

Common Foreign & Security Policy

EU Integration after Lisbon

Last week's remaining question

- ▶ What do *you* think about this whole regional business?

Outline

Intro CFSP


Early Steps

The “New” CFSP

ESDP, “New Wars”, and Global
Terrorism

Latest Developments

Summary



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
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
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Kissinger: “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?”
(Apparently another saying that was never said)

Strong CCP, weak CFSP


- ▶ FSP core part of “high politics”
 - ▶ Power
 - ▶ Self-defence & identity
 - ▶ *Sovereignty*
- ▶ Diverging capacities and preferences (special relations)
- ▶ National FSP still feasible
- ▶ Therefore
 - ▶ No reference to FSP in founding treaties
 - ▶ EU has no sovereign rights over ground, water and air
 - ▶ EU has no historical/traditional basis for CFSP
 - ▶ No police, army, security intelligence

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- ▶ **But**
 - ▶ Economic interests → security interests
 - ▶ Security/external implications of trade

EC/EU, WEU, NATO

- ▶ Western European system (WEU) of collective defence largely superseded by NATO
- ▶ EC nominally about economic co-operation, but high degree of overlap
 - ▶ No *need* to deal with defence problems
 - ▶ But membership still a problem for block-free countries before 1990 (EFTA)



European Political Co-operation

- ▶ Failure of EDC and EPC (1954)
- ▶ Failure of Fouchet Plan (1962)
- ▶ Luxembourg & Copenhagen Reports (1970) co-operation should be extended at a number of levels:
 - ▶ European Summits
 - ▶ Foreign ministers
 - ▶ Senior & junior level officials



Reuterphoto, 4. 10. 1962 (1962-10-04)
Foto: WPT/200, 2002 (22. April 2002)

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 - ▶ European Summits
 - ▶ Foreign ministers
 - ▶ Senior & junior level officials
- ▶ **Intergovernmental and largely outside treaty framework**



Background: A 1962 photograph of the signing of the Treaty of Rome in Rome, Italy, 25 April 1962.

EPC: problems

- ▶ Different security philosophies:
 - ▶ Atlanticists (GB, NL)
 - ▶ Europeanists (F, B)
 - ▶ Undecided (G) and
 - ▶ Neutrals (Irl)
- ▶ EPC-promoters against opponents

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- ▶ EPC-promoters against opponents
- ▶ Failures to adopt common positions re Israel (1973), Afghanistan (1979), Poland (1980) and South Africa (1980)

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 - ▶ Intergovernmental, not supranational

The 1990 political earthquake

- ▶ Collapse of Communist system and unification of Germany
- ▶ Official end of Cold War
- ▶ US partially withdraw security shield from Europe
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- ▶ **Complete lack of EU political, military and security structures**



Maastricht

- ▶ Political Union: Inter-governmental pillar of TEU
- ▶ Provides for “Joint Actions” based on unanimity but implementation by QMV
- ▶ Provides for “all questions of security including measures to lead to an eventual common European defence”
- ▶ Role of WEU: “bridge” (between NATO and EU) or “ferry” (from NATO to EU)?

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- ▶ Role of WEU: “bridge” (between NATO and EU) or “ferry” (from NATO to EU)?
- ▶ WEU today: wreck, organisation to be closed by June 2011

Amsterdam & Nice

- ▶ Future inclusion of WEU structure in TEU (Solana High Representative **plus** Secretary-General of WEU 99-09)
- ▶ "Common positions" on foreign policy matters
- ▶ "Common strategies" (positions + actions)
- ▶ "Closer cooperation" (Pillar 1 and 3) and "constructive abstention" in (CFSP)
 - ▶ Constructive abstention.: does not block unanimity
 - ▶ MS not obliged to support but must not hinder
 - ▶ Closer/enhanced cooperation: Subset of MS may make use of EU institutions



CFSP in practice

Common Positions define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature

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Common Strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the member states have important interests in common

- ▶ QMV sufficient
 - ▶ When adopting joint actions, common positions, other decisions based on Common Strategy
 - ▶ Decisions *implementing* joint action/common position

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- ▶ Joint Actions
 - ▶ Reconstruction of Mostar (1995)
 - ▶ Support of Montenegro (1998)
 - ▶ JA in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (2006)

Towards ESDP

- ▶ Much publicised British/French initiative for European Rapid Reaction Forces in 1998
 - ▶ 50,000-60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days
 - ▶ Sustainable for a year
 - ▶ Initially failed, but operational from 2003. **Not** a European army
- ▶ WEU structures gradually absorbed into EU (EU military staff, representatives, researchers)
- ▶ Relationship with NATO unclear
- ▶ US not too happy
 - ▶ Would rather deal with states bilaterally
 - ▶ Against duplication, decoupling, discrimination of US

ESDP: Mission Impossible?

- ▶ Severely limited air- and sealift capacities
- ▶ Lack of experience, knowledge, weapon systems, satellites
- ▶ Therefore dependent on US support (and Ukrainian planes)
- ▶ NATO framework necessary
- ▶ Lack of political will/common preferences, strategies, interests, cf Iraq 2006
 - ▶ Support: Britain, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic
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- ▶ **New threats not necessarily *military* problems (JHA)**



Models of "Flexibility"

Model	Main cause for differentiation	Vision
Multi-speed	Short-term inability to implement policy	Policy regimes with different members; laggards commit to catch up over time
Concentric Circles	Long-term inability to implement policy	Various tiers of member states around hard core
A la carte	Choice not to participate in certain policies	Overlapping policy regimes with different members over long term

ESDP

- ▶ WEU structures absorbed by EU, EU defence agency plus (small) budget
- ▶ Ever more national and multinational battle groups (18 × 1,500)
 - ▶ Council declaration 1999, supported by France, Germany, UK
 - ▶ Based on model of "Operation Artemis" in the DRC (2003), "niche capabilities"
 - ▶ Under control of unanimous council, led by single nation, for UN missions
- ▶ European Rapid Reaction Force: contributed by MS, MS make final decision
- ▶ Eurocorps: five-nation (+7) initiative within WEU, centred around French-German brigade
- ▶ Six-nation European Gendarmerie Force (EGF, ca. 800)

ToL: changes

- ▶ Full-time president of European Council (van Rompuy) to represent EU
- ▶ New EU High Representative (Ashton, renewable five year term)
 - ▶ Takes functions from Presidency, High Representative & Ext.Relations commissioner
 - ▶ Vice President of Commission → co-ordination
 - ▶ Head of emerging EU diplomatic service
- ▶ (Modified) collective defence/solidarity clause transferred from WEU to ToL → provision of military and other assets for MS under military/terrorist attack *possible*
- ▶ Start-up fund and institutional provisions for even more flexible military co-operation

Summary

- ▶ Member States still reluctant to give up sovereignty in core domains (security, identity, foreign relations)
- ▶ But relatively rapid changes since 1990
- ▶ Lisbon Treaty: further acceleration
- ▶ Even more obviously so in the field of JHA (next week. *Really.*)

Class questions

- ▶ Why was the joint statement on Egypt by Germany, France, UK much more interesting than anything Ashton had to say?
- ▶ What contribution can the EU make to stability in the new security order?
- ▶ What are the main obstacles of a common foreign policy and defence structure?
- ▶ How likely are they to be overcome?