

(C)FSP  
The “Reluctant Hegemon”

Europeanisation/German Politics

# Outline

Intro

Recap

Intro

Germany's role in Europe

1950s to 1990

Post unification


Germany as a "Reluctant Hegemon" in the

Euro Crisis

Summary/Class question

Summary

Your turn



## Last week

- ▶ Social policy: about welfare of citizens
- ▶ EU ostensibly about market efficiency
- ▶ Three inroads for Europeanisation
  1. European social policy (positive int.)
  2. Market de-regulation (negative int.)
  3. Spill-overs & side-effects of SEM/EMU
- ▶ Germany and other states trying to contain Europeanisation of social policy, but more change likely

## Today: CFSP and Germany's role

- ▶ So far, all about “low politics”
- ▶ Failed stabs at FP role for EC/EU during 1950s/1970s
- ▶ Maastricht
- ▶ Germany's role after unification?
- ▶ More pressing thanks to Euro-Crisis
- ▶ We're not exclusively talking Europeanisation today
  - ▶ “European” effects on Germany
  - ▶ German effects on Europe

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- ▶ Germany in the 1950s: destroyed, divided, loathed
- ▶ "Westbindung" controversial in 1950s
- ▶ Successive governments balanced US and France
- ▶ European integration made West-Germany "semi-sovereign"
- ▶ And provided new identity
- ▶ Elites and citizenry europeanised (up to a point)



Source: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung Bundesrepublik Deutschland, um 1956, Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin, © Inv.-Nr.: 1990/276

## Germany's role in the integration process

- ▶ Close alliance w France within larger EU
- ▶ Germany extremely reluctant to lead, but often worked in tandem w France
  - ▶ 50s & early 60s
  - ▶ Mid/late 70s
  - ▶ 1980s
- ▶ Often provided side-payments
- ▶ (Together w Italy) promoter of EP, campaigned for democratic, quasi-federal EU

## Foreign policy

- ▶ Rediscovered Russia, CEE
- ▶ More assertive, more willing to (openly) pursue own economic interests
- ▶ Still committed to integration
- ▶ By and large, no major shifts
- ▶ But willing to use military force



## Security policy

- ▶ Slippery slope from AWACS crews to Afghanistan
- ▶ "Out of area" now considered normal
- ▶ Even ditched the draft
- ▶ But Germany still tied into NATO/EU structures
- ▶ Supported development of EU military capacities, so (still) fully europeanised


# Germany's Post-Unification European Vocation (-2005)

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## Germany's Post-Unification European Vocation (-2005)

- ▶ Unified Germany under Kohl
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  - ▶ "Reflexive multilateralism" (Bulmer)
- ▶ But ...
  - ▶ Problems/changes created by Eastern enlargement
  - ▶ "Resource crunch"
  - ▶ Elites
    - ▶ Generational change within the elite (Kohl → Schröder)
    - ▶ Even Kohl/CDU lowered tone on integration
  - ▶ Public
    - ▶ Loss of Deutschmark
    - ▶ Unification, generational change
    - ▶ "Permissive consensus" undermined
- ▶ Germany more assertive under Schröder, but also pushed for constitutional treaty

# Merkel and Lisbon



- ▶ Lucky start
  - ▶ Steinmeier busy
  - ▶ Staffing
  - ▶ Chirac and Blair lame ducks
- ▶ Good negotiating skills
- ▶ Merkel instrumental in "saving" constitutional treaty
- ▶ Acquired lots of political capital in Europe

## Merkel and the Euro

- ▶ Merkel's second term widely seen as a failure (outside Germany)
- ▶ "Misteps and over-cautious approach"
- ▶ Three explanations offered
  1. Merkel
  2. Domestic context
  3. Size and complexity of the problem



# Merkel

- ▶ (Success during first term)
- ▶ East-German socialisation & coalition politics
- ▶ No post-Lisbon strategy
- ▶ Focus on ECB job - failure
- ▶ Focus on protecting (initial) German concept of EMU
- ▶ Failure to garner support of German public for Euro

## Domestic context

- ▶ Restrictive policy of FCC (Lisbon ruling); but later rulings more pro-integration
- ▶ Declining elite support (SPD – but later gave support even in election year)
- ▶ Public concerned about Euro, Turkey, Eastern enlargement, and Euro
- ▶ Media hostility and framing (Bild); emergence of AfD
- ▶ *Government (like politicians elsewhere) did not comprehend scale and nature of problem*

## Nature of the problem

- ▶ Euro derailed after apparently working well for 10 years
- ▶ Cheap credit, low inflation, high prices
- ▶ High sovereign debt, banking crisis
- ▶ Eurozone not OCA
- ▶ Monetary Union w/o full Economic and *Fiscal* Union



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- ▶ EU institutions take hard line, want to force a quick decision in UK
- ▶ Some governments seem keen to get rid of UK asap
- ▶ Merkel seems to take more lenient line (but SPD)
  - ▶ see the above
  - ▶ German exports (national interest)
- ▶ Once more, no obvious strong leadership

# Summary

- ▶ Germany after unification remained firmly integrated into EU
- ▶ More assertive
- ▶ Yet less diplomatic, less willing to pay
- ▶ And still unwilling (and unable) to play the role of the hegemon

## Class questions

In groups of four to five students, discuss the following questions:

1. Do you agree that Germany has been a “reluctant hegemon” in the Euro crisis? How do you explain the government’s policy in this area?
2. Is there a solution to the Euro crisis? What could it look like?