The good people at the European Center for Populism Studies asked me what I think of the meeting between Martin Sellner, some other right-wing extremists, and representatives of Alternative for Germany. The result is a long interview, which is based not just like uh, my opinion, man, but on research (see below)
And here is the research that went into that interview. Most articles are ungated.
- Arzheimer, Kai. “Im Osten nichts Neues? Die elektorale Unterstützung von AfD und Linkspartei in den alten und neuen Bundesländern bei der Bundestagswahl 2021.” Wahlen und Wähler – Analysen zur Bundestagwahl 2021. Eds. Schoen, Harald and Bernhard Weßels. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2024. 139-178. doi:10.1007/978-3-658-42694-1_6
[BibTeX] [Download PDF] [HTML]@InCollection{arzheimer-2023c, author = {Arzheimer, Kai}, title = {Im Osten nichts Neues? Die elektorale Unterstützung von AfD und Linkspartei in den alten und neuen Bundesländern bei der Bundestagswahl 2021}, booktitle = {Wahlen und Wähler - Analysen zur Bundestagwahl 2021}, publisher = {Springer}, year = 2024, editor = {Schoen, Harald and Weßels, Bernhard}, address = {Wiesbaden}, url = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/bundestagswahl-2021-ostdeutschland-linkspartei-afd.pdf}, html = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/bundestagswahl-2021-ostdeutschland-linkspartei-afd/}, dateadded = {14-11-2022}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-42694-1_6}, pages = {139-178} } - Arzheimer, Kai. “Identification with an anti-system party undermines diffuse political support: The case of Alternative for Germany and trust in the Federal Constitutional Court.” Party Politics online first (2024): 1-13. doi:10.1177/13540688241237493
[BibTeX] [Abstract] [HTML]The rise of the far right is increasingly raising the question of whether partisanship can have negative consequences for democracy. While issues such as partisan bias and affective polarization have been extensively researched, little is known about the relationship between identification with anti-system parties and diffuse system support. I address this gap by introducing a novel indicator and utilising the GESIS panel dataset, which tracks the rise of a new party, “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) from 2013, when the party was founded, to 2017, when the AfD, now transformed into a right-wing populist and anti-system party, entered the federal parliament for the first time. Employing a panel fixed effects design, I demonstrate that identification with “Alternative for Germany” reduces trust in the Federal Constitutional Court by a considerable margin. These findings are robust across various alternative specifications, suggesting that the effects of anti-system party identification should not be dismissed.
@Article{arzheimer-2024, author = {Kai Arzheimer}, title = {Identification with an anti-system party undermines diffuse political support: The case of Alternative for Germany and trust in the Federal Constitutional Court}, journal = {Party Politics}, year = 2024, volume = {online first}, pages = {1-13}, keywords = {EuroReX, AfD}, abstract = {The rise of the far right is increasingly raising the question of whether partisanship can have negative consequences for democracy. While issues such as partisan bias and affective polarization have been extensively researched, little is known about the relationship between identification with anti-system parties and diffuse system support. I address this gap by introducing a novel indicator and utilising the GESIS panel dataset, which tracks the rise of a new party, "Alternative for Germany" (AfD) from 2013, when the party was founded, to 2017, when the AfD, now transformed into a right-wing populist and anti-system party, entered the federal parliament for the first time. Employing a panel fixed effects design, I demonstrate that identification with "Alternative for Germany" reduces trust in the Federal Constitutional Court by a considerable margin. These findings are robust across various alternative specifications, suggesting that the effects of anti-system party identification should not be dismissed.}, doi = {10.1177/13540688241237493}, pdf = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/paper/identification-anti-system-party-undermines-support-trust-courts/}, html = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/paper/paper-identification-anti-system-party-undermines-support-trust-courts/} } - Arzheimer, Kai, Theresa Bernemann, and Timo Sprang. “Oppression of Catholics in Prussia Does Not Explain Spatial Differences in Support for the Radical Right in Germany. A Critique of Haffert (2022).” Electoral Studies 89 (2024): 102789. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102789
[BibTeX] [Abstract] [HTML]A growing literature links contemporary far-right mobilization to the “legacies” of events in the distant past, but often, the effects are small, and their estimates appear to rely on problematic assumptions. We re-analyse Haffert’s (2022) study, a key example of this strand of research. Haffert claims that historical political oppression of Catholics in Prussia moderates support for the radical right AfD party among Catholics in contemporary Germany. While the argument itself has intellectual merit, we identify some severe limitations in the empirical strategy. Retesting the study’s cross-level interaction hypothesis using more suitable multi-level data and a more appropriate statistical model, we find a modest overall difference in AfD support between formerly Prussian and non-Prussian territories. However, this difference is unrelated to individual Catholic religion or to the contextual presence of Catholics. This contradicts the oppression hypothesis. Our study thus provides another counterpoint to the claim that historical events have strong and long-lasting effects on contemporary support for the radical right. We conclude that simpler explanations for variations in radical right support should be exhausted before resorting to history.
@Article{arzheimer-bernemann-sprang-2024, author = {Arzheimer, Kai and Bernemann, Theresa and Sprang, Timo}, title = {Oppression of Catholics in Prussia Does Not Explain Spatial Differences in Support for the Radical Right in Germany. A Critique of Haffert (2022)}, journal = {Electoral Studies}, year = 2024, volume = 89, pages = 102789, abstract = {A growing literature links contemporary far-right mobilization to the "legacies" of events in the distant past, but often, the effects are small, and their estimates appear to rely on problematic assumptions. We re-analyse Haffert's (2022) study, a key example of this strand of research. Haffert claims that historical political oppression of Catholics in Prussia moderates support for the radical right AfD party among Catholics in contemporary Germany. While the argument itself has intellectual merit, we identify some severe limitations in the empirical strategy. Retesting the study's cross-level interaction hypothesis using more suitable multi-level data and a more appropriate statistical model, we find a modest overall difference in AfD support between formerly Prussian and non-Prussian territories. However, this difference is unrelated to individual Catholic religion or to the contextual presence of Catholics. This contradicts the oppression hypothesis. Our study thus provides another counterpoint to the claim that historical events have strong and long-lasting effects on contemporary support for the radical right. We conclude that simpler explanations for variations in radical right support should be exhausted before resorting to history.}, html = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379424000477}, pdf = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379424000477/pdfft?md5=8b0c75faf974eb845135c7c1e0f41c14&pid=1-s2.0-S0261379424000477-main.pdf}, doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102789} } - Arzheimer, Kai. “The Electoral Breakthrough of the AfD and the East-West Divide In German Politics.” Contemporary Germany and the Fourth Wave of Far-Right Politics: From the Streets to Parliament. London: Routledge, 2023. 140-158.
[BibTeX] [Abstract]The radical right became a relevant party family in most west European polities in the 1990s and early 2000s, but Germany was a negative outlier up until very recently. Right-wing mobilisation success remained confinded to the local and regional level, as previous far-right parties never managed to escape from the shadow of “Grandpa’s Fascism”. This only changed with the rise, electoral breakthrough, and transformation of “Alternative for Germany” (AfD), which quickly became the dominant far-right actor. Germany’s “new” eastern states were crucial for the AfD’s ascendancy. In the east, the AfD began to experiment with nativist messages as early as 2014. Their electoral breakthroughs in the state elections of this year helped sustain the party through the wilderness year of 2015 and provided personel, ressources, and a template for the AfD’s transformation. Since its inception, support for the AfD in the east has been at least twice as high as in the west. This can be fully explained by substantively higher levels of nativist attitudes in the eastern population. As all alleged causes of this nativism are structural, the eastern states seem set to remain a stronghold for the far right in the medium- to long-term.
@InCollection{arzheimer-2021, author = {Arzheimer, Kai}, title = {The Electoral Breakthrough of the AfD and the East-West Divide In German Politics}, booktitle = {Contemporary Germany and the Fourth Wave of Far-Right Politics: From the Streets to Parliament}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = 2023, pages = {140-158}, address = {London}, abstract = {The radical right became a relevant party family in most west European polities in the 1990s and early 2000s, but Germany was a negative outlier up until very recently. Right-wing mobilisation success remained confinded to the local and regional level, as previous far-right parties never managed to escape from the shadow of “Grandpa’s Fascism”. This only changed with the rise, electoral breakthrough, and transformation of “Alternative for Germany” (AfD), which quickly became the dominant far-right actor. Germany’s “new” eastern states were crucial for the AfD’s ascendancy. In the east, the AfD began to experiment with nativist messages as early as 2014. Their electoral breakthroughs in the state elections of this year helped sustain the party through the wilderness year of 2015 and provided personel, ressources, and a template for the AfD’s transformation. Since its inception, support for the AfD in the east has been at least twice as high as in the west. This can be fully explained by substantively higher levels of nativist attitudes in the eastern population. As all alleged causes of this nativism are structural, the eastern states seem set to remain a stronghold for the far right in the medium- to long-term.}, keywords = {eurorex,afd}, dateadded = {12-04-2021} } - Arzheimer, Kai. “To Russia with love? German populist actors’ positions vis-a-vis the Kremlin.” The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe. Eds. Ivaldi, Gilles and Emilia Zankina. Brussels: European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 2023. 156-167. doi:10.55271/rp0020
[BibTeX] [Abstract]Russia’s fresh attack on Ukraine and its many international and national repercussions have helped to revive the fortunes of Germany’s main radical right-wing populist party ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD). Worries about traditional industries, energy prices, Germany’s involvement in the war and hundreds of thousands of refugees arriving in Germany seem to have contributed to a modest rise in the polls after a long period of stagnation. However, the situation is more complicated for the AfD than it would appear at first glance. While many party leaders and the rank-and-file have long held sympathies for Putin and more generally for Russia, support for Ukraine is still strong amongst the German public, even if there is some disagreement about the right means and the acceptable costs. At least some AfD voters are appalled by the levels of Russian violence against civilians, and the party’s electorate is divided as to the right course of action. To complicate matters, like on many other issues, there is a gap in opinion between Germany’s formerly communist federal states in the East and the western half of the country. As a result, the AfD leadership needs to tread carefully or risk alienating party members and voters in the more populous western states. Beyond the AfD, the current and future consequences of the war have galvanised the larger far-right movement, particularly in the East. Moreover, they have led to further tensions in the left-wing populist “Linke” (left) party, which is traditionally pacifist and highly sceptical of NATO. The majority of the party tries to square commitment to these principles with solidarity with the victims of Russian aggression. A small but very visible faction, however, shows at least a degree of support for Russia and blames NATO and the US for the war.
@InCollection{arzheimer-2023e, author = {Arzheimer, Kai}, title = {To Russia with love? German populist actors' positions vis-a-vis the Kremlin}, booktitle = {The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe}, publisher = {European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS)}, year = 2023, editor = {Ivaldi, Gilles and Zankina, Emilia}, pages = {156-167}, address = {Brussels}, abstract = {Russia's fresh attack on Ukraine and its many international and national repercussions have helped to revive the fortunes of Germany's main radical right-wing populist party 'Alternative for Germany' (AfD). Worries about traditional industries, energy prices, Germany's involvement in the war and hundreds of thousands of refugees arriving in Germany seem to have contributed to a modest rise in the polls after a long period of stagnation. However, the situation is more complicated for the AfD than it would appear at first glance. While many party leaders and the rank-and-file have long held sympathies for Putin and more generally for Russia, support for Ukraine is still strong amongst the German public, even if there is some disagreement about the right means and the acceptable costs. At least some AfD voters are appalled by the levels of Russian violence against civilians, and the party's electorate is divided as to the right course of action. To complicate matters, like on many other issues, there is a gap in opinion between Germany's formerly communist federal states in the East and the western half of the country. As a result, the AfD leadership needs to tread carefully or risk alienating party members and voters in the more populous western states. Beyond the AfD, the current and future consequences of the war have galvanised the larger far-right movement, particularly in the East. Moreover, they have led to further tensions in the left-wing populist "Linke" (left) party, which is traditionally pacifist and highly sceptical of NATO. The majority of the party tries to square commitment to these principles with solidarity with the victims of Russian aggression. A small but very visible faction, however, shows at least a degree of support for Russia and blames NATO and the US for the war.}, doi = {10.55271/rp0020} } - Arzheimer, Kai. “Regionalvertretungswechsel von links nach rechts? Die Wahl von Alternative für Deutschland und Linkspartei in Ost-West-Perspektive.” Wahlen und Wähler – Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagwahl 2017. Eds. Schoen, Harald and Bernhard Wessels. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2021. 61-80. doi:10.1007/978-3-658-33582-3_4
[BibTeX] [Abstract] [Download PDF] [HTML] [DATA]Bei der Bundestagswahl 2017 zeigten sich wiedereinmal dramatische Ost-West-Unterschiede. Diese gingen vor allem auf den überdurchschnittlichen Erfolg von AfD und LINKE in den neuen Ländenr zurück. Die AfD ist vor allem in Thüringen und Sachsen besonders stark , die LINKE in Berlin, aber auch in den Stadtstaaten Bremen und Hamburg sowie in einigen westdeutschen Großstädten. Die Wahlentscheidung zugunsten beider Parteien wird sehr stark von Einstellungen zum Sozialstaat (im Falle der Linkspartei) sowie zur Zuwanderung (im Falle der AfD) bestimmt. Beide Parteien profitieren überdies von einem Gefühl der Unzufriedenheit mit dem Funktionieren der Demokratie. Sobald für diese Faktoren kontrolliert wird, zeigt sich, dass die AfD keinen davon unabhängigen “Ost-Bonus” genießt. Zugleich deuten die Modellschätzungen auf substantielle Einflüsse auf der Wahlkreisebene hin. Im Falle der Linkspartei bleibt dagegen ein substantieller Effekt des Befragungsgebietes erhalten, selbst wenn für die Einstellungen kontrolliert wird. Signifikante Differenzen zwischen den Wahlkreisen gibt es hier nicht.
@InCollection{arzheimer-2019, author = {Arzheimer, Kai}, title = {Regionalvertretungswechsel von links nach rechts? Die Wahl von Alternative für Deutschland und Linkspartei in Ost-West-Perspektive}, booktitle = {Wahlen und Wähler - Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagwahl 2017}, publisher = {Springer}, year = 2021, data = {https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/Q2M1AS}, html = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/afd-linkspartei-ostdeutschland/}, url = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/afd-linkspartei-ostdeutschland.pdf}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-33582-3_4}, editor = {Schoen, Harald and Wessels, Bernhard}, pages = {61-80}, abstract = {Bei der Bundestagswahl 2017 zeigten sich wiedereinmal dramatische Ost-West-Unterschiede. Diese gingen vor allem auf den überdurchschnittlichen Erfolg von AfD und LINKE in den neuen Ländenr zurück. Die AfD ist vor allem in Thüringen und Sachsen besonders stark , die LINKE in Berlin, aber auch in den Stadtstaaten Bremen und Hamburg sowie in einigen westdeutschen Großstädten. Die Wahlentscheidung zugunsten beider Parteien wird sehr stark von Einstellungen zum Sozialstaat (im Falle der Linkspartei) sowie zur Zuwanderung (im Falle der AfD) bestimmt. Beide Parteien profitieren überdies von einem Gefühl der Unzufriedenheit mit dem Funktionieren der Demokratie. Sobald für diese Faktoren kontrolliert wird, zeigt sich, dass die AfD keinen davon unabhängigen "Ost-Bonus" genießt. Zugleich deuten die Modellschätzungen auf substantielle Einflüsse auf der Wahlkreisebene hin. Im Falle der Linkspartei bleibt dagegen ein substantieller Effekt des Befragungsgebietes erhalten, selbst wenn für die Einstellungen kontrolliert wird. Signifikante Differenzen zwischen den Wahlkreisen gibt es hier nicht.}, address = {Wiesbaden}, dateadded = {01-04-2019} } - Arzheimer, Kai and Carl Berning. “How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Their Voters Veered to the Radical Right, 2013-2017.” Electoral Studies 60 (2019): online first. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2019.04.004
[BibTeX] [Abstract] [Download PDF] [HTML]Until 2017, Germany was an exception to the success of radical right parties in postwar Europe. We provide new evidence for the transformation of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) to a radical right party drawing upon social media data. Further, we demonstrate that the AfD’s electorate now matches the radical right template of other countries and that its trajectory mirrors the ideological shift of the party. Using data from the 2013 to 2017 series of German Longitudinal Elections Study (GLES) tracking polls, we employ multilevel modeling to test our argument on support for the AfD. We find the AfD’s support now resembles the image of European radical right voters. Specifically, general right-wing views and negative attitudes towards immigration have become the main motivation to vote for the AfD. This, together with the increased salience of immigration and the AfD’s new ideological profile, explains the party’s rise.
@Article{arzheimer-berning-2019, author = {Arzheimer, Kai and Berning, Carl}, title = {How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Their Voters Veered to the Radical Right, 2013-2017}, journal = {Electoral Studies}, year = 2019, doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2019.04.004}, volume = {60}, html = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/alternative-for-germany-voters}, url = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/alternative-for-germany-party-voters-transformation.pdf}, pages = {online first}, abstract = {Until 2017, Germany was an exception to the success of radical right parties in postwar Europe. We provide new evidence for the transformation of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) to a radical right party drawing upon social media data. Further, we demonstrate that the AfD's electorate now matches the radical right template of other countries and that its trajectory mirrors the ideological shift of the party. Using data from the 2013 to 2017 series of German Longitudinal Elections Study (GLES) tracking polls, we employ multilevel modeling to test our argument on support for the AfD. We find the AfD's support now resembles the image of European radical right voters. Specifically, general right-wing views and negative attitudes towards immigration have become the main motivation to vote for the AfD. This, together with the increased salience of immigration and the AfD's new ideological profile, explains the party's rise.}, dateadded = {01-04-2019} } - Arzheimer, Kai. “‘Don’t mention the war!’ How populist right-wing radicalism became (almost) normal in Germany.” Journal of Common Market Studies 57.S1 (2019): 90-102. doi:10.1111/jcms.12920
[BibTeX] [Abstract] [Download PDF] [HTML]After decades of false dawns, the “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) is the first radical right-wing populist party to establish a national presence in Germany. Their rise was possible because they started out as soft-eurosceptic and radicalised only gradually. The presence of the AfD had relatively little impact on public discourses but has thoroughly affected the way German parliaments operate: so far, the cordon sanitaire around the party holds. However, the AfD has considerable blackmailing potential, especially in the eastern states. In the medium run, this will make German politics even more inflexible and inward looking than it already is.
@Article{arzheimer-2019c, author = {Arzheimer, Kai}, title = {'Don't mention the war!' How populist right-wing radicalism became (almost) normal in Germany}, journal = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, year = 2019, abstract = {After decades of false dawns, the "Alternative for Germany" (AfD) is the first radical right-wing populist party to establish a national presence in Germany. Their rise was possible because they started out as soft-eurosceptic and radicalised only gradually. The presence of the AfD had relatively little impact on public discourses but has thoroughly affected the way German parliaments operate: so far, the cordon sanitaire around the party holds. However, the AfD has considerable blackmailing potential, especially in the eastern states. In the medium run, this will make German politics even more inflexible and inward looking than it already is.}, volume = {57}, pages = {90-102}, number = {S1}, html = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/right-wing-populism-germany-normalisation}, dateadded = {27-05-2019}, url = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/afd-normalisation-right-wing-populism-germany.pdf}, doi = {10.1111/jcms.12920}, keywords = {EuroReX, AfD} } - Arzheimer, Kai. “The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?.” West European Politics 38 (2015): 535–556. doi:10.1080/01402382.2015.1004230
[BibTeX] [Abstract] [Download PDF] [HTML] [DATA]Within less than two years of being founded by disgruntled members of the governing CDU, the newly-formed Alternative for Germany (AfD) party has already performed extraordinary well in the 2013 General election, the 2014 EP election, and a string of state elections. Highly unusually by German standards, it campaigned for an end to all efforts to save the Euro and argued for a re-configuration of Germany’s foreign policy. This seems to chime with the recent surge in far right voting in Western Europe, and the AfD was subsequently described as right-wing populist and europhobe. On the basis of the party’s manifesto and of hundreds of statements the party has posted on the internet, this article demonstrates that the AfD does indeed occupy a position at the far-right of the German party system, but it is currently neither populist nor does it belong to the family of Radical Right parties. Moreover, its stance on European Integration is more nuanced than expected and should best be classified as soft eurosceptic.
@Article{arzheimer-2015, author = {Arzheimer, Kai}, title = {The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?}, journal = {West European Politics}, year = 2015, volume = 38, pages = {535--556}, doi = {10.1080/01402382.2015.1004230}, keywords = {gp-e, cp, eurorex}, abstract = {Within less than two years of being founded by disgruntled members of the governing CDU, the newly-formed Alternative for Germany (AfD) party has already performed extraordinary well in the 2013 General election, the 2014 EP election, and a string of state elections. Highly unusually by German standards, it campaigned for an end to all efforts to save the Euro and argued for a re-configuration of Germany's foreign policy. This seems to chime with the recent surge in far right voting in Western Europe, and the AfD was subsequently described as right-wing populist and europhobe. On the basis of the party's manifesto and of hundreds of statements the party has posted on the internet, this article demonstrates that the AfD does indeed occupy a position at the far-right of the German party system, but it is currently neither populist nor does it belong to the family of Radical Right parties. Moreover, its stance on European Integration is more nuanced than expected and should best be classified as soft eurosceptic. }, data = {https://hdl.handle.net/10.7910/DVN/28755}, html = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/afd-right-wing-populist-eurosceptic-germany}, url = {https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/afd-right-wing-populist-eurosceptic-germany.pdf} }
