

Working Class Parties 2.0?
Electoral Competition between the Extreme Right
and the Centre Left in Western Europe

Kai Arzheimer



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Outline: Extreme Right Working Class Parties???

Introduction

Theory

Political Space and the Extreme Right

Centre Left / Extreme Right Competition

Data, Models, Methods

Data

Models & Methods

Findings

The Proletarianisation of the Extreme Right

Left or Right?

Summary

What is this all about?

1. Is there a 'proletarianisation' of the Extreme Right?
2. Does context matter for this process?
3. What can the Centre Left do about it?

Why is this relevant?

- ▶ Extreme Right parties now permanent feature of many West European party systems
- ▶ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, (Germany), Italy, Netherlands, Norway . . .

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- ▶ Extreme Right parties now permanent feature of many West European party systems
- ▶ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, (Germany), Italy, Netherlands, Norway . . .
- ▶ Questions:
 - ▶ Legitimacy?
 - ▶ Changing dimensionality of competition?
 - ▶ Electoral losses?

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 - ▶ Often populist/anti-elite
 - ▶ Not fully integrated (segmentation)
 - ▶ Range of positions on economic/social issues
 - ▶ *Obsessed with non-Western Immigrants (more recently Muslims)*

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 - ▶ Range of positions on economic/social issues
 - ▶ *Obsessed with non-Western Immigrants (more recently Muslims)*
- ▶ Go by many names: Anti-Immigrant / New / Populist / Radical / Extreme Right ...
- ▶ Mudde (1996): 'We know who they are ...'

Who loses?

- ▶ Spatial and directional models → Centre-Right parties
- ▶ Corroborated by (highly) aggregated data (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2011)
- ▶ New Left/Greens not affected

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- ▶ New Left/Greens not affected
- ▶ But: Is the Centre Left safe? Would blue-collar workers turn to the Extreme Right?

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Kraft Durch Freude

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
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1. Because they have done it in the past (Germany, Italy ...)
2. As a result of dealignment
3. Because the political landscape and the ideology of the Centre Left are changing

Herbert Kitschelt's 1995 view of West European party competition




Economic voting and the Extreme Right

- ▶ Extreme Right:
 - ▶ Flirt with 'neo-liberal' positions short-lived
 - ▶ Now more centrist or even protectionist positions
 - ▶ In some cases: welfare chauvinism and criticism of economic globalisation
- ▶ Centre Left
 - ▶ Moved further to the centre
 - ▶ Trying to appease middle-class voters (Keman, 2011)


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- ▶ 'Authoritarian workers' becoming available for Extreme Right?
- ▶ Proletarianisation of the Extreme Right?

An updated perspective on West European party competition



An updated perspective on West European party competition



Lifeboat Metaphor



The German Welfare State as a Lifeboat. Photocredit: Haus der Geschichte Bonn

So ...

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1. Is there a proletarianisation of the Extreme Right?
2. What factors to impact affect workers' Extreme Right / Centre Left choices?




Micro level data

- ▶ Eurobarometer 1980-2003 (Mannheim Trend File)
- ▶ Good coverage of
 - ▶ XR rise in 1980s, persistence, sometimes decline
 - ▶ Centre Left shifts after end of cold war
 - ▶ Many relevant systems

Micro level data

- ▶ Eurobarometer 1980-2003 (Mannheim Trend File)
- ▶ Good coverage of
 - ▶ XR rise in 1980s, persistence, sometimes decline
 - ▶ Centre Left shifts after end of cold war
 - ▶ Many relevant systems
- ▶ But ...
 - ▶ Little information on class
 - ▶ Becoming slightly outdated
 - ▶ No coverage of UK and Switzerland
 - ▶ Data for Austria, Finland, Sweden, Norway not available for whole period

Eurobarometer coverage



Macro/Meso level data

Unemployment rates/benefits: OECD

New asylum applications: OECD, UNHCR

Ideological positions: CMP



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Ideological positions: CMP

- ▶ Positions of mainstream parties
- ▶ Index: internationalism, multi-culturalism, national lifestyle, law & order (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006)
- ▶ Salience and variation

What do the models look like?

- ▶ Multi-level binary logistic regression
- ▶ Roughly 250,000 level-1 units (respondents)
- ▶ 336 level-2 units (surveys within countries)
- ▶ Fixed country effects
- ▶ Estimation: `xtlogit` (Stata)

What models?

1. Effect of class on the Extreme Right vote
 - ▶ Static
 - ▶ Dynamic

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1. Effect of class on the Extreme Right vote
 - ▶ Static
 - ▶ Dynamic
2. Extreme Right vs Centre Left vote amongst working class voters
 - ▶ Baseline
 - ▶ Context + party competition

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- ▶ Strict interpretation: Workers dominating electorate (+ membership + leadership + issues)?
- ▶ Loose interpretation: Workers increasingly likely to vote for XR (+ positive attention to welfare)

Who is a worker / belongs to 'working class' ?



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- ▶ ...
- ▶ Eurobarometer: restricted to *current* occupation (ISCO)

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blue-collar jobs	→	'workers'
farmers and small business owners	→	'petty bourgeoisie'
w/o job	→	'unemployed'
any other occupation	→	'other'
pensioners etc	→	'retired'
homemakers	→	like main earner

Class and the Extreme Right vote

	(1)	(2)
Worker	0.483*** (0.0277)	
Petty bourgeoisie	0.438*** (0.0347)	
Retired	0.0546 (0.0282)	
Unemployed	0.555*** (0.0410)	
Time		
Worker × Time		
Farmer/Owner × Time		
Retired × Time		
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Observations	254726	
σ_u	0.720	
ρ	0.136	
Groups	336	

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- ▶ Worker/petty bourgeoisie: roughly twice as likely to vote for XR (unemployed!)

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Petty bourgeoisie	0.438*** (0.0347)	0.478*** (0.0363)
Retired	0.0546 (0.0282)	0.0563 (0.0318)
Unemployed	0.555*** (0.0410)	0.552*** (0.0455)
Time		0.00593*** (0.000666)
Worker × Time		0.00176*** (0.000433)
Farmer/Owner × Time		-0.00207*** (0.000512)
Retired × Time		-0.0000549 (0.000442)
Unemployed × Time		0.000120 (0.000665)
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- ▶ Change over time
 - ▶ DK 1980: worker 2%, petty bourgeoisie 3%
 - ▶ DK 2002: worker 13%, petty bourgeoisie 8%
- ▶ But:
 - ▶ Both groups shrinking
 - ▶ Majority of workers *not* voting for Extreme Right (but Austria)

What strategies are available for the Centre Left?

Bale et al. (2010):

1. 'Hold'
2. 'Defuse'
3. 'Adopt' ((middle) elites)


Which macro/meso variables, and why?

- ▶ Asylum/Immigration
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 - ▶ Classic Centre Left issue
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- ▶ *Ideology of Centre Left and other parties*
 - ▶ Centre Left: position (Hold vs Adopt)
 - ▶ Centre Left: salience (Defuse)
 - ▶ Most extreme other non Extreme Right party: position
 - ▶ All other non Extreme Right parties: (weighted) average salience
 - ▶ All other non Extreme Right parties: (weighted) variance

Does the Centre Left move?



Centre Left or Extreme Right: findings

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Male	0.445*** (0.0515)		
Time	0.00982*** (0.000874)		
Toughness (max SD)			
Toughness (mean SD)			
Ideology Saliency (SD)			
Toughness (other)			
Ideological Variance (other)			
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New Asylum Applications			
Unemployment			
Replacement Rate			
Observations	19858		
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ρ	0.140		
Groups	336		

What does that mean?

- ▶ Very slow shift towards Extreme Right (Centre Left vote still much more likely in most countries)

Centre Left or Extreme Right: findings

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Male	0.445*** (0.0515)	0.449*** (0.0517)	
Time	0.00982*** (0.000874)	0.00692*** (0.00121)	
Toughness (max SD)		0.0327 (0.0270)	
Toughness (mean SD)			
Ideology Salience (SD)		-0.0437 (0.0257)	
Toughness (other)		-0.00246 (0.0255)	
Ideological Variance (other)		-0.0131** (0.00437)	
Ideology Salience (other)		0.119*** (0.0291)	
New Asylum Applications		0.0386 (0.0667)	
Unemployment		0.0999** (0.0374)	
Replacement Rate		0.0515*** (0.0138)	
Observations	19858	19663	
σ_u	0.733	0.645	
ρ	0.140	0.112	
Groups	336	327	

What does that mean?

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- ▶ Ideological salience (of others): marked effect, so 'Defuse' conditional on other parties' co-operation

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Time	0.00982*** (0.000874)	0.00692*** (0.00121)	0.00651*** (0.00127)
Toughness (max SD)		0.0327 (0.0270)	
Toughness (mean SD)			0.0296 (0.0309)
Ideology Salience (SD)		-0.0437 (0.0257)	-0.0383 (0.0247)
Toughness (other)		-0.00246 (0.0255)	0.00360 (0.0242)
Ideological Variance (other)		-0.0131** (0.00437)	-0.0137** (0.00429)
Ideology Salience (other)		0.119*** (0.0291)	0.116*** (0.0288)
New Asylum Applications		0.0386 (0.0667)	0.0326 (0.0663)
Unemployment		0.0999** (0.0374)	0.106** (0.0388)
Replacement Rate		0.0515*** (0.0138)	0.0520*** (0.0138)
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- ▶ Ideological salience (of others): marked effect, so 'Defuse' conditional on other parties' co-operation
- ▶ Operationalisation of toughness makes no difference

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- ▶ Q: Does context matter? A: A great deal, particularly what other parties say
- ▶ Q: What can the Centre Left do? A: Not too much, probably

Conclusion

- ▶ Centre Left sandwiched between New Left and New Right
- ▶ 'Defuse' might work for Centre Left
 - ▶ If others co-operate
 - ▶ Which might not be in their short-term interest

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- ▶ 'Defuse' might work for Centre Left
 - ▶ If others co-operate
 - ▶ Which might not be in their short-term interest
- ▶ Thank you!
- ▶ Full paper here:
<http://www.kai-arzheimer.com/xr-workers>

Descriptive Statistics I

	min	p25	mean	p75	max
XR vote	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	1.00
Worker	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.00	1.00
Farmer/Owner	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.00	1.00
Retired	0.00	0.00	0.22	0.00	1.00
Unemployed	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00
Time	-131.00	-36.00	10.22	56.00	130.00
AT	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	1.00
BE	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.00
DE-E	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00
DE-W	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	1.00
DK	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	1.00
ES	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	1.00
FI	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	1.00
FR	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.00	1.00
GR	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00
IT	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00	1.00
LU	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	1.00
NL	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.00	1.00
NO	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	1.00
PT	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	1.00
SE	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	1.00
N	254726				

Descriptive Statistics II

	min	p25	mean	p75	max
XR vote	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00	1.00
Male	0.00	0.00	0.60	1.00	1.00
Time	-131.00	-47.00	1.99	55.00	130.00
Toughness (max SD)	-11.71	-2.01	-0.12	1.51	13.68
Toughness (mean SD)	-11.71	-2.37	-1.02	1.12	7.45
Ideology Salience (SD)	0.00	3.45	6.83	9.19	16.08
Toughness (other)	-4.54	0.59	4.84	7.92	27.54
Ideological Variance (other)	0.00	1.87	17.18	16.50	244.60
Ideology Salience (other)	0.50	5.08	8.95	12.41	31.25
New Asylum Applications	-0.98	-0.61	0.16	0.58	4.46
Unemployment	-4.91	-1.31	0.35	1.69	12.29
Replacement Rate	-31.62	-4.19	4.07	18.48	32.96
AT	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	1.00
BE	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00
DE-E	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00
DE-W	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.00	1.00
DK	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	1.00
ES	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	1.00
FI	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	1.00
FR	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00	1.00
GR	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	1.00
IT	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	1.00
LU	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
NL	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.00	1.00
NO	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	1.00
PT	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	1.00
SE	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	1.00