

# How Institutions Affect Gender Gaps in Public Opinion Expression

Kontext und Mehr-Ebenen-Datensätze

# Wer?

## *Lilach Nir, Hebrew University*

I am an Associate Professor in the Political Science Department and in the Department for Communications and Journalism.



Most of my research efforts focus on the role the media plays in democracies: Does it contribute to pluralistic thinking or polarized hatred? Which news formats increase political interest and knowledge? Does the media narrow or widen the knowledge gap between men and women? How does social media help formulate

decisions? My research draws on diverse traditions including the study of media audiences, voter behavior, political psychology and public opinion.

## *Scott D. McClurg, Southern Illinois University*

Professor McClurg (Ph.D., Washington University, 2000) joined SIU Carbondale in fall 2001. He holds a joint appointment with Political Science and Journalism. His general areas of research focus on political communications, campaigns and election, public opinion and voting behavior, and American politics more generally.



He is most recognized for his application of social network analysis to the study of political communication, with a particular focus on social influence. His current research projects focuses on the different role of men and women in social networks, as well as the impact of friends and family on political decisions.

# Was?

- ▶ Diverse Gender Gaps bei politischer Teilhabe:
  - ▶ Wissenslücke (?)
  - ▶ Formale Repräsentationslücke
  - ▶ Inhaltliche Repräsentationslücke
  - ▶ Lücke in “expressiveness” (Alltagsgespräche)
- ▶ Ist letztere in geschlechtergerechteren Gesellschaften kleiner?
- ▶ Ressourcen und Symbolik
- ▶ (Kausalität?)

# Warum?

- ▶ Demokratie ohne offene Diskurse?
- ▶ “Public opinion formation processes” ...
  - ▶ Opinion leadership
  - ▶ False consensus
  - ▶ Pluralistic ignorance

# Wie?

- ▶ Mehr-Ebenen-Analyse von Umfragedaten

# Wie?

- ▶ Mehr-Ebenen-Analyse von Umfragedaten
- ▶ Selbsteinschätzungx
- ▶ *Nicht*: tatsächliches Verhalten (Beobachtung)

# Hypothesen

## SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES

Based on the discussion above, we expect that material and symbolic cues moderate the effect of gender on expression; that is, we expect contextual cues to narrow the gap between men and women in political discussion. Proportional representation, legislative quotas, female representation in parliament, and the national history with women suffrage should encourage women's expression. Similarly, we expect an interaction between gender and resources: Smaller gender differences in education, income, and employment will lead to more equal discussion opportunities among men and women. Therefore, in countries with greater gender disparities in material resources, the effect of gender on discussion will be stronger; we that expect men will discuss politics more often than women in less egalitarian contexts.

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## ISSP II

- ▶ Vergleichsweise altes komparatives Projekt (seit 1983)
- ▶ Bilaterale, dann multilaterale Kooperation (NORC, ZUMA ... )
- ▶ Keine zentrale Finanzierung: gemeinsames Modul im Anschluß an national social survey (ALLBUS, GSS, BSA)
- ▶ Module werden (manchmal) wiederholt
  - ▶ Role of Government: 1985, 1990, 1996, 2006, 2016
  - ▶ Religion: 1991, 1998, 2008, 2018
  - ▶ *Citizenship: 2004, 2014*

# Welche Länder?

## Welche Länder?

To achieve comparable (democratic) cases, we excluded Russia and Venezuela from our data because they are categorized as “partly free” by Freedom House. We dropped Flanders due to its regional designation, and combined the East and West German samples into a single country-level observation. Finally, we dropped two other cases missing data at the aggregate level: Taiwan (missing information on male and female employment) and Slovenia (missing data on its electoral system). The reported analyses are of data on 48,000 individuals across 33 democratic nations, though our effective sample size was closer to 36,500 because of missing individual observations. [Table 1](#) reports the variables used in this analysis.<sup>5</sup>

## Abhängige Variable: “expressiveness” bzw. “discussion”, “talk”


- ▶ “When you get together with your friends, relatives, or fellow workers, how often do you discuss politics?”
- ▶ “When you hold a strong opinion about politics, how often do you try to persuade your friends, relatives, or fellow workers to share your views?”
- ▶ “never (1) rarely (2), sometimes (3), often (4)”
- ▶ Summenindex (average),  $\alpha = 0.73$ . Zentriert?

## Alle Variablen


Table 1. Variable Sources and Descriptives

Variable	Description/source	Mean	SD	Range	N
<b>Individual-level indicators</b>					
Talk scale	Average of two questions; low scores indicate less talk	0.01	0.89	-1.48, 1.99	44,978
Female	1 = female, 0 = male	0.53	0.5	0, 1	45,296
Age	Years, divided by 10	4.61	1.73	1.5, 9.8	44,992
Income	Logged income in local currency	8.84	2.09	2.99, 13.82	37,409
Education	0 = no formal qualification, 5 = university degree complete	2.60	1.52	0, 5	44,941
Interest	0 = not interested, 3 = very interested	1.41	0.89	0, 3	44,510
<b>Country-level indicators</b>					
Proportional system	2 = PR multimember districts, 1 = mixed PR, 0 = single-member districts; <a href="#">Carey and Hix 2008</a>	1.34	0.73	0, 2	45,329
Legislative quota for women in lower chamber	1 = have a mandatory quota, 0 = does not have a quota; Source: <a href="#">Quotaproject.com</a>	0.13	0.33	0, 1	45,329
Years since female suffrage	2004 minus year of female suffrage; <a href="#">Paxton, Green, and Hughes 2008</a>	66.03	23.76	10, 111	45,329
% Women in lower chamber	% of women elected to lower chamber of legislature; Source: United Nations	23.10	10.43	7, 45	45,329
Education gap	Average education for men minus average education of women; aggregated from survey	0.09	0.18	-0.33, 0.48	45,329
Income gap	% men in top income quintile in a country minus % women in top quintile in country; aggregated from survey	0.06	0.03	0.00, 0.14	45,329
Employment gap	% men employed minus % women employed; World Bank, <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/">http://data.worldbank.org/</a>	18.04	7.07	8, 40	45,329

# Gender Gap



# Average levels



## Modelle 1+2: Institutionen

Table 2. Formal Institutional Sources of Political Discussion

Independent variables	Electoral system		Representation	
	B	(SE)	B	(SE)
<b>Individual</b>				
Constant	-1.440	(.089)*	-1.328	(.058)*
Female	-.060	(.015)*	-.100	(.008)*
Age	-.018	(.002)*	-.017	(.002)*
Income	.064	(.005)*	.063	(.005)*
Education	.067	(.003)*	.067	(.003)*
Interest	.519	(.004)*	.519	(.004)*
<b>Country</b>				
Electoral system	.097	(.049)*		
Electoral system x Female	-.034	(.010)*		
Legislative quotas			.273	(.110)
Quotas x Female			-.037	(.021)
<b>Variance components</b>				
Country level	.203	(.025)*	.204	(.025)*
Individual level	.689	(.003)*	.689	(.003)*
<i>N</i>	36,310		36,310	
Clusters	33		33	
Wald $\chi^2$	18452.13#		18438.48#	
Likelihood ratio	1940.38#		1865.43#	

## Modelle 3+4: Symbolische (?) cues

Table 3. Symbolic Sources of Political Discussion

Independent variables	Suffrage		Representation	
	B	(SE)	B	(SE)
Individual				
Constant	-1.274	(.127)*	-1.354	(.097)*
Female	-.156	(.022)*	-.156	(.017)*
Age	-.018	(.002)*	-.018	(.002)*
Income	.063	(.005)*	.063	(.005)*
Education	.067	(.003)*	.067	(.003)*
Interest	.519	(.004)*	.519	(.004)*
Country level				
Years female suffrage	-.001	(.002)		
Suffrage x Female	.001	(.0003)*		
% Female in lower chamber			.002	(.004)
Lower chamber x Female			.002	(.001)*
Variance components				
Country level	.210	(.027)*	.207	(.027)*
Individual level	.689	(.003)*	.689	(.003)*
<i>N</i>	36,310		36,310	
Clusters	33		33	
Wald $\chi^2$	18440.65#		18448.54#	
Likelihood ratio	1935.67#		1911.45#	

## Modelle 5-7: Materielle Ausstattung

Table 4. Material Sources of Political Discussion


Independent variables	Education gap		Income gap		Employment gap	
	B	(SE)	B	(SE)	B	(SE)
Individual						
Constant	-1.306	(.059)*	-1.395	(.082)*	-1.217	(.106)*
Female	-.099	(.008)*	-.096	(.014)*	-.074	(.020)*
Age	-.017	(.002)*	-.017	(.002)*	-.018	(.002)*
Income	.063	(.005)*	.063	(.005)*	.063	(.005)*
Education	.066	(.003)*	.067	(.003)*	.067	(.003)*
Interest	.519	(.004)*	.519	(.004)*	.519	(.004)*
Country level						
Education gap	-.015	(.190)				
Ed. gap x Female	-.060	(.040)				
Income gap			1.643	(1.078)		
Inc. gap x Female			-.154	(.226)		
Unemployment					-.005	(.005)
Unemp. gap x Female					-.002	(.001)*
Variance components						
Country level	.210	(.027)*	.203	(.026)*	.209	(.026)*
Individual level	.689	(.003)*	.689	(.003)*	.689	(.003)*
<i>N</i>	36,310		36,310		36,310	
Clusters	33		33		33	
Wald $\chi^2$	18434.81#		18434.69#		18436.90#	
Likelihood ratio	2014.58#		1773.12#		1868.79#	

## Modelle 8-9: Kombination


Table 5. Combined Sources of Political Discussion

Independent variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	(SE)	B	(SE)
<b>Individual</b>				
Constant	-1.331	(.184)*	-1.530	(.110)*
Female	-.155	(.041)*	-.114	(.022)*
Age	-.017	(.002)*	-.017	(.002)*
Income	.063	(.005)*	.062	(.005)*
Education	.067	(.003)*	.067	(.003)*
Interest	.518	(.004)*	.519	(.004)*
<b>Country level</b>				
Electoral system	.106	(.049)*	.101	(.049)*
Electoral system x Female	-.049	(.011)*	-.050	(.010)*
Quota	-.242	(.108)*	.239	(.110)*
Quota x Female	-.008	(.026)	-.005	(.023)
Suffrage	-.001	(.002)		
Suffrage x Female	.000	(.000)		
% Female in lower chamber	.002	(.004)	.003	(.004)
Lower chamber x Female	.003	(.001)*	.003	(.001)*
Employment gap	-.006	(.005)		
Employment x Female	.001	(.001)		
<b>Variance components</b>				
Country level	.184	(.023)*	.188	(.024)*
Individual level	.689	(.003)*	.689	(.003)*
N	36,310		36,310	
Cluster	33		33	
Wald $\chi^2$	18497.74#		18491.93#	
Likelihood ratio	1447.66#		1533.43#	


# Effekt des Geschlechts (Interaktionen)



● Coefficient      ─── 95% c.i.



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# Methoden: Probleme und Fragen?

## Methoden: Probleme und Fragen?

- ▶ Viele Kontextvariablen, relativ wenig Kontexte
- ▶ Wie genau kommen Plots zustande (sehr viele Interaktionen)
- ▶ Signifikanz Interaktionseffekte (letztes/vorletztes Modell)
- ▶ Einkommen in lokaler Währung?
- ▶ Anteil Frauen/Männer oberstes Quintil Haushaltseinkommen?

# Theorie/Inhalt: Probleme und Fragen?

## Theorie/Inhalt: Probleme und Fragen?

- ▶ Stellenwert der Selbstauskunft?
- ▶ Magnitude des gender gaps?
- ▶ Stärke der Effekte? (vs Stärke Interesse)
- ▶ Gendereffekt über Interesse
- ▶ Wahlsystemeffekte kontinuierlich?

# Was haben wir inhaltlich gelernt?

# Was haben wir methodologisch gelernt?

# Was nehmen wir sonst noch mit?