Europeanisation and Parties

Europeanisation/German Politics
Outline

Intro
  Recap
Intro
Europeanisation of Political Parties
  Research questions, hypotheses & data
  Findings
Preferences on European Integration
  Research questions, hypotheses & data
  Findings
Summary
  Summary
Your turn
Last week: High Courts

- EU: basically a legal system
- Germany: a political system built on the rule of law
  - Rigid constitution
  - Powerful FCC
- Relationship between European law and national constitutions not well defined
- So far, courts have mostly avoided clashes
- Judges as politicians?
Today: Parties & party systems

- Parties most powerful/relevant political actors in representative democracies
- EU created by parties/party politicians (elite project)
- But: EP elections ‘national second-order contests’
- Parties/party systems have similar yet different nat histories (cf cleavage theory)
- Parties still operate in national contexts, organised along national conflicts
Two related questions

1. How ‘Europeanised’ are German parties?
   - Carter/Poguntke 2010
   - Comparative
   - Based on interviews w politicians
     - First hand information
     - Reliability?
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2. What preferences do they have with respect to Europe?
   - Wimmel/Edwards 2011
   - Based on analysis of plenary debates
   - Focus on Germany, comparison over time
Research questions

▶ ‘Repercussions of ongoing European integration on Political Parties’?
▶ ‘Impact of integration on the distribution of power within national political parties’?
  ▶ ‘Whether and how the involvement of party elites in EU-level decision-making has changed the internal balance of power within national political parties’?
  ▶ Which factors ‘filter’ impact of integration → differences between countries/parties
Theory

- Background: executive bias + hidden information + hidden action for ministers
- Power (Weber)
  - ‘The ability to achieve a desired outcome, even against resistance’
  - Very difficult to measure
- Power-shift from parties in parliament to gov members within parties?
- Parties can try to control their elites ex-post or ex-ante (formally and informally)
  - Ex-ante: ‘mandate’
  - Ex-post: ‘accountability’
4 Hypotheses

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3. Discretion of party elites active in EU-level decision-making arenas vis-a-vis their national parties will have increased over time.
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3. Discretion of party elites active in EU-level decision-making arenas vis-a-vis their national parties will have increased over time.

4. Over time national parties will have made increased use of ex ante and ex post accountability mechanisms to oversee the activities of their elites in European-level decision-making arenas.
Operationalisations

- Mail survey of party elites in EU 15 in 2004/2005
  - Head MEP, parliamentary party leader, party manager/general secretary
  - Senior members of nat EU affairs committee, European secretary . . .
- 334 questionnaires completed by members of 86 parties in 15 countries
- Role, involvement, influence of actors within party
- Current and retrospective
- 55 of 86 parties represented in EC and/or CoM over between 1994 and 2004/5
Accountability of elites

- Very low levels/intensities of prior instruction
- Moderate extent of ex-post explanation required (about 10 percent of respondents report ‘full explanation required’)
- 70+ percent of respondents rank level of discretion as (rather) high
- *(In spite of modest attempts to control party elites)*
- Elites might be able to escape even fairly specific mandates
Change over time

- Carter/Poguntke expect low levels of change (inertia)
- Next to no change in prior instruction
- Modest increase in ex-post explanations
- Clear increase in discretion
- Parties ‘fighting a losing battle’?
## Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Council</th>
<th>Council of Ministers</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>3a: Change in prior instruction given by national parties to party elites acting in EU-level decision-making arenas (percentage and number of responses)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 4 Much less prior instruction</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>7 3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Much more prior instruction</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>3b: Change in ex post explanation required by national parties from party elites acting in EU-level decision-making arenas (percentage and number of responses)</td>
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<td>7 4 Much less explanation</td>
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<td>7 3</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer/don't know</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Differences between countries/parties

- Italy and Ireland stand out (high levels of attempted control)
- Liberals give more leeway than other parties
- Pro-European parties give more leeway than other parties
- Germans subject to rather high levels of instruction and scrutiny in EC (and CoM)
- *Low levels of discretion in EC*
Research question

- Is the uber-broad consensus on European integration changing?
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- Background
  - Historically, Germany a promoter of political and tightly integrated *Union*
  - Most pronounced in centre-right parties, but SPD also committed (plus Greens, eventually)
  - PDS/Left not nationalist, but anti-capitalist/anti-freetrade and therefore EU-sceptical
  - Emerging European cleavage within German party system?
Hypotheses/Data

- Eastern enlargement has substantively transformed EU
  - (Influx of cheap labour)
  - Opportunity to shift production to low-wage countries within EU
- Incentive for centre-left parties to campaign for
  - Re-regulation of single market
  - European social policies
- So: change in rhetoric/preferences likely for centre-left
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Data
- Analysis of ratification debate on Lisbon vs Maastricht and Nice debates

Three dimensions
1. Principle stance and ‘finality'
2. Evaluation of respective treaty
3. Inter- and intra-party dissent
CDU/CSU

- Continuity from Maastricht to Lisbon
- Support for federal Europe less enthusiastic than in the past
- Dissidents (CSU) and concerns about federalism/subsidiarity
- But similar dissident in the context of Maastricht/EMU
SPD

- Support for a ‘Social Europe’ within the limits of Lisbon treaty
- Scepticism about purely economic co-operation and downward spiral
- Accused Bisky of ‘Left Nationalism’
- Similar to party’s position on Maastricht → return of previous concerns
FDP

- In favour of treaty/integration, sceptical of ‘welfare-state tinge’
- Clear and consistent pro-European line over decades
- Only concern: integration not going far enough/too slow
Greens

- Welcome strengthening of human rights/parliaments
- In favour of ‘Social Europe’
- Party less critical on Nice
- Party divided/critical on Maastricht
PDS/Left

- ‘Leftists are internationalist’, but . . .
- Focused on anti-war, anti-capitalism etc.
- Voted against
- Nice and Maastricht rejected with very similar arguments
## TABLE 1

**IDEAS AND PREFERENCES CONCERNING THE MODEL OF A ‘SOCIAL EUROPE’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>Alliance ’90/ The Greens</th>
<th>PDS/The Left Party</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maastricht 1992</td>
<td>− − −</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>− − −</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++ +</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nice 2001</td>
<td>− −</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>− −</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+ +</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lisbon 2008</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>− −</td>
<td>+ +</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The symbols represent how strongly the parties support the idea of a ‘social Europe’ and/or expressed their support for a strict adherence to or strengthening of an EU free market economy: a minus sign means that the party was against the model of a ‘social Europe’ and in favour of an EU free market economy (− − − very strongly, − − strongly, − moderately); a plus sign means that the party was in favour of the model of a ‘social Europe’ and against an EU free market economy (+++ very strongly, ++ strongly, + moderately).
Conclusion

- Parties are not (yet) Europeanised, but affected by Europeanisation
- Like parliaments, parties cannot control elites that operate in European context
- Attempts to control elites in council contribute to weak bargaining position of German representatives
- German parties generally staunchly pro-European (qualification: Left)
- But Greens and SPD sometimes sceptical of ‘neo-liberal’ EU
  - Pressure on social standards and labour markets
  - (Parties in/out of government)
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- But Greens and SPD sometimes sceptical of ‘neo-liberal’ EU
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- AfD a game changer?
In groups of five-six students, discuss the following questions:

1. How does Europeanisation of German parties reduce the quality of German democracy?

2. How will ‘Social Europe’ play out in the German discourse over the next two-five years? What role will the AfD play (if any)?