Of “Frames” and “Winning Formulas”: The Supply Side

The Extreme Right in Western Europe
Review/Intro
The Supply Side
Frames and Opportunities
Kitschelt’s “Winning Formula”
A New “Winning Formula”? Euroscepticism

Summary
This week’s events in Extreme Right Politics?
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- Spain
- Austria
- ...
Last week ...

- Roots of the Interwar Extreme Right (late 19th century + First World War)
- Democracy in a precarious position
- Core of the (then New) Extreme Right
  - Ultra-nationalistic
  - Authoritarian
  - Anti-socialist/-liberal
  - Not committed to unfettered markets
  - Often (not always): biological racism + anti-semitism
- Contaminated and largely unsuccessful after World War II
- Until 1980s – so what’s new?
Today:

- (Relative) Success of Extreme Right Parties since 1980s in many countries
- Why?
  1. New *demand* for Extreme Right policies
  2. Changes *external* to Extreme Right parties (changing opportunity structures)
  3. Changes in the *supply* of Extreme Right policies
Today:

- (Relative) Success of Extreme Right Parties since 1980s in many countries
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  3. Changes in the *supply* of Extreme Right policies
- How have the (successful) ER parties changed?
Readings for today


- Sofia Vasilopoulou. “European Integration and the Radical Right. Three Patterns of Opposition”. In: *Government and Opposition* 46.2 (2011), pp. 223–244

What are frames, and why should we care?

- An intellectual device for interpreting social/political problems
  - Who is affected
  - Who has caused the problem
  - What should be done about it?
- Master frame: general, encompasses more specific frames
- Important for political mobilisation
- Rydgren 2005: Construction of a new Extreme Right master frame in France during 1960s/70s
The old Nazi frame

- Politics as a struggle between the Aryans (Germans, Dutch, Swedish . . . ) and the rest
  - Roughly equivalent to crude ideas about a “survival of the fittest” (social Darwinism)
  - No difference between analysis (“politics is us vs. the Jews”) and prescription (“politics *should* be a struggle, and the fittest race *should* survive”)
- All political problems due to racial impurity and Jewish/Bolshevist interference
- Used for mobilisation
- Every political action, however violent and shocking, is therefore justified
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- Obviously contaminated after Second World War
The new frame

- *Nouvelle Droit*: Attempt to break “left hegemony” over public discourses
- Successful copied by political entrepreneurs in other countries
- *One* possible explanation for
  - Extreme Right successes after 1980
  - Temporal “clustering” of successes
- Some evidence for “emitter” role of FN, especially during 1980s
- Rydgren 2005: Frame needs to be “adapted”, not simply copied (e.g. abortion)
The new frame

1. Cultural racism / ethnopluralism
   - Ethnic groups equal but different
   - Difference not based on biological traits but on culture
   - Cultures not compatible; must be protected by keeping them separate
   - (“Equality” not too much emphasised in politics)
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2. “Populist anti-political establishment strategy” (Poujadism → Populism)
   - Party/leader fundamentally different from “political class”
   - An agent of “the people”, fostering common sense
   - *Not* presenting an alternative to democracy – to the contrary
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   - Mobilisation by outsiders couched in cultural terms – “not racist”
   - Less emphasis on national differences within “European culture” (even more relevant after 9/11)
Kitschelt’s ideas

- Model of political competition in Western Europe after 1980
- Applied in a series of monographs on Green, Social-Democratic and Extreme Right parties
- Basic tenets
  - Two-dimensional, spatial competition
  - Occupation shapes political demands
  - New demand for market-liberal, authoritarian policies
- “Electoral winning formula” → successful ERPs
- French FN as “master case”

The book for the 1990s
“It’s (not) the economy, stupid”

- Front National and Austrian Freedom Party abolish (pure) market-liberalism during 90s
- (Probably never a core issue for them and their electorates)
- Some Extreme Right parties try to join ranks with critics of globalisation
- A return to the roots (cf Fascist Manifesto, “National Socialism”)?
- Reaction
  - Kitschelt: ER more centrist but theory still holds (somehow)
  - Betz: We were wrong
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  - De Lange: *Empirical test*
How do we measure party positions?

- Ask experts
- Ask voters
- Look at manifestos
  - MRG (CMP) data: based on salience
  - Pelikaan method: confrontation (direction)

Method

Huib Pellikaan, Tom van der Meer and Sarah L. de Lange. “The Road from a Depoliticized to a Centrifugal Democracy”. In: Acta Politica 38 (2003), pp. 23–49
Findings: France

Source: Lange, “A New Winning Formula?: The Programmatic Appeal of the Radical Right”, p. 424
Findings: Flanders

Source: Lange, “A New Winning Formula?: The Programmatic Appeal of the Radical Right”, p. 424
Findings: Netherlands

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Findings: summary

- Plausible but ...
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- Plausible but . . .
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- Because they call for referenda and claim to represent “the people”
Findings: summary

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- LPF and VB appear way too libertarian
- Because they call for referenda and claim to represent “the people”
- Do we need another dimension – populism?
What is Euroscepticism?

- A negative stance towards European integration (from the 1990s)
- “Sussex School”
  - “Soft euroscepticism”: critical of current state of EU, wary of “ever closer union”
  - “Hard euroscepticism”: opposed to integration in principle
- Overlap with Radical Right, excitement around 2014 and now 2019 EP election
Vasilopoulou: Rejection not universal

- Four dimensions
- Three patterns
Vasilopoulou: Rejection not universal

Table 1

Conceptualizing European Integration

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<thead>
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<th>The four aspects of European integration</th>
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<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>Principle</td>
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<td>Practice</td>
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<td>Future</td>
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Source: Vasilopoulou 2011: 231
Vasilopoulou: Rejection not universal

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Patterns of opposition</th>
<th>Cultural definition</th>
<th>Principle of cooperation</th>
<th>Policy practice</th>
<th>Future EU polity</th>
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<td>Rejecting</td>
<td>In favour</td>
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<td>Conditional</td>
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Source: Vasilopoulou 2011: 234
Vasilopoulou: Rejection not universal

Table 3
Radical Right Party Positions on European Integration

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patterns of opposition to European integration</th>
<th>Rejecting</th>
<th>Conditional</th>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Austrian Freedom Party</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Flemish Interest Attack</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Danish People’s Party</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Popular Orthodox Rally</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Tricolour Flame</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Northern League</td>
<td>National Alliance For Fatherland and Freedom</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>League of Polish Families</td>
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Summary

► “New” Extreme Right (mostly) different from Interwar Extreme Right
► New Frame: ethnopluralism (cultural racism) + populism
► Adopted and adapted by many (but not all) of them
► Kitschelt’s “winning formula” put too much emphasis on market liberalism
► Not necessarily “hard euroscepticism”
► In reality, multitude of economic positions + populism + shades of nationalism + some degree of authoritarianism
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- Why do people like that (demand?)
Class questions

Read the texts carefully, even if they offend you

- Can you recognise elements of the “New Master Frame”?  
- Are there any elements of the “Old Master Frame” left?  
- Do the texts provide evidence in favour of Kitschelt’s original “winning formula” thesis? To they contradict the thesis?  
- Can you spot any important points that go beyond the frame/formula?