative piece on right-wing populism in Austria and Germany that I co-authored as a PhD student back in the 1990s when I was young, careless, and heavily under the influence of Herbert Kitschelt’s monograph on the Radical Right in Western Europe [in German].
Dies ist eine vergleichende Analyse der Wählerschaften der Repulikaner (REP), der FPÖ und der FDP am Ende der 1990er Jahre