(C)FSP
The “Reluctant Hegemon”

Europeanisation/German Politics
Outline

Intro
  Recap
  Intro
Germany’s role in Europe
  1950s to 1990
  Post unification
  Germany as a “Reluctant Hegemon” in the Euro Crisis
Summary/Class question
  Summary
  Your turn
Last week

- Social policy: about welfare of citizens
- EU ostensibly about market efficiency
- Three inroads for Europeanisation
  1. European social policy (positive int.)
  2. Market de-regulation (negative int.)
  3. Spill-overs & side-effects of SEM/EMU
- Germany and other states trying to contain Europeanisation of social policy, but more change likely
Today: CFSP and Germany’s role

- So far, all about “low politics”
- Failed stabs at FP role for EC/EU during 1950s/1970s
- Maastricht
- Germany’s role after unification?
- More pressing thanks to Euro-Crisis
- We’re not exclusively talking Europeanisation today
  - “European” effects on Germany
  - German effects on Europe
How (West)Germany learned to love Europe

- Germany in the 1950s: destroyed, divided, loathed
- “Westbindung” controversial in 1950s
How (West)Germany learned to love Europe

- Germany in the 1950s: destroyed, divided, loathed
- “Westbindung” controversial in 1950s
- Successive governments balanced US and France
- European integration made West-Germany “semi-sovereign”
- And provided new identity
- Elites and citizenry europeanised (up to a point)

Source: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung Bundesrepublik Deutschland, um 1956, Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin, © Inv.-Nr.: 1990/276
Germany’s role in the integration process

- Close alliance with France within larger EU
- Germany extremely reluctant to lead, but often worked in tandem with France
  - 50s & early 60s
  - Mid/late 70s
  - 1980s
- Often provided side-payments
- (Together with Italy) promoter of EP, campaigned for democratic, quasi-federal EU
Foreign policy

- Rediscovered Russia, CEE
- More assertive, more willing to (openly) pursue own economic interests
- Still committed to integration
- By and large, no major shifts
- But willing to use military force
Security policy

- Slippery slope from AWACS crews to Afghanistan
- "Out of area" now considered normal
- Even ditched the draft
- But Germany still tied into NATO/EU structures
- Supported development of EU military capacities, so (still) fully europeanised
Germany’s Post-Unification European Vocation (-2005)

- Unified Germany under Kohl
  - Integration poster boy, yet uploading
  - “Reflexive multilateralism” (Bulmer)
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- Unified Germany under Kohl
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  - “Reflexive multilateralism” (Bulmer)
- But . . .
  - Problems/changes created by Eastern enlargement
  - “Resource crunch”
  - Elites
    - Generational change within the elite (Kohl → Schröder)
    - Even Kohl/CDU lowered tone on integration
  - Public
    - Loss of Deutschmark
    - Unification, generational change
    - “Permissive consensus” undermined
- Germany more assertive under Schröder, but also pushed for constitutional treaty
Merkel and Lisbon

- Lucky start
  - Steinmeier busy
  - Staffing
  - Chirac and Blair lame ducks
- Good negotiating skills
- Merkel instrumental in “saving” constitutional treaty
- Acquired lots of political capital in Europe
Merkel and the Euro

- Merkel’s second term widely seen as a failure (outside Germany)
- “Missteps and over-cautious approach”
- Three explanations offered
  1. Merkel
  2. Domestic context
  3. Size and complexity of the problem
Merkel

- (Success during first term)
- East-German socialisation & coalition politics
- No post-Lisbon strategy
- Focus on ECB job - failure
- Focus on protecting (initial) German concept of EMU
- Failure to garner support of German public for Euro
Domestic context

- Restrictive policy of FCC (Lisbon ruling); but later rulings more pro-integration
- Declining elite support (SPD – but later gave support even in election year)
- Public concerned about Euro, Turkey, Eastern enlargement, and Euro
- Media hostility and framing (Bild); emergence of AfD
- Government (like politicians elsewhere) did not comprehend scale and nature of problem
Nature of the problem

- Euro derailed after apparently working well for 10 years
- Cheap credit, low inflation, high prices
- High sovereign debt, banking crisis
- Eurozone not OCA
- Monetary Union w/o full Economic and Fiscal Union
Germany and Brexit

- Rhetoric notwithstanding, Germany and UK have common interests/preferences
  - (Relatively) liberal approach to economy
  - Limit benefits for EU citizens
  - Germany wants to balance France
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- Merkel seems to take more lenient line (but SPD)
  - see the above
  - German exports (national interest)

- Once more, no obvious strong leadership
Germany after unification remained firmly integrated into the EU
More assertive
Yet less diplomatic, less willing to pay
And still unwilling (and unable) to play the role of the hegemon
Class questions

In groups of four to five students, discuss the following questions:

1. Do you agree that Germany has been a “reluctant hegemon” in the Euro crisis? How do you explain the government’s policy in this area?

2. Is there a solution to the Euro crisis? What could it look like?