Nov 082013

Slides (in German) for a talk I gave at the University of Zurich on the idea of a European set of value priorities. While preferences are very similar across Europe, with universalism and benevolence coming out top and self-enhancement ranking low, security is crucial for the post-communist societies in Central & Eastern Europe. I further claim that this finding is not driven by economic disparities. This is an update to and extension of my chapter on the notion of a European community of shared values. Somewhat ironically, the preliminary results from the 2012 wave of the ESS were published on the day I gave that talk, so I should go back to the drawing board soon.

Oct 292012

Like social networks, multilevel data structures are everywhere once you start thinking about it. People live in neighbourhoods, neighbourhoods are nested in municipalities, which make up provinces – well, you get the picture. Even if we have no substantive interest in their effects, it often makes sense to control for structures in our data to get more realistic standard errors.

Now the good folks over at the European Social Survey have reacted and spent the Descartes Prize money on compiling multilevel information and merging them with their own data. So far, the selection is a little bit disappointing in some respects. Homicide rates, for instance, are reported on the national level only. But there are some pleasant surprises (I guess due to Eurostat, who collect such things): We get unemployment, GDP growth and even student numbers at the NUTS-3 level. Since you asked, NUTS is the Nomenclature of (subnational) Territory, and level 3 is the lowest level for which comparative data are normally published.

Regrettably, the size and number of level 3 units is not necessarily comparable across countries: For Germany, level 3 corresponds to about 400 local government districts, while France is divided into 96 European Departments. But if you need to combine top-notch survey data with small(ish) regional data, it’s a start, and not a bad one.

Apr 122012

The European Social Survey’s Core Scientific Team (formerly known as the Central Coordination Team) has just announced in the User Bulletin (distributed via email, not yet on the website) that they will remove a cool 27 items from the core questionnaire, and three more from the supplementary questionnaire. The items in question are A3-A7, B21-B22, B32-B33, C7-C14, F6a, F34, F43-F47, F51-F52, F57-F58, F71-F73 (“referring to their round 4 question numbers”).

Now I’m sure you all know your round 4 question numbers by heart, but I don’t, so I looked them up. From round 6 on, we will miss information on use of radio, newspapers, and the internet (both global and politics specific), party membership, support for bans of extremist party, believe in scientific solutions to ecological problems,  worries about crime (six items), support for anti-terror measures, field of highest qualification, ability to borrow money from friends or family, detailed information on partner’s, mother’s and father’s work, and phone ownership/access.


Ye olden days (photo credit: Wikipedia)

From a political science vantage point, use of media and party-political questions are obviously absolutely essential, while respondents’ views on torture and terrorism are interesting at the very least. Sociologists, on the other hand, will worry about the loss of information required for Goldthorpe coding and the fact that they cannot measure fear of crime any longer. For me, the ESS is one of the most important collective resources for social research, and my instinct is to object to any cuts to the questionnaire.

On the other hand, this resource has a  price tag attached to it. Some ten years ago, it was estimated that the fieldwork in the original 16 countries would cost 4.2 million euros per round. In the meantime, both the number of countries and the fees charged by the pollsters have risen considerably. But are the savings from sacrificing these items relevant given that they make up only a fraction of the total questionnaire, that there are considerable fixed costs, and that the total costs of the ESS are still small beer compared to what Europe spends on rocket science, its subsidised industries, or agriculture?

The Core Scientific Team has promised to publish a full report on the cuts by autumn 2013. In the meantime, what are your views on the matter?

Aug 082011

If you are interested in the distribution of value orientations within Europe (Western, Central, Eastern), and if you read German (I know that is a lot to ask for), this chapter draft might be of interest (PDF). The final version will appear in Silke I. Keil/Jan W. van Deth (Eds.): Deutschlands Metamorphosen. Einheit und Differenzen in europäischer Perspektive. Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2011. And yes, I do realise that this provides a somewhat ironic corollary to my previous post  on the potential futility of political culture research.

Read: Europa als Wertegemeinschaft? Ost und West im Spiegel des „Schwartz Value Inventory“

Aug 292008

Everyone just seems to know that the voters of the Extreme Right hate foreigners in general and immigrants in particular, but robust comparative evidence for the alleged xenophobia – Radical Right vote link is scarce. Moreover, many of the published analyses are based on somewhat outdated (i.e. 1990s) data, and alternative accounts of the extreme right vote (the “unpolitical” protest hypothesis and the hypothesis that the Far Right in Western Europe attracts people with “neo-liberal” economic preferences, championed by Betz and Kitschelt in the 1990s) do exist. Just a few days ago, a journal has accepted a paper by me in which I test these three competing hypotheses using (relatively) recent data from the European Social Survey and a little Structural Equation Modelling. As it turns out, protest and neo-liberalism have no statistically significant impact on the Extreme Right vote whatsoever. Anti-immigrant sentiment, however, plays a crucial role for the Extreme Right in all countries but Italy. Its effects are moderated by party identification and general ideological preferences. Moreover, the effect of immigrant sentiment is moderate by general ideological preferences and party identification. I conclude that comparative electoral research should focus on the circumstances under which immigration is politicised. Wasn’t it blindingly obvious?

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